summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security
AgeCommit message (Collapse)Author
2009-09-23Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: SELinux: do not destroy the avc_cache_nodep KEYS: Have the garbage collector set its timer for live expired keys tpm-fixup-pcrs-sysfs-file-update creds_are_invalid() needs to be exported for use by modules: include/linux/cred.h: fix build Fix trivial BUILD_BUG_ON-induced conflicts in drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
2009-09-23SELinux: do not destroy the avc_cache_nodepEric Paris
The security_ops reset done when SELinux is disabled at run time is done after the avc cache is freed and after the kmem_cache for the avc is also freed. This means that between the time the selinux disable code destroys the avc_node_cachep another process could make a security request and could try to allocate from the cache. We are just going to leave the cachep around, like we always have. SELinux: Disabled at runtime. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff81122537>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x9a/0x185 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC last sysfs file: CPU 1 Modules linked in: Pid: 12, comm: khelper Not tainted 2.6.31-tip-05525-g0eeacc6-dirty #14819 System Product Name RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81122537>] [<ffffffff81122537>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x9a/0x185 RSP: 0018:ffff88003f9258b0 EFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000078c0129e RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8130b626 RDI: ffffffff81122528 RBP: ffff88003f925900 R08: 0000000078c0129e R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000078c0129e R12: 0000000000000246 R13: 0000000000008020 R14: ffff88003f8586d8 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880002b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000001001000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: ffffffff827bd420 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process khelper (pid: 12, threadinfo ffff88003f924000, task ffff88003f928000) Stack: 0000000000000246 0000802000000246 ffffffff8130b626 0000000000000001 <0> 0000000078c0129e 0000000000000000 ffff88003f925a70 0000000000000002 <0> 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 ffff88003f925960 ffffffff8130b626 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8130b626>] ? avc_alloc_node+0x36/0x273 [<ffffffff8130b626>] avc_alloc_node+0x36/0x273 [<ffffffff8130b545>] ? avc_latest_notif_update+0x7d/0x9e [<ffffffff8130b8b4>] avc_insert+0x51/0x18d [<ffffffff8130bcce>] avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x9d/0x128 [<ffffffff8130bf20>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0x88 [<ffffffff8130f99d>] current_has_perm+0x52/0x6d [<ffffffff8130fbb2>] selinux_task_create+0x2f/0x45 [<ffffffff81303bf7>] security_task_create+0x29/0x3f [<ffffffff8105c6ba>] copy_process+0x82/0xdf0 [<ffffffff81091578>] ? register_lock_class+0x2f/0x36c [<ffffffff81091a13>] ? mark_lock+0x2e/0x1e1 [<ffffffff8105d596>] do_fork+0x16e/0x382 [<ffffffff81091578>] ? register_lock_class+0x2f/0x36c [<ffffffff810d9166>] ? probe_workqueue_execution+0x57/0xf9 [<ffffffff81091a13>] ? mark_lock+0x2e/0x1e1 [<ffffffff810d9166>] ? probe_workqueue_execution+0x57/0xf9 [<ffffffff8100cdb2>] kernel_thread+0x82/0xe0 [<ffffffff81078b1f>] ? ____call_usermodehelper+0x0/0x139 [<ffffffff8100ce10>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20 [<ffffffff81078aea>] ? __call_usermodehelper+0x65/0x9a [<ffffffff8107a5c7>] run_workqueue+0x171/0x27e [<ffffffff8107a573>] ? run_workqueue+0x11d/0x27e [<ffffffff81078a85>] ? __call_usermodehelper+0x0/0x9a [<ffffffff8107a7bc>] worker_thread+0xe8/0x10f [<ffffffff810808e2>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x63 [<ffffffff8107a6d4>] ? worker_thread+0x0/0x10f [<ffffffff8108042e>] kthread+0x91/0x99 [<ffffffff8100ce1a>] child_rip+0xa/0x20 [<ffffffff8100c754>] ? restore_args+0x0/0x30 [<ffffffff8108039d>] ? kthread+0x0/0x99 [<ffffffff8100ce10>] ? child_rip+0x0/0x20 Code: 0f 85 99 00 00 00 9c 58 66 66 90 66 90 49 89 c4 fa 66 66 90 66 66 90 e8 83 34 fb ff e8 d7 e9 26 00 48 98 49 8b 94 c6 10 01 00 00 <48> 8b 1a 44 8b 7a 18 48 85 db 74 0f 8b 42 14 48 8b 04 c3 ff 42 RIP [<ffffffff81122537>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x9a/0x185 RSP <ffff88003f9258b0> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 42f41a982344e606 ]--- Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-23KEYS: Have the garbage collector set its timer for live expired keysDavid Howells
The key garbage collector sets a timer to start a new collection cycle at the point the earliest key to expire should be considered garbage. However, it currently only does this if the key it is considering hasn't yet expired. If the key being considering has expired, but hasn't yet reached the collection time then it is ignored, and won't be collected until some other key provokes a round of collection. Make the garbage collector set the timer for the earliest key that hasn't yet passed its collection time, rather than the earliest key that hasn't yet expired. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-23seq_file: constify seq_operationsJames Morris
Make all seq_operations structs const, to help mitigate against revectoring user-triggerable function pointers. This is derived from the grsecurity patch, although generated from scratch because it's simpler than extracting the changes from there. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-23Move magic numbers into magic.hNick Black
