diff options
| author | Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> | 2018-09-14 12:59:14 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2018-09-14 17:08:45 +0200 |
| commit | 61a6bd83abf2f14b2a917b6a0279c88d299267af (patch) | |
| tree | 14cade8f610c1fb68b6dba04e5c7e5de16651368 /security/Kconfig | |
| parent | cf40361ede6cf9dc09349e4c049dc0d166ca2d8b (diff) | |
Revert "x86/mm/legacy: Populate the user page-table with user pgd's"
This reverts commit 1f40a46cf47c12d93a5ad9dccd82bd36ff8f956a.
It turned out that this patch is not sufficient to enable PTI on 32 bit
systems with legacy 2-level page-tables. In this paging mode the huge-page
PTEs are in the top-level page-table directory, where also the mirroring to
the user-space page-table happens. So every huge PTE exits twice, in the
kernel and in the user page-table.
That means that accessed/dirty bits need to be fetched from two PTEs in
this mode to be safe, but this is not trivial to implement because it needs
changes to generic code just for the sake of enabling PTI with 32-bit
legacy paging. As all systems that need PTI should support PAE anyway,
remove support for PTI when 32-bit legacy paging is used.
Fixes: 7757d607c6b3 ('x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32')
Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536922754-31379-1-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
Diffstat (limited to 'security/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 27d8b2688f75..d9aa521b5206 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" default y - depends on X86 && !UML + depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) && !UML help This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped |