diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-01-31 13:12:31 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-01-31 13:12:31 -0800 |
commit | ae0cb7be35fe6c7e8bcc816ec4185d0a37748cc1 (patch) | |
tree | 2453151c8d507502ce91c6827f3e8a35e1777996 /security/keys | |
parent | 2a7149031457c5dd05f670737a9dd5d32524f145 (diff) | |
parent | ebceb1c87c0c482d47cb92dc3cc51d28f7387716 (diff) |
Merge branch 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull tpm updates from James Morris:
- reduce polling delays in tpm_tis
- support retrieving TPM 2.0 Event Log through EFI before
ExitBootServices
- replace tpm-rng.c with a hwrng device managed by the driver for each
TPM device
- TPM resource manager synthesizes TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE response instead
of returning -EINVAL for unknown TPM commands. This makes user space
more sound.
- CLKRUN fixes:
* Keep #CLKRUN disable through the entier TPM command/response flow
* Check whether #CLKRUN is enabled before disabling and enabling it
again because enabling it breaks PS/2 devices on a system where it
is disabled
* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
tpm: remove unused variables
tpm: remove unused data fields from I2C and OF device ID tables
tpm: only attempt to disable the LPC CLKRUN if is already enabled
tpm: follow coding style for variable declaration in tpm_tis_core_init()
tpm: delete the TPM_TIS_CLK_ENABLE flag
tpm: Update MAINTAINERS for Jason Gunthorpe
tpm: Keep CLKRUN enabled throughout the duration of transmit_cmd()
tpm_tis: Move ilb_base_addr to tpm_tis_data
tpm2-cmd: allow more attempts for selftest execution
tpm: return a TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE response if command is not implemented
tpm: Move Linux RNG connection to hwrng
tpm: use struct tpm_chip for tpm_chip_find_get()
tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
tpm: add event log format version
tpm: rename event log provider files
tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
tpm: use tpm_msleep() value as max delay
tpm: reduce tpm polling delay in tpm_tis_core
tpm: move wait_for_tpm_stat() to respective driver files
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys')
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/trusted.c | 35 |
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 98aa89ff7bfd..423776682025 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -355,13 +355,12 @@ out: * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function. */ -static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd, - size_t buflen) +static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen) { int rc; dump_tpm_buf(cmd); - rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen); + rc = tpm_send(NULL, cmd, buflen); dump_tpm_buf(cmd); if (rc > 0) /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */ @@ -382,10 +381,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) return ret; - return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0; + return tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0; } /* @@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; int ret; - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) return ret; @@ -410,7 +409,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, store32(tb, handle); storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -434,7 +433,7 @@ static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE); store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP); - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -493,7 +492,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, if (ret < 0) goto out; - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) goto out; ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); @@ -542,7 +541,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, store8(tb, cont); storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) goto out; @@ -603,7 +602,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE); - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) { pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); return ret; @@ -635,7 +634,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, store8(tb, cont); storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) { pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret); return ret; @@ -748,7 +747,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, int i; int tpm2; - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL); if (tpm2 < 0) return tpm2; @@ -917,7 +916,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) struct trusted_key_options *options; int tpm2; - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL); if (tpm2 < 0) return NULL; @@ -967,7 +966,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, size_t key_len; int tpm2; - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL); if (tpm2 < 0) return tpm2; @@ -1008,7 +1007,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, switch (key_cmd) { case Opt_load: if (tpm2) - ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options); + ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(NULL, payload, options); else ret = key_unseal(payload, options); dump_payload(payload); @@ -1018,13 +1017,13 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, break; case Opt_new: key_len = payload->key_len; - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload->key, key_len); + ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, payload->key, key_len); if (ret != key_len) { pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); goto out; } if (tpm2) - ret = tpm_seal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options); + ret = tpm_seal_trusted(NULL, payload, options); else ret = key_seal(payload, options); if (ret < 0) |