diff options
author | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> | 2015-11-20 10:48:02 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> | 2015-11-24 11:36:31 -0700 |
commit | 414ca017a54d26c3a58ed1504884e51448d22ae1 (patch) | |
tree | e76eb79e0573b50eed71b8fe5a20696f702fde82 /security/security.c | |
parent | 920dd9bb7d7cf9ae339e15240326a28a22f08a74 (diff) |
nfsd4: fix gss-proxy 4.1 mounts for some AD principals
The principal name on a gss cred is used to setup the NFSv4.0 callback,
which has to have a client principal name to authenticate to.
That code wants the name to be in the form servicetype@hostname.
rpc.svcgssd passes down such names (and passes down no principal name at
all in the case the principal isn't a service principal).
gss-proxy always passes down the principal name, and passes it down in
the form servicetype/hostname@REALM. So we've been munging the name
gss-proxy passes down into the format the NFSv4.0 callback code expects,
or throwing away the name if we can't.
Since the introduction of the MACH_CRED enforcement in NFSv4.1, we've
also been using the principal name to verify that certain operations are
done as the same principal as was used on the original EXCHANGE_ID call.
For that application, the original name passed down by gss-proxy is also
useful.
Lack of that name in some cases was causing some kerberized NFSv4.1
mount failures in an Active Directory environment.
This fix only works in the gss-proxy case. The fix for legacy
rpc.svcgssd would be more involved, and rpc.svcgssd already has other
problems in the AD case.
Reported-and-tested-by: James Ralston <ralston@pobox.com>
Acked-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/security.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions