diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 17 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/xfrm.c | 85 |
2 files changed, 42 insertions, 60 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index f2a2314aac1a..b463f210f1af 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void) return (atomic_read(&selinux_xfrm_refcount) > 0); } -int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct common_audit_data *ad); -int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto); +int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct common_audit_data *ad); +int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto); int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall); static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void) @@ -61,14 +61,15 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void) return 0; } -static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct common_audit_data *ad) +static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct common_audit_data *ad) { return 0; } -static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto) +static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct common_audit_data *ad, + u8 proto) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 4a7ba4ac487e..1f6c6e619e98 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -367,14 +367,12 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have * gone thru the IPSec process. */ -int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct common_audit_data *ad) +int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct common_audit_data *ad) { - int i, rc = 0; - struct sec_path *sp; - u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; - - sp = skb->sp; + int i; + struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp; + u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; if (sp) { for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) { @@ -382,23 +380,17 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) { struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; - sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; + peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; break; } } } - /* - * This check even when there's no association involved is - * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a - * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless - * explicitly allowed by policy. - */ - - rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, - ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad); - - return rc; + /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended, + * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in + * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */ + return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad); } /* @@ -408,49 +400,38 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above. */ -int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto) +int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto) { struct dst_entry *dst; - int rc = 0; - - dst = skb_dst(skb); - - if (dst) { - struct dst_entry *dst_test; - - for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != NULL; - dst_test = dst_test->child) { - struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm; - - if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) - goto out; - } - } switch (proto) { case IPPROTO_AH: case IPPROTO_ESP: case IPPROTO_COMP: - /* - * We should have already seen this packet once before - * it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the - * unlabeled check. - */ - goto out; + /* We should have already seen this packet once before it + * underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the unlabeled + * check. */ + return 0; default: break; } - /* - * This check even when there's no association involved is - * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a - * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless - * explicitly allowed by policy. - */ + dst = skb_dst(skb); + if (dst) { + struct dst_entry *iter; - rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, - ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad); -out: - return rc; + for (iter = dst; iter != NULL; iter = iter->child) { + struct xfrm_state *x = iter->xfrm; + + if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) + return 0; + } + } + + /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended, + * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in + * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */ + return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, + SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad); } |