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Create key domain tags for network namespaces and make it possible to
automatically tag keys that are used by networked services (e.g. AF_RXRPC,
AFS, DNS) with the default network namespace if not set by the caller.
This allows keys with the same description but in different namespaces to
coexist within a keyring.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
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If a key operation domain (such as a network namespace) has been removed
then attempt to garbage collect all the keys that use it.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Currently a key has a standard matching criteria of { type, description }
and this is used to only allow keys with unique criteria in a keyring.
This means, however, that you cannot have keys with the same type and
description but a different target namespace in the same keyring.
This is a potential problem for a containerised environment where, say, a
container is made up of some parts of its mount space involving netfs
superblocks from two different network namespaces.
This is also a problem for shared system management keyrings such as the
DNS records keyring or the NFS idmapper keyring that might contain keys
from different network namespaces.
Fix this by including a namespace component in a key's matching criteria.
Keyring types are marked to indicate which, if any, namespace is relevant
to keys of that type, and that namespace is set when the key is created
from the current task's namespace set.
The capability bit KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEY_TAG is set if the kernel is
employing this feature.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace struct rather
than pinning them from the user_struct struct. This prevents these
keyrings from propagating across user-namespaces boundaries with regard to
the KEY_SPEC_* flags, thereby making them more useful in a containerised
environment.
The issue is that a single user_struct may be represent UIDs in several
different namespaces.
The way the patch does this is by attaching a 'register keyring' in each
user_namespace and then sticking the user and user-session keyrings into
that. It can then be searched to retrieve them.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
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Keyring names are held in a single global list that any process can pick
from by means of keyctl_join_session_keyring (provided the keyring grants
Search permission). This isn't very container friendly, however.
Make the following changes:
(1) Make default session, process and thread keyring names begin with a
'.' instead of '_'.
(2) Keyrings whose names begin with a '.' aren't added to the list. Such
keyrings are system specials.
(3) Replace the global list with per-user_namespace lists. A keyring adds
its name to the list for the user_namespace that it is currently in.
(4) When a user_namespace is deleted, it just removes itself from the
keyring name list.
The global keyring_name_lock is retained for accessing the name lists.
This allows (4) to work.
This can be tested by:
# keyctl newring foo @s
995906392
# unshare -U
$ keyctl show
...
995906392 --alswrv 65534 65534 \_ keyring: foo
...
$ keyctl session foo
Joined session keyring: 935622349
As can be seen, a new session keyring was created.
The capability bit KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEYRING_NAME is set if the kernel is
employing this feature.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches so that the flag can be omitted
and recursion disabled, thereby allowing just the nominated keyring to be
searched and none of the children.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Cache the hash of the key's type and description in the index key so that
we're not recalculating it every time we look at a key during a search.
The hash function does a bunch of multiplications, so evading those is
probably worthwhile - especially as this is done for every key examined
during a search.
This also allows the methods used by assoc_array to get chunks of index-key
to be simplified.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Simplify key description management by cramming the word containing the
length with the first few chars of the description also. This simplifies
the code that generates the index-key used by assoc_array. It should speed
up key searching a bit too.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Kill off request_key_async{,_with_auxdata}() as they're not currently used.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Currently during soft reboot(kexec_file_load) boot command line
arguments are not measured. Define hooks needed to measure kexec
command line arguments during soft reboot(kexec_file_load).
- A new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline is defined to be called by the
kexec code.
- A new function process_buffer_measurement is defined to measure
the buffer hash into the IMA measurement list.
- A new func policy KEXEC_CMDLINE is defined to control the
measurement.
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Minor SPDX change conflict.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx
Pull still more SPDX updates from Greg KH:
"Another round of SPDX updates for 5.2-rc6
Here is what I am guessing is going to be the last "big" SPDX update
for 5.2. It contains all of the remaining GPLv2 and GPLv2+ updates
that were "easy" to determine by pattern matching. The ones after this
are going to be a bit more difficult and the people on the spdx list
will be discussing them on a case-by-case basis now.
