From 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2017 15:07:11 -0800 Subject: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become "locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently. This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse. This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead, an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely. This change is not expected to break any applications. In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations --- waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations, and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed. This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them. Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Acked-by: Michael Halcrow --- fs/crypto/keyinfo.c | 52 +++++++++------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs/crypto/keyinfo.c') diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c index 02eb6b9e4438..cb3e82abf034 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c @@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ static int validate_user_key(struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info, kfree(description); if (IS_ERR(keyring_key)) return PTR_ERR(keyring_key); + down_read(&keyring_key->sem); if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) { printk_once(KERN_WARNING @@ -102,11 +103,9 @@ static int validate_user_key(struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info, res = -ENOKEY; goto out; } - down_read(&keyring_key->sem); ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key); if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct fscrypt_key)) { res = -EINVAL; - up_read(&keyring_key->sem); goto out; } master_key = (struct fscrypt_key *)ukp->data; @@ -117,17 +116,11 @@ static int validate_user_key(struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info, "%s: key size incorrect: %d\n", __func__, master_key->size); res = -ENOKEY; - up_read(&keyring_key->sem); goto out; } res = derive_key_aes(ctx->nonce, master_key->raw, raw_key); - up_read(&keyring_key->sem); - if (res) - goto out; - - crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key; - return 0; out: + up_read(&keyring_key->sem); key_put(keyring_key); return res; } @@ -169,12 +162,11 @@ static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci) if (!ci) return; - key_put(ci->ci_keyring_key); crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm); kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci); } -int fscrypt_get_crypt_info(struct inode *inode) +int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) { struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info; struct fscrypt_context ctx; @@ -184,21 +176,15 @@ int fscrypt_get_crypt_info(struct inode *inode) u8 *raw_key = NULL; int res; + if (inode->i_crypt_info) + return 0; + res = fscrypt_initialize(inode->i_sb->s_cop->flags); if (res) return res; if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context) return -EOPNOTSUPP; -retry: - crypt_info = ACCESS_ONCE(inode->i_crypt_info); - if (crypt_info) { - if (!crypt_info->ci_keyring_key || - key_validate(crypt_info->ci_keyring_key) == 0) - return 0; - fscrypt_put_encryption_info(inode, crypt_info); - goto retry; - } res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); if (res < 0) { @@ -229,7 +215,6 @@ retry: crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode; crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode; crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL; - crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = NULL; memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor, sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key)); @@ -273,14 +258,8 @@ retry: if (res) goto out; - kzfree(raw_key); - raw_key = NULL; - if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) != NULL) { - put_crypt_info(crypt_info); - goto retry; - } - return 0; - + if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL) + crypt_info = NULL; out: if (res == -ENOKEY) res = 0; @@ -288,6 +267,7 @@ out: kzfree(raw_key); return res; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_encryption_info); void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, struct fscrypt_info *ci) { @@ -305,17 +285,3 @@ void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, struct fscrypt_info *ci) put_crypt_info(ci); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_put_encryption_info); - -int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) -{ - struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info; - - if (!ci || - (ci->ci_keyring_key && - (ci->ci_keyring_key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | - (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) | - (1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD))))) - return fscrypt_get_crypt_info(inode); - return 0; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_get_encryption_info); -- cgit v1.2.3