From add7c65ca426b7a37184dd3d2172394e23d585d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrei Vagin Date: Wed, 4 Jan 2017 19:28:14 -0800 Subject: pid: fix lockdep deadlock warning due to ucount_lock ========================================================= [ INFO: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected ] 4.10.0-rc2-00024-g4aecec9-dirty #118 Tainted: G W --------------------------------------------------------- swapper/1/0 just changed the state of lock: (&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock){-.....}, at: [] __lock_task_sighand+0xb6/0x2c0 but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past: (ucounts_lock){+.+...} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &(&sighand->siglock)->rlock --> &(&tty->ctrl_lock)->rlock --> ucounts_lock Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(ucounts_lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock); lock(&(&tty->ctrl_lock)->rlock); lock(&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** This patch removes a dependency between rlock and ucount_lock. Fixes: f333c700c610 ("pidns: Add a limit on the number of pid namespaces") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin Acked-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman --- kernel/pid_namespace.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c index df9e8e9e0be7..eef2ce968636 100644 --- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c @@ -151,8 +151,12 @@ out: static void delayed_free_pidns(struct rcu_head *p) { - kmem_cache_free(pid_ns_cachep, - container_of(p, struct pid_namespace, rcu)); + struct pid_namespace *ns = container_of(p, struct pid_namespace, rcu); + + dec_pid_namespaces(ns->ucounts); + put_user_ns(ns->user_ns); + + kmem_cache_free(pid_ns_cachep, ns); } static void destroy_pid_namespace(struct pid_namespace *ns) @@ -162,8 +166,6 @@ static void destroy_pid_namespace(struct pid_namespace *ns) ns_free_inum(&ns->ns); for (i = 0; i < PIDMAP_ENTRIES; i++) kfree(ns->pidmap[i].page); - dec_pid_namespaces(ns->ucounts); - put_user_ns(ns->user_ns); call_rcu(&ns->rcu, delayed_free_pidns); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 24b91e360ef521a2808771633d76ebc68bd5604b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Frederic Weisbecker Date: Wed, 4 Jan 2017 15:12:04 +0100 Subject: nohz: Fix collision between tick and other hrtimers When the tick is stopped and an interrupt occurs afterward, we check on that interrupt exit if the next tick needs to be rescheduled. If it doesn't need any update, we don't want to do anything. In order to check if the tick needs an update, we compare it against the clockevent device deadline. Now that's a problem because the clockevent device is at a lower level than the tick itself if it is implemented on top of hrtimer. Every hrtimer share this clockevent device. So comparing the next tick deadline against the clockevent device deadline is wrong because the device may be programmed for another hrtimer whose deadline collides with the tick. As a result we may end up not reprogramming the tick accidentally. In a worst case scenario under full dynticks mode, the tick stops firing as it is supposed to every 1hz, leaving /proc/stat stalled: Task in a full dynticks CPU ---------------------------- * hrtimer A is queued 2 seconds ahead * the tick is stopped, scheduled 1 second ahead * tick fires 1 second later * on tick exit, nohz schedules the tick 1 second ahead but sees the clockevent device is already programmed to that deadline, fooled by hrtimer A, the tick isn't rescheduled. * hrtimer A is cancelled before its deadline * tick never fires again until an interrupt happens... In order to fix this, store the next tick deadline to the tick_sched local structure and reuse that value later to check whether we need to reprogram the clock after an interrupt. On the other hand, ts->sleep_length still wants to know about the next clock event and not just the tick, so we want to improve the related comment to avoid confusion. Reported-by: James Hartsock Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra Acked-by: Rik van Riel Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1483539124-5693-1-git-send-email-fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner --- kernel/time/tick-sched.c | 9 +++++++-- kernel/time/tick-sched.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c index 2c115fdab397..74e0388cc88d 100644 --- a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c +++ b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c @@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ static ktime_t tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick(struct tick_sched *ts, tick = expires; /* Skip reprogram of event if its not changed */ - if (ts->tick_stopped && (expires == dev->next_event)) + if (ts->tick_stopped && (expires == ts->next_tick)) goto out; /* @@ -787,6 +787,8 @@ static ktime_t tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick(struct tick_sched *ts, trace_tick_stop(1, TICK_DEP_MASK_NONE); } + ts->next_tick = tick; + /* * If the expiration time == KTIME_MAX, then we simply stop * the tick timer. @@ -802,7 +804,10 @@ static ktime_t tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick(struct tick_sched *ts, else tick_program_event(tick, 1); out: - /* Update the estimated sleep length */ + /* + * Update the estimated sleep length until the next timer + * (not only the tick). + */ ts->sleep_length = ktime_sub(dev->next_event, now); return tick; } diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-sched.h b/kernel/time/tick-sched.h index bf38226e5c17..075444e3d48e 100644 --- a/kernel/time/tick-sched.h +++ b/kernel/time/tick-sched.h @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ enum tick_nohz_mode { * timer is modified for nohz sleeps. This is necessary * to resume the tick timer operation in the timeline * when the CPU returns from nohz sleep. + * @next_tick: Next tick to be fired when in dynticks mode. * @tick_stopped: Indicator that the idle tick has been stopped * @idle_jiffies: jiffies at the entry to idle for idle time accounting * @idle_calls: Total number of idle calls @@ -44,6 +45,7 @@ struct tick_sched { unsigned long check_clocks; enum tick_nohz_mode nohz_mode; ktime_t last_tick; + ktime_t next_tick; int inidle; int tick_stopped; unsigned long idle_jiffies; -- cgit v1.2.3 From b6416e61012429e0277bd15a229222fd17afc1c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Matlack Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2016 14:30:35 -0800 Subject: jump_labels: API for flushing deferred jump label updates Modules that use static_key_deferred need a way to synchronize with any delayed work that is still pending when the module is unloaded. Introduce static_key_deferred_flush() which flushes any pending jump label updates. Signed-off-by: David Matlack Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini --- kernel/jump_label.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/jump_label.c b/kernel/jump_label.c index 93ad6c1fb9b6..a9b8cf500591 100644 --- a/kernel/jump_label.c +++ b/kernel/jump_label.c @@ -182,6 +182,13 @@ void static_key_slow_dec_deferred(struct static_key_deferred *key) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(static_key_slow_dec_deferred); +void static_key_deferred_flush(struct static_key_deferred *key) +{ + STATIC_KEY_CHECK_USE(); + flush_delayed_work(&key->work); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(static_key_deferred_flush); + void jump_label_rate_limit(struct static_key_deferred *key, unsigned long rl) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 19c816e8e455f58da9997e4c6626f06203d8fbf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jike Song Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2017 16:52:02 +0800 Subject: capability: export has_capability has_capability() is sometimes needed by modules to test capability for specified task other than current, so export it. Cc: Kirti Wankhede Signed-off-by: Jike Song Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Acked-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson --- kernel/capability.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index a98e814f216f..f97fe77ceb88 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap) { return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(has_capability); /** * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 63cae12bce9861cec309798d34701cf3da20bc71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2016 14:59:00 +0100 Subject: perf/core: Fix sys_perf_event_open() vs. hotplug There is problem with installing an event in a task that is 'stuck' on an offline CPU. Blocked tasks are not dis-assosciated from offlined CPUs, after all, a blocked task doesn't run and doesn't require a CPU etc.. Only on wakeup do we ammend the situation and place the task on a available CPU. If we hit such a task with perf_install_in_context() we'll loop until either that task wakes up or the CPU comes back online, if the task waking depends on the event being installed, we're stuck. While looking into this issue, I also spotted another problem, if we hit a task with