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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2021-05-01 18:50:44 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2021-05-01 18:50:44 -0700
commit17ae69aba89dbfa2139b7f8024b757ab3cc42f59 (patch)
treed0d13c06cf9bb3024563036a9ba5213b06b454e0 /samples
parente6f0bf09f0669b3c2cd77fa906830123279a0a21 (diff)
parent3532b0b4352ce79400b0aa68414f1a0fc422b920 (diff)
Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris: "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün. Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing. From Mickaël's cover letter: "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves. Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD Pledge/Unveil. In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features. This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing, init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]" The cover letter and v34 posting is here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/ See also: https://landlock.io/ This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several years" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2] * tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features landlock: Add user and kernel documentation samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example selftests/landlock: Add user space tests landlock: Add syscall implementations arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls fs,security: Add sb_delete hook landlock: Support filesystem access-control LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock landlock: Add ptrace restrictions landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials landlock: Add ruleset and domain management landlock: Add object management
Diffstat (limited to 'samples')
-rw-r--r--samples/Kconfig7
-rw-r--r--samples/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--samples/landlock/.gitignore1
-rw-r--r--samples/landlock/Makefile13
-rw-r--r--samples/landlock/sandboxer.c238
5 files changed, 260 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/samples/Kconfig b/samples/Kconfig
index e76cdfc50e25..b5a1a7aa7e23 100644
--- a/samples/Kconfig
+++ b/samples/Kconfig
@@ -124,6 +124,13 @@ config SAMPLE_HIDRAW
bool "hidraw sample"
depends on CC_CAN_LINK && HEADERS_INSTALL
+config SAMPLE_LANDLOCK
+ bool "Landlock example"
+ depends on CC_CAN_LINK && HEADERS_INSTALL
+ help
+ Build a simple Landlock sandbox manager able to start a process
+ restricted by a user-defined filesystem access control policy.
+
config SAMPLE_PIDFD
bool "pidfd sample"
depends on CC_CAN_LINK && HEADERS_INSTALL
diff --git a/samples/Makefile b/samples/Makefile
index c3392a595e4b..087e0988ccc5 100644
--- a/samples/Makefile
+++ b/samples/Makefile
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KDB) += kdb/
obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KFIFO) += kfifo/
obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KOBJECT) += kobject/
obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KPROBES) += kprobes/
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_LANDLOCK) += landlock
obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_LIVEPATCH) += livepatch/
subdir-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_PIDFD) += pidfd
obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_QMI_CLIENT) += qmi/
diff --git a/samples/landlock/.gitignore b/samples/landlock/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f43668b2d318
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/landlock/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/sandboxer
diff --git a/samples/landlock/Makefile b/samples/landlock/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5d601e51c2eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/landlock/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+
+userprogs-always-y := sandboxer
+
+userccflags += -I usr/include
+
+.PHONY: all clean
+
+all:
+ $(MAKE) -C ../.. samples/landlock/
+
+clean:
+ $(MAKE) -C ../.. M=samples/landlock/ clean
diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7a15910d2171
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * Simple Landlock sandbox manager able to launch a process restricted by a
+ * user-defined filesystem access control policy.
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ * Copyright © 2020 ANSSI
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/landlock.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifndef landlock_create_ruleset
+static inline int landlock_create_ruleset(
+ const struct landlock_ruleset_attr *const attr,
+ const size_t size, const __u32 flags)
+{
+ return syscall(__NR_landlock_create_ruleset, attr, size, flags);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef landlock_add_rule
+static inline int landlock_add_rule(const int ruleset_fd,
+ const enum landlock_rule_type rule_type,
+ const void *const rule_attr, const __u32 flags)
+{
+ return syscall(__NR_landlock_add_rule, ruleset_fd, rule_type,
+ rule_attr, flags);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef landlock_restrict_self
+static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int ruleset_fd,
+ const __u32 flags)
+{
+ return syscall(__NR_landlock_restrict_self, ruleset_fd, flags);
+}
+#endif
+
+#define ENV_FS_RO_NAME "LL_FS_RO"
+#define ENV_FS_RW_NAME "LL_FS_RW"
+#define ENV_PATH_TOKEN ":"
+
+static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
+{
+ int i, num_paths = 0;
+
+ if (env_path) {
+ num_paths++;
+ for (i = 0; env_path[i]; i++) {
+ if (env_path[i] == ENV_PATH_TOKEN[0])
+ num_paths++;
+ }
+ }
+ *path_list = malloc(num_paths * sizeof(**path_list));
+ for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++)
+ (*path_list)[i] = strsep(&env_path, ENV_PATH_TOKEN);
+
+ return num_paths;
+}
+
+#define ACCESS_FILE ( \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
+
+static int populate_ruleset(
+ const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
+ const __u64 allowed_access)
+{
+ int num_paths, i, ret = 1;
+ char *env_path_name;
+ const char **path_list = NULL;
+ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath = {
+ .parent_fd = -1,
+ };
+
+ env_path_name = getenv(env_var);
+ if (!env_path_name) {
+ /* Prevents users to forget a setting. */
+ fprintf(stderr, "Missing environment variable %s\n", env_var);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ env_path_name = strdup(env_path_name);
+ unsetenv(env_var);
+ num_paths = parse_path(env_path_name, &path_list);
+ if (num_paths == 1 && path_list[0][0] == '\0') {
+ /*
+ * Allows to not use all possible restrictions (e.g. use
+ * LL_FS_RO without LL_FS_RW).
