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Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"There has been a fair amount of activity in the docs tree this time
around. Highlights include:
- Conversion of a bunch of security documentation into RST
- The conversion of the remaining DocBook templates by The Amazing
Mauro Machine. We can now drop the entire DocBook build chain.
- The usual collection of fixes and minor updates"
* tag 'docs-4.13' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (90 commits)
scripts/kernel-doc: handle DECLARE_HASHTABLE
Documentation: atomic_ops.txt is core-api/atomic_ops.rst
Docs: clean up some DocBook loose ends
Make the main documentation title less Geocities
Docs: Use kernel-figure in vidioc-g-selection.rst
Docs: fix table problems in ras.rst
Docs: Fix breakage with Sphinx 1.5 and upper
Docs: Include the Latex "ifthen" package
doc/kokr/howto: Only send regression fixes after -rc1
docs-rst: fix broken links to dynamic-debug-howto in kernel-parameters
doc: Document suitability of IBM Verse for kernel development
Doc: fix a markup error in coding-style.rst
docs: driver-api: i2c: remove some outdated information
Documentation: DMA API: fix a typo in a function name
Docs: Insert missing space to separate link from text
doc/ko_KR/memory-barriers: Update control-dependencies example
Documentation, kbuild: fix typo "minimun" -> "minimum"
docs: Fix some formatting issues in request-key.rst
doc: ReSTify keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
doc: ReSTify keys-request-key.txt
...
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<linux/wait_bit.h>
The wait_bit*() types and APIs are mixed into wait.h, but they
are a pretty orthogonal extension of wait-queues.
Furthermore, only about 50 kernel files use these APIs, while
over 1000 use the regular wait-queue functionality.
So clean up the main wait.h by moving the wait-bit functionality
out of it, into a separate .h and .c file:
include/linux/wait_bit.h for types and APIs
kernel/sched/wait_bit.c for the implementation
Update all header dependencies.
This reduces the size of wait.h rather significantly, by about 30%.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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If a key's refcount is dropped to zero between key_lookup() peeking at
the refcount and subsequently attempting to increment it, refcount_inc()
will see a zero refcount. Here, refcount_inc() will WARN_ONCE(), and
will *not* increment the refcount, which will remain zero.
Once key_lookup() drops key_serial_lock, it is possible for the key to
be freed behind our back.
This patch uses refcount_inc_not_zero() to perform the peek and increment
atomically.
Fixes: fff292914d3a2f1e ("security, keys: convert key.usage from atomic_t to refcount_t")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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The initial Diffie-Hellman computation made direct use of the MPI
library because the crypto module did not support DH at the time. Now
that KPP is implemented, KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE should use it to get rid of
duplicate code and leverage possible hardware acceleration.
This fixes an issue whereby the input to the KDF computation would
include additional uninitialized memory when the result of the
Diffie-Hellman computation was shorter than the input prime number.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Accessing a 'u8[4]' through a '__be32 *' violates alignment rules. Just
make the counter a __be32 instead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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If userspace called KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE with kdf_params containing NULL
otherinfo but nonzero otherinfolen, the kernel would allocate a buffer
for the otherinfo, then feed it into the KDF without initializing it.
Fix this by always doing the copy from userspace (which will fail with
EFAULT in this scenario).
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Requesting "digest_null" in the keyctl_kdf_params caused an infinite
loop in kdf_ctr() because the "null" hash has a digest size of 0. Fix
it by rejecting hash algorithms with a digest size of 0.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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While a 'struct key' itself normally does not contain sensitive
information, Documentation/security/keys.txt actually encourages this:
"Having a payload is not required; and the payload can, in fact,
just be a value stored in the struct key itself."
In case someone has taken this advice, or will take this advice in the
future, zero the key structure before freeing it. We might as well, and
as a bonus this could make it a bit more difficult for an adversary to
determine which keys have recently been in use.
This is safe because the key_jar cache does not use a constructor.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any
potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it
is freed. Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which
the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing
the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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For keys of type "encrypted", consistently zero sensitive key material
before freeing it. This was already being done for the decrypted
payloads of encrypted keys, but not for the master key and the keys
derived from the master key.
Out of an abundance of caution and because it is trivial to do so, also
zero buffers containing the key payload in encrypted form, although
depending on how the encrypted-keys feature is used such information
does not necessarily need to be kept secret.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Zero the payloads of user and logon keys before freeing them. This
prevents sensitive key material from being kept around in the slab
caches after a key is released.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Before returning from add_key() or one of the keyctl() commands that
takes in a key payload, zero the temporary buffer that was allocated to
hold the key payload copied from userspace. This may contain sensitive
key material that should not be kept around in the slab caches.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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key_update() freed the key_preparsed_payload even if it was not
initialized first. This would cause a crash if userspace called
keyctl_update() on a key with type like "asymmetric" that has a
->preparse() method but not an ->update() method. Possibly it could
even be triggered for other key types by racing with keyctl_setperm() to
make the KEY_NEED_WRITE check fail (the permission was already checked,
so normally it wouldn't fail there).
Reproducer with key type "asymmetric", given a valid cert.der:
keyctl new_session
keyid=$(keyctl padd asymmetric desc @s < cert.der)
keyctl setperm $keyid 0x3f000000
keyctl update $keyid data
[ 150.686666] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
[ 150.687601] IP: asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30
[ 150.688139] PGD 38a3d067
[ 150.688141] PUD 3b3de067
[ 150.688447] PMD 0
[ 150.688745]
[ 150.689160] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 150.689455] Modules linked in:
[ 150.689769] CPU: 1 PID: 2478 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.11.0-rc4-xfstests-00187-ga9f6b6b8cd2f #742
[ 150.690916] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
[ 150.692199] task: ffff88003b30c480 task.stack: ffffc90000350000
[ 150.692952] RIP: 0010:asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30
[ 150.693556] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000353e58 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 150.694142] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000004
[ 150.694845] RDX: ffffffff81ee3920 RSI: ffff88003d4b0700 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 150.697569] RBP: ffffc90000353e60 R08: ffff88003d5d2140 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 150.702483] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
[ 150.707393] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: ffff880038a4d2d8 R15: 000000000040411f
[ 150.709720] FS: 00007fcbcee35700(0000) GS:ffff88003fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 150.711504] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 150.712733] CR2: 0000000000000001 CR3: 0000000039eab000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
[ 150.714487] Call Trace:
[ 150.714975] asymmetric_key_free_preparse+0x2f/0x40
[ 150.715907] key_update+0xf7/0x140
[ 150.716560] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
[ 150.717319] keyctl_update_key+0xb0/0xe0
[ 150.718066] SyS_keyctl+0x109/0x130
[ 150.718663] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
[ 150.719440] RIP: 0033:0x7fcbce75ff19
[ 150.719926] RSP: 002b:00007ffd5d167088 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
[ 150.720918] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000404d80 RCX: 00007fcbce75ff19
[ 150.721874] RDX: 00007ffd5d16785e RSI: 000000002866cd36 RDI: 0000000000000002
[ 150.722827] RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000000002866cd36 R09: 00007ffd5d16785e
[ 150.723781] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000404d80
[ 150.724650] R13: 00007ffd5d16784d R14: 00007ffd5d167238 R15: 000000000040411f
[ 150.725447] Code: 83 c4 08 31 c0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 85 ff 74 23 55 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb <48> 8b 3f e8 06 21 c5 ff 48 8b 7b 08 e8 fd 20 c5 ff 48 89 df e8
[ 150.727489] RIP: asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30 RSP: ffffc90000353e58
[ 150.728117] CR2: 0000000000000001
[ 150.728430] ---[ end trace f7f8fe1da2d5ae8d ]---
Fixes: 4d8c0250b841 ("KEYS: Call ->free_preparse() even after ->preparse() returns an error")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a
NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's
->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods. Various key
types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did
not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a
NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was
present. Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero
rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail
with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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MACs should, in general, be compared using crypto_memneq() to prevent
timing attacks.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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The encrypted-keys module was using a single global HMAC transform,
which could be rekeyed by multiple threads concurrently operating on
different keys, causing incorrect HMAC values to be calculated. Fix
this by allocating a new HMAC transform whenever we need to calculate a
HMAC. Also simplify things a bit by allocating the shash_desc's using
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() for both the HMAC and unkeyed hashes.
The following script reproduces the bug:
keyctl new_session
keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s
for i in $(seq 2); do
(
set -e
for j in $(seq 1000); do
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "new user:master 25" @s)
datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "load $datablob" @s)
keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null
done
) &
done
Output with bug:
[ 439.691094] encrypted_key: bad hmac (-22)
add_key: Invalid argument
add_key: Invalid argument
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a
data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected,
e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a
master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end
of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also
clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.]
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Since v4.9, the crypto API cannot (normally) be used to encrypt/decrypt
stack buffers because the stack may be virtually mapped. Fix this for
the padding buffers in encrypted-keys by using ZERO_PAGE for the
encryption padding and by allocating a temporary heap buffer for the
decryption padding.
Tested with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y:
keyctl new_session
keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "new user:master 25" @s)
datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
keyctl unlink $keyid
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "load $datablob" @s)
datablob2="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
[ "$datablob" = "$datablob2" ] && echo "Success!"
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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In join_session_keyring(), if install_session_keyring_to_cred() were to
fail, we would leak the keyring reference, just like in the bug fixed by
commit 23567fd052a9 ("KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in
join_session_keyring()"). Fortunately this cannot happen currently, but
we really should be more careful. Do this by adding and using a new
error label at which the keyring reference is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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get_derived_key()
Omit an extra message for a memory allocation failure in this function.
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Link: http://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/LCJ16-Refactor_Strings-WSang_0.pdf
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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With the new standardized functions, we can replace all ACCESS_ONCE()
calls across relevant security/keyrings/.
ACCESS_ONCE() does not work reliably on non-scalar types. For example
gcc 4.6 and 4.7 might remove the volatile tag for such accesses during
the SRA (scalar replacement of aggregates) step:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58145
Update the new calls regardless of if it is a scalar type, this is
cleaner than having three alternatives.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT is defined in arch-specific Kconfigs and is missing for
several 64-bit architectures : mips, parisc, tile.
At the moment and for those architectures, calling in 32-bit userspace the
keyctl syscall would return an ENOSYS error.
This patch moves the CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT option to security/keys/Kconfig, to
make sure the compatibility wrapper is registered by default for any 64-bit
architecture as long as it is configured with CONFIG_COMPAT.
[DH: Modified to remove arm64 compat enablement also as requested by Eric
Biggers]
Signed-off-by: Bilal Amarni <bilal.amarni@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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There are many code paths opencoding kvmalloc. Let's use the helper
instead. The main difference to kvmalloc is that those users are
usually not considering all the aspects of the memory allocator. E.g.
allocation requests <= 32kB (with 4kB pages) are basically never failing
and invoke OOM killer to satisfy the allocation. This sounds too
disruptive for something that has a reasonable fallback - the vmalloc.
On the other hand those requests might fallback to vmalloc even when the
memory allocator would succeed after several more reclaim/compaction
attempts previously. There is no guarantee something like that happens
though.
This patch converts many of those places to kv[mz]alloc* helpers because
they are more conservative.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306103327.2766-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> # Xen bits
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Andreas Dilger <andreas.dilger@intel.com> # Lustre
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> # KVM/s390
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> # nvdim
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> # btrfs
Acked-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> # Ceph
Acked-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> # mlx4
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> # mlx5
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>
Cc: Santosh Raspatur <santosh@chelsio.com>
Cc: Hariprasad S <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Cc: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Cc: Oleg Drokin <oleg.drokin@intel.com>
Cc: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
IMA:
- provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules
KEYS:
- add a system blacklist keyring
- add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction
functionality to userland via keyctl()
LSM:
- harden LSM API with __ro_after_init
- add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux
- revive security_task_alloc hook
TPM:
- implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits)
tpm: Fix reference count to main device
tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks
tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs
tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant
keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF
apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly
apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot
apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836
apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK
security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages
apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings
Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().
smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()
KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining
KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain
KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type
KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check
KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type
...
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This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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This fixes CVE-2017-6951.
Userspace should not be able to do things with the "dead" key type as it
doesn't have some of the helper functions set upon it that the kernel
needs. Attempting to use it may cause the kernel to crash.
Fix this by changing the name of the type to ".dead" so that it's rejected
up front on userspace syscalls by key_get_type_from_user().
Though this doesn't seem to affect recent kernels, it does affect older
ones, certainly those prior to:
commit c06cfb08b88dfbe13be44a69ae2fdc3a7c902d81
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue Sep 16 17:36:06 2014 +0100
KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
which went in before 3.18-rc1.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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This fixes CVE-2016-9604.
Keyrings whose name begin with a '.' are special internal keyrings and so
userspace isn't allowed to create keyrings by this name to prevent
shadowing. However, the patch that added the guard didn't fix
KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING. Not only can that create dot-named keyrings,
it can also subscribe to them as a session keyring if they grant SEARCH
permission to the user.
This, for example, allows a root process to set .builtin_trusted_keys as
its session keyring, at which point it has full access because now the
possessor permissions are added. This permits root to add extra public
keys, thereby bypassing module verification.
This also affects kexec and IMA.
This can be tested by (as root):
keyctl session .builtin_trusted_keys
keyctl add user a a @s
keyctl list @s
which on my test box gives me:
2 keys in keyring:
180010936: ---lswrv 0 0 asymmetric: Build time autogenerated kernel key: ae3d4a31b82daa8e1a75b49dc2bba949fd992a05
801382539: --alswrv 0 0 user: a
Fix this by rejecting names beginning with a '.' in the keyctl.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Select CONFIG_CRYPTO in addition to CONFIG_HASH to ensure that
also CONFIG_HASH2 is selected. Both are needed for the shash
cipher support required for the KDF operation.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a
counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other
information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by
the caller.
The KDF is implemented using the hash support from the kernel crypto API.
The implementation uses the symmetric hash support as the input to the
hash operation is usually very small. The caller is allowed to specify
the hash name that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing
the use of all supported hashes provided with the kernel crypto API.
As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to
the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size.
The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space
code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with
SP800-56A.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Keyrings recently gained restrict_link capabilities that allow
individual keys to be validated prior to linking. This functionality
was only available using internal kernel APIs.
With the KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING command existing keyrings can be
configured to check the content of keys before they are linked, and
then allow or disallow linkage of that key to the keyring.
To restrict a keyring, call:
keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring, const char *type,
const char *restriction)
where 'type' is the name of a registered key type and 'restriction' is a
string describing how key linkage is to be restricted. The restriction
option syntax is specific to each key type.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
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The keyring restrict callback was sometimes called before
__key_link_begin and sometimes after, which meant that the keyring
semaphores were not always held during the restrict callback.
If the semaphores are consistently acquired before checking link
restrictions, keyring contents cannot be changed after the restrict
check is complete but before the evaluated key is linked to the keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
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Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to
the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the
restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the
restriction.
The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are
unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted
to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by
unregistering key types.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
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The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring
pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this
argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature
expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring.
Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key
pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that
decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth
argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
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This pointer type needs to be returned from a lookup function, and
without a typedef the syntax gets cumbersome.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
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refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull sched.h split-up from Ingo Molnar:
"The point of these changes is to significantly reduce the
<linux/sched.h> header footprint, to speed up the kernel build and to
have a cleaner header structure.
After these changes the new <linux/sched.h>'s typical preprocessed
size goes down from a previous ~0.68 MB (~22K lines) to ~0.45 MB (~15K
lines), which is around 40% faster to build on typical configs.
Not much changed from the last version (-v2) posted three weeks ago: I
eliminated quirks, backmerged fixes plus I rebased it to an upstream
SHA1 from yesterday that includes most changes queued up in -next plus
all sched.h changes that were pending from Andrew.
I've re-tested the series both on x86 and on cross-arch defconfigs,
and did a bisectability test at a number of random points.
I tried to test as many build configurations as possible, but some
build breakage is probably still left - but it should be mostly
limited to architectures that have no cross-compiler binaries
available on kernel.org, and non-default configurations"
* 'WIP.sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (146 commits)
sched/headers: Clean up <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove #ifdefs from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove the <linux/topology.h> include from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers, hrtimer: Remove the <linux/wait.h> include from <linux/hrtimer.h>
sched/headers, x86/apic: Remove the <linux/pm.h> header inclusion from <asm/apic.h>
sched/headers, timers: Remove the <linux/sysctl.h> include from <linux/timer.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/magic.h> from <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/init.h>
sched/core: Remove unused prefetch_stack()
sched/headers: Remove <linux/rculist.h> from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove the 'init_pid_ns' prototype from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/signal.h> from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/rwsem.h> from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove the runqueue_is_locked() prototype
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/hotplug.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/debug.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/nohz.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/stat.h>
sched/headers: Remove the <linux/gfp.h> include from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/rtmutex.h> from <linux/sched.h>
...
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<linux/sched/task.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.
Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over
2,200 files ...
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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<linux/sched/user.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/user.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/user.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:
(1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
to protect the key.
(2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
used to protect the key and the may be being modified.
Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:
(1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:
dereference_key_locked()
user_key_payload_locked()
(2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:
dereference_key_rcu()
user_key_payload_rcu()
This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W
-------------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
__rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
_nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
do_mount+0x254/0xf70
SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
system_call+0x38/0xe0
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull driver core updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the "small" driver core patches for 4.11-rc1.
Not much here, some firmware documentation and self-test updates, a
debugfs code formatting issue, and a new feature for call_usermodehelper
to make it more robust on systems that want to lock it down in a more
secure way.
All of these have been linux-next for a while now with no reported
issues"
* tag 'driver-core-4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
kernfs: handle null pointers while printing node name and path
Introduce STATIC_USERMODEHELPER to mediate call_usermodehelper()
Make static usermode helper binaries constant
kmod: make usermodehelper path a const string
firmware: revamp firmware documentation
selftests: firmware: send expected errors to /dev/null
selftests: firmware: only modprobe if driver is missing
platform: Print the resource range if device failed to claim
kref: prefer atomic_inc_not_zero to atomic_add_unless
debugfs: improve formatting of debugfs_real_fops()
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I don't think GCC has figured out how to optimize the memset() away, but
they might eventually so let's future proof this code a bit.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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This function has two callers and neither are able to handle a NULL
return. Really, -EINVAL is the correct thing return here anyway. This
fixes some static checker warnings like:
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c:709 encrypted_key_decrypt()
error: uninitialized symbol 'master_key'.
Fixes: 7e70cb497850 ("keys: add new key-type encrypted")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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There are a number of usermode helper binaries that are "hard coded" in
the kernel today, so mark them as "const" to make it harder for someone
to change where the variables point to.
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Thomas Sailer <t.sailer@alumni.ethz.ch>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Cc: Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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copy_from_iter_full(), copy_from_iter_full_nocache() and
csum_and_copy_from_iter_full() - counterparts of copy_from_iter()
et.al., advancing iterator only in case of successful full copy
and returning whether it had been successful or not.
Convert some obvious users. *NOTE* - do not blindly assume that
something is a good candidate for those unless you are sure that
not advancing iov_iter in failure case is the right thing in
this case. Anything that does short read/short write kind of
stuff (or is in a loop, etc.) is unlikely to be a good one.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Since BIG_KEYS can't be compiled as module it requires one of the "stdrng"
providers to be compiled into kernel. Otherwise big_key_crypto_init() fails
on crypto_alloc_rng step and next dereference of big_key_skcipher (e.g. in
big_key_preparse()) results in a NULL pointer dereference.
Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted')
Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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