perf_install_in_context() that is in the middle of being migrated, that is we observe the old CPU before sending the IPI, but run the IPI (on the old CPU) while the task is already running on the new CPU, things also go sideways. Rework things to rely on task_curr() -- outside of rq->lock -- which is rather tricky. Imagine the following scenario where we're trying to install the first event into our task 't': CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 (current == t) t->perf_event_ctxp[] = ctx; smp_mb(); cpu = task_cpu(t); switch(t, n); migrate(t, 2); switch(p, t); ctx = t->perf_event_ctxp[]; // must not be NULL smp_function_call(cpu, ..); generic_exec_single() func(); spin_lock(ctx->lock); if (task_curr(t)) // false add_event_to_ctx(); spin_unlock(ctx->lock); perf_event_context_sched_in(); spin_lock(ctx->lock); // sees event So its CPU0's store of t->perf_event_ctxp[] that must not go 'missing'. Because if CPU2's load of that variable were to observe NULL, it would not try to schedule the ctx and we'd have a task running without its counter, which would be 'bad'. As long as we observe !NULL, we'll acquire ctx->lock. If we acquire it first and not see the event yet, then CPU0 must observe task_curr() and retry. If the install happens first, then we must see the event on sched-in and all is well. I think we can translate the first part (until the 'must not be NULL') of the scenario to a litmus test like: C C-peterz { } P0(int *x, int *y) { int r1; WRITE_ONCE(*x, 1); smp_mb(); r1 = READ_ONCE(*y); } P1(int *y, int *z) { WRITE_ONCE(*y, 1); smp_store_release(z, 1); } P2(int *x, int *z) { int r1; int r2; r1 = smp_load_acquire(z); smp_mb(); r2 = READ_ONCE(*x); } exists (0:r1=0 /\ 2:r1=1 /\ 2:r2=0) Where: x is perf_event_ctxp[], y is our tasks's CPU, and z is our task being placed on the rq of CPU2. The P0 smp_mb() is the one added by this patch, ordering the store to perf_event_ctxp[] from find_get_context() and the load of task_cpu() in task_function_call(). The smp_store_release/smp_load_acquire model the RCpc locking of the rq->lock and the smp_mb() of P2 is the context switch switching from whatever CPU2 was running to our task 't'. This litmus test evaluates into: Test C-peterz Allowed States 7 0:r1=0; 2:r1=0; 2:r2=0; 0:r1=0; 2:r1=0; 2:r2=1; 0:r1=0; 2:r1=1; 2:r2=1; 0:r1=1; 2:r1=0; 2:r2=0; 0:r1=1; 2:r1=0; 2:r2=1; 0:r1=1; 2:r1=1; 2:r2=0; 0:r1=1; 2:r1=1; 2:r2=1; No Witnesses Positive: 0 Negative: 7 Condition exists (0:r1=0 /\ 2:r1=1 /\ 2:r2=0) Observation C-peterz Never 0 7 Hash=e427f41d9146b2a5445101d3e2fcaa34 And the strong and weak model agree. Reported-by: Mark Rutland Tested-by: Mark Rutland Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vince Weaver Cc: Will Deacon Cc: jeremy.linton@arm.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161209135900.GU3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- kernel/events/core.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index ab15509fab8c..72ce7d63e561 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -2249,7 +2249,7 @@ static int __perf_install_in_context(void *info) struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx; struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx); struct perf_event_context *task_ctx = cpuctx->task_ctx; - bool activate = true; + bool reprogram = true; int ret = 0; raw_spin_lock(&cpuctx->ctx.lock); @@ -2257,27 +2257,26 @@ static int __perf_install_in_context(void *info) raw_spin_lock(&ctx->lock); task_ctx = ctx; - /* If we're on the wrong CPU, try again */ - if (task_cpu(ctx->task) != smp_processor_id()) { - ret = -ESRCH; - goto unlock; - } + reprogram = (ctx->task == current); /* - * If we're on the right CPU, see if the task we target is - * current, if not we don't have to activate the ctx, a future - * context switch will do that for us. + * If the task is running, it must be running on this CPU, + * otherwise we cannot reprogram things. + * + * If its not running, we don't care, ctx->lock will + * serialize against it becoming runnable. */ - if (ctx->task != current) - activate = false; - else - WARN_ON_ONCE(cpuctx->task_ctx && cpuctx->task_ctx != ctx); + if (task_curr(ctx->task) && !reprogram) { + ret = -ESRCH; + goto unlock; + } + WARN_ON_ONCE(reprogram && cpuctx->task_ctx && cpuctx->task_ctx != ctx); } else if (task_ctx) { raw_spin_lock(&task_ctx->lock); } - if (activate) { + if (reprogram) { ctx_sched_out(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_TIME); add_event_to_ctx(event, ctx); ctx_resched(cpuctx, task_ctx); @@ -2328,13 +2327,36 @@ perf_install_in_context(struct perf_event_context *ctx, /* * Installing events is tricky because we cannot rely on ctx->is_active * to be set in case this is the nr_events 0 -> 1 transition. + * + * Instead we use task_curr(), which tells us if the task is running. + * However, since we use task_curr() outside of rq::lock, we can race + * against the actual state. This means the result can be wrong. + * + * If we get a false positive, we retry, this is harmless. + * + * If we get a false negative, things are complicated. If we are after + * perf_event_context_sched_in() ctx::lock will serialize us, and the + * value must be correct. If we're before, it doesn't matter since + * perf_event_context_sched_in() will program the counter. + * + * However, this hinges on the remote context switch having observed + * our task->perf_event_ctxp[] store, such that it will in fact take + * ctx::lock in perf_event_context_sched_in(). + * + * We do this by task_function_call(), if the IPI fails to hit the task + * we know any future context switch of task must see the + * perf_event_ctpx[] store. */ -again: + /* - * Cannot use task_function_call() because we need to run on the task's - * CPU regardless of whether its current or not. + * This smp_mb() orders the task->perf_event_ctxp[] store with the + * task_cpu() load, such that if the IPI then does not find the task + * running, a future context switch of that task must observe the + * store. */ - if (!cpu_function_call(task_cpu(task), __perf_install_in_context, event)) + smp_mb(); +again: + if (!task_function_call(task, __perf_install_in_context, event)) return; raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock); @@ -2348,12 +2370,16 @@ again: raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock); return; } - raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock); /* - * Since !ctx->is_active doesn't mean anything, we must IPI - * unconditionally. + * If the task is not running, ctx->lock will avoid it becoming so, + * thus we can safely install the event. */ - goto again; + if (task_curr(task)) { + raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock); + goto again; + } + add_event_to_ctx(event, ctx); + raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock); } /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From 321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2017 21:09:50 +0100 Subject: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open() calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group into a hardware context. The problem is exactly that described in commit: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking") ... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx relation can have changed under us. That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the established locking rules correctly. So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead). Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested() to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means we need to validate state after we acquire the locks. Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab) Tested-by: John Dias Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Min Chong Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vince Weaver Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- kernel/events/core.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 72ce7d63e561..cbc5937265da 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -9529,6 +9529,37 @@ static int perf_event_set_clock(struct perf_event *event, clockid_t clk_id) return 0; } +/* + * Variation on perf_event_ctx_lock_nested(), except we take two context + * mutexes. + */ +static struct perf_event_context * +__perf_event_ctx_lock_double(struct perf_event *group_leader, + struct perf_event_context *ctx) +{ + struct perf_event_context *gctx; + +again: + rcu_read_lock(); + gctx = READ_ONCE(group_leader->ctx); + if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&gctx->refcount)) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + goto again; + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + mutex_lock_double(&gctx->mutex, &ctx->mutex); + + if (group_leader->ctx != gctx) { + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); + mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex); + put_ctx(gctx); + goto again; + } + + return gctx; +} + /** * sys_perf_event_open - open a performance event, associate it to a task/cpu * @@ -9772,12 +9803,31 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, } if (move_group) { - gctx = group_leader->ctx; - mutex_lock_double(&gctx->mutex, &ctx->mutex); + gctx = __perf_event_ctx_lock_double(group_leader, ctx); + if (gctx->task == TASK_TOMBSTONE) { err = -ESRCH; goto err_locked; } + + /* + * Check if we raced against another sys_perf_event_open() call + * moving the software group underneath us. + */ + if (!