Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)

Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:

 - the rest of MM

 - KASAN updates

 - procfs updates

 - exit, fork updates

 - printk updates

 - lib/ updates

 - radix-tree testsuite updates

 - checkpatch updates

 - kprobes updates

 - a few other misc bits

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (162 commits)
  samples/kprobes: print out the symbol name for the hooks
  samples/kprobes: add a new module parameter
  kprobes: add the "tls" argument for j_do_fork
  init/main.c: simplify initcall_blacklisted()
  fs/efs/super.c: fix return value
  checkpatch: improve --git <commit-count> shortcut
  checkpatch: reduce number of `git log` calls with --git
  checkpatch: add support to check already applied git commits
  checkpatch: add --list-types to show message types to show or ignore
  checkpatch: advertise the --fix and --fix-inplace options more
  checkpatch: whine about ACCESS_ONCE
  checkpatch: add test for keywords not starting on tabstops
  checkpatch: improve CONSTANT_COMPARISON test for structure members
  checkpatch: add PREFER_IS_ENABLED test
  lib/GCD.c: use binary GCD algorithm instead of Euclidean
  radix-tree: free up the bottom bit of exceptional entries for reuse
  dax: move RADIX_DAX_ definitions to dax.c
  radix-tree: make radix_tree_descend() more useful
  radix-tree: introduce radix_tree_replace_clear_tags()
  radix-tree: tidy up __radix_tree_create()
  ...

1 files changed, 41 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index ff4527dd69b7..a11eb7196ec8 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -3163,6 +3163,44 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
 }
 
 /*
+ * proc_tid_comm_permission is a special permission function exclusively
+ * used for the node /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/comm.
+ * It bypasses generic permission checks in the case where a task of the same
+ * task group attempts to access the node.
+ * The rationale behind this is that glibc and bionic access this node for
+ * cross thread naming (pthread_set/getname_np(!self)). However, if
+ * PR_SET_DUMPABLE gets set to 0 this node among others becomes uid=0 gid=0,
+ * which locks out the cross thread naming implementation.
+ * This function makes sure that the node is always accessible for members of
+ * same thread group.
+ */
+static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+	bool is_same_tgroup;
+	struct task_struct *task;
+
+	task = get_proc_task(inode);
+	if (!task)
+		return -ESRCH;
+	is_same_tgroup = same_thread_group(current, task);
+	put_task_struct(task);
+
+	if (likely(is_same_tgroup && !(mask & MAY_EXEC))) {
+		/* This file (/proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/comm) can always be
+		 * read or written by the members of the corresponding
+		 * thread group.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return generic_permission(inode, mask);
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations proc_tid_comm_inode_operations = {
+		.permission = proc_tid_comm_permission,
+};
+
+/*
  * Tasks
  */
 static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
@@ -3180,7 +3218,9 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG
 	REG("sched",     S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_sched_operations),
 #endif
-	REG("comm",      S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_set_comm_operations),
+	NOD("comm",      S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR,
+			 &proc_tid_comm_inode_operations,
+			 &proc_pid_set_comm_operations, {}),
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
 	ONE("syscall",   S_IRUSR, proc_pid_syscall),
 #endif