Move various magic-number definitions into magic.h. Signed-off-by: Nick Black <dank@qemfd.net> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-15Merge branch 'x86-txt-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'x86-txt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: x86, intel_txt: clean up the impact on generic code, unbreak non-x86 x86, intel_txt: Handle ACPI_SLEEP without X86_TRAMPOLINE x86, intel_txt: Fix typos in Kconfig help x86, intel_txt: Factor out the code for S3 setup x86, intel_txt: tboot.c needs <asm/fixmap.h> intel_txt: Force IOMMU on for Intel TXT launch x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT Sx shutdown support x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT reboot/halt shutdown support x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT boot support
2009-09-15KEYS: Fix garbage collectorDavid Howells
Fix a number of problems with the new key garbage collector: (1) A rogue semicolon in keyring_gc() was causing the initial count of dead keys to be miscalculated. (2) A missing return in keyring_gc() meant that under certain circumstances, the keyring semaphore would be unlocked twice. (3) The key serial tree iterator (key_garbage_collector()) part of the garbage collector has been modified to: (a) Complete each scan of the keyrings before setting the new timer. (b) Only set the new timer for keys that have yet to expire. This means that the new timer is now calculated correctly, and the gc doesn't get into a loop continually scanning for keys that have expired, and preventing other things from happening, like RCU cleaning up the old keyring contents. (c) Perform an extra scan if any keys were garbage collected in this one as a key might become garbage during a scan, and (b) could mean we don't set the timer again. (4) Made key_schedule_gc() take the time at which to do a collection run, rather than the time at which the key expires. This means the collection of dead keys (key type unregistered) can happen immediately. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-15KEYS: Unlock tasklist when exiting early from keyctl_session_to_parentMarc Dionne
When we exit early from keyctl_session_to_parent because of permissions or because the session keyring is the same as the parent, we need to unlock the tasklist. The missing unlock causes the system to hang completely when using keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT) with a keyring shared with the parent. Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-14SELinux: flush the avc before disabling SELinuxEric Paris
Before SELinux is disabled at boot it can create AVC entries. This patch will flush those entries before disabling SELinux. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-14SELinux: seperate avc_cache flushingEric Paris
Move the avc_cache flushing into it's own function so it can be reused when disabling SELinux. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-14Creds: creds->security can be NULL is selinux is disabledEric Paris
__validate_process_creds should check if selinux is actually enabled before running tests on the selinux portion of the credentials struct. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-11Merge branch 'next' into for-linusJames Morris
2009-09-10sysfs: Add labeling support for sysfsDavid P. Quigley
This patch adds a setxattr handler to the file, directory, and symlink inode_operations structures for sysfs. The patch uses hooks introduced in the previous patch to handle the getting and setting of security information for the sysfs inodes. As was suggested by Eric Biederman the struct iattr in the sysfs_dirent structure has been replaced by a structure which contains the iattr, secdata and secdata length to allow the changes to persist in the event that the inode representing the sysfs_dirent is evicted. Because sysfs only stores this information when a change is made all the optional data is moved into one dynamically allocated field. This patch addresses an issue where SELinux was denying virtd access to the PCI configuration entries in sysfs. The lack of setxattr handlers for sysfs required that a single label be assigned to all entries in sysfs. Granting virtd access to every entry in sysfs is not an acceptable solution so fine grained labeling of sysfs is required such that individual entries can be labeled appropriately. [sds: Fixed compile-time warnings, coding style, and setting of inode security init flags.] Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-10LSM/SELinux: inode_{get,set,notify}secctx hooks to access LSM security ↵David P. Quigley
context information. This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below. Quote Stephen Smalley inode_setsecctx: Change the security context of an inode. Updates the in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. inode_notifysecctx: Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-07IMA: update ima_counts_putMimi Zohar
- As ima_counts_put() may be called after the inode has been freed, verify that the inode is not NULL, before dereferencing it. - Maintain the IMA file counters in may_open() properly, decrementing any counter increments on subsequent errors. Reported-by: Ciprian Docan <docan@eden.rutgers.edu> Reported-by: J.R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]David Howells
