diff options
| author | Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> | 2020-09-15 22:11:13 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> | 2020-09-29 16:08:15 +0100 |
| commit | 6e5f0927846adf39aebee450f13871e3cb4ab012 (patch) | |
| tree | 261a6871c7b1a509831ad48b9ec2ea0fe9204675 /arch/arm64/Kconfig | |
| parent | 39533e12063be7f55e3d6ae21ffe067799d542a4 (diff) | |
arm64: Remove Spectre-related CONFIG_* options
The spectre mitigations are too configurable for their own good, leading
to confusing logic trying to figure out when we should mitigate and when
we shouldn't. Although the plethora of command-line options need to stick
around for backwards compatibility, the default-on CONFIG options that
depend on EXPERT can be dropped, as the mitigations only do anything if
the system is vulnerable, a mitigation is available and the command-line
hasn't disabled it.
Remove CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR and CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD in favour of
enabling this code unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/Kconfig | 26 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 6d232837cbee..51259274a819 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1165,32 +1165,6 @@ config UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 If unsure, say Y. -config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR - bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT - default y - help - Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on - being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by - executing aliasing branches in the attacker context. Such attacks - can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch - predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations. - - This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the - branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific - instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system - firmware. - - If unsure, say Y. - -config ARM64_SSBD - bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT - default y - help - This enables mitigation of the bypassing of previous stores - by speculative loads. - - If unsure, say Y. - config RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED bool "Apply r/o permissions of VM areas also to their linear aliases" default y |