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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
"This fixes the following issues:
- a crash regression in the new skcipher walker
- incorrect return value in public_key_verify_signature
- fix for in-place signing in the sign-file utility"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: skcipher - fix crash in virtual walk
sign-file: Fix inplace signing when src and dst names are both specified
crypto: asymmetric_keys - set error code on failure
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When src and dst both are specified and they point to the same file
the sign-file utility will write only signature to the dst file and
the module (.ko file) body will not be written.
That happens because we open the same file with "rb" and "wb" flags,
from fopen man:
w Truncate file to zero length or create text file for writing.
The stream is positioned at the beginning of the file.
...
bm = BIO_new_file(module_name, "rb");
...
bd = BIO_new_file(dest_name, "wb");
...
while ((n = BIO_read(bm, buf, sizeof(buf))),
n > 0) {
ERR(BIO_write(bd, buf, n) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
}
...
Signed-off-by: Alex Yashchenko <alexhoppus111@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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.c and .h source files should not be executable, change
the permissions to 0644.
[ This would normally go through Andrew Morton, but his ancient
patch-based toolchain doesn't do permission changes ]
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Make sign-file determine the format of the X.509 certificate by reading the
first two bytes and seeing if the first byte is 0x30 and the second
0x81-0x84. If this is the case, assume it's DER encoded, otherwise assume
it to be PEM encoded.
Without this, it gets awkward to deal with the error messages from
d2i_X509_bio() when we want to call BIO_reset() and then PEM_read_bio() in
case the certificate was PEM encoded rather than X.509 encoded.
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@hpe.com>
cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Some versions of openssl might have the CMS feature disabled
LibreSSL disables this feature too
If the feature is disabled, fallback to PKCS7
In file included from scripts/sign-file.c:46:0:
/usr/x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/include/openssl/cms.h:62:2: error: #error CMS is disabled.
#error CMS is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Marc-Antoine Perennou <Marc-Antoine@Perennou.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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This patch adds support for signing a kernel module with a raw
detached PKCS#7 signature/message.
The signature is not converted and is simply appended to the module so
it needs to be in the right format. Using openssl, a valid signature can
be generated like this:
$ openssl smime -sign -nocerts -noattr -binary -in <module> -inkey \
<key> -signer <x509> -outform der -out <raw sig>
The resulting raw signature from the above command is (more or less)
identical to the raw signature that sign-file itself can produce like
this:
$ scripts/sign-file -d <hash algo> <key> <x509> <module>
Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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In file included from scripts/sign-file.c:47:0:
/usr/include/openssl/cms.h:62:2: error: #error CMS is disabled.
#error CMS is disabled.
^
scripts/Makefile.host:91: recipe for target 'scripts/sign-file' failed
make[1]: *** [scripts/sign-file] Error 1
Makefile:567: recipe for target 'scripts' failed
make: *** [scripts] Error 2
Fix SSL headers so that the kernel can build with LibreSSL
Signed-off-by: Codarren Velvindron <codarren@hackers.mu>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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The sign-file.c program actually uses CMS rather than PKCS#7 to sign a file
since that allows the target X.509 certificate to be specified by
subjectKeyId rather than by issuer + serialNumber.
However, older versions of the OpenSSL crypto library (such as may be found
in CentOS 5.11) don't support CMS. Assume everything prior to
OpenSSL-1.0.0 doesn't support CMS and switch to using PKCS#7 in that case.
Further, the pre-1.0.0 OpenSSL only supports PKCS#7 signing with SHA1, so
give an error from the sign-file script if the caller requests anything
other than SHA1.
The compiler gives the following error with an OpenSSL crypto library
that's too old:
HOSTCC scripts/sign-file
scripts/sign-file.c:23:25: fatal error: openssl/cms.h: No such file or directory
#include <openssl/cms.h>
Reported-by: Vinson Lee <vlee@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
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The GPL does not permit us to link against the OpenSSL library. Use
LGPL for sign-file and extract-file instead.
[ The whole "openssl isn't compatible with gpl" is really just
fear-mongering, but there's no reason not to make modsign LGPL, so
nobody cares. - Linus ]
Reported-by: Julian Andres Klode <jak@jak-linux.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Julian Andres Klode <jak@jak-linux.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Fix the following warning:
scripts/sign-file.c: In function ‘main’:
scripts/sign-file.c:188: warning: value computed is not used
whereby the result of BIO_ctrl() is cast inside of BIO_reset() to an
integer of a different size - which we're not checking but probably should.
Reported-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes
that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that
signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself
signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then
contributes to the signature.
Further, we already require the master message content type to be
pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data
itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the
authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1].
We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them
entirely as appropriate. To this end:
(1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one
signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one
that does not.
(2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them.
Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are
rejected:
(a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the
content type in the SignedData object.
(b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data.
(c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable
UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within
the validity window of the matching X.509 cert.
(d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents.
(e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents.
(f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents.
The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is
an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if
not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present.
The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed
to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only
affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP).
The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or
if it contains more than one element in its set of values.
(3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following
restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers:
(*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and
forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more
flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal
content.
(*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and
requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute
holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set.
(*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but
allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set.
(*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE
This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type
and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the
minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and
an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't
remove these).
(*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE
(*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE
These are invalid in this context but are included for later use
when limiting the use of X.509 certs.
(4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between
the above options for testing purposes. For example:
echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage
keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7
will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a
firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE).
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
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Make sign-file use the OpenSSL CMS routines to generate a message to be
used as the signature blob instead of the PKCS#7 routines. This allows us
to change how the matching X.509 certificate is selected. With PKCS#7 the
only option is to match on the serial number and issuer fields of an X.509
certificate; with CMS, we also have the option of matching by subjectKeyId
extension. The new behaviour is selected with the "-k" flag.
Without the -k flag specified, the output is pretty much identical to the
PKCS#7 output.
Whilst we're at it, don't include the S/MIME capability list in the message
as it's irrelevant to us.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com
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This is only the key; the corresponding *cert* still needs to be in
$(topdir)/signing_key.x509. And there's no way to actually use this
from the build system yet.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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We don't want this in the Kconfig since it might then get exposed in
/proc/config.gz. So make it a parameter to Kbuild instead. This also
means we don't have to jump through hoops to strip quotes from it, as
we would if it was a config option.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Make the -d option (which currently isn't actually wired to anything) write
out the PKCS#7 message as per the -p option and then exit without either
modifying the source or writing out a compound file of the source, signature
and metadata.
This will be useful when firmware signature support is added
upstream as firmware will be left intact, and we'll only require
the signature file. The descriptor is implicit by file extension
and the file's own size.
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Provide a utility that:
(1) Digests a module using the specified hash algorithm (typically sha256).
[The digest can be dumped into a file by passing the '-d' flag]
(2) Generates a PKCS#7 message that:
(a) Has detached data (ie. the module content).
(b) Is signed with the specified private key.
(c) Refers to the specified X.509 certificate.
(d) Has an empty X.509 certificate list.
[The PKCS#7 message can be dumped into a file by passing the '-p' flag]
(3) Generates a signed module by concatenating the old module, the PKCS#7
message, a descriptor and a magic string. The descriptor contains the
size of the PKCS#7 message and indicates the id_type as PKEY_ID_PKCS7.
(4) Either writes the signed module to the specified destination or renames
it over the source module.
This allows module signing to reuse the PKCS#7 handling code that was added
for PE file parsing for signed kexec.
Note that the utility is written in C and must be linked against the OpenSSL
crypto library.
Note further that I have temporarily dropped support for handling externally
created signatures until we can work out the best way to do those. Hopefully,
whoever creates the signature can give me a PKCS#7 certificate.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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