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this will be after a wait*() syscall. To support this, three new security hooks have been provided: cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if the process may replace its parent's session keyring. The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it. Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path. This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace execution. This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed the newpag flag. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> #define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18 #define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0) int main(int argc, char **argv) { key_serial_t keyring, key; long ret; keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]); OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring"); key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring); OSERROR(key, "add_key"); ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT"); return 0; } Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043 [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses 1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello [dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show Session Keyring -3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello 340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named 'a' into it and then installs it on its parent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02KEYS: Do some whitespace cleanups [try #6]David Howells
Do some whitespace cleanups in the key management code. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02KEYS: Make /proc/keys use keyid not numread as file position [try #6]Serge E. Hallyn
Make the file position maintained by /proc/keys represent the ID of the key just read rather than the number of keys read. This should make it faster to perform a lookup as we don't have to scan the key ID tree from the beginning to find the current position. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02KEYS: Add garbage collection for dead, revoked and expired keys. [try #6]David Howells
Add garbage collection for dead, revoked and expired keys. This involved erasing all links to such keys from keyrings that point to them. At that point, the key will be deleted in the normal manner. Keyrings from which garbage collection occurs are shrunk and their quota consumption reduced as appropriate. Dead keys (for which the key type has been removed) will be garbage collected immediately. Revoked and expired keys will hang around for a number of seconds, as set in /proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay before being automatically removed. The default is 5 minutes. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02KEYS: Flag dead keys to induce EKEYREVOKED [try #6]David Howells
Set the KEY_FLAG_DEAD flag on keys for which the type has been removed. This causes the key_permission() function to return EKEYREVOKED in response to various commands. It does not, however, prevent unlinking or clearing of keyrings from detaching the key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02KEYS: Allow keyctl_revoke() on keys that have SETATTR but not WRITE perm ↵David Howells
[try #6] Allow keyctl_revoke() to operate on keys that have SETATTR but not WRITE permission, rather than only on keys that have WRITE permission. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02KEYS: Deal with dead-type keys appropriately [try #6]David Howells
Allow keys for which the key type has been removed to be unlinked. Currently dead-type keys can only be disposed of by completely clearing the keyrings that point to them. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02CRED: Add some configurable debugging [try #6]David Howells
Add a config option (CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS) to turn on some debug checking for credential management. The additional code keeps track of the number of pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct (which includes all references, not just those from task_structs). Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, the code also checks that the security pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid. This attempts to catch the bug whereby inode_has_perm() faults in an nfsd kernel thread on seeing cred->security be a NULL pointer (it appears that the credential struct has been previously released): http://www.kerneloops.org/oops.php?number=252883 Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-02Merge commit 'v2.6.31-rc8' into x86/txtIngo Molnar
Conflicts: arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c security/Kconfig Merge reason: resolve the conflicts, bump up from rc3 to rc8. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-01x86, intel_txt: clean up the impact on generic code, unbreak non-x86Shane Wang
Move tboot.h from asm to linux to fix the build errors of intel_txt patch on non-X86 platforms. Remove the tboot code from generic code init/main.c and kernel/cpu.c. Signed-off-by: Shane Wang <shane.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-09-01selinux: Support for the new TUN LSM hooksPaul Moore
Add support for the new TUN LSM hooks: security_tun_dev_create(), security_tun_dev_post_create() and security_tun_dev_attach(). This includes the addition of a new object class, tun_socket, which represents the socks associated with TUN devices. The _tun_dev_create() and _tun_dev_post_create() hooks are fairly similar to the standard socket functions but _tun_dev_attach() is a bit special. The _tun_dev_attach() is unique because it involves a domain attaching to an existing TUN device and its associated tun_socket object, an operation which does not exist with standard sockets and most closely resembles a relabel operation. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-09-01lsm: Add hooks to the TUN driverPaul Moore
