diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-07-08 19:56:57 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-07-08 19:56:57 -0700 |
commit | 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (patch) | |
tree | bdd2a6b7f35695b1d7ab1209efbb40187501fe7d /security/keys/proc.c | |
parent | c84ca912b07901be528e5184fd254fca1dddf2ac (diff) | |
parent | 7a1ade847596dadc94b37e49f8c03f167fd71748 (diff) |
Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
"This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
based on an internal ACL by the following means:
- Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.
ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
tags/namespaces.
Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
acquiring use of possessor permits.
- Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"
* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys/proc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/proc.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index 415f3f1c2da0..b394ad1e874b 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -110,11 +110,13 @@ static struct key *find_ge_key(struct seq_file *p, key_serial_t id) } static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos) + __acquires(rcu) __acquires(key_serial_lock) { key_serial_t pos = *_pos; struct key *key; + rcu_read_lock(); spin_lock(&key_serial_lock); if (*_pos > INT_MAX) @@ -144,12 +146,15 @@ static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos) static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v) __releases(key_serial_lock) + __releases(rcu) { spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); } static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { + const struct key_acl *acl; struct rb_node *_p = v; struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node); unsigned long flags; @@ -157,6 +162,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) time64_t now, expiry; char xbuf[16]; short state; + bool check_pos; u64 timo; int rc; @@ -170,15 +176,15 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE), }; - key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0); + acl = rcu_dereference(key->acl); + check_pos = acl->possessor_viewable; /* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can * skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it */ - if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) { - rcu_read_lock(); + key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0); + if (check_pos) { skey_ref = search_cred_keyrings_rcu(&ctx); - rcu_read_unlock(); if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) { key_ref_put(skey_ref); key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); @@ -188,12 +194,10 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) /* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */ rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW); if (rc < 0) - return 0; + goto out; now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); - rcu_read_lock(); - /* come up with a suitable timeout value */ expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); if (expiry == 0) { @@ -232,7 +236,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) showflag(flags, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED), refcount_read(&key->usage), xbuf, - key->perm, + key_acl_to_perm(acl), from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->uid), from_kgid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->gid), key->type->name); @@ -243,7 +247,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) key->type->describe(key, m); seq_putc(m, '\n'); - rcu_read_unlock(); +out: return 0; } |