(group_leader->group_caps & PERF_EV_CAP_SOFTWARE)) { + /* + * If someone moved the group out from under us, check + * if this new event wound up on the same ctx, if so + * its the regular !move_group case, otherwise fail. + */ + if (gctx != ctx) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_locked; + } else { + perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx); + move_group = 0; + } + } } else { mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); } @@ -9879,7 +9929,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, perf_unpin_context(ctx); if (move_group) - mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex); + perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx); mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); if (task) { @@ -9905,7 +9955,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, err_locked: if (move_group) - mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex); + perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx); mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); /* err_file: */ fput(event_file); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 475113d937adfd150eb82b5e2c5507125a68e7af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Olsa Date: Wed, 28 Dec 2016 14:31:03 +0100 Subject: perf/x86/intel: Account interrupts for PEBS errors It's possible to set up PEBS events to get only errors and not any data, like on SNB-X (model 45) and IVB-EP (model 62) via 2 perf commands running simultaneously: taskset -c 1 ./perf record -c 4 -e branches:pp -j any -C 10 This leads to a soft lock up, because the error path of the intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm() does not account event->hw.interrupt for error PEBS interrupts, so in case you're getting ONLY errors you don't have a way to stop the event when it's over the max_samples_per_tick limit: NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#22 stuck for 22s! [perf_fuzzer:5816] ... RIP: 0010:[] [] smp_call_function_single+0xe2/0x140 ... Call Trace: ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf5/0x1b0 ? perf_cgroup_attach+0x70/0x70 perf_install_in_context+0x199/0x1b0 ? ctx_resched+0x90/0x90 SYSC_perf_event_open+0x641/0xf90 SyS_perf_event_open+0x9/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Add perf_event_account_interrupt() which does the interrupt and frequency checks and call it from intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm()'s error path. We keep the pending_kill and pending_wakeup logic only in the __perf_event_overflow() path, because they make sense only if there's any data to deliver. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vince Weaver Cc: Vince Weaver Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1482931866-6018-2-git-send-email-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- kernel/events/core.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index cbc5937265da..110b38a58493 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -7060,25 +7060,12 @@ static void perf_log_itrace_start(struct perf_event *event) perf_output_end(&handle); } -/* - * Generic event overflow handling, sampling. - */ - -static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event, - int throttle, struct perf_sample_data *data, - struct pt_regs *regs) +static int +__perf_event_account_interrupt(struct perf_event *event, int throttle) { - int events = atomic_read(&event->event_limit); struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw; - u64 seq; int ret = 0; - - /* - * Non-sampling counters might still use the PMI to fold short - * hardware counters, ignore those. - */ - if (unlikely(!is_sampling_event(event))) - return 0; + u64 seq; seq = __this_cpu_read(perf_throttled_seq); if (seq != hwc->interrupts_seq) { @@ -7106,6 +7093,34 @@ static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event, perf_adjust_period(event, delta, hwc->last_period, true); } + return ret; +} + +int perf_event_account_interrupt(struct perf_event *event) +{ + return __perf_event_account_interrupt(event, 1); +} + +/* + * Generic event overflow handling, sampling. + */ + +static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event, + int throttle, struct perf_sample_data *data, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int events = atomic_read(&event->event_limit); + int