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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-11-13 10:41:25 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-11-13 10:41:25 -0800 |
commit | b33e3cc5c90b8293599318b68e61b93a89c127bb (patch) | |
tree | f61f315118d2b3e60e409c36e09fe06f8b6b6908 /fs | |
parent | 55b3a0cb5aeef0961ee18eac058e488f149a0053 (diff) | |
parent | e5729f86a2987c9404f9b2fb494b9a6fc4412baf (diff) |
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem integrity updates from James Morris:
"There is a mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, preparatory code for
new functionality and new functionality.
Commit 26ddabfe96bb ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is
loaded") enabled EVM without loading a symmetric key, but was limited
to defining the x509 certificate pathname at build. Included in this
set of patches is the ability of enabling EVM, without loading the EVM
symmetric key, from userspace. New is the ability to prevent the
loading of an EVM symmetric key."
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: Remove redundant conditional operator
ima: Fix bool initialization/comparison
ima: check signature enforcement against cmdline param instead of CONFIG
module: export module signature enforcement status
ima: fix hash algorithm initialization
EVM: Only complain about a missing HMAC key once
EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded
EVM: Include security.apparmor in EVM measurements
ima: call ima_file_free() prior to calling fasync
integrity: use kernel_read_file_from_path() to read x509 certs
ima: always measure and audit files in policy
ima: don't remove the securityfs policy file
vfs: fix mounting a filesystem with i_version
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/file_table.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c index 61517f57f8ef..49e1f2f1a4cb 100644 --- a/fs/file_table.c +++ b/fs/file_table.c @@ -201,11 +201,11 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file) eventpoll_release(file); locks_remove_file(file); + ima_file_free(file); if (unlikely(file->f_flags & FASYNC)) { if (file->f_op->fasync) file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0); } - ima_file_free(file); if (file->f_op->release) file->f_op->release(inode, file); security_file_free(file); |