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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-07-08 20:28:59 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-07-08 20:28:59 -0700
commit8b68150883ca466a23e90902dd4113b22e692f04 (patch)
treee27be560379f4dc6f3d49a88f83bf5f9cb539851 /arch/x86
parent0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (diff)
parent650b29dbdf2caf7db27cdc8bfa8fc009b28a6ce3 (diff)
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: "Bug fixes, code clean up, and new features: - IMA policy rules can be defined in terms of LSM labels, making the IMA policy dependent on LSM policy label changes, in particular LSM label deletions. The new environment, in which IMA-appraisal is being used, frequently updates the LSM policy and permits LSM label deletions. - Prevent an mmap'ed shared file opened for write from also being mmap'ed execute. In the long term, making this and other similar changes at the VFS layer would be preferable. - The IMA per policy rule template format support is needed for a couple of new/proposed features (eg. kexec boot command line measurement, appended signatures, and VFS provided file hashes). - Other than the "boot-aggregate" record in the IMA measuremeent list, all other measurements are of file data. Measuring and storing the kexec boot command line in the IMA measurement list is the first buffer based measurement included in the measurement list" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition KEXEC: Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args IMA: Define a new template field buf IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments IMA: support for per policy rule template formats integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data ima: use the lsm policy update notifier LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers x86/ima: fix the Kconfig dependency for IMA_ARCH_POLICY ima: Make arch_policy_entry static ima: prevent a file already mmap'ed write to be mmap'ed execute x86/ima: check EFI SetupMode too
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c12
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
index 64b973f0e985..4c407833faca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
@@ -11,10 +11,11 @@ extern struct boot_params boot_params;
static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
{
efi_char16_t efi_SecureBoot_name[] = L"SecureBoot";
+ efi_char16_t efi_SetupMode_name[] = L"SecureBoot";
efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
efi_status_t status;
unsigned long size;
- u8 secboot;
+ u8 secboot, setupmode;
size = sizeof(secboot);
@@ -36,7 +37,14 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
}
- if (secboot == 0) {
+ size = sizeof(setupmode);
+ status = efi.get_variable(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid,
+ NULL, &size, &setupmode);
+
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) /* ignore unknown SetupMode */
+ setupmode = 0;
+
+ if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1) {
pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n");
return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
}