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authorEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>2019-05-17 17:17:22 -0700
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2019-06-15 18:47:31 -0700
commit3b4929f65b0d8249f19a50245cd88ed1a2f78cff (patch)
tree6f48603df7001f7048016a2e98573bf10044dd3e /net/ipv4/datagram.c
parent1eb4169c1e6b3c95f3a99c2c7f91b10e6c98e848 (diff)
tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs
Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash in tcp_shifted_skb() : BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount); This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48 An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC. This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs can overflow. Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled. SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity. CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com> Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4/datagram.c')
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