diff options
author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2014-04-11 16:15:36 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2014-04-11 16:15:36 -0400 |
commit | 676d23690fb62b5d51ba5d659935e9f7d9da9f8e (patch) | |
tree | f6fbceee43e05c724868153ca37b702fb5e43b8c /net/ipv4 | |
parent | ad20d5f673898578f9d8a156d7a4c921f5ca4584 (diff) |
net: Fix use after free by removing length arg from sk_data_ready callbacks.
Several spots in the kernel perform a sequence like:
skb_queue_tail(&sk->s_receive_queue, skb);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk, skb->len);
But at the moment we place the SKB onto the socket receive queue it
can be consumed and freed up. So this skb->len access is potentially
to freed up memory.
Furthermore, the skb->len can be modified by the consumer so it is
possible that the value isn't accurate.
And finally, no actual implementation of this callback actually uses
the length argument. And since nobody actually cared about it's
value, lots of call sites pass arbitrary values in such as '0' and
even '1'.
So just remove the length argument from the callback, that way there
is no confusion whatsoever and all of these use-after-free cases get
fixed as a side effect.
Based upon a patch by Eric Dumazet and his suggestion to audit this
issue tree-wide.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4')
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 |
3 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index e1661f46fd19..d6b46eb2f94c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4413,7 +4413,7 @@ queue_and_out: if (eaten > 0) kfree_skb_partial(skb, fragstolen); if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) - sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0); + sk->sk_data_ready(sk); return; } @@ -4914,7 +4914,7 @@ static void tcp_urg(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tcphdr *t BUG(); tp->urg_data = TCP_URG_VALID | tmp; if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) - sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0); + sk->sk_data_ready(sk); } } } @@ -5000,11 +5000,11 @@ static bool tcp_dma_try_early_copy(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, (tcp_flag_word(tcp_hdr(skb)) & TCP_FLAG_PSH) || (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) > (sk->sk_rcvbuf >> 1))) { tp->ucopy.wakeup = 1; - sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0); + sk->sk_data_ready(sk); } } else if (chunk > 0) { tp->ucopy.wakeup = 1; - sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0); + sk->sk_data_ready(sk); } out: return copied_early; @@ -5275,7 +5275,7 @@ no_ack: #endif if (eaten) kfree_skb_partial(skb, fragstolen); - sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0); + sk->sk_data_ready(sk); return; } } diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 6379894ec210..438f3b95143d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -1434,7 +1434,7 @@ static int tcp_v4_conn_req_fastopen(struct sock *sk, tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq; tp->syn_data_acked = 1; } - sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0); + sk->sk_data_ready(sk); bh_unlock_sock(child); sock_put(child); WARN_ON(req->sk == NULL); diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c index ca788ada5bd3..05c1b155251d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c @@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ int tcp_child_process(struct sock *parent, struct sock *child, skb->len); /* Wakeup parent, send SIGIO */ if (state == TCP_SYN_RECV && child->sk_state != state) - parent->sk_data_ready(parent, 0); + parent->sk_data_ready(parent); } else { /* Alas, it is possible again, because we do lookup * in main socket hash table and lock on listening |