From 64b0812b6d26bb30cac74c65f51f4ebfb4ec5429 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2007 11:50:38 +0900
Subject: SCTP : Fix bad formatted comment in outqueue.c

Just fix the bad format of the comment in outqueue.c.

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/outqueue.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'net')

diff --git a/net/sctp/outqueue.c b/net/sctp/outqueue.c
index 28f4fe77ceee..e315c6c756ca 100644
--- a/net/sctp/outqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/outqueue.c
@@ -641,7 +641,8 @@ static int sctp_outq_flush_rtx(struct sctp_outq *q, struct sctp_packet *pkt,
 
 		/* If we are here due to a retransmit timeout or a fast
 		 * retransmit and if there are any chunks left in the retransmit
-		 * queue that could not fit in the PMTU sized packet, they need			 * to be marked as ineligible for a subsequent fast retransmit.
+		 * queue that could not fit in the PMTU sized packet, they need
+		 * to be marked as ineligible for a subsequent fast retransmit.
 		 */
 		if (rtx_timeout && !lchunk) {
 			list_for_each(lchunk1, lqueue) {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f3830ccc2ea503ab37d605f6c313d61423ddd94e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2007 11:51:03 +0900
Subject: SCTP : Fix to process bundled ASCONF chunk correctly

If ASCONF chunk is bundled with other chunks as the first chunk, when
process the ASCONF parameters, full packet data will be process as the
parameters of the ASCONF chunk, not only the real parameters. So if you
send a ASCONF chunk bundled with other chunks, you will get an unexpect
result.
This problem also exists when ASCONF-ACK chunk is bundled with other chunks.

This patch fix this problem.

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net')

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index c377e4e8f653..5de4729fe993 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -2848,10 +2848,11 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 
 	__be16	err_code;
 	int	length = 0;
-	int	chunk_len = asconf->skb->len;
+	int	chunk_len;
 	__u32	serial;
 	int	all_param_pass = 1;
 
+	chunk_len = ntohs(asconf->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);
 	hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf->skb->data;
 	serial = ntohl(hdr->serial);
 
@@ -2990,7 +2991,7 @@ static __be16 sctp_get_asconf_response(struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack,
 	sctp_addip_param_t	*asconf_ack_param;
 	sctp_errhdr_t		*err_param;
 	int			length;
-	int			asconf_ack_len = asconf_ack->skb->len;
+	int			asconf_ack_len;
 	__be16			err_code;
 
 	if (no_err)
@@ -2998,6 +2999,9 @@ static __be16 sctp_get_asconf_response(struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack,
 	else
 		err_code = SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
 
+	asconf_ack_len = ntohs(asconf_ack->chunk_hdr->length) -
+			     sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t);
+
 	/* Skip the addiphdr from the asconf_ack chunk and store a pointer to
 	 * the first asconf_ack parameter.
 	 */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From b6157d8e03e1e780660a328f7183bcbfa4a93a19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2007 15:59:16 -0400
Subject: SCTP: Fix difference cases of retransmit.

Commit d0ce92910bc04e107b2f3f2048f07e94f570035d broke several retransmit
cases including fast retransmit.  The reason is that we should
only delay by rto while doing retranmists as a result of a timeout.
Retransmit as a result of path mtu discover, fast retransmit, or
other evernts that should trigger immidiate retransmissions got broken.

Also, since rto is doubled prior to marking of packets elegable for
retransmission, we never marked correct chunks anyway.

The fix is provide a reason for a given retransmission so that we
can mark chunks appropriately and to save the old rto value to do
comparisons against.

All regressions tests passed with this code.

Spotted by Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/outqueue.c      | 33 +++++++++++++++++----------------
 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c | 10 +++++++++-
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c  |  2 +-
 net/sctp/transport.c     |  5 +++--
 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net')

diff --git a/net/sctp/outqueue.c b/net/sctp/outqueue.c
index e315c6c756ca..99a3db5d5fae 100644
--- a/net/sctp/outqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/outqueue.c
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static void sctp_insert_list(struct list_head *head, struct list_head *new)
 /* Mark all the eligible packets on a transport for retransmission.  */
 void sctp_retransmit_mark(struct sctp_outq *q,
 			  struct sctp_transport *transport,
-			  __u8 fast_retransmit)
+			  __u8 reason)
 {
 	struct list_head *lchunk, *ltemp;
 	struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
@@ -412,20 +412,20 @@ void sctp_retransmit_mark(struct sctp_outq *q,
 			continue;
 		}
 
-		/* If we are doing retransmission due to a fast retransmit,
-		 * only the chunk's that are marked for fast retransmit
-		 * should be added to the retransmit queue.  If we are doing
-		 * retransmission due to a timeout or pmtu discovery, only the
-		 * chunks that are not yet acked should be added to the
-		 * retransmit queue.
+		/* If we are doing  retransmission due to a timeout or pmtu
+		 * discovery, only the  chunks that are not yet acked should
+		 * be added to the retransmit queue.
 		 */
-		if ((fast_retransmit && (chunk->fast_retransmit > 0)) ||
-		   (!fast_retransmit && !chunk->tsn_gap_acked)) {
+		if ((reason == SCTP_RTXR_FAST_RTX  &&
+			    (chunk->fast_retransmit > 0)) ||
+		    (reason != SCTP_RTXR_FAST_RTX  && !chunk->tsn_gap_acked)) {
 			/* If this chunk was sent less then 1 rto ago, do not
 			 * retransmit this chunk, but give the peer time
-			 * to acknowlege it.
+			 * to acknowlege it.  Do this only when
+			 * retransmitting due to T3 timeout.
 			 */
-			if ((jiffies - chunk->sent_at) < transport->rto)
+			if (reason == SCTP_RTXR_T3_RTX &&
+			    (jiffies - chunk->sent_at) < transport->last_rto)
 				continue;
 
 			/* RFC 2960 6.2.1 Processing a Received SACK
@@ -467,10 +467,10 @@ void sctp_retransmit_mark(struct sctp_outq *q,
 		}
 	}
 
-	SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: transport: %p, fast_retransmit: %d, "
+	SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: transport: %p, reason: %d, "
 			  "cwnd: %d, ssthresh: %d, flight_size: %d, "
 			  "pba: %d\n", __FUNCTION__,
-			  transport, fast_retransmit,
+			  transport, reason,
 			  transport->cwnd, transport->ssthresh,
 			  transport->flight_size,
 			  transport->partial_bytes_acked);
@@ -484,7 +484,6 @@ void sctp_retransmit(struct sctp_outq *q, struct sctp_transport *transport,
 		     sctp_retransmit_reason_t reason)
 {
 	int error = 0;
-	__u8 fast_retransmit = 0;
 
 	switch(reason) {
 	case SCTP_RTXR_T3_RTX:
@@ -499,16 +498,18 @@ void sctp_retransmit(struct sctp_outq *q, struct sctp_transport *transport,
 	case SCTP_RTXR_FAST_RTX:
 		SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_FAST_RETRANSMITS);
 		sctp_transport_lower_cwnd(transport, SCTP_LOWER_CWND_FAST_RTX);
-		fast_retransmit = 1;
 		break;
 	case SCTP_RTXR_PMTUD:
 		SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_PMTUD_RETRANSMITS);
 		break;
+	case SCTP_RTXR_T1_RTX:
+		SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_T1_RETRANSMITS);
+		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
 	}
 
-	sctp_retransmit_mark(q, transport, fast_retransmit);
+	sctp_retransmit_mark(q, transport, reason);
 
 	/* PR-SCTP A5) Any time the T3-rtx timer expires, on any destination,
 	 * the sender SHOULD try to advance the "Advanced.Peer.Ack.Point" by
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
index bbdc938da86f..78d1a8a49bd0 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
@@ -453,6 +453,7 @@ static void sctp_do_8_2_transport_strike(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 	 * maximum value discussed in rule C7 above (RTO.max) may be
 	 * used to provide an upper bound to this doubling operation.
 	 */
+	transport->last_rto = transport->rto;
 	transport->rto = min((transport->rto * 2), transport->asoc->rto_max);
 }
 
@@ -1267,6 +1268,12 @@ static int sctp_cmd_interpreter(sctp_event_t event_type,
 			sctp_ootb_pkt_free(packet);
 			break;
 
+		case SCTP_CMD_T1_RETRAN:
+			/* Mark a transport for retransmission.  */
+			sctp_retransmit(&asoc->outqueue, cmd->obj.transport,
+					SCTP_RTXR_T1_RTX);
+			break;
+
 		case SCTP_CMD_RETRAN:
 			/* Mark a transport for retransmission.  */
 			sctp_retransmit(&asoc->outqueue, cmd->obj.transport,
@@ -1393,7 +1400,8 @@ static int sctp_cmd_interpreter(sctp_event_t event_type,
 			list_for_each(pos, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
 				t = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport,
 					       transports);
-				sctp_retransmit_mark(&asoc->outqueue, t, 0);
+				sctp_retransmit_mark(&asoc->outqueue, t,
+					    SCTP_RTXR_T1_RTX);
 			}
 
 			sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands,
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index f01b408508ff..a66075a70f29 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -2305,7 +2305,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 	/* If we've sent any data bundled with COOKIE-ECHO we will need to
 	 * resend
 	 */
-	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_RETRAN,
+	sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_T1_RETRAN,
 			SCTP_TRANSPORT(asoc->peer.primary_path));
 
 	/* Cast away the const modifier, as we want to just
diff --git a/net/sctp/transport.c b/net/sctp/transport.c
index 5f467c914f80..d55ce83a020b 100644
--- a/net/sctp/transport.c
+++ b/net/sctp/transport.c
@@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ static struct sctp_transport *sctp_transport_init(struct sctp_transport *peer,
 	 * given destination transport address, set RTO to the protocol
 	 * parameter 'RTO.Initial'.
 	 */
+	peer->last_rto = peer->rto = msecs_to_jiffies(sctp_rto_initial);
 	peer->rtt = 0;
-	peer->rto = msecs_to_jiffies(sctp_rto_initial);
 	peer->rttvar = 0;
 	peer->srtt = 0;
 	peer->rto_pending = 0;
@@ -385,6 +385,7 @@ void sctp_transport_update_rto(struct sctp_transport *tp, __u32 rtt)
 		tp->rto = tp->asoc->rto_max;
 
 	tp->rtt = rtt;
+	tp->last_rto = tp->rto;
 
 	/* Reset rto_pending so that a new RTT measurement is started when a
 	 * new data chunk is sent.
@@ -578,7 +579,7 @@ void sctp_transport_reset(struct sctp_transport *t)
 	 */
 	t->cwnd = min(4*asoc->pathmtu, max_t(__u32, 2*asoc->pathmtu, 4380));
 	t->ssthresh = asoc->peer.i.a_rwnd;
-	t->rto = asoc->rto_initial;
+	t->last_rto = t->rto = asoc->rto_initial;
 	t->rtt = 0;
 	t->srtt = 0;
 	t->rttvar = 0;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0ed90fb0f668fd07f14ae2007a809e8b26cd27a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2007 16:10:00 -0400
Subject: SCTP: Update RCU handling during the ADD-IP case

After learning more about rcu, it looks like the ADD-IP hadling
doesn't need to call call_rcu_bh.  All the rcu critical sections
use rcu_read_lock, so using call_rcu_bh is wrong here.
Now, restore the local_bh_disable() code blocks and use normal
call_rcu() calls.  Also restore the missing return statement.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/bind_addr.c     | 13 +++----------
 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c |  6 +++++-
 net/sctp/socket.c        |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net')

diff --git a/net/sctp/bind_addr.c b/net/sctp/bind_addr.c
index dfffa94fb9f6..cae95af9a8cc 100644
--- a/net/sctp/bind_addr.c
+++ b/net/sctp/bind_addr.c
@@ -180,9 +180,7 @@ int sctp_add_bind_addr(struct sctp_bind_addr *bp, union sctp_addr *new,
 /* Delete an address from the bind address list in the SCTP_bind_addr
  * structure.
  */
-int sctp_del_bind_addr(struct sctp_bind_addr *bp, union sctp_addr *del_addr,
-			void fastcall (*rcu_call)(struct rcu_head *head,
-					 void (*func)(struct rcu_head *head)))
+int sctp_del_bind_addr(struct sctp_bind_addr *bp, union sctp_addr *del_addr)
 {
 	struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *addr, *temp;
 
@@ -198,15 +196,10 @@ int sctp_del_bind_addr(struct sctp_bind_addr *bp, union sctp_addr *del_addr,
 		}
 	}
 
-	/* Call the rcu callback provided in the args.  This function is
-	 * called by both BH packet processing and user side socket option
-	 * processing, but it works on different lists in those 2 contexts.
-	 * Each context provides it's own callback, whether call_rcu_bh()
-	 * or call_rcu(), to make sure that we wait for an appropriate time.
-	 */
 	if (addr && !addr->valid) {
-		rcu_call(&addr->rcu, sctp_local_addr_free);
+		call_rcu(&addr->rcu, sctp_local_addr_free);
 		SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(addr);
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 5de4729fe993..c60564dd169d 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -2953,13 +2953,17 @@ static int sctp_asconf_param_success(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 		/* This is always done in BH context with a socket lock
 		 * held, so the list can not change.
 		 */
+		local_bh_disable();
 		list_for_each_entry(saddr, &bp->address_list, list) {
 			if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(&saddr->a, &addr))
 				saddr->use_as_src = 1;
 		}
+		local_bh_enable();
 		break;
 	case SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP:
-		retval = sctp_del_bind_addr(bp, &addr, call_rcu_bh);
+		local_bh_disable();
+		retval = sctp_del_bind_addr(bp, &addr);
+		local_bh_enable();
 		list_for_each(pos, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
 			transport = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport,
 						 transports);
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index a7ecf3159e53..6ce9b490fad5 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ static int sctp_bindx_rem(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addrs, int addrcnt)
 		 * socket routing and failover schemes. Refer to comments in
 		 * sctp_do_bind(). -daisy
 		 */
-		retval = sctp_del_bind_addr(bp, sa_addr, call_rcu);
+		retval = sctp_del_bind_addr(bp, sa_addr);
 
 		addr_buf += af->sockaddr_len;
 err_bindx_rem:
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 88799fe5ec65fad1d5cb1d4dc5d8f78edb949f1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2007 17:24:23 -0400
Subject: SCTP: Correctly disable ADD-IP when AUTH is not supported.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/associola.c     | 2 +-
 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 5 +++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net')

diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c
index 03158e3665da..eaad5c5535a8 100644
--- a/net/sctp/associola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *sctp_association_init(struct sctp_association *a
 	/* Assume that the peer recongizes ASCONF until reported otherwise
 	 * via an ERROR chunk.
 	 */
-	asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 1;
+	asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 0;
 
 	/* Create an input queue.  */
 	sctp_inq_init(&asoc->base.inqueue);
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index c60564dd169d..2ff3a3df049d 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ static void sctp_process_ext_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 			    break;
 		    case SCTP_CID_ASCONF:
 		    case SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK:
-			    asoc->peer.addip_capable = 1;
+			    asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 1;
 			    break;
 		    default:
 			    break;
@@ -2138,10 +2138,11 @@ int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_association *asoc, sctp_cid_t cid,
 	/* If the peer claims support for ADD-IP without support
 	 * for AUTH, disable support for ADD-IP.
 	 */
-	if (asoc->peer.addip_capable && !asoc->peer.auth_capable) {
+	if (asoc->peer.asconf_capable && !asoc->peer.auth_capable) {
 		asoc->peer.addip_disabled_mask |= (SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP |
 						  SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP |
 						  SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY);
+		asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 0;
 	}
 
 	/* Walk list of transports, removing transports in the UNKNOWN state. */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 73d9c4fd1a6ec4950b2eac8135d35506bf400d6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2007 17:24:26 -0400
Subject: SCTP: Allow ADD_IP to work with AUTH for backward compatibility.

This patch adds a tunable that will allow ADD_IP to work without
AUTH for backward compatibility.  The default value is off since
the default value for ADD_IP is off as well.  People who need
to use ADD-IP with older implementations take risks of connection
hijacking and should consider upgrading or turning this tunable on.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/associola.c     | 8 ++++++--
 net/sctp/protocol.c      | 1 +
 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 4 +++-
 net/sctp/sysctl.c        | 9 +++++++++
 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net')

diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c
index eaad5c5535a8..013e3d3ab0f1 100644
--- a/net/sctp/associola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/associola.c
@@ -262,10 +262,14 @@ static struct sctp_association *sctp_association_init(struct sctp_association *a
 	 */
 	asoc->peer.sack_needed = 1;
 
-	/* Assume that the peer recongizes ASCONF until reported otherwise
-	 * via an ERROR chunk.
+	/* Assume that the peer will tell us if he recognizes ASCONF
+	 * as part of INIT exchange.
+	 * The sctp_addip_noauth option is there for backward compatibilty
+	 * and will revert old behavior.
 	 */
 	asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 0;
+	if (sctp_addip_noauth)
+		asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 1;
 
 	/* Create an input queue.  */
 	sctp_inq_init(&asoc->base.inqueue);
diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c
index 40c1a47d1b8d..ecfab0344e73 100644
--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c
@@ -1179,6 +1179,7 @@ SCTP_STATIC __init int sctp_init(void)
 
 	/* Disable ADDIP by default. */
 	sctp_addip_enable = 0;
+	sctp_addip_noauth = 0;
 
 	/* Enable PR-SCTP by default. */
 	sctp_prsctp_enable = 1;
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 2ff3a3df049d..43e8de1228f9 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -2137,8 +2137,10 @@ int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_association *asoc, sctp_cid_t cid,
 
 	/* If the peer claims support for ADD-IP without support
 	 * for AUTH, disable support for ADD-IP.
+	 * Do this only if backward compatible mode is turned off.
 	 */
-	if (asoc->peer.asconf_capable && !asoc->peer.auth_capable) {
+	if (!sctp_addip_noauth &&
+	     (asoc->peer.asconf_capable && !asoc->peer.auth_capable)) {
 		asoc->peer.addip_disabled_mask |= (SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP |
 						  SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP |
 						  SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY);
diff --git a/net/sctp/sysctl.c b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
index 0669778e4335..da4f15734fb1 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
@@ -263,6 +263,15 @@ static ctl_table sctp_table[] = {
 		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
 		.strategy	= &sysctl_intvec
 	},
+	{
+		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
+		.procname	= "addip_noauth_enable",
+		.data		= &sctp_addip_noauth,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= &proc_dointvec,
+		.strategy	= &sysctl_intvec
+	},
 	{ .ctl_name = 0 }
 };
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 027f6e1ad32de32f9fe1c61d0f744e329e8acfd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2007 11:39:27 -0500
Subject: SCTP: Fix a potential race between timers and receive path.

There is a possible race condition where the timer code will
free the association and the next packet in the queue will also
attempt to free the same association.

The example is, when we receive an ABORT at about the same time
as the retransmission timer fires.  If the timer wins the race,
it will free the association.  Once it releases the lock, the
queue processing will recieve the ABORT and will try to free
the association again.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/inqueue.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net')

diff --git a/net/sctp/inqueue.c b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
index f10fe7fbf24c..cf4b7eb023b3 100644
--- a/net/sctp/inqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/inqueue.c
@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ void sctp_inq_free(struct sctp_inq *queue)
 void sctp_inq_push(struct sctp_inq *q, struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
 {
 	/* Directly call the packet handling routine. */
+	if (chunk->rcvr->dead) {
+		sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	/* We are now calling this either from the soft interrupt
 	 * or from the backlog processing.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 123ed979eaa8de0dd2422862d247469eda0bd645 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2007 11:41:36 -0500
Subject: SCTP: Use hashed lookup when looking for an association.

A SCTP endpoint may have a lot of associations on them and walking
the list is fairly inefficient.  Instead, use a hashed lookup,
and filter out the hash list based on the endopoing we already have.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/endpointola.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net')

diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
index 2d2d81ef4a69..68f0556efcc6 100644
--- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
@@ -328,24 +328,34 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(
 	const union sctp_addr *paddr,
 	struct sctp_transport **transport)
 {
+	struct sctp_association *asoc = NULL;
+	struct sctp_transport *t = NULL;
+	struct sctp_hashbucket *head;
+	struct sctp_ep_common *epb;
+	int hash;
 	int rport;
-	struct sctp_association *asoc;
-	struct list_head *pos;
 
+	*transport = NULL;
 	rport = ntohs(paddr->v4.sin_port);
 
-	list_for_each(pos, &ep->asocs) {
-		asoc = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_association, asocs);
-		if (rport == asoc->peer.port) {
-			*transport = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, paddr);
-
-			if (*transport)
-				return asoc;
+	hash = sctp_assoc_hashfn(ep->base.bind_addr.port, rport);
+	head = &sctp_assoc_hashtable[hash];
+	read_lock(&head->lock);
+	for (epb = head->chain; epb; epb = epb->next) {
+		asoc = sctp_assoc(epb);
+		if (asoc->ep != ep || rport != asoc->peer.port)
+			goto next;
+
+		t = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, paddr);
+		if (t) {
+			*transport = t;
+			break;
 		}
+next:
+		asoc = NULL;
 	}
-
-	*transport = NULL;
-	return NULL;
+	read_unlock(&head->lock);
+	return asoc;
 }
 
 /* Lookup association on an endpoint based on a peer address.  BH-safe.  */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d970dbf8455eb1b8cebd3cde6e18f73dd1b3ce38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2007 11:43:40 -0500
Subject: SCTP: Convert custom hash lists to use hlist.

Convert the custom hash list traversals to use hlist functions.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/endpointola.c |  3 ++-
 net/sctp/input.c       | 43 +++++++++++--------------------------------
 net/sctp/proc.c        |  6 ++++--
 net/sctp/protocol.c    |  6 +++---
 net/sctp/socket.c      | 14 +++++---------
 5 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net')

diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
index 68f0556efcc6..de6f505d6ff8 100644
--- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(
 	struct sctp_transport *t = NULL;
 	struct sctp_hashbucket *head;
 	struct sctp_ep_common *epb;
+	struct hlist_node *node;
 	int hash;
 	int rport;
 
@@ -341,7 +342,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(
 	hash = sctp_assoc_hashfn(ep->base.bind_addr.port, rport);
 	head = &sctp_assoc_hashtable[hash];
 	read_lock(&head->lock);
-	for (epb = head->chain; epb; epb = epb->next) {
+	sctp_for_each_hentry(epb, node, &head->chain) {
 		asoc = sctp_assoc(epb);
 		if (asoc->ep != ep || rport != asoc->peer.port)
 			goto next;
diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c
index 86503e7fa21e..91ae463b079b 100644
--- a/net/sctp/input.c
+++ b/net/sctp/input.c
@@ -656,7 +656,6 @@ discard:
 /* Insert endpoint into the hash table.  */
 static void __sctp_hash_endpoint(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
 {
-	struct sctp_ep_common **epp;
 	struct sctp_ep_common *epb;
 	struct sctp_hashbucket *head;
 
@@ -666,12 +665,7 @@ static void __sctp_hash_endpoint(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
 	head = &sctp_ep_hashtable[epb->hashent];
 
 	sctp_write_lock(&head->lock);
-	epp = &head->chain;
-	epb->next = *epp;
-	if (epb->next)
-		(*epp)->pprev = &epb->next;
-	*epp = epb;
-	epb->pprev = epp;
+	hlist_add_head(&epb->node, &head->chain);
 	sctp_write_unlock(&head->lock);
 }
 
@@ -691,19 +685,15 @@ static void __sctp_unhash_endpoint(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
 
 	epb = &ep->base;
 
+	if (hlist_unhashed(&epb->node))
+		return;
+
 	epb->hashent = sctp_ep_hashfn(epb->bind_addr.port);
 
 	head = &sctp_ep_hashtable[epb->hashent];
 
 	sctp_write_lock(&head->lock);
-
-	if (epb->pprev) {
-		if (epb->next)
-			epb->next->pprev = epb->pprev;
-		*epb->pprev = epb->next;
-		epb->pprev = NULL;
-	}
-
+	__hlist_del(&epb->node);
 	sctp_write_unlock(&head->lock);
 }
 
@@ -721,12 +711,13 @@ static struct sctp_endpoint *__sctp_rcv_lookup_endpoint(const union sctp_addr *l
 	struct sctp_hashbucket *head;
 	struct sctp_ep_common *epb;
 	struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
+	struct hlist_node *node;
 	int hash;
 
 	hash = sctp_ep_hashfn(ntohs(laddr->v4.sin_port));
 	head = &sctp_ep_hashtable[hash];
 	read_lock(&head->lock);
-	for (epb = head->chain; epb; epb = epb->next) {
+	sctp_for_each_hentry(epb, node, &head->chain) {
 		ep = sctp_ep(epb);
 		if (sctp_endpoint_is_match(ep, laddr))
 			goto hit;
@@ -744,7 +735,6 @@ hit:
 /* Insert association into the hash table.  */
 static void __sctp_hash_established(struct sctp_association *asoc)
 {
-	struct sctp_ep_common **epp;
 	struct sctp_ep_common *epb;
 	struct sctp_hashbucket *head;
 
@@ -756,12 +746,7 @@ static void __sctp_hash_established(struct sctp_association *asoc)
 	head = &sctp_assoc_hashtable[epb->hashent];
 
 	sctp_write_lock(&head->lock);
-	epp = &head->chain;
-	epb->next = *epp;
-	if (epb->next)
-		(*epp)->pprev = &epb->next;
-	*epp = epb;
-	epb->pprev = epp;
+	hlist_add_head(&epb->node, &head->chain);
 	sctp_write_unlock(&head->lock);
 }
 
@@ -790,14 +775,7 @@ static void __sctp_unhash_established(struct sctp_association *asoc)
 	head = &sctp_assoc_hashtable[epb->hashent];
 
 	sctp_write_lock(&head->lock);
-
-	if (epb->pprev) {
-		if (epb->next)
-			epb->next->pprev = epb->pprev;
-		*epb->pprev = epb->next;
-		epb->pprev = NULL;
-	}
-
+	__hlist_del(&epb->node);
 	sctp_write_unlock(&head->lock);
 }
 
@@ -822,6 +800,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_lookup_association(
 	struct sctp_ep_common *epb;
 	struct sctp_association *asoc;
 	struct sctp_transport *transport;
+	struct hlist_node *node;
 	int hash;
 
 	/* Optimize here for direct hit, only listening connections can
@@ -830,7 +809,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_lookup_association(
 	hash = sctp_assoc_hashfn(ntohs(local->v4.sin_port), ntohs(peer->v4.sin_port));
 	head = &sctp_assoc_hashtable[hash];
 	read_lock(&head->lock);
-	for (epb = head->chain; epb; epb = epb->next) {
+	sctp_for_each_hentry(epb, node, &head->chain) {
 		asoc = sctp_assoc(epb);
 		transport = sctp_assoc_is_match(asoc, local, peer);
 		if (transport)
diff --git a/net/sctp/proc.c b/net/sctp/proc.c
index e4cd841a22e4..249973204070 100644
--- a/net/sctp/proc.c
+++ b/net/sctp/proc.c
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ static int sctp_eps_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 	struct sctp_ep_common *epb;
 	struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
 	struct sock *sk;
+	struct hlist_node *node;
 	int    hash = *(loff_t *)v;
 
 	if (hash >= sctp_ep_hashsize)
@@ -233,7 +234,7 @@ static int sctp_eps_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 	head = &sctp_ep_hashtable[hash];
 	sctp_local_bh_disable();
 	read_lock(&head->lock);
-	for (epb = head->chain; epb; epb = epb->next) {
+	sctp_for_each_hentry(epb, node, &head->chain) {
 		ep = sctp_ep(epb);
 		sk = epb->sk;
 		seq_printf(seq, "%8p %8p %-3d %-3d %-4d %-5d %5d %5lu ", ep, sk,
@@ -328,6 +329,7 @@ static int sctp_assocs_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 	struct sctp_ep_common *epb;
 	struct sctp_association *assoc;
 	struct sock *sk;
+	struct hlist_node *node;
 	int    hash = *(loff_t *)v;
 
 	if (hash >= sctp_assoc_hashsize)
@@ -336,7 +338,7 @@ static int sctp_assocs_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 	head = &sctp_assoc_hashtable[hash];
 	sctp_local_bh_disable();
 	read_lock(&head->lock);
-	for (epb = head->chain; epb; epb = epb->next) {
+	sctp_for_each_hentry(epb, node, &head->chain) {
 		assoc = sctp_assoc(epb);
 		sk = epb->sk;
 		seq_printf(seq,
diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c
index ecfab0344e73..d50f610d1b02 100644
--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c
@@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@ SCTP_STATIC __init int sctp_init(void)
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < sctp_assoc_hashsize; i++) {
 		rwlock_init(&sctp_assoc_hashtable[i].lock);
-		sctp_assoc_hashtable[i].chain = NULL;
+		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_assoc_hashtable[i].chain);
 	}
 
 	/* Allocate and initialize the endpoint hash table.  */
@@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ SCTP_STATIC __init int sctp_init(void)
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < sctp_ep_hashsize; i++) {
 		rwlock_init(&sctp_ep_hashtable[i].lock);
-		sctp_ep_hashtable[i].chain = NULL;
+		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_ep_hashtable[i].chain);
 	}
 
 	/* Allocate and initialize the SCTP port hash table.  */
@@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ SCTP_STATIC __init int sctp_init(void)
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < sctp_port_hashsize; i++) {
 		spin_lock_init(&sctp_port_hashtable[i].lock);
-		sctp_port_hashtable[i].chain = NULL;
+		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sctp_port_hashtable[i].chain);
 	}
 
 	printk(KERN_INFO "SCTP: Hash tables configured "
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 6ce9b490fad5..ff8bc95670ed 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -5307,6 +5307,7 @@ static long sctp_get_port_local(struct sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr)
 {
 	struct sctp_bind_hashbucket *head; /* hash list */
 	struct sctp_bind_bucket *pp; /* hash list port iterator */
+	struct hlist_node *node;
 	unsigned short snum;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -5331,7 +5332,7 @@ static long sctp_get_port_local(struct sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr)
 			index = sctp_phashfn(rover);
 			head = &sctp_port_hashtable[index];
 			sctp_spin_lock(&head->lock);
-			for (pp = head->chain; pp; pp = pp->next)
+			sctp_for_each_hentry(pp, node, &head->chain)
 				if (pp->port == rover)
 					goto next;
 			break;
@@ -5358,7 +5359,7 @@ static long sctp_get_port_local(struct sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr)
 		 */
 		head = &sctp_port_hashtable[sctp_phashfn(snum)];
 		sctp_spin_lock(&head->lock);
-		for (pp = head->chain; pp; pp = pp->next) {
+		sctp_for_each_hentry(pp, node, &head->chain) {
 			if (pp->port == snum)
 				goto pp_found;
 		}
@@ -5702,10 +5703,7 @@ static struct sctp_bind_bucket *sctp_bucket_create(
 		pp->port = snum;
 		pp->fastreuse = 0;
 		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&pp->owner);
-		if ((pp->next = head->chain) != NULL)
-			pp->next->pprev = &pp->next;
-		head->chain = pp;
-		pp->pprev = &head->chain;
+		hlist_add_head(&pp->node, &head->chain);
 	}
 	return pp;
 }
@@ -5714,9 +5712,7 @@ static struct sctp_bind_bucket *sctp_bucket_create(
 static void sctp_bucket_destroy(struct sctp_bind_bucket *pp)
 {
 	if (pp && hlist_empty(&pp->owner)) {
-		if (pp->next)
-			pp->next->pprev = pp->pprev;
-		*(pp->pprev) = pp->next;
+		__hlist_del(&pp->node);
 		kmem_cache_free(sctp_bucket_cachep, pp);
 		SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(bind_bucket);
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 7ab9080467040054e27ae54d67cc185f24d881ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2007 11:43:41 -0500
Subject: SCTP: Make sctp_verify_param return multiple indications.

SCTP-AUTH and future ADD-IP updates have a requirement to
do additional verification of parameters and an ability to
ABORT the association if verification fails.  So, introduce
additional return code so that we can clear signal a required
action.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 149 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net')

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 43e8de1228f9..5a9783c38de1 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -1788,9 +1788,14 @@ static int sctp_process_inv_paramlength(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 						sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
 
 
+	/* This is a fatal error.  Any accumulated non-fatal errors are
+	 * not reported.
+	 */
+	if (*errp)
+		sctp_chunk_free(*errp);
+
 	/* Create an error chunk and fill it in with our payload. */
-	if (!*errp)
-		*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, payload_len);
+	*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, payload_len);
 
 	if (*errp) {
 		sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION,
@@ -1813,9 +1818,15 @@ static int sctp_process_hn_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 {
 	__u16 len = ntohs(param.p->length);
 
-	/* Make an ERROR chunk. */
-	if (!*errp)
-		*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, len);
+	/* Processing of the HOST_NAME parameter will generate an
+	 * ABORT.  If we've accumulated any non-fatal errors, they
+	 * would be unrecognized parameters and we should not include
+	 * them in the ABORT.
+	 */
+	if (*errp)
+		sctp_chunk_free(*errp);
+
+	*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, len);
 
 	if (*errp) {
 		sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED, len);
@@ -1862,56 +1873,40 @@ static void sctp_process_ext_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
  * taken if the processing endpoint does not recognize the
  * Parameter Type.
  *
- * 00 - Stop processing this SCTP chunk and discard it,
- *	do not process any further chunks within it.
+ * 00 - Stop processing this parameter; do not process any further
+ * 	parameters within this chunk
  *
- * 01 - Stop processing this SCTP chunk and discard it,
- *	do not process any further chunks within it, and report
- *	the unrecognized parameter in an 'Unrecognized
- *	Parameter Type' (in either an ERROR or in the INIT ACK).
+ * 01 - Stop processing this parameter, do not process any further
+ *	parameters within this chunk, and report the unrecognized
+ *	parameter in an 'Unrecognized Parameter' ERROR chunk.
  *
  * 10 - Skip this parameter and continue processing.
  *
  * 11 - Skip this parameter and continue processing but
  *	report the unrecognized parameter in an
- *	'Unrecognized Parameter Type' (in either an ERROR or in
- *	the INIT ACK).
+ *	'Unrecognized Parameter' ERROR chunk.
  *
  * Return value:
- * 	0 - discard the chunk
- * 	1 - continue with the chunk
+ * 	SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR - continue with the chunk
+ * 	SCTP_IERROR_ERROR    - stop and report an error.
+ * 	SCTP_IERROR_NOMEME   - out of memory.
  */
-static int sctp_process_unk_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
-				  union sctp_params param,
-				  struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
-				  struct sctp_chunk **errp)
+static sctp_ierror_t sctp_process_unk_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+					    union sctp_params param,
+					    struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
+					    struct sctp_chunk **errp)
 {
-	int retval = 1;
+	int retval = SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR;
 
 	switch (param.p->type & SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_MASK) {
 	case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_DISCARD:
-		retval =  0;
-		break;
-	case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_DISCARD_ERR:
-		retval =  0;
-		/* Make an ERROR chunk, preparing enough room for
-		 * returning multiple unknown parameters.
-		 */
-		if (NULL == *errp)
-			*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk,
-					ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length));
-
-		if (*errp) {
-			sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM,
-					WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)));
-			sctp_addto_chunk(*errp,
-					WORD_ROUND(ntohs(param.p->length)),
-					param.v);
-		}
-
+		retval =  SCTP_IERROR_ERROR;
 		break;
 	case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_SKIP:
 		break;
+	case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_DISCARD_ERR:
+		retval =  SCTP_IERROR_ERROR;
+		/* Fall through */
 	case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_SKIP_ERR:
 		/* Make an ERROR chunk, preparing enough room for
 		 * returning multiple unknown parameters.
@@ -1932,9 +1927,8 @@ static int sctp_process_unk_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 			 * to the peer and the association won't be
 			 * established.
 			 */
-			retval = 0;
+			retval = SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
 		}
-
 		break;
 	default:
 		break;
@@ -1943,18 +1937,20 @@ static int sctp_process_unk_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 	return retval;
 }
 
-/* Find unrecognized parameters in the chunk.
+/* Verify variable length parameters
  * Return values:
- * 	0 - discard the chunk
- * 	1 - continue with the chunk
+ * 	SCTP_IERROR_ABORT - trigger an ABORT
+ * 	SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM - out of memory (abort)
+ *	SCTP_IERROR_ERROR - stop processing, trigger an ERROR
+ * 	SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR - continue with the chunk
  */
-static int sctp_verify_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
-			     union sctp_params param,
-			     sctp_cid_t cid,
-			     struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
-			     struct sctp_chunk **err_chunk)
+static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+					union sctp_params param,
+					sctp_cid_t cid,
+					struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
+					struct sctp_chunk **err_chunk)
 {
-	int retval = 1;
+	int retval = SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR;
 
 	/* FIXME - This routine is not looking at each parameter per the
 	 * chunk type, i.e., unrecognized parameters should be further
@@ -1976,7 +1972,9 @@ static int sctp_verify_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 
 	case SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS:
 		/* Tell the peer, we won't support this param.  */
-		return sctp_process_hn_param(asoc, param, chunk, err_chunk);
+		sctp_process_hn_param(asoc, param, chunk, err_chunk);
+		retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
+		break;
 
 	case SCTP_PARAM_FWD_TSN_SUPPORT:
 		if (sctp_prsctp_enable)
@@ -1993,9 +1991,11 @@ static int sctp_verify_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 		 * cause 'Protocol Violation'.
 		 */
 		if (SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_LENGTH !=
-			ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
-			return sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,
+			ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t)) {
+			sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,
 							chunk, err_chunk);
+			retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
+		}
 		break;
 
 	case SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS:
@@ -2007,9 +2007,11 @@ static int sctp_verify_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 		 *  INIT-ACK chunk if the sender wants to receive authenticated
 		 *  chunks.  Its maximum length is 260 bytes.
 		 */
-		if (260 < ntohs(param.p->length))
-			return sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,
-							chunk, err_chunk);
+		if (260 < ntohs(param.p->length)) {
+			sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p,
+						     chunk, err_chunk);
+			retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
+		}
 		break;
 
 	case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO:
@@ -2020,8 +2022,7 @@ fallthrough:
 	default:
 		SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("Unrecognized param: %d for chunk %d.\n",
 				ntohs(param.p->type), cid);
-		return sctp_process_unk_param(asoc, param, chunk, err_chunk);
-
+		retval = sctp_process_unk_param(asoc, param, chunk, err_chunk);
 		break;
 	}
 	return retval;
@@ -2036,6 +2037,7 @@ int sctp_verify_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 {
 	union sctp_params param;
 	int has_cookie = 0;
+	int result;
 
 	/* Verify stream values are non-zero. */
 	if ((0 == peer_init->init_hdr.num_outbound_streams) ||
@@ -2043,8 +2045,7 @@ int sctp_verify_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 	    (0 == peer_init->init_hdr.init_tag) ||
 	    (SCTP_DEFAULT_MINWINDOW > ntohl(peer_init->init_hdr.a_rwnd))) {
 
-		sctp_process_inv_mandatory(asoc, chunk, errp);
-		return 0;
+		return sctp_process_inv_mandatory(asoc, chunk, errp);
 	}
 
 	/* Check for missing mandatory parameters.  */
@@ -2062,29 +2063,29 @@ int sctp_verify_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
 	 * VIOLATION error.  We build the ERROR chunk here and let the normal
 	 * error handling code build and send the packet.
 	 */
-	if (param.v != (void*)chunk->chunk_end) {
-		sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p, chunk, errp);
-		return 0;
-	}
+	if (param.v != (void*)chunk->chunk_end)
+		return sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p, chunk, errp);
 
 	/* The only missing mandatory param possible today is
 	 * the state cookie for an INIT-ACK chunk.
 	 */
-	if ((SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK == cid) && !has_cookie) {
-		sctp_process_missing_param(asoc, SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE,
-					   chunk, errp);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	/* Find unrecognized parameters. */
+	if ((SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK == cid) && !has_cookie)
+		return sctp_process_missing_param(asoc, SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE,
+						  chunk, errp);
 
+	/* Verify all the variable length parameters */
 	sctp_walk_params(param, peer_init, init_hdr.params) {
 
-		if (!sctp_verify_param(asoc, param, cid, chunk, errp)) {
-			if (SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS == param.p->type)
+		result = sctp_verify_param(asoc, param, cid, chunk, errp);
+		switch (result) {
+		    case SCTP_IERROR_ABORT:
+		    case SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM:
 				return 0;
-			else
+		    case SCTP_IERROR_ERROR:
 				return 1;
+		    case SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR:
+		    default:
+				break;
 		}
 
 	} /* for (loop through all parameters) */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From cd3ae8e61570b55e32864c5f9e50085aa67126e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2007 11:43:41 -0500
Subject: SCTP: Fix PR-SCTP to deliver all the accumulated ordered chunks

There is a small bug when we process a FWD-TSN.  We'll deliver
anything upto the current next expected SSN.  However, if the
next expected is already in the queue, it will take another
chunk to trigger its delivery.  The fix is to simply check
the current queued SSN is the next expected one.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/ulpqueue.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'net')

diff --git a/net/sctp/ulpqueue.c b/net/sctp/ulpqueue.c
index 4be92d0a2cab..4908041ffb31 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ulpqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ulpqueue.c
@@ -862,7 +862,7 @@ static inline void sctp_ulpq_reap_ordered(struct sctp_ulpq *ulpq, __u16 sid)
 			continue;
 
 		/* see if this ssn has been marked by skipping */
-		if (!SSN_lt(cssn, sctp_ssn_peek(in, csid)))
+		if (!SSN_lte(cssn, sctp_ssn_peek(in, csid)))
 			break;
 
 		__skb_unlink(pos, &ulpq->lobby);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 7d54dc6876b83d6bb75b8f7e865b7b9051056d22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2007 11:43:41 -0500
Subject: SCTP: Always flush the queue when uncorcking.

When the code calls uncork, trigger a queue flush, even
if the queue was not corked.  Most callers that explicitely
cork the queue will have additinal checks to see if they
corked it.  Callers who do not cork the queue expect packets
to flow when they call uncork.

The scneario that showcased this bug happend when we were not
able to bundle DATA with outgoing COOKIE-ECHO.  As a result
the data just sat in the outqueue and did not get transmitted.
The application expected a response, but nothing happened.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/outqueue.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net')

diff --git a/net/sctp/outqueue.c b/net/sctp/outqueue.c
index 99a3db5d5fae..fa76f235169b 100644
--- a/net/sctp/outqueue.c
+++ b/net/sctp/outqueue.c
@@ -662,10 +662,9 @@ static int sctp_outq_flush_rtx(struct sctp_outq *q, struct sctp_packet *pkt,
 int sctp_outq_uncork(struct sctp_outq *q)
 {
 	int error = 0;
-	if (q->cork) {
+	if (q->cork)
 		q->cork = 0;
-		error = sctp_outq_flush(q, 0);
-	}
+	error = sctp_outq_flush(q, 0);
 	return error;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 9abed245a6dc94c32b2f45a1ecc51a0829d11470 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 11 Nov 2007 23:57:49 +0100
Subject: Fix memory leak in discard case of sctp_sf_abort_violation()

In net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c::sctp_sf_abort_violation() we may leak
the storage allocated for 'abort' by returning from the function
without using or freeing it. This happens in case
"sctp_auth_recv_cid(SCTP_CID_ABORT, asoc)" is true and we jump to
the 'discard' label.
Spotted by the Coverity checker.

The simple fix is to simply move the creation of the "abort chunk"
to after the possible jump to the 'discard' label. This way we don't
even have to allocate the memory at all in the problem case.

Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net')

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index a66075a70f29..5ebbe808d801 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -4064,11 +4064,6 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_abort_violation(
 	struct sctp_chunk *chunk =  arg;
 	struct sctp_chunk *abort = NULL;
 
-	/* Make the abort chunk. */
-	abort = sctp_make_abort_violation(asoc, chunk, payload, paylen);
-	if (!abort)
-		goto nomem;
-
 	/* SCTP-AUTH, Section 6.3:
 	 *    It should be noted that if the receiver wants to tear
 	 *    down an association in an authenticated way only, the
@@ -4083,6 +4078,11 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_abort_violation(
 	if (sctp_auth_recv_cid(SCTP_CID_ABORT, asoc))
 		goto discard;
 
+	/* Make the abort chunk. */
+	abort = sctp_make_abort_violation(asoc, chunk, payload, paylen);
+	if (!abort)
+		goto nomem;
+
 	if (asoc) {
 		sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
 		SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3