From 3d071d8da1f586c24863a57349586a1611b9aa67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephan Mueller Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2016 12:42:33 +0100 Subject: random: remove stale maybe_reseed_primary_crng The function maybe_reseed_primary_crng is not used anywhere and thus can be removed. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- drivers/char/random.c | 7 ------- 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers/char') diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 1ef26403bcc8..8e5ab20848c0 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -855,13 +855,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); } -static inline void maybe_reseed_primary_crng(void) -{ - if (crng_init > 2 && - time_after(jiffies, primary_crng.init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) - crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool); -} - static inline void crng_wait_ready(void) { wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready()); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2e03c36f25ebb52d3358b8baebcdf96895c33a87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Stephan=20M=C3=BCller?= Date: Tue, 27 Dec 2016 23:39:31 +0100 Subject: random: remove stale urandom_init_wait The urandom_init_wait wait queue is a left over from the pre-ChaCha20 times and can therefore be savely removed. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- drivers/char/random.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'drivers/char') diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 8e5ab20848c0..482531d87fb8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -409,7 +409,6 @@ static struct poolinfo { */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait); static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait); -static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(urandom_init_wait); static struct fasync_struct *fasync; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 43d8a72cd985ca5279a9eb84d61fcbb3ee3d3774 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Stephan=20M=C3=BCller?= Date: Tue, 27 Dec 2016 23:40:59 +0100 Subject: random: remove variable limit The variable limit was used to identify the nonblocking pool's unlimited random number generation. As the nonblocking pool is a thing of the past, remove the limit variable and any conditions around it (i.e. preserve the branches for limit == 1). Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- drivers/char/random.c | 30 +++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers/char') diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 482531d87fb8..92d6dd24c86e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -466,7 +466,6 @@ struct entropy_store { int entropy_count; int entropy_total; unsigned int initialized:1; - unsigned int limit:1; unsigned int last_data_init:1; __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE]; }; @@ -484,7 +483,6 @@ static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; static struct entropy_store input_pool = { .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0], .name = "input", - .limit = 1, .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock), .pool = input_pool_data }; @@ -492,7 +490,6 @@ static struct entropy_store input_pool = { static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = { .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1], .name = "blocking", - .limit = 1, .pull = &input_pool, .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(blocking_pool.lock), .pool = blocking_pool_data, @@ -1212,15 +1209,6 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits) return; - if (r->limit == 0 && random_min_urandom_seed) { - unsigned long now = jiffies; - - if (time_before(now, - r->last_pulled + random_min_urandom_seed * HZ)) - return; - r->last_pulled = now; - } - _xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes); } @@ -1228,8 +1216,6 @@ static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) { __u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS]; - /* For /dev/random's pool, always leave two wakeups' worth */ - int rsvd_bytes = r->limit ? 0 : random_read_wakeup_bits / 4; int bytes = nbytes; /* pull at least as much as a wakeup */ @@ -1240,7 +1226,7 @@ static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes) trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8, ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull)); bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes, - random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, rsvd_bytes); + random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, 0); mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes); credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8); } @@ -1268,7 +1254,7 @@ static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work) static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved) { - int entropy_count, orig; + int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes; size_t ibytes, nfrac; BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits); @@ -1277,14 +1263,12 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min, retry: entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count); ibytes = nbytes; - /* If limited, never pull more than available */ - if (r->limit) { - int have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); + /* never pull more than available */ + have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3); - if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0) - have_bytes = 0; - ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes); - } + if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0) + have_bytes = 0; + ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes); if (ibytes < min) ibytes = 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5d0e5ea343a0f70351428476bcf8715e0731f26a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Stephan=20M=C3=BCller?= Date: Tue, 27 Dec 2016 23:41:22 +0100 Subject: random: fix comment for unused random_min_urandom_seed The variable random_min_urandom_seed is not needed any more as it defined the reseeding behavior of the nonblocking pool. Though it is not needed any more, it is left in the code for user space interface compatibility. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers/char') diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 92d6dd24c86e..9d147d456598 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -313,9 +313,7 @@ static int random_read_wakeup_bits = 64; static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS; /* - * The minimum number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding. We - * do this to limit the amount of entropy that can be drained from the - * input pool even if there are heavy demands on /dev/urandom. + * Variable is currently unused by left for user space compatibility. */ static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60; -- cgit v1.2.3 From f5b98461cb8167ba362ad9f74c41d126b7becea7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Fri, 6 Jan 2017 19:32:01 +0100 Subject: random: use chacha20 for get_random_int/long Now that our crng uses chacha20, we can rely on its speedy characteristics for replacing MD5, while simultaneously achieving a higher security guarantee. Before the idea was to use these functions if you wanted random integers that aren't stupidly insecure but aren't necessarily secure either, a vague gray zone, that hopefully was "good enough" for its users. With chacha20, we can strengthen this claim, since either we're using an rdrand-like instruction, or we're using the same crng as /dev/urandom. And it's faster than what was before. We could have chosen to replace this with a SipHash-derived function, which might be slightly faster, but at the cost of having yet another RNG construction in the kernel. By moving to chacha20, we have a single RNG to analyze and verify, and we also already get good performance improvements on all platforms. Implementation-wise, rather than use a generic buffer for both get_random_int/long and memcpy based on the size needs, we use a specific buffer for 32-bit reads and for 64-bit reads. This way, we're guaranteed to always have aligned accesses on all platforms. While slightly more verbose in C, the assembly this generates is a lot simpler than otherwise. Finally, on 32-bit platforms where longs and ints are the same size, we simply alias get_random_int to get_random_long. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Suggested-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa Cc: Andy Lutomirski Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- drivers/char/random.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers/char') diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 9d147d456598..b800e5479b7d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -2016,63 +2016,65 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { }; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ -static u32 random_int_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned; - -int random_int_secret_init(void) -{ - get_random_bytes(random_int_secret, sizeof(random_int_secret)); - return 0; -} - -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash) - __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)); +struct batched_entropy { + union { + unsigned long entropy_long[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)]; + unsigned int entropy_int[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned int)]; + }; + unsigned int position; +}; /* - * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but - * with the goal of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random - * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of - * depleting entropy is too high + * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random + * number is either as good as RDRAND or as good as /dev/urandom, with the + * goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. */ -unsigned int get_random_int(void) +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_long); +unsigned long get_random_long(void) { - __u32 *hash; - unsigned int ret; + unsigned long ret; + struct batched_entropy *batch; - if (arch_get_random_int(&ret)) + if (arch_get_random_long(&ret)) return ret; - hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); - - hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + random_get_entropy(); - md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret); - ret = hash[0]; - put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); - + batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_long); + if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_long) == 0) { + extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_long); + batch->position = 0; + } + ret = batch->entropy_long[batch->position++]; + put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_long); return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_int); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_long); -/* - * Same as get_random_int(), but returns unsigned long. - */ -unsigned long get_random_long(void) +#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 +unsigned int get_random_int(void) { - __u32 *hash; - unsigned long ret; + return get_random_long(); +} +#else +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_int); +unsigned int get_random_int(void) +{ + unsigned int ret; + struct batched_entropy *batch; - if (arch_get_random_long(&ret)) + if (arch_get_random_int(&ret)) return ret; - hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); - - hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + random_get_entropy(); - md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret); - ret = *(unsigned long *)hash; - put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); - + batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_int); + if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_int) == 0) { + extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_int); + batch->position = 0; + } + ret = batch->entropy_int[batch->position++]; + put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_int); return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_long); +#endif +EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_int); /** * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address -- cgit v1.2.3 From c440408cf6901eeb2c09563397e24a9097907078 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Date: Sun, 22 Jan 2017 16:34:08 +0100 Subject: random: convert get_random_int/long into get_random_u32/u64 Many times, when a user wants a random number, he wants a random number of a guaranteed size. So, thinking of get_random_int and get_random_long in terms of get_random_u32 and get_random_u64 makes it much easier to achieve this. It also makes the code simpler. On 32-bit platforms, get_random_int and get_random_long are both aliased to get_random_u32. On 64-bit platforms, int->u32 and long->u64. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- drivers/char/random.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers/char') diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index b800e5479b7d..066ae125f2c8 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -2018,8 +2018,8 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { struct batched_entropy { union { - unsigned long entropy_long[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned long)]; - unsigned int entropy_int[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(unsigned int)]; + u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)]; + u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; }; unsigned int position; }; @@ -2029,52 +2029,51 @@ struct batched_entropy { * number is either as good as RDRAND or as good as /dev/urandom, with the * goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. */ -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_long); -unsigned long get_random_long(void) +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64); +u64 get_random_u64(void) { - unsigned long ret; + u64 ret; struct batched_entropy *batch; - if (arch_get_random_long(&ret)) +#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 + if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret)) return ret; +#else + if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret) && + arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret + 1)) + return ret; +#endif - batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_long); - if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_long) == 0) { - extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_long); + batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64); + if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) { + extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); batch->position = 0; } - ret = batch->entropy_long[batch->position++]; - put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_long); + ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++]; + put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64); return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_long); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64); -#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 -unsigned int get_random_int(void) -{ - return get_random_long(); -} -#else -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_int); -unsigned int get_random_int(void) +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32); +u32 get_random_u32(void) { - unsigned int ret; + u32 ret; struct batched_entropy *batch; if (arch_get_random_int(&ret)) return ret; - batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_int); - if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_int) == 0) { - extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_int); + batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32); + if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) { + extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); batch->position = 0; } - ret = batch->entropy_int[batch->position++]; - put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_int); + ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++]; + put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32); return ret; } -#endif -EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_int); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32); /** * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address -- cgit v1.2.3 From db61ffe3a71c697aaa91c42c862a5f7557a0e562 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabio Estevam Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2017 14:36:07 -0200 Subject: random: move random_min_urandom_seed into CONFIG_SYSCTL ifdef block Building arm allnodefconfig causes the following build warning: drivers/char/random.c:318:12: warning: 'random_min_urandom_seed' defined but not used [-Wunused-variable] Fix the warning by moving 'random_min_urandom_seed' declaration inside the CONFIG_SYSCTL ifdef block, where it is actually used. While at it, remove the comment prior to the variable declaration. Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o --- drivers/char/random.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers/char') diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 066ae125f2c8..0ab024918907 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -312,11 +312,6 @@ static int random_read_wakeup_bits = 64; */ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS; -/* - * Variable is currently unused by left for user space compatibility. - */ -static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60; - /* * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords * over GF(2). The taps for various sizes are defined below. They @@ -1886,6 +1881,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh; static int max_read_thresh = OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32; +static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60; static char sysctl_bootid[16]; /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From bb35e4515411396219431fa235bf21bf9c2794e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guenter Roeck Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2017 17:13:31 -0800 Subject: drivers/char/nwbutton: Fix build breakage caused by include file reshuffling Fix: drivers/char/nwbutton.c: In function 'button_sequence_finished': drivers/char/nwbutton.c:134:3: error: implicit declaration of function 'kill_cad_pid' The declaration has been moved from one include file to another. Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Fixes: c3edc4010e9d102 ("sched/headers: Move task_struct::signal and ...") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1488762811-9022-1-git-send-email-linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- drivers/char/nwbutton.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'drivers/char') diff --git a/drivers/char/nwbutton.c b/drivers/char/nwbutton.c index a5b1eb276c0b..e6d0d271c58c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/nwbutton.c +++ b/drivers/char/nwbutton.c @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ #include #include -#include +#include #include #include #include -- cgit v1.2.3 From 45c2fdde01299b02a6e3225e848598a3c1e55539 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Petazzoni Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 15:14:46 +0100 Subject: hwrng: omap - write registers after enabling the clock Commit 383212425c926 ("hwrng: omap - Add device variant for SafeXcel IP-76 found in Armada 8K") added support for the SafeXcel IP-76 variant of the IP. This modification included getting a reference and enabling a clock. Unfortunately, this was done *after* writing to the RNG_INTMASK_REG register. This generally works fine when the driver is built-in because the clock might have been left enabled by the bootloader, but fails short when the driver is built as a module: it causes a system hang because a register is being accessed while the clock is not enabled. This commit fixes that by making the register access *after* enabling the clock. This issue was found by the kernelci.org testing effort. Fixes: 383212425c926 ("hwrng: omap - Add device variant for SafeXcel IP-76 found in Armada 8K") Cc: Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'drivers/char') diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c index 3ad86fdf954e..efa3747c1750 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c @@ -397,7 +397,6 @@ static int of_get_omap_rng_device_details(struct omap_rng_dev *priv, irq, err); return err; } - omap_rng_write(priv, RNG_INTMASK_REG, RNG_SHUTDOWN_OFLO_MASK); priv->clk = of_clk_get(pdev->dev.of_node, 0); if (IS_ERR(priv->clk) && PTR_ERR(priv->clk) == -EPROBE_DEFER) @@ -408,6 +407,8 @@ static int of_get_omap_rng_device_details(struct omap_rng_dev *priv, dev_err(&pdev->dev, "unable to enable the clk, " "err = %d\n", err); } + + omap_rng_write(priv, RNG_INTMASK_REG, RNG_SHUTDOWN_OFLO_MASK); } return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 761c2510283066324cab7859930777ee34cbca78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Petazzoni Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 15:14:47 +0100 Subject: hwrng: omap - use devm_clk_get() instead of of_clk_get() The omap-rng driver currently uses of_clk_get() to get a reference to the clock, but never releases that reference. This commit fixes that by using devm_clk_get() instead. Fixes: 383212425c926 ("hwrng: omap - Add device variant for SafeXcel IP-76 found in Armada 8K") Cc: Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'drivers/char') diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c index efa3747c1750..d2866280f130 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c @@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ static int of_get_omap_rng_device_details(struct omap_rng_dev *priv, return err; } - priv->clk = of_clk_get(pdev->dev.of_node, 0); + priv->clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, NULL); if (IS_ERR(priv->clk) && PTR_ERR(priv->clk) == -EPROBE_DEFER) return -EPROBE_DEFER; if (!IS_ERR(priv->clk)) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From b985735be7afea3a5e0570ce2ea0b662c0e12e19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Petazzoni Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 15:14:48 +0100 Subject: hwrng: omap - Do not access INTMASK_REG on EIP76 The INTMASK_REG register does not exist on EIP76. Due to this, the call: omap_rng_write(priv, RNG_INTMASK_REG, RNG_SHUTDOWN_OFLO_MASK); ends up, through the reg_map_eip76[] array, in accessing the register at offset 0, which is the RNG_OUTPUT_0_REG. This by itself doesn't cause any problem, but clearly doesn't enable the interrupt as it was expected. On EIP76, the register that allows to enable the interrupt is RNG_CONTROL_REG. And just like RNG_INTMASK_REG, it's bit 1 of this register that allows to enable the shutdown_oflo interrupt. Fixes: 383212425c926 ("hwrng: omap - Add device variant for SafeXcel IP-76 found in Armada 8K") Cc: Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'drivers/char') diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c index d2866280f130..b1ad12552b56 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/omap-rng.c @@ -408,7 +408,18 @@ static int of_get_omap_rng_device_details(struct omap_rng_dev *priv, "err = %d\n", err); } - omap_rng_write(priv, RNG_INTMASK_REG, RNG_SHUTDOWN_OFLO_MASK); + /* + * On OMAP4, enabling the shutdown_oflo interrupt is + * done in the interrupt mask register. There is no + * such register on EIP76, and it's enabled by the + * same bit in the control register + */ + if (priv->pdata->regs[RNG_INTMASK_REG]) + omap_rng_write(priv, RNG_INTMASK_REG, + RNG_SHUTDOWN_OFLO_MASK); + else + omap_rng_write(priv, RNG_CONTROL_REG, + RNG_SHUTDOWN_OFLO_MASK); } return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3