Merge tag 'audit-pr-20210629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit

Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
 "Another merge window, another small audit pull request.

  Four patches in total: one is cosmetic, one removes an unnecessary
  initialization, one renames some enum values to prevent name
  collisions, and one converts list_del()/list_add() to list_move().

  None of these are earth shattering and all pass the audit-testsuite
  tests while merging cleanly on top of your tree from earlier today"

* tag 'audit-pr-20210629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: remove unnecessary 'ret' initialization
  audit: remove trailing spaces and tabs
  audit: Use list_move instead of list_del/list_add
  audit: Rename enum audit_state constants to avoid AUDIT_DISABLED redefinition
  audit: add blank line after variable declarations

5 files changed, 53 insertions, 37 deletions

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index cd2d8279a5e4..daa481729e9b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
  * 2500 - 2999 future user space (maybe integrity labels and related events)
  *
  * Messages from 1000-1199 are bi-directional. 1200-1299 & 2100 - 2999 are
- * exclusively user space. 1300-2099 is kernel --> user space 
+ * exclusively user space. 1300-2099 is kernel --> user space
  * communication.
  */
 #define AUDIT_GET		1000	/* Get status */
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
 #define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG	1199
 #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2	2100	/* More user space messages */
 #define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2	2999
- 
+
 #define AUDIT_DAEMON_START      1200    /* Daemon startup record */
 #define AUDIT_DAEMON_END        1201    /* Daemon normal stop record */
 #define AUDIT_DAEMON_ABORT      1202    /* Daemon error stop record */
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 1522e100fd17..b565ea16c0a5 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
-/* audit -- definition of audit_context structure and supporting types 
+/* audit -- definition of audit_context structure and supporting types
  *
  * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc.
  * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
@@ -21,16 +21,16 @@
    a per-task filter.  At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
    the syscall filter. */
 enum audit_state {
-	AUDIT_DISABLED,		/* Do not create per-task audit_context.
+	AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED,	/* Do not create per-task audit_context.
 				 * No syscall-specific audit records can
 				 * be generated. */
-	AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT,	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
+	AUDIT_STATE_BUILD,	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
 				 * and fill it in at syscall
 				 * entry time.  This makes a full
 				 * syscall record available if some
 				 * other part of the kernel decides it
 				 * should be recorded. */
-	AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
+	AUDIT_STATE_RECORD	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
 				 * always fill it in at syscall entry
 				 * time, and always write out the audit
 				 * record at syscall exit time.  */
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static inline int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) AUDIT_DISABLED
+#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
 
 extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
diff --git a/kernel/audit_tree.c b/kernel/audit_tree.c
index 6c91902f4f45..b2be4e978ba3 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_tree.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_tree.c
@@ -689,8 +689,7 @@ void audit_trim_trees(void)
 
 		tree = container_of(cursor.next, struct audit_tree, list);
 		get_tree(tree);
-		list_del(&cursor);
-		list_add(&cursor, &tree->list);
+		list_move(&cursor, &tree->list);
 		mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
 
 		err = kern_path(tree->pathname, 0, &path);
@@ -899,8 +898,7 @@ int audit_tag_tree(char *old, char *new)
 
 		tree = container_of(cursor.next, struct audit_tree, list);
 		get_tree(tree);
-		list_del(&cursor);
-		list_add(&cursor, &tree->list);
+		list_move(&cursor, &tree->list);
 		mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
 
 		err = kern_path(tree->pathname, 0, &path2);
@@ -925,8 +923,7 @@ int audit_tag_tree(char *old, char *new)
 		mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
 		spin_lock(&hash_lock);
 		if (!tree->goner) {
-			list_del(&tree->list);
-			list_add(&tree->list, &tree_list);
+			list_move(&tree->list, &tree_list);
 		}
 		spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
 		put_tree(tree);
@@ -937,8 +934,7 @@ int audit_tag_tree(char *old, char *new)
 
 		tree = container_of(barrier.prev, struct audit_tree, list);
 		get_tree(tree);
-		list_del(&tree->list);
-		list_add(&tree->list, &barrier);
+		list_move(&tree->list, &barrier);
 		mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
 
 		if (!failed) {
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 175ef6f3ea4e..8dd73a64f921 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs[] = {
 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
 {
 	unsigned n;
+
 	if (unlikely(!ctx))
 		return 0;
 	n = ctx->major;
@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
 	if (!ctx->prio) {
 		ctx->prio = 1;
-		ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
+		ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -239,6 +240,7 @@ static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
 {
 	struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
 	int left = ctx->tree_count;
+
 	if (likely(left)) {
 		p->c[--left] = chunk;
 		ctx->tree_count = left;
@@ -259,6 +261,7 @@ static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
 	struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
+
 	ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ctx->trees) {
 		ctx->trees = p;
@@ -277,6 +280,7 @@ static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
 {
 	struct audit_tree_refs *q;
 	int n;
+
 	if (!p) {
 		/* we started with empty chain */
 		p = ctx->first_trees;
@@ -303,6 +307,7 @@ static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
 {
 	struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
+
 	for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
 		q = p->next;
 		kfree(p);
@@ -313,6 +318,7 @@ static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
 {
 	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
 	int n;
+
 	if (!tree)
 		return 0;
 	/* full ones */
@@ -337,13 +343,13 @@ static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
 {
 	struct audit_names *n;
 	int rc;
- 
+
 	if (name) {
 		rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
- 
+
 	if (ctx) {
 		list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
 			rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
@@ -361,13 +367,13 @@ static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
 {
 	struct audit_names *n;
 	int rc;
- 
+
 	if (name) {
 		rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
- 
+
 	if (ctx) {
 		list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
 			rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
@@ -751,10 +757,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	}
 	switch (rule->action) {
 	case AUDIT_NEVER:
-		*state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
+		*state = AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED;
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
-		*state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
+		*state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
 		break;
 	}
 	return 1;
@@ -773,14 +779,14 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
 		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
 				       &state, true)) {
-			if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+			if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
 				*key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			return state;
 		}
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
+	return AUDIT_STATE_BUILD;
 }
 
