From 6b2484e13a52e9836e67e89cadc6189c40c8ae8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Alexander A. Klimov" Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2020 09:29:35 +0200 Subject: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: Documentation/admin-guide Rationale: Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate. Deterministic algorithm: For each file: If not .svg: For each line: If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`: For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`: If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions return 200 OK and serve the same content: Replace HTTP with HTTPS. Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200627072935.62652-1-grandmaster@al2klimov.de Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet --- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl') diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst index 2a45119e3331..f48277a0a850 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see: -http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp When set to "0", symlink following behavior is unrestricted. -- cgit v1.2.3