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authorOlof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>2013-10-28 14:39:03 -0700
committerOlof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>2013-10-28 14:39:03 -0700
commit43d93947a54cf9323198a3a37eaf3ec14adb23e1 (patch)
tree0c290a7fcbc644b94527f399e4f9509a8d379a5d /net/ipv6/sit.c
parent02673f94d04e629e4cdc41e2bf2dc980743cf3df (diff)
parent54b89756a14aa1043507ce0811b4b6c02c5dddcc (diff)
Merge tag 'omap-for-v3.13/cm-scm-cleanup-signed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tmlind/linux-omap into next/cleanup
From Paul Walmsley <paul@pwsan.com> via Tony Lindgren: Move some of the OMAP2+ CM and System Control Module direct register accesses into CM- and System Control Module-specific "drivers" underneath arch/arm/mach-omap2/. This is a prerequisite for moving this code out of arch/arm/mach-omap2/ into drivers/. Basic test logs are available here: http://www.pwsan.com/omap/testlogs/cm_scm_cleanup_a_v3.13/20131019101809/ * tag 'omap-for-v3.13/cm-scm-cleanup-signed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tmlind/linux-omap: ARM: OMAP3: control: add API for setting IVA bootmode ARM: OMAP3: CM/control: move CM scratchpad save to CM driver ARM: OMAP3: McBSP: do not access CM register directly ARM: OMAP3: clock: add API to enable/disable autoidle for a single clock ARM: OMAP2: CM/PM: remove direct register accesses outside CM code + Linux 3.12-rc4 Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6/sit.c')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv6/sit.c86
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/sit.c b/net/ipv6/sit.c
index 7ee5cb96db34..19269453a8ea 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/sit.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/sit.c
@@ -566,6 +566,70 @@ static inline bool is_spoofed_6rd(struct ip_tunnel *tunnel, const __be32 v4addr,
return false;
}
+/* Checks if an address matches an address on the tunnel interface.
+ * Used to detect the NAT of proto 41 packets and let them pass spoofing test.
+ * Long story:
+ * This function is called after we considered the packet as spoofed
+ * in is_spoofed_6rd.
+ * We may have a router that is doing NAT for proto 41 packets
+ * for an internal station. Destination a.a.a.a/PREFIX:bbbb:bbbb
+ * will be translated to n.n.n.n/PREFIX:bbbb:bbbb. And is_spoofed_6rd
+ * function will return true, dropping the packet.
+ * But, we can still check if is spoofed against the IP
+ * addresses associated with the interface.
+ */
+static bool only_dnatted(const struct ip_tunnel *tunnel,
+ const struct in6_addr *v6dst)
+{
+ int prefix_len;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SIT_6RD
+ prefix_len = tunnel->ip6rd.prefixlen + 32
+ - tunnel->ip6rd.relay_prefixlen;
+#else
+ prefix_len = 48;
+#endif
+ return ipv6_chk_custom_prefix(v6dst, prefix_len, tunnel->dev);
+}
+
+/* Returns true if a packet is spoofed */
+static bool packet_is_spoofed(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct iphdr *iph,
+ struct ip_tunnel *tunnel)
+{
+ const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h;
+
+ if (tunnel->dev->priv_flags & IFF_ISATAP) {
+ if (!isatap_chksrc(skb, iph, tunnel))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (tunnel->dev->flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT)
+ return false;
+
+ ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+
+ if (unlikely(is_spoofed_6rd(tunnel, iph->saddr, &ipv6h->saddr))) {
+ net_warn_ratelimited("Src spoofed %pI4/%pI6c -> %pI4/%pI6c\n",
+ &iph->saddr, &ipv6h->saddr,
+ &iph->daddr, &ipv6h->daddr);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (likely(!is_spoofed_6rd(tunnel, iph->daddr, &ipv6h->daddr)))
+ return false;
+
+ if (only_dnatted(tunnel, &ipv6h->daddr))
+ return false;
+
+ net_warn_ratelimited("Dst spoofed %pI4/%pI6c -> %pI4/%pI6c\n",
+ &iph->saddr, &ipv6h->saddr,
+ &iph->daddr, &ipv6h->daddr);
+ return true;
+}
+
static int ipip6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
@@ -586,19 +650,9 @@ static int ipip6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
IPCB(skb)->flags = 0;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
- if (tunnel->dev->priv_flags & IFF_ISATAP) {
- if (!isatap_chksrc(skb, iph, tunnel)) {
- tunnel->dev->stats.rx_errors++;
- goto out;
- }
- } else if (!(tunnel->dev->flags&IFF_POINTOPOINT)) {
- if (is_spoofed_6rd(tunnel, iph->saddr,
- &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr) ||
- is_spoofed_6rd(tunnel, iph->daddr,
- &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr)) {
- tunnel->dev->stats.rx_errors++;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (packet_is_spoofed(skb, iph, tunnel)) {
+ tunnel->dev->stats.rx_errors++;
+ goto out;
}
__skb_tunnel_rx(skb, tunnel->dev, tunnel->net);
@@ -748,7 +802,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipip6_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
neigh = dst_neigh_lookup(skb_dst(skb), &iph6->daddr);
if (neigh == NULL) {
- net_dbg_ratelimited("sit: nexthop == NULL\n");
+ net_dbg_ratelimited("nexthop == NULL\n");
goto tx_error;
}
@@ -777,7 +831,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipip6_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
neigh = dst_neigh_lookup(skb_dst(skb), &iph6->daddr);
if (neigh == NULL) {
- net_dbg_ratelimited("sit: nexthop == NULL\n");
+ net_dbg_ratelimited("nexthop == NULL\n");
goto tx_error;
}
@@ -1612,6 +1666,7 @@ static int __net_init sit_init_net(struct net *net)
goto err_alloc_dev;
}
dev_net_set(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev, net);
+ sitn->fb_tunnel_dev->rtnl_link_ops = &sit_link_ops;
/* FB netdevice is special: we have one, and only one per netns.
* Allowing to move it to another netns is clearly unsafe.
*/
@@ -1646,7 +1701,6 @@ static void __net_exit sit_exit_net(struct net *net)
rtnl_lock();
sit_destroy_tunnels(sitn, &list);
- unregister_netdevice_queue(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev, &list);
unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
rtnl_unlock();
}