The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules, such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as QEMU and KVM. This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are: * security_tun_dev_create() Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices * security_tun_dev_post_create() Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly created TUN devices * security_tun_dev_attach() Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices and the ability to update the TUN device's socket LSM state as necessary Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-26Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: IMA: iint put in ima_counts_get and put
2009-08-27IMA: iint put in ima_counts_get and putEric Paris
ima_counts_get() calls ima_iint_find_insert_get() which takes a reference to the iint in question, but does not put that reference at the end of the function. This can lead to a nasty memory leak. Easy enough to reproduce: #include <sys/mman.h> #include <stdio.h> int main (void) { int i; void *ptr; for (i=0; i < 100000; i++) { ptr = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) return 2; munmap(ptr, 4096); } return 0; } Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-24ima: hashing large files bug fixMimi Zohar
Hashing files larger than INT_MAX causes process to loop. Dependent on redefining kernel_read() offset type to loff_t. (http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13909) Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-21selinux: adjust rules for ATTR_FORCEAmerigo Wang
As suggested by OGAWA Hirofumi in thread: http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/8/7/132, we should let selinux_inode_setattr() to match our ATTR_* rules. ATTR_FORCE should not force things like ATTR_SIZE. [hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp: tweaks] Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-20Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris
Conflicts: security/Kconfig Manual fix. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-19security: Fix prompt for LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDRAndreas Schwab
Fix prompt for LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. (Verbs are cool!) Signed-off-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-19security: Make LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR default match its help text.Dave Jones
Commit 788084aba2ab7348257597496befcbccabdc98a3 added the LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR option, whose help text states "For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems." Which implies that it's default setting was typoed. Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addrEric Paris
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect. The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17SELinux: call cap_file_mmap in selinux_file_mmapEric Paris
Currently SELinux does not check CAP_SYS_RAWIO in the file_mmap hook. This means there is no DAC check on the ability to mmap low addresses in the memory space. This function adds the DAC check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO while maintaining the selinux check on mmap_zero. This means that processes which need to mmap low memory will need CAP_SYS_RAWIO and mmap_zero but will NOT need the SELinux sys_rawio capability. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.cEric Paris
Currently we duplicate the mmap_min_addr test in cap_file_mmap and in security_file_mmap if !CONFIG_SECURITY. This patch moves cap_file_mmap into commoncap.c and then calls that function directly from security_file_mmap ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY like all of the other capability checks are done. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-17SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.hThomas Liu
Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h, for better maintainability. - changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of avc_audit_data - eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead. Had to add a LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to lsm_audit.h so that avc_audit can call common_lsm_audit and do the pre and post callbacks without doing the actual dump. This makes it so that the patched version behaves the same way as the unpatched version. Also added a denied field to the selinux_audit_data private space, once again to make it so that the patched version behaves like the unpatched. I've tested and confirmed that AVCs look the same before and after this patch. Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-14x86, intel_txt: Fix typos in Kconfig helpArnaldo Carvalho de Melo
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-08-14SELinux: add selinux_kernel_module_requestEric Paris
This patch adds a new selinux hook so SELinux can arbitrate if a given process should be allowed to trigger a request for the kernel to try to load a module. This is a different operation than a process trying to load a module itself, which is already protected by CAP_SYS_MODULE. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-14security: introducing security_request_moduleEric Paris
Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a new module into the kernel. This can be a dangerous event if the process able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe binary or the module binary. This patch adds a new security hook to request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability to call request_module(). Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-11SELinux: fix memory leakage in /security/selinux/hooks.cJames Morris
Fix memory leakage in /security/selinux/hooks.c The buffer always needs to be freed here; we either error out or allocate more memory. Reported-by: iceberg <strakh@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
2009-08-06Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addrEric Paris
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect. The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-06SELinux: call cap_file_mmap in selinux_file_mmapEric Paris
Currently SELinux does not check CAP_SYS_RAWIO in the file_mmap hook. This means there is no DAC check on the ability to mmap low addresses in the memory space. This function adds the DAC check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO while maintaining the selinux check on mmap_zero. This means that processes which need to mmap low memory will need CAP_SYS_RAWIO and mmap_zero but will NOT need the SELinux sys_rawio capability. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-06Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.cEric Paris
Currently we duplicate the mmap_min_addr test in cap_file_mmap and in security_file_mmap if !CONFIG_SECURITY. This patch moves cap_file_mmap into commoncap.c and then calls that function directly from security_file_mmap ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY like all of the other capability checks are done. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-08-06security/smack: Use AF_INET for sin_family fieldJulia Lawall
Elsewhere the sin_family field holds a value with a name of the form AF_..., so it seems reasonable to do so here as well. Also the values of PF_INET and AF_INET are the same. The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) // <smpl> @@ struct sockaddr_in sip; @@ ( sip.sin_family == - PF_INET + AF_INET | sip.sin_family != - PF_INET + AF_INET | sip.sin_family = - PF_INET + AF_INET ) // </smpl> Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-07-21x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT boot supportJoseph Cihula
This patch adds kernel configuration and boot support for Intel Trusted Execution Technology (Intel TXT). Intel's technology for safer computing, Intel Trusted Execution Technology (Intel TXT), defines platform-level enhancements that provide the building blocks for creating trusted platforms. Intel TXT was formerly known by the code name LaGrande Technology (LT). Intel TXT in Brief: o Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM) o Data protection in case of improper shutdown o Measurement and verification of launched environment Intel TXT is part of the vPro(TM) brand and is also available some non-vPro systems. It is currently available on desktop systems based on the Q35, X38, Q45, and Q43 Express chipsets (e.g. Dell Optiplex 755, HP dc7800, etc.) and mobile systems based on the GM45, PM45, and GS45 Express chipsets. For more information, see http://www.intel.com/technology/security/. This site also has a link to the Intel TXT MLE Developers Manual, which has been updated for the new released platforms. A much more complete description of how these patches support TXT, how to configure a system for it, etc. is in the Documentation/intel_txt.txt file in this patch. This patch provides the TXT support routines for complete functionality, documentation for TXT support and for the changes to the boot_params structure, and boot detection of a TXT launch. Attempts to shutdown (reboot, Sx) the system will result in platform resets; subsequent patches will support these shutdown modes properly. Documentation/intel_txt.txt | 210 +++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 1 arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h | 3 arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 3 arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 4 arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c | 379 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/Kconfig | 30 +++ 9 files changed, 827 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Signed-off-by: Joseph Cihula <joseph.cihula@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shane Wang <shane.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Gang Wei <gang.wei@intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-07-17kernel: rename is_single_threaded(task) to current_is_single_threaded(void)Oleg Nesterov
- is_single_threaded(task) is not safe unless task == current, we can't use task->signal or task->mm. - it doesn't make sense unless task == current, the task can fork right after the check. Rename it to current_is_single_threaded() and kill the argument. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-07-13Revert "SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h"James Morris
This reverts commit 8113a8d80f4c6a3dc3724b39b470f3fee9c426b6. The patch causes a stack overflow on my system during boot. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-07-13SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.hThomas Liu
Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h, for better maintainability and for less code duplication. - changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of avc_audit_data - eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead. I have tested to make sure that the avcs look the same before and after this patch. Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-30 20:24:52 +0000