 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
@@ -802,7 +808,7 @@ static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if the audit_state is
  * not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is also not
  * high enough that we already know we have to write an audit record
- * (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
+ * (i.e., the state is AUDIT_STATE_BUILD).
  */
 static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				 struct audit_context *ctx)
@@ -923,7 +929,7 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
 	if (!context)
 		return NULL;
 	context->state = state;
-	context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
+	context->prio = state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0;
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
 	context->fds[0] = -1;
@@ -950,7 +956,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
 		return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
 
 	state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
-	if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
+	if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) {
 		clear_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -1225,6 +1231,7 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 	switch (context->type) {
 	case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
 		int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
+
 		audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
 		for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
 			audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
@@ -1240,6 +1247,7 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 		if (osid) {
 			char *ctx = NULL;
 			u32 len;
+
 			if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
 				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
 				*call_panic = 1;
@@ -1289,6 +1297,7 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
 		struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
+
 		audit_log_format(ab,
 			"mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
 			"mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
@@ -1325,6 +1334,7 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
 {
 	char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
+
 	while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
 		end--;
 
@@ -1513,6 +1523,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
 
 		case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
 			struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
+
 			audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
 			audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
 			audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
@@ -1628,7 +1639,7 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 		audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context);
 		audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
-		if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+		if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
 			audit_log_exit();
 	}
 
@@ -1647,7 +1658,7 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
  * Fill in audit context at syscall entry.  This only happens if the
  * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
  * filters demand the audit context be built.  If the state from the
- * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
+ * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD,
  * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
  * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
  * be written).
@@ -1664,11 +1675,11 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
 	BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
 
 	state = context->state;
-	if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
+	if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED)
 		return;
 
 	context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
-	if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
+	if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD) {
 		context->prio = 0;
 		if (auditd_test_task(current))
 			return;
@@ -1693,7 +1704,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
  * @return_code: return value of the syscall
  *
  * Tear down after system call.  If the audit context has been marked as
- * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
+ * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_STATE_RECORD state from
  * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
  * message), then write out the syscall information.  In call cases,
  * free the names stored from getname().
@@ -1735,12 +1746,12 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
 
 		audit_filter_syscall(current, context);
 		audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
-		if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+		if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
 			audit_log_exit();
 	}
 
 	context->in_syscall = 0;
-	context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
+	context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0;
 
 	audit_free_module(context);
 	audit_free_names(context);
@@ -1753,7 +1764,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
 	context->sockaddr_len = 0;
 	context->type = 0;
 	context->fds[0] = -1;
-	if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
+	if (context->state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) {
 		kfree(context->filterkey);
 		context->filterkey = NULL;
 	}
@@ -1765,6 +1776,7 @@ static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
 	struct audit_tree_refs *p;
 	struct audit_chunk *chunk;
 	int count;
+
 	if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
 		return;
 	context = audit_context();
@@ -1806,8 +1818,10 @@ retry:
 	seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
 	for(;;) {
 		struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
+
 		if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
 			struct audit_chunk *chunk;
+
 			chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
 			if (chunk) {
 				if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
@@ -2203,7 +2217,7 @@ int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
 	*serial    = ctx->serial;
 	if (!ctx->prio) {
 		ctx->prio = 1;
-		ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
+		ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
 	}
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -2285,6 +2299,7 @@ void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+
 	context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
 	context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
 	context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
@@ -2298,6 +2313,7 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+
 	context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
 	context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
 	context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
@@ -2362,6 +2378,7 @@ int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+
 	context->fds[0] = fd1;
 	context->fds[1] = fd2;
 }
@@ -2379,6 +2396,7 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
 
 	if (!context->sockaddr) {
 		void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
+
 		if (!p)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		context->sockaddr = p;
@@ -2510,6 +2528,7 @@ int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+
 	context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
 	context->capset.cap.effective   = new->cap_effective;
 	context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
@@ -2521,6 +2540,7 @@ void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+
 	context->mmap.fd = fd;
 	context->mmap.flags = flags;
 	context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
@@ -2686,6 +2706,7 @@ void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
 {
 	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
+
 	if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
 		return NULL;
 	return &ctx->killed_trees;
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 82ce14933513..5a5016ef43b0 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -119,7 +119,6 @@ int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
 	ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
-	ret = 0;
 	/* IPv6 can have several extension header before the Transport header
 	 * skip them */
 	offset = skb_network_offset(skb);