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Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"Two minor fixes and one performance enhancement to Smack. The
performance improvement is significant and the new code is more like
its counterpart in SELinux.
- Two kernel test robot suggested clean-ups.
- Teach Smack to use the IPv4 netlabel cache. This results in a
12-14% improvement on TCP benchmarks"
* tag 'Smack-for-5.10' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
Smack: Remove unnecessary variable initialization
Smack: Fix build when NETWORK_SECMARK is not set
Smack: Use the netlabel cache
Smack: Set socket labels only once
Smack: Consolidate uses of secmark into a function
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Pull tomoyo fix from Tetsuo HandaL
"One patch to make it possible to execute usermode-driver's path"
* tag 'tomoyo-pr-20201012' of git://git.osdn.net/gitroot/tomoyo/tomoyo-test1:
tomoyo: Loosen pathname/domainname validation.
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Fix multiple cast-to-union warnings related to casting kuid_t and kgid_t
types to kid_t union type. Also fix incompatible type warning that
arises from accidental omission of "__rcu" qualifier on the struct
setid_ruleset pointer in the argument list for safesetid_file_read().
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
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The SafeSetID LSM has functionality for restricting setuid() calls based
on its configured security policies. This patch adds the analogous
functionality for setgid() calls. This is mostly a copy-and-paste change
with some code deduplication, plus slight modifications/name changes to
the policy-rule-related structs (now contain GID rules in addition to
the UID ones) and some type generalization since SafeSetID now needs to
deal with kgid_t and kuid_t types.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Allow DRBG testing through user-space af_alg
- Add tcrypt speed testing support for keyed hashes
- Add type-safe init/exit hooks for ahash
Algorithms:
- Mark arc4 as obsolete and pending for future removal
- Mark anubis, khazad, sead and tea as obsolete
- Improve boot-time xor benchmark
- Add OSCCA SM2 asymmetric cipher algorithm and use it for integrity
Drivers:
- Fixes and enhancement for XTS in caam
- Add support for XIP8001B hwrng in xiphera-trng
- Add RNG and hash support in sun8i-ce/sun8i-ss
- Allow imx-rngc to be used by kernel entropy pool
- Use crypto engine in omap-sham
- Add support for Ingenic X1830 with ingenic"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (205 commits)
X.509: Fix modular build of public_key_sm2
crypto: xor - Remove unused variable count in do_xor_speed
X.509: fix error return value on the failed path
crypto: bcm - Verify GCM/CCM key length in setkey
crypto: qat - drop input parameter from adf_enable_aer()
crypto: qat - fix function parameters descriptions
crypto: atmel-tdes - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
crypto: drivers - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: mxc-rnga - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: iproc-rng200 - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: stm32 - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking
crypto: xor - defer load time benchmark to a later time
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the uninitalized 'curr_qm_qp_num'
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the return value when device is busy
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix zero length input in GZIP decompress
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the uncleared debug registers
lib/mpi: Fix unused variable warnings
crypto: x86/poly1305 - Remove assignments with no effect
hwrng: npcm - modify readl to readb
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull compat iovec cleanups from Al Viro:
"Christoph's series around import_iovec() and compat variant thereof"
* 'work.iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
security/keys: remove compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov
mm: remove compat_process_vm_{readv,writev}
fs: remove compat_sys_vmsplice
fs: remove the compat readv/writev syscalls
fs: remove various compat readv/writev helpers
iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec
iov_iter: refactor rw_copy_check_uvector and import_iovec
iov_iter: move rw_copy_check_uvector() into lib/iov_iter.c
compat.h: fix a spelling error in <linux/compat.h>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI changes from Ingo Molnar:
- Preliminary RISC-V enablement - the bulk of it will arrive via the
RISCV tree.
- Relax decompressed image placement rules for 32-bit ARM
- Add support for passing MOK certificate table contents via a config
table rather than a EFI variable.
- Add support for 18 bit DIMM row IDs in the CPER records.
- Work around broken Dell firmware that passes the entire Boot####
variable contents as the command line
- Add definition of the EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO memory attribute so we
can identify it in the memory map listings.
- Don't abort the boot on arm64 if the EFI RNG protocol is available
but returns with an error
- Replace slashes with exclamation marks in efivarfs file names
- Split efi-pstore from the deprecated efivars sysfs code, so we can
disable the latter on !x86.
- Misc fixes, cleanups and updates.
* tag 'efi-core-2020-10-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (26 commits)
efi: mokvar: add missing include of asm/early_ioremap.h
efi: efivars: limit availability to X86 builds
efi: remove some false dependencies on CONFIG_EFI_VARS
efi: gsmi: fix false dependency on CONFIG_EFI_VARS
efi: efivars: un-export efivars_sysfs_init()
efi: pstore: move workqueue handling out of efivars
efi: pstore: disentangle from deprecated efivars module
efi: mokvar-table: fix some issues in new code
efi/arm64: libstub: Deal gracefully with EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL failure
efivarfs: Replace invalid slashes with exclamation marks in dentries.
efi: Delete deprecated parameter comments
efi/libstub: Fix missing-prototypes in string.c
efi: Add definition of EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO and ability to report it
cper,edac,efi: Memory Error Record: bank group/address and chip id
edac,ghes,cper: Add Row Extension to Memory Error Record
efi/x86: Add a quirk to support command line arguments on Dell EFI firmware
efi/libstub: Add efi_warn and *_once logging helpers
integrity: Load certs from the EFI MOK config table
integrity: Move import of MokListRT certs to a separate routine
efi: Support for MOK variable config table
...
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Since commit e2dc9bf3f5275ca3 ("umd: Transform fork_usermode_blob into
fork_usermode_driver") started calling execve() on a program written in
a local mount which is not connected to mount tree,
tomoyo_realpath_from_path() started returning a pathname in
"$fsname:/$pathname" format which violates TOMOYO's domainname rule that
it must start with "<$namespace>" followed by zero or more repetitions of
pathnames which start with '/'.
Since $fsname must not contain '.' since commit 79c0b2df79eb56fc ("add
filesystem subtype support"), tomoyo_correct_path() can recognize a token
which appears '/' before '.' appears (e.g. proc:/self/exe ) as a pathname
while rejecting a token which appears '.' before '/' appears (e.g.
exec.realpath="/bin/bash" ) as a condition parameter.
Therefore, accept domainnames which contain pathnames which do not start
with '/' but contain '/' before '.' (e.g. <kernel> tmpfs:/bpfilter_umh ).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
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The initialization of rc in smack_from_netlbl() is pointless.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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To perform partial reads, callers of kernel_read_file*() must have a
non-NULL file_size argument and a preallocated buffer. The new "offset"
argument can then be used to seek to specific locations in the file to
fill the buffer to, at most, "buf_size" per call.
Where possible, the LSM hooks can report whether a full file has been
read or not so that the contents can be reasoned about.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-14-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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When the kernel_read_file LSM hook is called with contents=false, IMA
can appraise the file directly, without requiring a filled buffer. When
such a buffer is available, though, IMA can continue to use it instead
of forcing a double read here.
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706232309.12010-10-scott.branden@broadcom.com/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-13-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the
kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect
a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full
contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read
support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able
to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls.
For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents,
it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file
hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all
existing LSMs to retain existing behavior.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Now that security_post_load_data() is wired up, use it instead
of the NULL file argument style of security_post_read_file(),
and update the security_kernel_load_data() call to indicate that a
security_kernel_post_load_data() call is expected.
Wire up the IMA check to match earlier logic. Perhaps a generalized
change to ima_post_load_data() might look something like this:
return process_buffer_measurement(buf, size,
kernel_load_data_id_str(load_id),
read_idmap[load_id] ?: FILE_CHECK,
0, NULL);
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-10-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().
Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)
Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.
With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.
Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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In preparation for adding partial read support, add an optional output
argument to kernel_read_file*() that reports the file size so callers
can reason more easily about their reading progress.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-8-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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In preparation for further refactoring of kernel_read_file*(), rename
the "max_size" argument to the more accurate "buf_size", and correct
its type to size_t. Add kerndoc to explain the specifics of how the
arguments will be used. Note that with buf_size now size_t, it can no
longer be negative (and was never called with a negative value). Adjust
callers to use it as a "maximum size" when *buf is NULL.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-7-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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In preparation for refactoring kernel_read_file*(), remove the redundant
"size" argument which is not needed: it can be included in the return
code, with callers adjusted. (VFS reads already cannot be larger than
INT_MAX.)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-6-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h
include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere
and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER is a "how", not a "what", and confuses the LSMs
that are interested in filtering between types of things. The "how"
should be an internal detail made uninteresting to the LSMs.
Fixes: a098ecd2fa7d ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer")
Fixes: fd90bc559bfb ("ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)")
Fixes: 4f0496d8ffa3 ("ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Now that import_iovec handles compat iovecs, the native version of
keyctl_instantiate_key_iov can be used for the compat case as well.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Use in compat_syscall to import either native or the compat iovecs, and
remove the now superflous compat_import_iovec.
This removes the need for special compat logic in most callers, and
the remaining ones can still be simplified by using __import_iovec
with a bool compat parameter.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Asymmetric digsig supports SM2-with-SM3 algorithm combination,
so that IMA can also verify SM2's signature data.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: Xufeng Zhang <yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Two minor conflicts:
1) net/ipv4/route.c, adding a new local variable while
moving another local variable and removing it's
initial assignment.
2) drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz9477.c, overlapping changes.
One pretty prints the port mode differently, whilst another
changes the driver to try and obtain the port mode from
the port node rather than the switch node.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Use proper conditional compilation for the secmark field in
the network skb.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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ima_file_hash can be called when there is no iint->ima_hash available
even though the inode exists in the integrity cache. It is fairly
common for a file to not have a hash. (e.g. an mknodat, prior to the
file being closed).
Another example where this can happen (suggested by Jann Horn):
Process A does:
while(1) {
unlink("/tmp/imafoo");
fd = open("/tmp/imafoo", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0700);
if (fd == -1) {
perror("open");
continue;
}
write(fd, "A", 1);
close(fd);
}
and Process B does:
while (1) {
int fd = open("/tmp/imafoo", O_RDONLY);
if (fd == -1)
continue;
char *mapping = mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC,
MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
if (mapping != MAP_FAILED)
munmap(mapping, 0x1000);
close(fd);
}
Due to the race to get the iint->mutex between ima_file_hash and
process_measurement iint->ima_hash could still be NULL.
Fixes: 6beea7afcc72 ("ima: add the ability to query the cached hash of a given file")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Because of system-specific EFI firmware limitations, EFI volatile
variables may not be capable of holding the required contents of
the Machine Owner Key (MOK) certificate store when the certificate
list grows above some size. Therefore, an EFI boot loader may pass
the MOK certs via a EFI configuration table created specifically for
this purpose to avoid this firmware limitation.
An EFI configuration table is a much more primitive mechanism
compared to EFI variables and is well suited for one-way passage
of static information from a pre-OS environment to the kernel.
This patch adds the support to load certs from the MokListRT
entry in the MOK variable configuration table, if it's present.
The pre-existing support to load certs from the MokListRT EFI
variable remains and is used if the EFI MOK configuration table
isn't present or can't be successfully used.
Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-4-lszubowi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Move the loading of certs from the UEFI MokListRT into a separate
routine to facilitate additional MokList functionality.
There is no visible functional change as a result of this patch.
Although the UEFI dbx certs are now loaded before the MokList certs,
they are loaded onto different key rings. So the order of the keys
on their respective key rings is the same.
Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-3-lszubowi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer fix from James Morris:
"A device_cgroup RCU warning fix from Amol Grover"
* tag 'fixes-v5.9a' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
device_cgroup: Fix RCU list debugging warning
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checkreqprot data member in selinux_state struct is accessed directly by
SELinux functions to get and set. This could cause unexpected read or
write access to this data member due to compiler optimizations and/or
compiler's reordering of access to this field.
Add helper functions to get and set checkreqprot data member in
selinux_state struct. These helper functions use READ_ONCE and
WRITE_ONCE macros to ensure atomic read or write of memory for
this data member.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This patch checks the size for the EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG and
EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG types to ensure that the algorithm is read from
the buffer returned by vfs_getxattr_alloc().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19.x
Fixes: 5feeb61183dde ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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This patch removes the unnecessary semicolon at the end of
ima_get_binary_runtime_size().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d158847ae89a2 ("ima: maintain memory size needed for serializing the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Errors returned by crypto_shash_update() are not checked in
ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm() and thus can be overwritten at the next
iteration of the loop. This patch adds a check after calling
crypto_shash_update() and returns immediately if the result is not zero.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3323eec921efd ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Issue identified with Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar <alex.dewar90@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Utilize the Netlabel cache mechanism for incoming packet matching.
Refactor the initialization of secattr structures, as it was being
done in two places.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Refactor the IP send checks so that the netlabel value
is set only when necessary, not on every send. Some functions
get renamed as the changes made the old name misleading.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Add a function smack_from_skb() that returns the Smack label
identified by a network secmark. Replace the explicit uses of
the secmark with this function.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE for all accesses to the
selinux_state.policycaps booleans to prevent compiler
mischief.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Depending on the IMA policy rule a key may be searched for in multiple
keyrings (e.g. .ima and .platform) and possibly not found. This patch
improves feedback by including the keyring "description" (name) in the
error message.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Only emit an unknown/invalid message when setting the IMA appraise mode
to anything other than "enforce", when secureboot is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Don't silently ignore unknown or invalid ima_{policy,appraise,hash} and evm
kernel boot command line options.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The "enforce" string is allowed as an option for ima_appraise= kernel
paramenter per kernel-paramenters.txt and should be considered on the
parameter setup checking as a matter of completeness. Also it allows futher
checking on the options being passed by the user.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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We got slightly different patches removing a double word
in a comment in net/ipv4/raw.c - picked the version from net.
Simple conflict in drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c. Use cached
values instead of VNIC login response buffer (following what
commit 507ebe6444a4 ("ibmvnic: Fix use-after-free of VNIC login
response buffer") did).
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Modify integrity_audit_message() to use current_uid().
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Measuring keys is currently only supported for asymmetric keys. In the
future, this might change.
For now, the "func=KEY_CHECK" and "keyrings=" options are only
appropriate when CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Make
this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that
these policy language constructs are supported.
Fixes: 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Fixes: 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Suggested-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The ima_keyrings buffer was used as a work buffer for strsep()-based
parsing of the "keyrings=" option of an IMA policy rule. This parsing
was re-performed each time an asymmetric key was added to a kernel
keyring for each loaded policy rule that contained a "keyrings=" option.
An example rule specifying this option is:
measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=a|b|c
The rule says to measure asymmetric keys added to any of the kernel
keyrings named "a", "b", or "c". The size of the buffer size was
equal to the size of the largest "keyrings=" value seen in a previously
loaded rule (5 + 1 for the NUL-terminator in the previous example) and
the buffer was pre-allocated at the time of policy load.
The pre-allocated buffer approach suffered from a couple bugs:
1) There was no locking around the use of the buffer so concurrent key
add operations, to two different keyrings, would result in the
strsep() loop of ima_match_keyring() to modify the buffer at the same
time. This resulted in unexpected results from ima_match_keyring()
and, therefore, could cause unintended keys to be measured or keys to
not be measured when IMA policy intended for them to be measured.
2) If the kstrdup() that initialized entry->keyrings in ima_parse_rule()
failed, the ima_keyrings buffer was freed and set to NULL even when a
valid KEY_CHECK rule was previously loaded. The next KEY_CHECK event
would trigger a call to strcpy() with a NULL destination pointer and
crash the kernel.
Remove the need for a pre-allocated global buffer by parsing the list of
keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule at the time of policy load. The
ima_rule_entry will contain an array of string pointers which point to
the name of each keyring specified in the rule. No string processing
needs to happen at the time of asymmetric key add so iterating through
the list and doing a string comparison is all that's required at the
time of policy check.
In the process of changing how the "keyrings=" policy option is handled,
a couple additional bugs were fixed:
1) The rule parser accepted rules containing invalid "keyrings=" values
such as "a|b||c", "a|b|", or simply "|".
2) The /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy file did not display the entire
"keyrings=" value if the list of keyrings was longer than what could
fit in the fixed size tbuf buffer in ima_policy_show().
Fixes: 5c7bac9fb2c5 ("IMA: pre-allocate buffer to hold keyrings string")
Fixes: 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Remove the security_policydb_len() calls from sel_open_policy() and
instead update the inode size from the size returned from
security_read_policy().
Since after this change security_policydb_len() is only called from
security_load_policy(), remove it entirely and just open-code it there.
Also, since security_load_policy() is always called with policy_mutex
held, make it dereference the policy pointer directly and drop the
unnecessary RCU locking.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Move the mutex used to synchronize policy changes (reloads and setting
of booleans) from selinux_fs_info to selinux_state and use it in
lockdep checks for rcu_dereference_protected() calls in the security
server functions. This makes the dependency on the mutex explicit
in the code rather than relying on comments.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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There are a few bugs in the error handling for security_load_policy().
1) If the newpolicy->sidtab allocation fails then it leads to a NULL
dereference. Also the error code was not set to -ENOMEM on that
path.
2) If policydb_read() failed then we call policydb_destroy() twice
which meands we call kvfree(p->sym_val_to_name[i]) twice.
3) If policydb_load_isids() failed then we call sidtab_destroy() twice
and that results in a double free in the sidtab_destroy_tree()
function because entry.ptr_inner and entry.ptr_leaf are not set to
NULL.
One thing that makes this code nice to deal with is that none of the
functions return partially allocated data. In other words, the
policydb_read() either allocates everything successfully or it frees
all the data it allocates. It never returns a mix of allocated and
not allocated data.
I re-wrote this to only free the successfully allocated data which
avoids the double frees. I also re-ordered selinux_policy_free() so
it's in the reverse order of the allocation function.
Fixes: c7c556f1e81b ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
[PM: partially merged by hand due to merge fuzz]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Similar to bpf_local_storage for sockets, add local storage for inodes.
The life-cycle of storage is managed with the life-cycle of the inode.
i.e. the storage is destroyed along with the owning inode.
The BPF LSM allocates an __rcu pointer to the bpf_local_storage in the
security blob which are now stackable and can co-exist with other LSMs.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825182919.1118197-6-kpsingh@chromium.org
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Convert the policy read-write lock to RCU. This is significantly
simplified by the earlier work to encapsulate the policy data
structures and refactor the policy load and boolean setting logic.
Move the latest_granting sequence number into the selinux_policy
structure so that it can be updated atomically with the policy.
Since removing the policy rwlock and moving latest_granting reduces
the selinux_ss structure to nothing more than a wrapper around the
selinux_policy pointer, get rid of the extra layer of indirection.
At present this change merely passes a hardcoded 1 to
rcu_dereference_check() in the cases where we know we do not need to
take rcu_read_lock(), with the preceding comment explaining why.
Alternatively we could pass fsi->mutex down from selinuxfs and
apply a lockdep check on it instead.
Based in part on earlier attempts to convert the policy rwlock
to RCU by Kaigai Kohei [1] and by Peter Enderborg [2].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/6e2f9128-e191-ebb3-0e87-74bfccb0767f@tycho.nsa.gov/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20180530141104.28569-1-peter.enderborg@sony.com/
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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