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This patch is to add a function to process the incoming reconf chunk,
in which it verifies the chunk, and traverses the param and process
it with the right function one by one.
sctp_sf_do_reconf would be the process function of reconf chunk event.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch is to check if asoc->peer.prsctp_capable is set before
processing fwd tsn chunk, if not, it will return an ERROR to the
peer, just as rfc3758 section 3.3.1 demands.
Reported-by: Julian Cordes <julian.cordes@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch is to add a primitive based on sctp primitive frame for
sending stream reconf request. It works as the other primitives,
and create a SCTP_CMD_REPLY command to send the request chunk out.
sctp_primitive_RECONF would be the api to send a reconf request
chunk.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch is to add a per transport timer based on sctp timer frame
for stream reconf chunk retransmission. It would start after sending
a reconf request chunk, and stop after receiving the response chunk.
If the timer expires, besides retransmitting the reconf request chunk,
it would also do the same thing with data RTO timer. like to increase
the appropriate error counts, and perform threshold management, possibly
destroying the asoc if sctp retransmission thresholds are exceeded, just
as section 5.1.1 describes.
This patch is also to add asoc strreset_chunk, it is used to save the
reconf request chunk, so that it can be retransmitted, and to check if
the response is really for this request by comparing the information
inside with the response chunk as well.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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sctp stream reconf, described in RFC 6525, needs a structure to
save per stream information in assoc, like stream state.
In the future, sctp stream scheduler also needs it to save some
stream scheduler params and queues.
This patchset is to prepare the stream array in assoc for stream
reconf. It defines sctp_stream that includes stream arrays inside
to replace ssnmap.
Note that we use different structures for IN and OUT streams, as
the members in per OUT stream will get more and more different
from per IN stream.
v1->v2:
- put these patches into a smaller group.
v2->v3:
- define sctp_stream to contain stream arrays, and create stream.c
to put stream-related functions.
- merge 3 patches into 1, as new sctp_stream has the same name
with before.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There is no reason to use this cascading. It doesn't add anything.
Let's remove it and simplify.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Andrey Konovalov reported that KASAN detected that SCTP was using a slab
beyond the boundaries. It was caused because when handling out of the
blue packets in function sctp_sf_ootb() it was checking the chunk len
only after already processing the first chunk, validating only for the
2nd and subsequent ones.
The fix is to just move the check upwards so it's also validated for the
1st chunk.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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To something more meaningful these days, specially because this is
working on packet headers or lengths and which are not tied to any CPU
arch but to the protocol itself.
So, WORD_TRUNC becomes SCTP_TRUNC4 and WORD_ROUND becomes SCTP_PAD4.
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Reported-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Currently only read-only checks are performed up to the point on where
we check if peer is ECN capable, checks which we can avoid otherwise.
The flag ecn_ce_done is only used to perform this check once per
incoming packet, and nothing more.
Thus this patch moves the peer check up.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Identifying address family operations during rx path is not something
expensive but it's ugly to the eye to have it done multiple times,
specially when we already validated it during initial rx processing.
This patch takes advantage of the now shared sctp_input_cb and make the
pointer to the operations readily available.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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SCTP will try to access original IP headers on sctp_recvmsg in order to
copy the addresses used. There are also other places that do similar access
to IP or even SCTP headers. But after 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO
support") they aren't always there because they are only present in the
header skb.
SCTP handles the queueing of incoming data by cloning the incoming skb
and limiting to only the relevant payload. This clone has its cb updated
to something different and it's then queued on socket rx queue. Thus we
need to fix this in two moments.
For rx path, not related to socket queue yet, this patch uses a
partially copied sctp_input_cb to such GSO frags. This restores the
ability to access the headers for this part of the code.
Regarding the socket rx queue, it removes iif member from sctp_event and
also add a chunk pointer on it.
With these changes we're always able to reach the headers again.
The biggest change here is that now the sctp_chunk struct and the
original skb are only freed after the application consumed the buffer.
Note however that the original payload was already like this due to the
skb cloning.
For iif, SCTP's IPv4 code doesn't use it, so no change is necessary.
IPv6 now can fetch it directly from original's IPv6 CB as the original
skb is still accessible.
In the future we probably can simplify sctp_v*_skb_iif() stuff, as
sctp_v4_skb_iif() was called but it's return value not used, and now
it's not even called, but such cleanup is out of scope for this change.
Fixes: 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Dmitry Vyukov reported a use-after-free in the code expanded by the
macro debug_post_sfx, which is caused by the use of the asoc pointer
after it was freed within sctp_side_effect() scope.