+ */
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out_free_name;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) {
+ struct stat statbuf;
+
+ path_beneath.parent_fd = open(path_list[i], O_PATH |
+ O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (path_beneath.parent_fd < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open \"%s\": %s\n",
+ path_list[i],
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto out_free_name;
+ }
+ if (fstat(path_beneath.parent_fd, &statbuf)) {
+ close(path_beneath.parent_fd);
+ goto out_free_name;
+ }
+ path_beneath.allowed_access = allowed_access;
+ if (!S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode))
+ path_beneath.allowed_access &= ACCESS_FILE;
+ if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH,
+ &path_beneath, 0)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to update the ruleset with \"%s\": %s\n",
+ path_list[i], strerror(errno));
+ close(path_beneath.parent_fd);
+ goto out_free_name;
+ }
+ close(path_beneath.parent_fd);
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+out_free_name:
+ free(env_path_name);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ ( \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR)
+
+#define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE ( \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM)
+
+int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
+{
+ const char *cmd_path;
+ char *const *cmd_argv;
+ int ruleset_fd;
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ |
+ ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE,
+ };
+
+ if (argc < 2) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s <cmd> [args]...\n\n",
+ ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, argv[0]);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Launch a command in a restricted environment.\n\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Environment variables containing paths, "
+ "each separated by a colon:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-only way.\n",
+ ENV_FS_RO_NAME);
+ fprintf(stderr, "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-write way.\n",
+ ENV_FS_RW_NAME);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nexample:\n"
+ "%s=\"/bin:/lib:/usr:/proc:/etc:/dev/urandom\" "
+ "%s=\"/dev/null:/dev/full:/dev/zero:/dev/pts:/tmp\" "
+ "%s bash -i\n",
+ ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, argv[0]);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ if (ruleset_fd < 0) {
+ const int err = errno;
+
+ perror("Failed to create a ruleset");
+ switch (err) {
+ case ENOSYS:
+ fprintf(stderr, "Hint: Landlock is not supported by the current kernel. "
+ "To support it, build the kernel with "
+ "CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y and prepend "
+ "\"landlock,\" to the content of CONFIG_LSM.\n");
+ break;
+ case EOPNOTSUPP:
+ fprintf(stderr, "Hint: Landlock is currently disabled. "
+ "It can be enabled in the kernel configuration by "
+ "prepending \"landlock,\" to the content of CONFIG_LSM, "
+ "or at boot time by setting the same content to the "
+ "\"lsm\" kernel parameter.\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (populate_ruleset(ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ruleset_fd,
+ ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ)) {
+ goto err_close_ruleset;
+ }
+ if (populate_ruleset(ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ruleset_fd,
+ ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ | ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE)) {
+ goto err_close_ruleset;
+ }
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ perror("Failed to restrict privileges");
+ goto err_close_ruleset;
+ }
+ if (landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0)) {
+ perror("Failed to enforce ruleset");
+ goto err_close_ruleset;
+ }
+ close(ruleset_fd);
+
+ cmd_path = argv[1];
+ cmd_argv = argv + 1;
+ execvpe(cmd_path, cmd_argv, envp);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to execute \"%s\": %s\n", cmd_path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ fprintf(stderr, "Hint: access to the binary, the interpreter or "
+ "shared libraries may be denied.\n");
+ return 1;
+
+err_close_ruleset:
+ close(ruleset_fd);
+ return 1;
+}