diff options
| author | Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> | 2016-10-22 15:57:05 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2016-11-01 08:37:10 +0800 |
| commit | 2cc751545854d7bd7eedf4d7e377bb52e176cd07 (patch) | |
| tree | 3da983c4888bc5b606db9051f2322af27048fa68 /drivers/char | |
| parent | d7db7a882debaffc78f91aabedee973aa1f73390 (diff) | |
hwrng: core - zeroize buffers with random data
The HWRNG core allocates two buffers during initialization which are
used to obtain random data. After that data is processed, it is now
zeroized as it is possible that the HWRNG core will not be asked to
produce more random data for a long time. This prevents leaving such
sensitive data in memory.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c index d2d2c89de5b4..f9766415ff10 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static void add_early_randomness(struct hwrng *rng) mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex); if (bytes_read > 0) add_device_randomness(rng_buffer, bytes_read); + memset(rng_buffer, 0, size); } static inline void cleanup_rng(struct kref *kref) @@ -287,6 +288,7 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, } } out: + memset(rng_buffer, 0, rng_buffer_size()); return ret ? : err; out_unlock_reading: @@ -425,6 +427,7 @@ static int hwrng_fillfn(void *unused) /* Outside lock, sure, but y'know: randomness. */ add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_fillbuf, rc, rc * current_quality * 8 >> 10); + memset(rng_fillbuf, 0, rng_buffer_size()); } hwrng_fill = NULL; return 0; |