diff options
| author | Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> | 2016-12-02 16:35:09 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> | 2016-12-12 23:09:21 +0100 |
| commit | 5c056fdc5b474329037f2aa18401bd73033e0ce0 (patch) | |
| tree | c1ae131badc84a83b8df5746b5ce93bebfc2da39 | |
| parent | 5418d0a2c859abca2e59d7db36ba477ee4a3ebc6 (diff) | |
libceph: verify authorize reply on connect
After sending an authorizer (ceph_x_authorize_a + ceph_x_authorize_b),
the client gets back a ceph_x_authorize_reply, which it is supposed to
verify to ensure the authenticity and protect against replay attacks.
The code for doing this is there (ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(),
ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply() + plumbing), but it is never
invoked by the the messenger.
AFAICT this goes back to 2009, when ceph authentication protocols
support was added to the kernel client in 4e7a5dcd1bba ("ceph:
negotiate authentication protocol; implement AUTH_NONE protocol").
The second param of ceph_connection_operations::verify_authorizer_reply
is unused all the way down. Pass 0 to facilitate backporting, and kill
it in the next commit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ceph/messenger.c | 13 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger.c b/net/ceph/messenger.c index a5502898ea33..2efb335deada 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c @@ -2027,6 +2027,19 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con) dout("process_connect on %p tag %d\n", con, (int)con->in_tag); + if (con->auth_reply_buf) { + /* + * Any connection that defines ->get_authorizer() + * should also define ->verify_authorizer_reply(). + * See get_connect_authorizer(). + */ + ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con, 0); + if (ret < 0) { + con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply"; + return ret; + } + } + switch (con->in_reply.tag) { case CEPH_MSGR_TAG_FEATURES: pr_err("%s%lld %s feature set mismatch," |