ret = 0; + + /* + * Non-sampling counters might still use the PMI to fold short + * hardware counters, ignore those. + */ + if (unlikely(!is_sampling_event(event))) + return 0; + + ret = __perf_event_account_interrupt(event, throttle); + /* * XXX event_limit might not quite work as expected on inherited * events -- cgit v1.2.3 From f1f7714ea51c56b7163fb1a5acf39c6a204dd758 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2017 23:38:15 +0100 Subject: bpf: rework prog_digest into prog_tag Commit 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") was recently discussed, partially due to admittedly suboptimal name of "prog_digest" in combination with sha1 hash usage, thus inevitably and rightfully concerns about its security in terms of collision resistance were raised with regards to use-cases. The intended use cases are for debugging resp. introspection only for providing a stable "tag" over the instruction sequence that both kernel and user space can calculate independently. It's not usable at all for making a security relevant decision. So collisions where two different instruction sequences generate the same tag can happen, but ideally at a rather low rate. The "tag" will be dumped in hex and is short enough to introspect in tracepoints or kallsyms output along with other data such as stack trace, etc. Thus, this patch performs a rename into prog_tag and truncates the tag to a short output (64 bits) to make it obvious it's not collision-free. Should in future a hash or facility be needed with a security relevant focus, then we can think about requirements, constraints, etc that would fit to that situation. For now, rework the exposed parts for the current use cases as long as nothing has been released yet. Tested on x86_64 and s390x. Fixes: 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- kernel/bpf/core.c | 14 ++++++++------ kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 8 ++++---- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 1eb4f1303756..503d4211988a 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -146,10 +146,11 @@ void __bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *fp) vfree(fp); } -int bpf_prog_calc_digest(struct bpf_prog *fp) +int bpf_prog_calc_tag(struct bpf_prog *fp) { const u32 bits_offset = SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES - sizeof(__be64); - u32 raw_size = bpf_prog_digest_scratch_size(fp); + u32 raw_size = bpf_prog_tag_scratch_size(fp); + u32 digest[SHA_DIGEST_WORDS]; u32 ws[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS]; u32 i, bsize, psize, blocks; struct bpf_insn *dst; @@ -162,7 +163,7 @@ int bpf_prog_calc_digest(struct bpf_prog *fp) if (!raw) return -ENOMEM; - sha_init(fp->digest); + sha_init(digest); memset(ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); /* We need to take out the map fd for the digest calculation @@ -204,13 +205,14 @@ int bpf_prog_calc_digest(struct bpf_prog *fp) *bits = cpu_to_be64((psize - 1) << 3); while (blocks--) { - sha_transform(fp->digest, todo, ws); + sha_transform(digest, todo, ws); todo += SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES; } - result = (__force __be32 *)fp->digest; + result = (__force __be32 *)digest; for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_WORDS; i++) - result[i] = cpu_to_be32(fp->digest[i]); + result[i] = cpu_to_be32(digest[i]); + memcpy(fp->tag, result, sizeof(fp->tag)); vfree(raw); return 0; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index e89acea22ecf..1d6b29e4e2c3 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -688,17 +688,17 @@ static int bpf_prog_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) static void bpf_prog_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp) { const struct bpf_prog *prog = filp->private_data; - char prog_digest[sizeof(prog->digest) * 2 + 1] = { }; + char prog_tag[sizeof(prog->tag) * 2 + 1] = { }; - bin2hex(prog_digest, prog->digest, sizeof(prog->digest)); + bin2hex(prog_tag, prog->tag, sizeof(prog->tag)); seq_printf(m, "prog_type:\t%u\n" "prog_jited:\t%u\n" - "prog_digest:\t%s\n" + "prog_tag:\t%s\n" "memlock:\t%llu\n", prog->type, prog->jited, - prog_digest, + prog_tag, prog->pages * 1ULL << PAGE_SHIFT); } #endif diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 83ed2f8f6f22..cdc43b899f28 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -2936,7 +2936,7 @@ static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; int i, j, err; - err = bpf_prog_calc_digest(env->prog); + err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog); if (err) return err; -- cgit v1.2.3