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authorLiran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>2018-03-12 13:12:52 +0200
committerPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>2018-03-16 22:01:43 +0100
commit9718420e9fd462ac6b7ea840f9e63eb6af7e1bda (patch)
treecf8ffb44c2dec7e3e8faae138e196c2c456d469b /arch
parent9e86948041f2ec6b7868d4849181cb7bb1bdee70 (diff)
KVM: x86: SVM: Intercept #GP to support access to VMware backdoor ports
If KVM enable_vmware_backdoor module parameter is set, the commit change VMX to now intercept #GP instead of being directly deliviered from CPU to guest. It is done to support access to VMware Backdoor I/O ports even if TSS I/O permission denies it. In that case: 1. A #GP will be raised and intercepted. 2. #GP intercept handler will simulate I/O port access instruction. 3. I/O port access instruction simulation will allow access to VMware backdoor ports specifically even if TSS I/O permission bitmap denies it. Note that the above change introduce slight performance hit as now #GPs are now not deliviered directly from CPU to guest but instead cause #VMExit and instruction emulation. However, this behavior is introduced only when enable_vmware_backdoor KVM module parameter is set. Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <nikita.leshchenko@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm.c26
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 3ce5ba8dc58b..fa1c4977e1c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1364,6 +1364,14 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR);
set_exception_intercept(svm, AC_VECTOR);
set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
+ /*
+ * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
+ * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
+ * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
+ * as VMware does.
+ */
+ if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
+ set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_NMI);
@@ -2552,6 +2560,23 @@ static int ac_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
return 1;
}
+static int gp_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+ u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+ int er;
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vmware_backdoor);
+
+ er = emulate_instruction(vcpu,
+ EMULTYPE_VMWARE | EMULTYPE_NO_UD_ON_FAIL);
+ if (er == EMULATE_USER_EXIT)
+ return 0;
+ else if (er != EMULATE_DONE)
+ kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
+ return 1;
+}
+
static bool is_erratum_383(void)
{
int err, i;
@@ -4551,6 +4576,7 @@ static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct vcpu_svm *svm) = {
[SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + PF_VECTOR] = pf_interception,
[SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + MC_VECTOR] = mc_interception,
[SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + AC_VECTOR] = ac_interception,
+ [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + GP_VECTOR] = gp_interception,
[SVM_EXIT_INTR] = intr_interception,
[SVM_EXIT_NMI] = nmi_interception,
[SVM_EXIT_SMI] = nop_on_interception,