diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-11-21 10:24:05 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-11-21 10:24:05 -0800 |
| commit | ea0ab64306355432746bafda0364fb2d593bc9e3 (patch) | |
| tree | eb3dbdce84224e804ef8b680a9392d822d94ff44 /kernel | |
| parent | 27bba9c532a8d21050b94224ffd310ad0058c353 (diff) | |
| parent | 4c222f31fb1db4d590503a181a6268ced9252379 (diff) | |
Merge tag 'seccomp-v5.10-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull seccomp fixes from Kees Cook:
"This gets the seccomp selftests running again on powerpc and sh, and
fixes an audit reporting oversight noticed in both seccomp and ptrace.
- Fix typos in seccomp selftests on powerpc and sh (Kees Cook)
- Fix PF_SUPERPRIV audit marking in seccomp and ptrace (Mickaël
Salaün)"
* tag 'seccomp-v5.10-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
selftests/seccomp: sh: Fix register names
selftests/seccomp: powerpc: Fix typo in macro variable name
seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/ptrace.c | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 5 |
2 files changed, 7 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 43d6179508d6..79de1294f8eb 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -264,17 +264,11 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state) return ret; } -static bool ptrace_has_cap(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - unsigned int mode) +static bool ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode) { - int ret; - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) - ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); - else - ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NONE); - - return ret == 0; + return ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE); + return ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE); } /* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */ @@ -326,7 +320,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) && gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid)) goto ok; - if (ptrace_has_cap(cred, tcred->user_ns, mode)) + if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode)) goto ok; rcu_read_unlock(); return -EPERM; @@ -345,7 +339,7 @@ ok: mm = task->mm; if (mm && ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) && - !ptrace_has_cap(cred, mm->user_ns, mode))) + !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode))) return -EPERM; return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode); diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 8ad7a293255a..53a7d1512dd7 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ #include <linux/filter.h> #include <linux/pid.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> -#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/tracehook.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/anon_inodes.h> @@ -558,8 +558,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog) * behavior of privileged children. */ if (!task_no_new_privs(current) && - security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(), - CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0) + !ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */ |