From 8e0629c1d4ce86ce7d98ca8756f42769bb17a3c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Beulich Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2014 14:58:25 +0100 Subject: swiotlb: don't assume PA 0 is invalid In 2.6.29 io_tlb_orig_addr[] got converted from storing virtual addresses to storing physical ones. While checking virtual addresses against NULL is a legitimate thing to catch invalid entries, checking physical ones against zero isn't: There's no guarantee that PFN 0 is reserved on a particular platform. Since it is unclear whether the check in swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single() is actually needed, retain it but check against a guaranteed invalid physical address. This requires setting up the array in a suitable fashion. And since the original code failed to invalidate array entries when regions get unmapped, this is being fixed at once along with adding a similar check to swiotlb_tbl_sync_single(). Obviously the less intrusive change would be to simply drop the check in swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single(). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk --- lib/swiotlb.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/swiotlb.c b/lib/swiotlb.c index 649d097853a1..4abda074ea45 100644 --- a/lib/swiotlb.c +++ b/lib/swiotlb.c @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ static unsigned int io_tlb_index; * We need to save away the original address corresponding to a mapped entry * for the sync operations. */ +#define INVALID_PHYS_ADDR (~(phys_addr_t)0) static phys_addr_t *io_tlb_orig_addr; /* @@ -188,12 +189,14 @@ int __init swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs, int verbose) io_tlb_list = memblock_virt_alloc( PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_nslabs * sizeof(int)), PAGE_SIZE); - for (i = 0; i < io_tlb_nslabs; i++) - io_tlb_list[i] = IO_TLB_SEGSIZE - OFFSET(i, IO_TLB_SEGSIZE); - io_tlb_index = 0; io_tlb_orig_addr = memblock_virt_alloc( PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_nslabs * sizeof(phys_addr_t)), PAGE_SIZE); + for (i = 0; i < io_tlb_nslabs; i++) { + io_tlb_list[i] = IO_TLB_SEGSIZE - OFFSET(i, IO_TLB_SEGSIZE); + io_tlb_orig_addr[i] = INVALID_PHYS_ADDR; + } + io_tlb_index = 0; if (verbose) swiotlb_print_info(); @@ -313,10 +316,6 @@ swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs) if (!io_tlb_list) goto cleanup3; - for (i = 0; i < io_tlb_nslabs; i++) - io_tlb_list[i] = IO_TLB_SEGSIZE - OFFSET(i, IO_TLB_SEGSIZE); - io_tlb_index = 0; - io_tlb_orig_addr = (phys_addr_t *) __get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, get_order(io_tlb_nslabs * @@ -324,7 +323,11 @@ swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs) if (!io_tlb_orig_addr) goto cleanup4; - memset(io_tlb_orig_addr, 0, io_tlb_nslabs * sizeof(phys_addr_t)); + for (i = 0; i < io_tlb_nslabs; i++) { + io_tlb_list[i] = IO_TLB_SEGSIZE - OFFSET(i, IO_TLB_SEGSIZE); + io_tlb_orig_addr[i] = INVALID_PHYS_ADDR; + } + io_tlb_index = 0; swiotlb_print_info(); @@ -556,7 +559,8 @@ void swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single(struct device *hwdev, phys_addr_t tlb_addr, /* * First, sync the memory before unmapping the entry */ - if (orig_addr && ((dir == DMA_FROM_DEVICE) || (dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL))) + if (orig_addr != INVALID_PHYS_ADDR && + ((dir == DMA_FROM_DEVICE) || (dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL))) swiotlb_bounce(orig_addr, tlb_addr, size, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); /* @@ -573,8 +577,10 @@ void swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single(struct device *hwdev, phys_addr_t tlb_addr, * Step 1: return the slots to the free list, merging the * slots with superceeding slots */ - for (i = index + nslots - 1; i >= index; i--) + for (i = index + nslots - 1; i >= index; i--) { io_tlb_list[i] = ++count; + io_tlb_orig_addr[i] = INVALID_PHYS_ADDR; + } /* * Step 2: merge the returned slots with the preceding slots, * if available (non zero) @@ -593,6 +599,8 @@ void swiotlb_tbl_sync_single(struct device *hwdev, phys_addr_t tlb_addr, int index = (tlb_addr - io_tlb_start) >> IO_TLB_SHIFT; phys_addr_t orig_addr = io_tlb_orig_addr[index]; + if (orig_addr == INVALID_PHYS_ADDR) + return; orig_addr += (unsigned long)tlb_addr & ((1 << IO_TLB_SHIFT) - 1); switch (target) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 206a81c18401c0cde6e579164f752c4b147324ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 22:00:53 -0700 Subject: lzo: properly check for overruns The lzo decompressor can, if given some really crazy data, possibly overrun some variable types. Modify the checking logic to properly detect overruns before they happen. Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" Tested-by: "Don A. Bailey" Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- lib/lzo/lzo1x_decompress_safe.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_decompress_safe.c b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_decompress_safe.c index 569985d522d5..8563081e8da3 100644 --- a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_decompress_safe.c +++ b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_decompress_safe.c @@ -19,11 +19,31 @@ #include #include "lzodefs.h" -#define HAVE_IP(x) ((size_t)(ip_end - ip) >= (size_t)(x)) -#define HAVE_OP(x) ((size_t)(op_end - op) >= (size_t)(x)) -#define NEED_IP(x) if (!HAVE_IP(x)) goto input_overrun -#define NEED_OP(x) if (!HAVE_OP(x)) goto output_overrun -#define TEST_LB(m_pos) if ((m_pos) < out) goto lookbehind_overrun +#define HAVE_IP(t, x) \ + (((size_t)(ip_end - ip) >= (size_t)(t + x)) && \ + (((t + x) >= t) && ((t + x) >= x))) + +#define HAVE_OP(t, x) \ + (((size_t)(op_end - op) >= (size_t)(t + x)) && \ + (((t + x) >= t) && ((t + x) >= x))) + +#define NEED_IP(t, x) \ + do { \ + if (!HAVE_IP(t, x)) \ + goto input_overrun; \ + } while (0) + +#define NEED_OP(t, x) \ + do { \ + if (!HAVE_OP(t, x)) \ + goto output_overrun; \ + } while (0) + +#define TEST_LB(m_pos) \ + do { \ + if ((m_pos) < out) \ + goto lookbehind_overrun; \ + } while (0) int lzo1x_decompress_safe(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len) @@ -58,14 +78,14 @@ int lzo1x_decompress_safe(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, while (unlikely(*ip == 0)) { t += 255; ip++; - NEED_IP(1); + NEED_IP(1, 0); } t += 15 + *ip++; } t += 3; copy_literal_run: #if defined(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) - if (likely(HAVE_IP(t + 15) && HAVE_OP(t + 15))) { + if (likely(HAVE_IP(t, 15) && HAVE_OP(t, 15))) { const unsigned char *ie = ip + t; unsigned char *oe = op + t; do { @@ -81,8 +101,8 @@ copy_literal_run: } else #endif { - NEED_OP(t); - NEED_IP(t + 3); + NEED_OP(t, 0); + NEED_IP(t, 3); do { *op++ = *ip++; } while (--t > 0); @@ -95,7 +115,7 @@ copy_literal_run: m_pos -= t >> 2; m_pos -= *ip++ << 2; TEST_LB(m_pos); - NEED_OP(2); + NEED_OP(2, 0); op[0] = m_pos[0]; op[1] = m_pos[1]; op += 2; @@ -119,10 +139,10 @@ copy_literal_run: while (unlikely(*ip == 0)) { t += 255; ip++; - NEED_IP(1); + NEED_IP(1, 0); } t += 31 + *ip++; - NEED_IP(2); + NEED_IP(2, 0); } m_pos = op - 1; next = get_unaligned_le16(ip); @@ -137,10 +157,10 @@ copy_literal_run: while (unlikely(*ip == 0)) { t += 255; ip++; - NEED_IP(1); + NEED_IP(1, 0); } t += 7 + *ip++; - NEED_IP(2); + NEED_IP(2, 0); } next = get_unaligned_le16(ip); ip += 2; @@ -154,7 +174,7 @@ copy_literal_run: #if defined(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) if (op - m_pos >= 8) { unsigned char *oe = op + t; - if (likely(HAVE_OP(t + 15))) { + if (likely(HAVE_OP(t, 15))) { do { COPY8(op, m_pos); op += 8; @@ -164,7 +184,7 @@ copy_literal_run: m_pos += 8; } while (op < oe); op = oe; - if (HAVE_IP(6)) { + if (HAVE_IP(6, 0)) { state = next; COPY4(op, ip); op += next; @@ -172,7 +192,7 @@ copy_literal_run: continue; } } else { - NEED_OP(t); + NEED_OP(t, 0); do { *op++ = *m_pos++; } while (op < oe); @@ -181,7 +201,7 @@ copy_literal_run: #endif { unsigned char *oe = op + t; - NEED_OP(t); + NEED_OP(t, 0); op[0] = m_pos[0]; op[1] = m_pos[1]; op += 2; @@ -194,15 +214,15 @@ match_next: state = next; t = next; #if defined(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) - if (likely(HAVE_IP(6) && HAVE_OP(4))) { + if (likely(HAVE_IP(6, 0) && HAVE_OP(4, 0))) { COPY4(op, ip); op += t; ip += t; } else #endif { - NEED_IP(t + 3); - NEED_OP(t); + NEED_IP(t, 3); + NEED_OP(t, 0); while (t > 0) { *op++ = *ip++; t--; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 206204a1162b995e2185275167b22468c00d6b36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 22:01:41 -0700 Subject: lz4: ensure length does not wrap Given some pathologically compressed data, lz4 could possibly decide to wrap a few internal variables, causing unknown things to happen. Catch this before the wrapping happens and abort the decompression. Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c b/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c index df6839e3ce08..99a03acb7d47 100644 --- a/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c +++ b/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c @@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ static int lz4_uncompress(const char *source, char *dest, int osize) len = *ip++; for (; len == 255; length += 255) len = *ip++; + if (unlikely(length > (size_t)(length + len))) + goto _output_error; length += len; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From df2e1ef68c51ddccfdb6f34f92ee9f93541de802 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chen Gang Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2014 13:22:04 -0700 Subject: lib/Kconfig.debug: let FRAME_POINTER exclude SCORE, just like exclude most of other architectures The related warning: scripts/kconfig/conf --allmodconfig Kconfig warning: (FAULT_INJECTION_STACKTRACE_FILTER && LATENCYTOP && KMEMCHECK && LOCKDEP) selects FRAME_POINTER which has unmet direct dependencies (DEBUG_KERNEL && (CRIS || M68K || FRV || UML || AVR32 || SUPERH || BLACKFIN || MN10300 || METAG) || ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS) Signed-off-by: Chen Gang Cc: Chen Liqin Cc: Lennox Wu Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- lib/Kconfig.debug | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug index 7cfcc1b8e101..7a638aa3545b 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug +++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug @@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ config LOCKDEP bool depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT && STACKTRACE_SUPPORT && LOCKDEP_SUPPORT select STACKTRACE - select FRAME_POINTER if !MIPS && !PPC && !ARM_UNWIND && !S390 && !MICROBLAZE && !ARC + select FRAME_POINTER if !MIPS && !PPC && !ARM_UNWIND && !S390 && !MICROBLAZE && !ARC && !SCORE select KALLSYMS select KALLSYMS_ALL @@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ config FAULT_INJECTION_STACKTRACE_FILTER depends on FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS && STACKTRACE_SUPPORT depends on !X86_64 select STACKTRACE - select FRAME_POINTER if !MIPS && !PPC && !S390 && !MICROBLAZE && !ARM_UNWIND && !ARC + select FRAME_POINTER if !MIPS && !PPC && !S390 && !MICROBLAZE && !ARM_UNWIND && !ARC && !SCORE help Provide stacktrace filter for fault-injection capabilities -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4148c1f67abf823099b2d7db6851e4aea407f5ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 16:59:01 -0400 Subject: lz4: fix another possible overrun There is one other possible overrun in the lz4 code as implemented by Linux at this point in time (which differs from the upstream lz4 codebase, but will get synced at in a future kernel release.) As pointed out by Don, we also need to check the overflow in the data itself. While we are at it, replace the odd error return value with just a "simple" -1 value as the return value is never used for anything other than a basic "did this work or not" check. Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" Reported-by: Willy Tarreau Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c b/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c index 99a03acb7d47..b74da447e81e 100644 --- a/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c +++ b/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c @@ -108,6 +108,8 @@ static int lz4_uncompress(const char *source, char *dest, int osize) if (length == ML_MASK) { for (; *ip == 255; length += 255) ip++; + if (unlikely(length > (size_t)(length + *ip))) + goto _output_error; length += *ip++; } @@ -157,7 +159,7 @@ static int lz4_uncompress(const char *source, char *dest, int osize) /* write overflow error detected */ _output_error: - return (int) (-(((char *)ip) - source)); + return -1; } static int lz4_uncompress_unknownoutputsize(const char *source, char *dest, -- cgit v1.2.3 From ac5ccdba3a1659b3517e7e99ef7d35a6a2d77cf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 21:22:56 +0300 Subject: iovec: move memcpy_from/toiovecend to lib/iovec.c ERROR: "memcpy_fromiovecend" [drivers/vhost/vhost_scsi.ko] undefined! commit 9f977ef7b671f6169eca78bf40f230fe84b7c7e5 vhost-scsi: Include prot_bytes into expected data transfer length in target-pending makes drivers/vhost/scsi.c call memcpy_fromiovecend(). This function is not available when CONFIG_NET is not enabled. socket.h already includes uio.h, so no callers need updating. Reported-by: Randy Dunlap Cc: Stephen Rothwell Cc: "David S. Miller" Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger --- lib/iovec.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/iovec.c b/lib/iovec.c index 454baa88bf27..7a7c2da4cddf 100644 --- a/lib/iovec.c +++ b/lib/iovec.c @@ -51,3 +51,58 @@ int memcpy_toiovec(struct iovec *iov, unsigned char *kdata, int len) return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(memcpy_toiovec); + +/* + * Copy kernel to iovec. Returns -EFAULT on error. + */ + +int memcpy_toiovecend(const struct iovec *iov, unsigned char *kdata, + int offset, int len) +{ + int copy; + for (; len > 0; ++iov) { + /* Skip over the finished iovecs */ + if (unlikely(offset >= iov->iov_len)) { + offset -= iov->iov_len; + continue; + } + copy = min_t(unsigned int, iov->iov_len - offset, len); + if (copy_to_user(iov->iov_base + offset, kdata, copy)) + return -EFAULT; + offset = 0; + kdata += copy; + len -= copy; + } + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(memcpy_toiovecend); + +/* + * Copy iovec to kernel. Returns -EFAULT on error. + */ + +int memcpy_fromiovecend(unsigned char *kdata, const struct iovec *iov, + int offset, int len) +{ + /* Skip over the finished iovecs */ + while (offset >= iov->iov_len) { + offset -= iov->iov_len; + iov++; + } + + while (len > 0) { + u8 __user *base = iov->iov_base + offset; + int copy = min_t(unsigned int, len, iov->iov_len - offset); + + offset = 0; + if (copy_from_user(kdata, base, copy)) + return -EFAULT; + len -= copy; + kdata += copy; + iov++; + } + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(memcpy_fromiovecend); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4a3a99045177369700c60d074c0e525e8093b0fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2014 16:06:57 -0700 Subject: lz4: add overrun checks to lz4_uncompress_unknownoutputsize() Jan points out that I forgot to make the needed fixes to the lz4_uncompress_unknownoutputsize() function to mirror the changes done in lz4_decompress() with regards to potential pointer overflows. The only in-kernel user of this function is the zram code, which only takes data from a valid compressed buffer that it made itself, so it's not a big issue. But due to external kernel modules using this function, it's better to be safe here. Reported-by: Jan Beulich Cc: "Don A. Bailey" Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c b/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c index b74da447e81e..7a85967060a5 100644 --- a/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c +++ b/lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c @@ -192,6 +192,8 @@ static int lz4_uncompress_unknownoutputsize(const char *source, char *dest, int s = 255; while ((ip < iend) && (s == 255)) { s = *ip++; + if (unlikely(length > (size_t)(length + s))) + goto _output_error; length += s; } } @@ -232,6 +234,8 @@ static int lz4_uncompress_unknownoutputsize(const char *source, char *dest, if (length == ML_MASK) { while (ip < iend) { int s = *ip++; + if (unlikely(length > (size_t)(length + s))) + goto _output_error; length += s; if (s == 255) continue; @@ -284,7 +288,7 @@ static int lz4_uncompress_unknownoutputsize(const char *source, char *dest, /* write overflow error detected */ _output_error: - return (int) (-(((char *) ip) - source)); + return -1; } int lz4_decompress(const unsigned char *src, size_t *src_len, -- cgit v1.2.3