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This reverts commit 217091dd7a7a1bdac027ddb7c5a25f6ac0b8e241, which
caused the following build error:
security/integrity/digsig.c:70:5: error: redefinition of ‘integrity_init_keyring’
security/integrity/integrity.h:149:12: note: previous definition of ‘integrity_init_keyring’ w
security/integrity/integrity.h:149:12: warning: ‘integrity_init_keyring’ defined but not used
reported by Krzysztof Kolasa. Mimi says:
"I made the classic mistake of requesting this patch to be upstreamed
at the last second, rather than waiting until the next open window.
At this point, the best course would probably be to revert the two
commits and fix them for the next open window"
Reported-by: Krzysztof Kolasa <kkolasa@winsoft.pl>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Require all keys added to the IMA keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.
Changelog:
- define stub integrity_init_keyring() function (reported-by Fengguang Wu)
- differentiate between regular and trusted keyring names.
- replace printk with pr_info (D. Kasatkin)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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For possibility to use xattr type for new signature formats,
pass full xattr to the signature verification function.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Fix checkpatch, lindent, etc, warnings/errors
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Asymmetric keys were introduced in linux-3.7 to verify the signature on
signed kernel modules. The asymmetric keys infrastructure abstracts the
signature verification from the crypto details. This patch adds IMA/EVM
signature verification using asymmetric keys. Support for additional
signature verification methods can now be delegated to the asymmetric
key infrastructure.
Although the module signature header and the IMA/EVM signature header
could use the same format, to minimize the signature length and save
space in the extended attribute, this patch defines a new IMA/EVM
header format. The main difference is that the key identifier is a
sha1[12 - 19] hash of the key modulus and exponent, similar to the
current implementation. The only purpose of the key identifier is to
identify the corresponding key in the kernel keyring. ima-evm-utils
was updated to support the new signature format.
While asymmetric signature verification functionality supports many
different hash algorithms, the hash used in this patch is calculated
during the IMA collection phase, based on the configured algorithm.
The default algorithm is sha1, but for backwards compatibility md5
is supported. Due to this current limitation, signatures should be
generated using a sha1 hash algorithm.
Changes in this patch:
- Functionality has been moved to separate source file in order to get rid of
in source #ifdefs.
- keyid is derived according to the RFC 3280. It does not require to assign
IMA/EVM specific "description" when loading X509 certificate. Kernel
asymmetric key subsystem automatically generate the description. Also
loading a certificate does not require using of ima-evm-utils and can be
done using keyctl only.
- keyid size is reduced to 32 bits to save xattr space. Key search is done
using partial match functionality of asymmetric_key_match().
- Kconfig option title was changed
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Define separate keyrings for each of the different use cases - evm, ima,
and modules. Using different keyrings improves search performance, and also
allows "locking" specific keyring to prevent adding new keys.
This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are usually only
added from initramfs.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
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