diff options
author | Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> | 2019-04-24 09:19:24 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2019-04-24 12:19:45 +0200 |
commit | 6ae865615fc43d014da2fd1f1bba7e81ee622d1b (patch) | |
tree | d13c96f1252d46f49022a1c77d5795f51baf3e87 /arch/x86/include | |
parent | 64604d54d3115fee89598bfb6d8d2252f8a2d114 (diff) |
x86/uaccess: Dont leak the AC flag into __put_user() argument evaluation
The __put_user() macro evaluates it's @ptr argument inside the
__uaccess_begin() / __uaccess_end() region. While this would normally
not be expected to be an issue, an UBSAN bug (it ignored -fwrapv,
fixed in GCC 8+) would transform the @ptr evaluation for:
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c: if (unlikely(__put_user(offset, &urelocs[r-stack].presumed_offset))) {
into a signed-overflow-UB check and trigger the objtool AC validation.
Finish this commit:
2a418cf3f5f1 ("x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation")
and explicitly evaluate all 3 arguments early.
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: luto@kernel.org
Fixes: 2a418cf3f5f1 ("x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190424072208.695962771@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 7 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index 5ca7b91faf67..bb21913885a3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -427,10 +427,11 @@ do { \ ({ \ __label__ __pu_label; \ int __pu_err = -EFAULT; \ - __typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val; \ - __pu_val = x; \ + __typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val = (x); \ + __typeof__(ptr) __pu_ptr = (ptr); \ + __typeof__(size) __pu_size = (size); \ __uaccess_begin(); \ - __put_user_size(__pu_val, (ptr), (size), __pu_label); \ + __put_user_size(__pu_val, __pu_ptr, __pu_size, __pu_label); \ __pu_err = 0; \ __pu_label: \ __uaccess_end(); \ |