Another 5000+ files are fixed up, so our overall totals are:
Files checked: 64545
Files with SPDX: 45529
Compared to the 5.1 kernel which was:
Files checked: 63848
Files with SPDX: 22576
This is a huge improvement.
Also, we deleted another 20000 lines of boilerplate license crud,
always nice to see in a diffstat"
* tag 'spdx-5.2-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx: (65 commits)
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 507
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 506
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 505
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 504
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 503
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 502
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 501
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 499
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 498
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 497
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 496
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 495
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 491
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 490
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 489
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 488
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 487
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 486
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 485
...
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Admins may wish to log different measurements using different IMA
templates. Add support for overriding the default template on a per-rule
basis.
Inspired-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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If a filesystem uses keys to hold authentication tokens, then it needs a
token for each VFS operation that might perform an authentication check -
either by passing it to the server, or using to perform a check based on
authentication data cached locally.
For open files this isn't a problem, since the key should be cached in the
file struct since it represents the subject performing operations on that
file descriptor.
During pathwalk, however, there isn't anywhere to cache the key, except
perhaps in the nameidata struct - but that isn't exposed to the
filesystems. Further, a pathwalk can incur a lot of operations, calling
one or more of the following, for instance:
->lookup()
->permission()
->d_revalidate()
->d_automount()
->get_acl()
->getxattr()
on each dentry/inode it encounters - and each one may need to call
request_key(). And then, at the end of pathwalk, it will call the actual
operation:
->mkdir()
->mknod()
->getattr()
->open()
...
which may need to go and get the token again.
However, it is very likely that all of the operations on a single
dentry/inode - and quite possibly a sequence of them - will all want to use
the same authentication token, which suggests that caching it would be a
good idea.
To this end:
(1) Make it so that a positive result of request_key() and co. that didn't
require upcalling to userspace is cached temporarily in task_struct.
(2) The cache is 1 deep, so a new result displaces the old one.
(3) The key is released by exit and by notify-resume.
(4) The cache is cleared in a newly forked process.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Provide a request_key_rcu() function that can be used to request a key
under RCU conditions. It can only search and check permissions; it cannot
allocate a new key, upcall or wait for an upcall to complete. It may
return a partially constructed key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so that it
will become possible to provide an RCU-capable partial request_key()
function in a later commit.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Invalidate used request_key authentication keys rather than revoking them
so that they get cleaned up immediately rather than potentially hanging
around. There doesn't seem any need to keep the revoked keys around.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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The request_key() syscall allows a process to gain access to the 'possessor'
permits of any key that grants it Search permission by virtue of request_key()
not checking whether a key it finds grants Link permission to the caller.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Add a keyctl function that requests a set of capability bits to find out
what features are supported.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Each function that manipulates the aa_ext struct should reset it's "pos"
member on failure. This ensures that, on failure, no changes are made to
the state of the aa_ext struct.
There are paths were elements are optional and the error path is
used to indicate the optional element is not present. This means
instead of just aborting on error the unpack stream can become
unsynchronized on optional elements, if using one of the affected
functions.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 736ec752d95e ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy")
Signed-off-by: Mike Salvatore <mike.salvatore@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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A packed AppArmor policy contains null-terminated tag strings that are read
by unpack_nameX(). However, unpack_nameX() uses string functions on them
without ensuring that they are actually null-terminated, potentially
leading to out-of-bounds accesses.
Make sure that the tag string is null-terminated before passing it to
strcmp().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 736ec752d95e ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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While commit 11c236b89d7c2 ("apparmor: add a default null dfa") ensure
every profile has a policy.dfa it does not resize the policy.start[]
to have entries for every possible start value. Which means
PROFILE_MEDIATES is not safe to use on untrusted input. Unforunately
commit b9590ad4c4f2 ("apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFE") did not
take into account the start value usage.
The input string in profile_query_cb() is user controlled and is not
properly checked to be within the limited start[] entries, even worse
it can't be as userspace policy is allowed to make us of entries types
the kernel does not know about. This mean usespace can currently cause
the kernel to access memory up to 240 entries beyond the start array
bounds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b9590ad4c4f2 ("apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFE")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Honestly all the conflicts were simple overlapping changes,
nothing really interesting to report.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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With gcc-4.6.3:
WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text.unlikely+0x24c64): Section mismatch in reference from the function __integrity_init_keyring() to the function .init.text:set_platform_trusted_keys()
The function __integrity_init_keyring() references
the function __init set_platform_trusted_keys().
This is often because __integrity_init_keyring lacks a __init
annotation or the annotation of set_platform_trusted_keys is wrong.
Indeed, if the compiler decides not to inline __integrity_init_keyring(),
a warning is issued.
Fix this by adding the missing __init annotation.
Fixes: 9dc92c45177ab70e ("integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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lockdep_assert_held_write()
All callers of lockdep_assert_held_exclusive() use it to verify the
correct locking state of either a semaphore (ldisc_sem in tty,
mmap_sem for perf events, i_rwsem of inode for dax) or rwlock by
apparmor. Thus it makes sense to rename _exclusive to _write since
that's the semantics callers care. Additionally there is already
lockdep_assert_held_read(), which this new naming is more consistent with.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531100651.3969-1-nborisov@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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The 5.1 mount system rework changed the smackfsdef mount option to
smackfsdefault. This fixes the regression by making smackfsdef treated
the same way as smackfsdefault.
Also fix the smack_param_specs[] to have "smack" prefixes on all the
names. This isn't visible to a user unless they either:
(a) Try to mount a filesystem that's converted to the internal mount API
and that implements the ->parse_monolithic() context operation - and
only then if they call security_fs_context_parse_param() rather than
security_sb_eat_lsm_opts().
There are no examples of this upstream yet, but nfs will probably want
to do this for nfs2 or nfs3.
(b) Use fsconfig() to configure the filesystem - in which case
security_fs_context_parse_param() will be called.
This issue is that smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts() checks for the "smack" prefix
on the options, but smack_fs_context_parse_param() does not.
Fixes: c3300aaf95fb ("smack: get rid of match_token()")
Fixes: 2febd254adc4 ("smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jose Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Convert the cgroup-v1 files to ReST format, in order to
allow a later addition to the admin-guide.
The conversion is actually:
- add blank lines and identation in order to identify paragraphs;
- fix tables markups;
- add some lists markups;
- mark literal blocks;
- adjust title markups.
At its new index.rst, let's add a :orphan: while this is not linked to
the main index.rst file, in order to avoid build warnings.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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We need to pick up post-rc1 changes to various document files so they don't
get lost in Mauro's massive RST conversion push.
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Designated initializers allow specifying only the members of the struct
that need initialization. Non-mentioned members are initialized to zero.
This makes the code a bit clearer (particularly in ima_add_boot_aggregate)
and also allows adding a new member to the struct without having to update
all struct initializations.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Don't do lazy policy updates while running the rule matching,
run the updates as they happen.
Depends on commit f242064c5df3 ("LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers")
Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot
usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it
seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity,
switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename
the functions accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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If enabled, ima arch specific policies always adds the measurements rules,
this makes it dependent on CONFIG_IMA. CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE implicitly takes
care of this, however it is needed explicitly for CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG.
This patch adds the CONFIG_IMA dependency in combination with
CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG for CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY
Fixes: d958083a8f640 (x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86)
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Fix sparse warning:
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:202:23: warning:
symbol 'arch_policy_entry' was not declared. Should it be static?
Fixes: 6191706246de ("ima: add support for arch specific policies")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-5.0)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Three patches for v5.2.
One fixes a problem where we weren't correctly logging raw SELinux
labels, the other two fix problems where we weren't properly checking
calls to kmemdup()"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190612' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_add_mnt_opt( )
selinux: log raw contexts as untrusted strings
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When sid == 0 (we are resetting keycreate_sid to the default value), we
should skip the KEY__CREATE check.
Before this patch, doing a zero-sized write to /proc/self/keycreate
would check if the current task can create unlabeled keys (which would
usually fail with -EACCESS and generate an AVC). Now it skips the check
and correctly sets the task's keycreate_sid to 0.
Bug report: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1719067
Tested using the reproducer from the report above.
Fixes: 4eb582cf1fbd ("[PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keys")
Reported-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kir@sacred.ru>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), 'arg' is allocated by kmemdup_nul(). It
returns NULL when fails. So 'arg' should be checked. And 'mnt_opts'
should be freed when error.
Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@gmail.com>
Fixes: 99dbbb593fe6 ("selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In selinux_add_mnt_opt(), 'val' is allocated by kmemdup_nul(). It returns
NULL when fails. So 'val' should be checked. And 'mnt_opts' should be
freed when error.
Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@gmail.com>
Fixes: 757cbe597fe8 ("LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
[PM: fixed some indenting problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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These strings may come from untrusted sources (e.g. file xattrs) so they
need to be properly escaped.
Reproducer:
# setenforce 0
# touch /tmp/test
# setfattr -n security.selinux -v 'kuřecí řízek' /tmp/test
# runcon system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 cat /tmp/test
(look at the generated AVCs)
Actual result:
type=AVC [...] trawcon=kuřecí řízek
Expected result:
type=AVC [...] trawcon=6B75C5996563C3AD20C599C3AD7A656B
Fixes: fede148324c3 ("selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Fix sparse warning:
security/commoncap.c:1347:27: warning:
symbol 'capability_hooks' was not declared. Should it be static?
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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Mostly due to x86 and acpi conversion, several documentation
links are still pointing to the old file. Fix them.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Reviewed-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <TheSven73@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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Some ISDN files that got removed in net-next had some changes
done in mainline, take the removals.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation version 2 of the license
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation version 2
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 135 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531081036.435762997@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of version 2 of the gnu general public license as
published by the free software foundation this program is
distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 64 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529141901.894819585@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this software is licensed under the terms of the gnu general public
license version 2 as published by the free software foundation and
may be copied distributed and modified under those terms this
program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but
without any warranty without even the implied warranty of
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu
general public license for more details
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 285 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529141900.642774971@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The kernel calls deny_write_access() to prevent a file already opened
for write from being executed and also prevents files being executed
from being opened for write. For some reason this does not extend to
files being mmap'ed execute.
From an IMA perspective, measuring/appraising the integrity of a file
being mmap'ed shared execute, without first making sure the file cannot
be modified, makes no sense. This patch prevents files, in policy,
already mmap'ed shared write, from being mmap'ed execute.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Linux kernel already provide MODULE_SIG and KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG to
make sure loaded kernel module and kernel image are trusted. This
patch adds a kernel command line option "loadpin.exclude" which
allows to exclude specific file types from LoadPin. This is useful
when people want to use different mechanisms to verify module and
kernel image while still use LoadPin to protect the integrity of
other files kernel loads.
Signed-off-by: Ke Wu <mikewu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
[kees: fix array size issue reported by Coverity via Colin Ian King]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity subsystem fixes from Mimi Zohar:
"Four bug fixes, none 5.2-specific, all marked for stable.
The first two are related to the architecture specific IMA policy
support. The other two patches, one is related to EVM signatures,
based on additional hash algorithms, and the other is related to
displaying the IMA policy"
* 'next-fixes-for-5.2-rc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctly
evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc()
ima: fix wrong signed policy requirement when not appraising
x86/ima: Check EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES before using
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The phylink conflict was between a bug fix by Russell King
to make sure we have a consistent PHY interface mode, and
a change in net-next to pull some code in phylink_resolve()
into the helper functions phylink_mac_link_{up,down}()
On the dp83867 side it's mostly overlapping changes, with
the 'net' side removing a condition that was supposed to
trigger for RGMII but because of how it was coded never
actually could trigger.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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