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diff --git a/Documentation/module-signing.txt b/Documentation/module-signing.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2b40e04d3c49 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/module-signing.txt @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ + ============================== + KERNEL MODULE SIGNING FACILITY + ============================== + +CONTENTS + + - Overview. + - Configuring module signing. + - Generating signing keys. + - Public keys in the kernel. + - Manually signing modules. + - Signed modules and stripping. + - Loading signed modules. + - Non-valid signatures and unsigned modules. + - Administering/protecting the private key. + + +======== +OVERVIEW +======== + +The kernel module signing facility cryptographically signs modules during +installation and then checks the signature upon loading the module. This +allows increased kernel security by disallowing the loading of unsigned modules +or modules signed with an invalid key. Module signing increases security by +making it harder to load a malicious module into the kernel. The module +signature checking is done by the kernel so that it is not necessary to have +trusted userspace bits. + +This facility uses X.509 ITU-T standard certificates to encode the public keys +involved. The signatures are not themselves encoded in any industrial standard +type. The facility currently only supports the RSA public key encryption +standard (though it is pluggable and permits others to be used). The possible +hash algorithms that can be used are SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and +SHA-512 (the algorithm is selected by data in the signature). + + +========================== +CONFIGURING MODULE SIGNING +========================== + +The module signing facility is enabled by going to the "Enable Loadable Module +Support" section of the kernel configuration and turning on + + CONFIG_MODULE_SIG "Module signature verification" + +This has a number of options available: + + (1) "Require modules to be validly signed" (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE) + + This specifies how the kernel should deal with a module that has a + signature for which the key is not known or a module that is unsigned. + + If this is off (ie. "permissive"), then modules for which the key is not + available and modules that are unsigned are permitted, but the kernel will + be marked as being tainted. + + If this is on (ie. "restrictive"), only modules that have a valid + signature that can be verified by a public key in the kernel's possession + will be loaded. All other modules will generate an error. + + Irrespective of the setting here, if the module has a signature block that + cannot be parsed, it will be rejected out of hand. + + + (2) "Automatically sign all modules" (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL) + + If this is on then modules will be automatically signed during the + modules_install phase of a build. If this is off, then the modules must + be signed manually using: + + scripts/sign-file + + + (3) "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?" + + This presents a choice of which hash algorithm the installation phase will + sign the modules with: + + CONFIG_SIG_SHA1 "Sign modules with SHA-1" + CONFIG_SIG_SHA224 "Sign modules with SHA-224" + CONFIG_SIG_SHA256 "Sign modules with SHA-256" + CONFIG_SIG_SHA384 "Sign modules with SHA-384" + CONFIG_SIG_SHA512 "Sign modules with SHA-512" + + The algorithm selected here will also be built into the kernel (rather + than being a module) so that modules signed with that algorithm can have + their signatures checked without causing a dependency loop. + + +======================= +GENERATING SIGNING KEYS +======================= + +Cryptographic keypairs are required to generate and check signatures. A +private key is used to generate a signature and the corresponding public key is +used to check it. The private key is only needed during the build, after which +it can be deleted or stored securely. The public key gets built into the +kernel so that it can be used to check the signatures as the modules are +loaded. + +Under normal conditions, the kernel build will automatically generate a new +keypair using openssl if one does not exist in the files: + + signing_key.priv + signing_key.x509 + +during the building of vmlinux (the public part of the key needs to be built +into vmlinux) using parameters in the: + + x509.genkey + +file (which is also generated if it does not already exist). + +It is strongly recommended that you provide your own x509.genkey file. + +Most notably, in the x509.genkey file, the req_distinguished_name section +should be altered from the default: + + [ req_distinguished_name ] + O = Magrathea + CN = Glacier signing key + emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2 + +The generated RSA key size can also be set with: + + [ req ] + default_bits = 4096 + + +It is also possible to manually generate the key private/public files using the +x509.genkey key generation configuration file in the root node of the Linux +kernel sources tree and the openssl command. The following is an example to +generate the public/private key files: + + openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha256 -days 36500 -batch -x509 \ + -config x509.genkey -outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \ + -keyout signing_key.priv + + +========================= +PUBLIC KEYS IN THE KERNEL +========================= + +The kernel contains a ring of public keys that can be viewed by root. They're +in a keyring called ".system_keyring" that can be seen by: + + [root@deneb ~]# cat /proc/keys + ... + 223c7853 I------ 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .system_keyring: 1 + 302d2d52 I------ 1 perm 1f010000 0 0 asymmetri Fedora kernel signing key: d69a84e6bce3d216b979e9505b3e3ef9a7118079: X509.RSA a7118079 [] + ... + +Beyond the public key generated specifically for module signing, any file +placed in the kernel source root directory or the kernel build root directory +whose name is suffixed with ".x509" will be assumed to be an X.509 public key +and will be added to the keyring. + +Further, the architecture code may take public keys from a hardware store and +add those in also (e.g. from the UEFI key database). + +Finally, it is possible to add additional public keys by doing: + + keyctl padd asymmetric "" [.system_keyring-ID] <[key-file] + +e.g.: + + keyctl padd asymmetric "" 0x223c7853 <my_public_key.x509 + +Note, however, that the kernel will only permit keys to be added to +.system_keyring _if_ the new key's X.509 wrapper is validly signed by a key +that is already resident in the .system_keyring at the time the key was added. + + +========================= +MANUALLY SIGNING MODULES +========================= + +To manually sign a module, use the scripts/sign-file tool available in +the Linux kernel source tree. The script requires 4 arguments: + + 1. The hash algorithm (e.g., sha256) + 2. The private key filename + 3. The public key filename + 4. The kernel module to be signed + +The following is an example to sign a kernel module: + + scripts/sign-file sha512 kernel-signkey.priv \ + kernel-signkey.x509 module.ko + +The hash algorithm used does not have to match the one configured, but if it +doesn't, you should make sure that hash algorithm is either built into the +kernel or can be loaded without requiring itself. + + +============================ +SIGNED MODULES AND STRIPPING +============================ + +A signed module has a digital signature simply appended at the end. The string +"~Module signature appended~." at the end of the module's file confirms that a +signature is present but it does not confirm that the signature is valid! + +Signed modules are BRITTLE as the signature is outside of the defined ELF +container. Thus they MAY NOT be stripped once the signature is computed and +attached. Note the entire module is the signed payload, including any and all +debug information present at the time of signing. + + +====================== +LOADING SIGNED MODULES +====================== + +Modules are loaded with insmod, modprobe, init_module() or finit_module(), +exactly as for unsigned modules as no processing is done in userspace. The +signature checking is all done within the kernel. + + +========================================= +NON-VALID SIGNATURES AND UNSIGNED MODULES +========================================= + +If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is enabled or enforcemodulesig=1 is supplied on +the kernel command line, the kernel will only load validly signed modules +for which it has a public key. Otherwise, it will also load modules that are +unsigned. Any module for which the kernel has a key, but which proves to have +a signature mismatch will not be permitted to load. + +Any module that has an unparseable signature will be rejected. + + +========================================= +ADMINISTERING/PROTECTING THE PRIVATE KEY +========================================= + +Since the private key is used to sign modules, viruses and malware could use +the private key to sign modules and compromise the operating system. The +private key must be either destroyed or moved to a secure location and not kept +in the root node of the kernel source tree. |