diff options
author | Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> | 2014-11-14 07:39:57 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2014-11-18 00:58:52 +0100 |
commit | 6ba48ff46f764414f979d2eacb23c4e6296bcc95 (patch) | |
tree | c1e1ea9fd3e1ef9c396e36c5d446fa6f74d97224 /arch/x86/include | |
parent | 206c5f60a3d902bc4b56dab2de3e88de5eb06108 (diff) |
x86: Remove arbitrary instruction size limit in instruction decoder
The current x86 instruction decoder steps along through the
instruction stream but always ensures that it never steps farther
than the largest possible instruction size (MAX_INSN_SIZE).
The MPX code is now going to be doing some decoding of userspace
instructions. We copy those from userspace in to the kernel and
they're obviously completely untrusted coming from userspace. In
addition to the constraint that instructions can only be so long,
we also have to be aware of how long the buffer is that came in
from userspace. This _looks_ to be similar to what the perf and
kprobes is doing, but it's unclear to me whether they are
affected.
The whole reason we need this is that it is perfectly valid to be
executing an instruction within MAX_INSN_SIZE bytes of an
unreadable page. We should be able to gracefully handle short
reads in those cases.
This adds support to the decoder to record how long the buffer
being decoded is and to refuse to "validate" the instruction if
we would have gone over the end of the buffer to decode it.
The kprobes code probably needs to be looked at here a bit more
carefully. This patch still respects the MAX_INSN_SIZE limit
there but the kprobes code does look like it might be able to
be a bit more strict than it currently is.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Jim Keniston <jkenisto@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114153957.E6B01535@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h | 10 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h index 48eb30a86062..47f29b1d1846 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct insn { unsigned char x86_64; const insn_byte_t *kaddr; /* kernel address of insn to analyze */ + const insn_byte_t *end_kaddr; /* kernel address of last insn in buffer */ const insn_byte_t *next_byte; }; @@ -96,7 +97,7 @@ struct insn { #define X86_VEX_P(vex) ((vex) & 0x03) /* VEX3 Byte2, VEX2 Byte1 */ #define X86_VEX_M_MAX 0x1f /* VEX3.M Maximum value */ -extern void insn_init(struct insn *insn, const void *kaddr, int x86_64); +extern void insn_init(struct insn *insn, const void *kaddr, int buf_len, int x86_64); extern void insn_get_prefixes(struct insn *insn); extern void insn_get_opcode(struct insn *insn); extern void insn_get_modrm(struct insn *insn); @@ -115,12 +116,13 @@ static inline void insn_get_attribute(struct insn *insn) extern int insn_rip_relative(struct insn *insn); /* Init insn for kernel text */ -static inline void kernel_insn_init(struct insn *insn, const void *kaddr) +static inline void kernel_insn_init(struct insn *insn, + const void *kaddr, int buf_len) { #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - insn_init(insn, kaddr, 1); + insn_init(insn, kaddr, buf_len, 1); #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ - insn_init(insn, kaddr, 0); + insn_init(insn, kaddr, buf_len, 0); #endif } |