This patch fixes it by allowing sctp_side_effect to clear that asoc
pointer when the TCB is freed.
As Vlad explained, we also have to cover the SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT case
because it will trigger DELETE_TCB too on that same loop.
Also, there were places issuing SCTP_CMD_INIT_FAILED and ASSOC_FAILED
but returning SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME, which would fool the scheme
above. Fix it by returning SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT instead.
The macro is already prepared to handle such NULL pointer.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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sctp_close
In sctp_close, sctp_make_abort_user may return NULL because of memory
allocation failure. If this happens, it will bypass any state change
and never free the assoc. The assoc has no chance to be freed and it
will be kept in memory with the state it had even after the socket is
closed by sctp_close().
So if sctp_make_abort_user fails to allocate memory, we should abort
the asoc via sctp_primitive_ABORT as well. Just like the annotation in
sctp_sf_cookie_wait_prm_abort and sctp_sf_do_9_1_prm_abort said,
"Even if we can't send the ABORT due to low memory delete the TCB.
This is a departure from our typical NOMEM handling".
But then the chunk is NULL (low memory) and the SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd would
dereference the chunk pointer, and system crash. So we should add
SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd only when the chunk is not NULL, just like other
places where it adds SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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SHUTDOWN_PENDING
when A sends a data to B, then A close() and enter into SHUTDOWN_PENDING
state, if B neither claim his rwnd is 0 nor send SACK for this data, A
will keep retransmitting this data until t5 timeout, Max.Retrans times
can't work anymore, which is bad.
if B's rwnd is not 0, it should send abort after Max.Retrans times, only
when B's rwnd == 0 and A's retransmitting beyonds Max.Retrans times, A
will start t5 timer, which is also commit f8d960524328 ("sctp: Enforce
retransmission limit during shutdown") means, but it lacks the condition
peer rwnd == 0.
so fix it by adding a bit (zero_window_announced) in peer to record if
the last rwnd is 0. If it was, zero_window_announced will be set. and use
this bit to decide if start t5 timer when local.state is SHUTDOWN_PENDING.
Fixes: commit f8d960524328 ("sctp: Enforce retransmission limit during shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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We want to avoid using time_t in the kernel because of the y2038
overflow problem. The use in sctp is not for storing seconds at
all, but instead uses microseconds and is passed as 32-bit
on all machines.
This patch changes the type to u32, which better fits the use.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Cookie ACK is always received by the association initiator, so fix the
comment to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
[<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
[<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
[<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.
The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.
When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Currently association restarts do not take into consideration the
state of the socket. When a restart happens, the current assocation
simply transitions into established state. This creates a condition
where a remote system, through a the restart procedure, may create a
local association that is no way reachable by user. The conditions
to trigger this are as follows:
1) Remote does not acknoledge some data causing data to remain
outstanding.
2) Local application calls close() on the socket. Since data
is still outstanding, the association is placed in SHUTDOWN_PENDING
state. However, the socket is closed.
3) The remote tries to create a new association, triggering a restart
on the local system. The association moves from SHUTDOWN_PENDING
to ESTABLISHED. At this point, it is no longer reachable by
any socket on the local system.
This patch addresses the above situation by moving the newly ESTABLISHED
association into SHUTDOWN-SENT state and bundling a SHUTDOWN after
the COOKIE-ACK chunk. This way, the restarted associate immidiately
enters the shutdown procedure and forces the termination of the
unreachable association.
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch
auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect:
Oops[#1]:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1
task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000
[...]
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80
[<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4
[<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c
[<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8
[<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214
[<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630
[<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24
[<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440
[<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564
[<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c
[<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210
[<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac
[<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0
[<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4
[<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48
[<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148
[<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398
Code: dd0900b8 000330f8 0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1 0047182a a48306a0
03e00008 00000000
---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that
ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs()
when endpoint is being created.
After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1,
the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during
reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init()
via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk,
the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process
all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that
net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through,
but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus,
dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint
initialization phase.
The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value
during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is
being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate
from the very first days.
Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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receiver's buffer"
This reverts commit ef2820a735f7 ("net: sctp: Fix a_rwnd/rwnd management
to reflect real state of the receiver's buffer") as it introduced a
serious performance regression on SCTP over IPv4 and IPv6, though a not
as dramatic on the latter. Measurements are on 10Gbit/s with ixgbe NICs.
