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authorIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>2021-04-14 10:38:40 +0200
committerIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>2021-04-27 23:52:24 +0200
commit7807dafda21a549403d922da98dde0ddfeb70d08 (patch)
treedcee8f9d339ff40b118675cbf4a25e4099e2e988 /net/ceph
parentd4f6b31d721779d91b5e2f8072478af73b196c34 (diff)
libceph: bump CephXAuthenticate encoding version
A dummy v3 encoding (exactly the same as v2) was introduced so that the monitors can distinguish broken clients that may not include their auth ticket in CEPHX_GET_AUTH_SESSION_KEY request on reconnects, thus failing to prove previous possession of their global_id (one part of CVE-2021-20288). The kernel client has always included its auth ticket, so it is compatible with enforcing mode as is. However we want to bump the encoding version to avoid having to authenticate twice on the initial connect -- all legacy (CephXAuthenticate < v3) are now forced do so in order to expose insecure global_id reclaim. Marking for stable since at least for 5.11 and 5.12 it is trivial (v2 -> v3). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.11+ URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/50452 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ceph')
-rw-r--r--net/ceph/auth_x.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/ceph/auth_x.c b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
index ca44c327bace..79641c4afee9 100644
--- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c
+++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- auth->struct_v = 2; /* nautilus+ */
+ auth->struct_v = 3; /* nautilus+ */
auth->key = 0;
for (u = (u64 *)enc_buf; u + 1 <= (u64 *)(enc_buf + ret); u++)
auth->key ^= *(__le64 *)u;