diff options
author | Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> | 2021-06-08 14:31:22 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2021-06-08 16:29:10 -0400 |
commit | 6b26285f44c9306747c609cb304f787f1933594c (patch) | |
tree | 50ca9c69d4317105c9d384292c32fa56b9f9fd62 /security | |
parent | 24c9ae23bdfa0642228e747849dd052fd4295c6c (diff) |
ima/evm: Fix type mismatch
The endianness of a variable written to the measurement list cannot be
determined at compile time, as it depends on the value of the
ima_canonical_fmt global variable (set through a kernel option with the
same name if the machine is big endian).
If ima_canonical_fmt is false, the endianness of a variable is the same as
the machine; if ima_canonical_fmt is true, the endianness is little endian.
The warning arises due to this type of instruction:
var = cpu_to_leXX(var)
which tries to assign a value in little endian to a variable with native
endianness (little or big endian).
Given that the variables set with this instruction are not used in any
operation but just written to a buffer, it is safe to force the type of the
value being set to be the same of the type of the variable with:
var = (__force <var type>)cpu_to_leXX(var)
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 11 |
4 files changed, 12 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 2c226e634ae9..977208aecd06 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer, size = sizeof(u32); if (buffer) { if (canonical_fmt) - rc = cpu_to_le32(rc); + rc = (__force int)cpu_to_le32(rc); *(u32 *)(buffer + total_size) = rc; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index f6a7e9643b54..a7206cc1d7d1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -598,8 +598,8 @@ static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data, u8 buffer[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1] = { 0 }; u8 *data_to_hash = field_data[i].data; u32 datalen = field_data[i].len; - u32 datalen_to_hash = - !ima_canonical_fmt ? datalen : cpu_to_le32(datalen); + u32 datalen_to_hash = !ima_canonical_fmt ? + datalen : (__force u32)cpu_to_le32(datalen); if (strcmp(td->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) { rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index ea8ff8a07b36..3d8e9d5db5aa 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) * PCR used defaults to the same (config option) in * little-endian format, unless set in policy */ - pcr = !ima_canonical_fmt ? e->pcr : cpu_to_le32(e->pcr); + pcr = !ima_canonical_fmt ? e->pcr : (__force u32)cpu_to_le32(e->pcr); ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(e->pcr)); /* 2nd: template digest */ @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) /* 3rd: template name size */ namelen = !ima_canonical_fmt ? strlen(template_name) : - cpu_to_le32(strlen(template_name)); + (__force u32)cpu_to_le32(strlen(template_name)); ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen)); /* 4th: template name */ @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) if (!is_ima_template) { template_data_len = !ima_canonical_fmt ? e->template_data_len : - cpu_to_le32(e->template_data_len); + (__force u32)cpu_to_le32(e->template_data_len); ima_putc(m, &template_data_len, sizeof(e->template_data_len)); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index 3f8d53a03612..8e2a121af5e1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_binary(struct seq_file *m, strlen(field_data->data) : field_data->len; if (show != IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN) { - u32 field_len = !ima_canonical_fmt ? len : cpu_to_le32(len); + u32 field_len = !ima_canonical_fmt ? + len : (__force u32)cpu_to_le32(len); ima_putc(m, &field_len, sizeof(field_len)); } @@ -570,9 +571,9 @@ static int ima_eventinodedac_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, if (ima_canonical_fmt) { if (sizeof(id) == sizeof(u16)) - id = cpu_to_le16(id); + id = (__force u16)cpu_to_le16(id); else - id = cpu_to_le32(id); + id = (__force u32)cpu_to_le32(id); } return ima_write_template_field_data((void *)&id, sizeof(id), @@ -607,7 +608,7 @@ int ima_eventinodemode_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { struct inode *inode; - umode_t mode; + u16 mode; if (!event_data->file) return 0; @@ -615,7 +616,7 @@ int ima_eventinodemode_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, inode = file_inode(event_data->file); mode = inode->i_mode; if (ima_canonical_fmt) - mode = cpu_to_le16(mode); + mode = (__force u16)cpu_to_le16(mode); return ima_write_template_field_data((char *)&mode, sizeof(mode), DATA_FMT_UINT, field_data); |