diff options
author | Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> | 2013-10-28 14:39:03 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> | 2013-10-28 14:39:03 -0700 |
commit | 43d93947a54cf9323198a3a37eaf3ec14adb23e1 (patch) | |
tree | 0c290a7fcbc644b94527f399e4f9509a8d379a5d /net/ipv6/sit.c | |
parent | 02673f94d04e629e4cdc41e2bf2dc980743cf3df (diff) | |
parent | 54b89756a14aa1043507ce0811b4b6c02c5dddcc (diff) |
Merge tag 'omap-for-v3.13/cm-scm-cleanup-signed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tmlind/linux-omap into next/cleanup
From Paul Walmsley <paul@pwsan.com> via Tony Lindgren:
Move some of the OMAP2+ CM and System Control Module direct
register accesses into CM- and System Control
Module-specific "drivers" underneath arch/arm/mach-omap2/. This
is a prerequisite for moving this code out of arch/arm/mach-omap2/ into
drivers/.
Basic test logs are available here:
http://www.pwsan.com/omap/testlogs/cm_scm_cleanup_a_v3.13/20131019101809/
* tag 'omap-for-v3.13/cm-scm-cleanup-signed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tmlind/linux-omap:
ARM: OMAP3: control: add API for setting IVA bootmode
ARM: OMAP3: CM/control: move CM scratchpad save to CM driver
ARM: OMAP3: McBSP: do not access CM register directly
ARM: OMAP3: clock: add API to enable/disable autoidle for a single clock
ARM: OMAP2: CM/PM: remove direct register accesses outside CM code
+ Linux 3.12-rc4
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6/sit.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/sit.c | 86 |
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/sit.c b/net/ipv6/sit.c index 7ee5cb96db34..19269453a8ea 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/sit.c +++ b/net/ipv6/sit.c @@ -566,6 +566,70 @@ static inline bool is_spoofed_6rd(struct ip_tunnel *tunnel, const __be32 v4addr, return false; } +/* Checks if an address matches an address on the tunnel interface. + * Used to detect the NAT of proto 41 packets and let them pass spoofing test. + * Long story: + * This function is called after we considered the packet as spoofed + * in is_spoofed_6rd. + * We may have a router that is doing NAT for proto 41 packets + * for an internal station. Destination a.a.a.a/PREFIX:bbbb:bbbb + * will be translated to n.n.n.n/PREFIX:bbbb:bbbb. And is_spoofed_6rd + * function will return true, dropping the packet. + * But, we can still check if is spoofed against the IP + * addresses associated with the interface. + */ +static bool only_dnatted(const struct ip_tunnel *tunnel, + const struct in6_addr *v6dst) +{ + int prefix_len; + +#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SIT_6RD + prefix_len = tunnel->ip6rd.prefixlen + 32 + - tunnel->ip6rd.relay_prefixlen; +#else + prefix_len = 48; +#endif + return ipv6_chk_custom_prefix(v6dst, prefix_len, tunnel->dev); +} + +/* Returns true if a packet is spoofed */ +static bool packet_is_spoofed(struct sk_buff *skb, + const struct iphdr *iph, + struct ip_tunnel *tunnel) +{ + const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h; + + if (tunnel->dev->priv_flags & IFF_ISATAP) { + if (!isatap_chksrc(skb, iph, tunnel)) + return true; + + return false; + } + + if (tunnel->dev->flags & IFF_POINTOPOINT) + return false; + + ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb); + + if (unlikely(is_spoofed_6rd(tunnel, iph->saddr, &ipv6h->saddr))) { + net_warn_ratelimited("Src spoofed %pI4/%pI6c -> %pI4/%pI6c\n", + &iph->saddr, &ipv6h->saddr, + &iph->daddr, &ipv6h->daddr); + return true; + } + + if (likely(!is_spoofed_6rd(tunnel, iph->daddr, &ipv6h->daddr))) + return false; + + if (only_dnatted(tunnel, &ipv6h->daddr)) + return false; + + net_warn_ratelimited("Dst spoofed %pI4/%pI6c -> %pI4/%pI6c\n", + &iph->saddr, &ipv6h->saddr, + &iph->daddr, &ipv6h->daddr); + return true; +} + static int ipip6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) { const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb); @@ -586,19 +650,9 @@ static int ipip6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) IPCB(skb)->flags = 0; skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6); - if (tunnel->dev->priv_flags & IFF_ISATAP) { - if (!isatap_chksrc(skb, iph, tunnel)) { - tunnel->dev->stats.rx_errors++; - goto out; - } - } else if (!(tunnel->dev->flags&IFF_POINTOPOINT)) { - if (is_spoofed_6rd(tunnel, iph->saddr, - &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr) || - is_spoofed_6rd(tunnel, iph->daddr, - &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr)) { - tunnel->dev->stats.rx_errors++; - goto out; - } + if (packet_is_spoofed(skb, iph, tunnel)) { + tunnel->dev->stats.rx_errors++; + goto out; } __skb_tunnel_rx(skb, tunnel->dev, tunnel->net); @@ -748,7 +802,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipip6_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, neigh = dst_neigh_lookup(skb_dst(skb), &iph6->daddr); if (neigh == NULL) { - net_dbg_ratelimited("sit: nexthop == NULL\n"); + net_dbg_ratelimited("nexthop == NULL\n"); goto tx_error; } @@ -777,7 +831,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipip6_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, neigh = dst_neigh_lookup(skb_dst(skb), &iph6->daddr); if (neigh == NULL) { - net_dbg_ratelimited("sit: nexthop == NULL\n"); + net_dbg_ratelimited("nexthop == NULL\n"); goto tx_error; } @@ -1612,6 +1666,7 @@ static int __net_init sit_init_net(struct net *net) goto err_alloc_dev; } dev_net_set(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev, net); + sitn->fb_tunnel_dev->rtnl_link_ops = &sit_link_ops; /* FB netdevice is special: we have one, and only one per netns. * Allowing to move it to another netns is clearly unsafe. */ @@ -1646,7 +1701,6 @@ static void __net_exit sit_exit_net(struct net *net) rtnl_lock(); sit_destroy_tunnels(sitn, &list); - unregister_netdevice_queue(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev, &list); unregister_netdevice_many(&list); rtnl_unlock(); } |