diff options
| author | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2012-07-18 11:17:17 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2012-07-18 11:17:17 +0200 |
| commit | a2fe194723f6e4990d01d8c208c7b138fd410522 (patch) | |
| tree | 7aee93fa8f4ba1e18b56fa7d8eab75d249fc6966 /arch/x86/kernel | |
| parent | c3b7cdf180090d2686239a75bb0ae408108ed749 (diff) | |
| parent | a018540141a931f5299a866907b27886916b4374 (diff) | |
Merge branch 'linus' into perf/core
Pick up the latest ring-buffer fixes, before applying a new fix.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c | 39 |
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c index 7515cf0e1805..5db36caf4289 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c @@ -139,6 +139,19 @@ static int addr_to_vsyscall_nr(unsigned long addr) return nr; } +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP +static int vsyscall_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk, int syscall_nr) +{ + if (!seccomp_mode(&tsk->seccomp)) + return 0; + task_pt_regs(tsk)->orig_ax = syscall_nr; + task_pt_regs(tsk)->ax = syscall_nr; + return __secure_computing(syscall_nr); +} +#else +#define vsyscall_seccomp(_tsk, _nr) 0 +#endif + static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size) { /* @@ -174,6 +187,7 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) int vsyscall_nr; int prev_sig_on_uaccess_error; long ret; + int skip; /* * No point in checking CS -- the only way to get here is a user mode @@ -205,9 +219,6 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) } tsk = current; - if (seccomp_mode(&tsk->seccomp)) - do_exit(SIGKILL); - /* * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV. We want to * preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder. @@ -222,8 +233,13 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) * address 0". */ ret = -EFAULT; + skip = 0; switch (vsyscall_nr) { case 0: + skip = vsyscall_seccomp(tsk, __NR_gettimeofday); + if (skip) + break; + if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(struct timeval)) || !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(struct timezone))) break; @@ -234,6 +250,10 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) break; case 1: + skip = vsyscall_seccomp(tsk, __NR_time); + if (skip) + break; + if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(time_t))) break; @@ -241,6 +261,10 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) break; case 2: + skip = vsyscall_seccomp(tsk, __NR_getcpu); + if (skip) + break; + if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(unsigned)) || !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(unsigned))) break; @@ -253,6 +277,12 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error = prev_sig_on_uaccess_error; + if (skip) { + if ((long)regs->ax <= 0L) /* seccomp errno emulation */ + goto do_ret; + goto done; /* seccomp trace/trap */ + } + if (ret == -EFAULT) { /* Bad news -- userspace fed a bad pointer to a vsyscall. */ warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs, @@ -271,10 +301,11 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) regs->ax = ret; +do_ret: /* Emulate a ret instruction. */ regs->ip = caller; regs->sp += 8; - +done: return true; sigsegv: |