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authorMateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@google.com>2017-05-24 12:26:20 +0200
committerSamuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>2017-06-23 00:26:19 +0200
commit608c4adfcabab220142ee335a2a003ccd1c0b25b (patch)
tree02926d53fd24c2cd655fddd70b324e9446cb1430 /fs/9p
parenta81d1ab3cad77e20c2df8baef0a35a4980fc511c (diff)
nfc: Fix the sockaddr length sanitization in llcp_sock_connect
Fix the sockaddr length verification in the connect() handler of NFC/LLCP sockets, to compare against the size of the actual structure expected on input (sockaddr_nfc_llcp) instead of its shorter version (sockaddr_nfc). Both structures are defined in include/uapi/linux/nfc.h. The fields specific to the _llcp extended struct are as follows: 276 __u8 dsap; /* Destination SAP, if known */ 277 __u8 ssap; /* Source SAP to be bound to */ 278 char service_name[NFC_LLCP_MAX_SERVICE_NAME]; /* Service name URI */; 279 size_t service_name_len; If the caller doesn't provide a sufficiently long sockaddr buffer, these fields remain uninitialized (and they currently originate from the stack frame of the top-level sys_connect handler). They are then copied by llcp_sock_connect() into internal storage (nfc_llcp_sock structure), and could be subsequently read back through the user-mode getsockname() function (handled by llcp_sock_getname()). This would result in the disclosure of up to ~70 uninitialized bytes from the kernel stack to user-mode clients capable of creating AFC_NFC sockets. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/9p')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions