Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security layer updates from James Morris:

 - a major update for AppArmor. From JJ:

     * several bug fixes and cleanups

     * the patch to add symlink support to securityfs that was floated
       on the list earlier and the apparmorfs changes that make use of
       securityfs symlinks

     * it introduces the domain labeling base code that Ubuntu has been
       carrying for several years, with several cleanups applied. And it
       converts the current mediation over to using the domain labeling
       base, which brings domain stacking support with it. This finally
       will bring the base upstream code in line with Ubuntu and provide
       a base to upstream the new feature work that Ubuntu carries.

     * This does _not_ contain any of the newer apparmor mediation
       features/controls (mount, signals, network, keys, ...) that
       Ubuntu is currently carrying, all of which will be RFC'd on top
       of this.

 - Notable also is the Infiniband work in SELinux, and the new file:map
   permission. From Paul:

      "While we're down to 21 patches for v4.13 (it was 31 for v4.12),
       the diffstat jumps up tremendously with over 2k of line changes.

       Almost all of these changes are the SELinux/IB work done by
       Daniel Jurgens; some other noteworthy changes include a NFS v4.2
       labeling fix, a new file:map permission, and reporting of policy
       capabilities on policy load"

   There's also now genfscon labeling support for tracefs, which was
   lost in v4.1 with the separation from debugfs.

 - Smack incorporates a safer socket check in file_receive, and adds a
   cap_capable call in privilege check.

 - TPM as usual has a bunch of fixes and enhancements.

 - Multiple calls to security_add_hooks() can now be made for the same
   LSM, to allow LSMs to have hook declarations across multiple files.

 - IMA now supports different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from
   the boot command line.

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (126 commits)
  apparmor: put back designators in struct initialisers
  seccomp: Switch from atomic_t to recount_t
  seccomp: Adjust selftests to avoid double-join
  seccomp: Clean up core dump logic
  IMA: update IMA policy documentation to include pcr= option
  ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature
  ima: Simplify policy_func_show.
  integrity: Small code improvements
  ima: fix get_binary_runtime_size()
  ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse template data
  ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers
  ima: introduce ima_parse_buf()
  ima: Add cgroups2 to the defaults list
  ima: use memdup_user_nul
  ima: fix up #endif comments
  IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selection
  ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled()
  ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option
  ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures
  ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policies
  ...

1 files changed, 15 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 3b335c1f8441..f24ee1c99412 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1501,12 +1501,21 @@
 			in crypto/hash_info.h.
 
 	ima_policy=	[IMA]
-			The builtin measurement policy to load during IMA
-			setup.  Specyfing "tcb" as the value, measures all
-			programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
-			opened with the read mode bit set by either the
-			effective uid (euid=0) or uid=0.
-			Format: "tcb"
+			The builtin policies to load during IMA setup.
+			Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb | secure_boot"
+
+			The "tcb" policy measures all programs exec'd, files
+			mmap'd for exec, and all files opened with the read
+			mode bit set by either the effective uid (euid=0) or
+			uid=0.
+
+			The "appraise_tcb" policy appraises the integrity of
+			all files owned by root. (This is the equivalent
+			of ima_appraise_tcb.)
+
+			The "secure_boot" policy appraises the integrity
+			of files (eg. kexec kernel image, kernel modules,
+			firmware, policy, etc) based on file signatures.
 
 	ima_tcb		[IMA] Deprecated.  Use ima_policy= instead.
 			Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted