diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-01-04 12:56:09 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-01-04 12:56:09 -0800 |
| commit | 594cc251fdd0d231d342d88b2fdff4bc42fb0690 (patch) | |
| tree | 259269a399e6504a7cf8739201cf172d1cbb197a /kernel/compat.c | |
| parent | 0b2c8f8b6b0c7530e2866c95862546d0da2057b0 (diff) | |
make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'
Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok()
separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the
direct (optimized) user access.
But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok()
at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or
similar. Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has
actually been range-checked.
If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either
SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged
Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin(). But
nothing really forces the range check.
By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force
people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible
near the actual accesses. We have way too long a history of people
trying to avoid them.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/compat.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/compat.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/compat.c b/kernel/compat.c index 705d4ae6c018..f01affa17e22 100644 --- a/kernel/compat.c +++ b/kernel/compat.c @@ -354,10 +354,9 @@ long compat_get_bitmap(unsigned long *mask, const compat_ulong_t __user *umask, bitmap_size = ALIGN(bitmap_size, BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG); nr_compat_longs = BITS_TO_COMPAT_LONGS(bitmap_size); - if (!access_ok(umask, bitmap_size / 8)) + if (!user_access_begin(umask, bitmap_size / 8)) return -EFAULT; - user_access_begin(); while (nr_compat_longs > 1) { compat_ulong_t l1, l2; unsafe_get_user(l1, umask++, Efault); @@ -384,10 +383,9 @@ long compat_put_bitmap(compat_ulong_t __user *umask, unsigned long *mask, bitmap_size = ALIGN(bitmap_size, BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG); nr_compat_longs = BITS_TO_COMPAT_LONGS(bitmap_size); - if (!access_ok(umask, bitmap_size / 8)) + if (!user_access_begin(umask, bitmap_size / 8)) return -EFAULT; - user_access_begin(); while (nr_compat_longs > 1) { unsigned long m = *mask++; unsafe_put_user((compat_ulong_t)m, umask++, Efault); |