Current state:
[root@Lab200slot2 ~]# iperf3 --sctp -4 -c 192.168.241.3 -V -l 1452 -t 60
iperf version 3.0.1 (10 January 2014)
Linux Lab200slot2 3.14.0 #1 SMP Thu Apr 3 23:18:29 EDT 2014 x86_64
Time: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 17:56:21 GMT
Connecting to host 192.168.241.3, port 5201
Cookie: Lab200slot2.1397238981.812898.548918
[ 4] local 192.168.241.2 port 38616 connected to 192.168.241.3 port 5201
Starting Test: protocol: SCTP, 1 streams, 1452 byte blocks, omitting 0 seconds, 60 second test
[ ID] Interval Transfer Bandwidth
[ 4] 0.00-1.09 sec 20.8 MBytes 161 Mbits/sec
[ 4] 1.09-2.13 sec 10.8 MBytes 86.8 Mbits/sec
[ 4] 2.13-3.15 sec 3.57 MBytes 29.5 Mbits/sec
[ 4] 3.15-4.16 sec 4.33 MBytes 35.7 Mbits/sec
[ 4] 4.16-6.21 sec 10.4 MBytes 42.7 Mbits/sec
[ 4] 6.21-6.21 sec 0.00 Bytes 0.00 bits/sec
[ 4] 6.21-7.35 sec 34.6 MBytes 253 Mbits/sec
[ 4] 7.35-11.45 sec 22.0 MBytes 45.0 Mbits/sec
[ 4] 11.45-11.45 sec 0.00 Bytes 0.00 bits/sec
[ 4] 11.45-11.45 sec 0.00 Bytes 0.00 bits/sec
[ 4] 11.45-11.45 sec 0.00 Bytes 0.00 bits/sec
[ 4] 11.45-12.51 sec 16.0 MBytes 126 Mbits/sec
[ 4] 12.51-13.59 sec 20.3 MBytes 158 Mbits/sec
[ 4] 13.59-14.65 sec 13.4 MBytes 107 Mbits/sec
[ 4] 14.65-16.79 sec 33.3 MBytes 130 Mbits/sec
[ 4] 16.79-16.79 sec 0.00 Bytes 0.00 bits/sec
[ 4] 16.79-17.82 sec 5.94 MBytes 48.7 Mbits/sec
(etc)
[root@Lab200slot2 ~]# iperf3 --sctp -6 -c 2001:db8:0:f101::1 -V -l 1400 -t 60
iperf version 3.0.1 (10 January 2014)
Linux Lab200slot2 3.14.0 #1 SMP Thu Apr 3 23:18:29 EDT 2014 x86_64
Time: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 19:08:41 GMT
Connecting to host 2001:db8:0:f101::1, port 5201
Cookie: Lab200slot2.1397243321.714295.2b3f7c
[ 4] local 2001:db8:0:f101::2 port 55804 connected to 2001:db8:0:f101::1 port 5201
Starting Test: protocol: SCTP, 1 streams, 1400 byte blocks, omitting 0 seconds, 60 second test
[ ID] Interval Transfer Bandwidth
[ 4] 0.00-1.00 sec 169 MBytes 1.42 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 1.00-2.00 sec 201 MBytes 1.69 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 2.00-3.00 sec 188 MBytes 1.58 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 3.00-4.00 sec 174 MBytes 1.46 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 4.00-5.00 sec 165 MBytes 1.39 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 5.00-6.00 sec 199 MBytes 1.67 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 6.00-7.00 sec 163 MBytes 1.36 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 7.00-8.00 sec 174 MBytes 1.46 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 8.00-9.00 sec 193 MBytes 1.62 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 9.00-10.00 sec 196 MBytes 1.65 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 10.00-11.00 sec 157 MBytes 1.31 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 11.00-12.00 sec 175 MBytes 1.47 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 12.00-13.00 sec 192 MBytes 1.61 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 13.00-14.00 sec 199 MBytes 1.67 Gbits/sec
(etc)
After patch:
[root@Lab200slot2 ~]# iperf3 --sctp -4 -c 192.168.240.3 -V -l 1452 -t 60
iperf version 3.0.1 (10 January 2014)
Linux Lab200slot2 3.14.0+ #1 SMP Mon Apr 14 12:06:40 EDT 2014 x86_64
Time: Mon, 14 Apr 2014 16:40:48 GMT
Connecting to host 192.168.240.3, port 5201
Cookie: Lab200slot2.1397493648.413274.65e131
[ 4] local 192.168.240.2 port 50548 connected to 192.168.240.3 port 5201
Starting Test: protocol: SCTP, 1 streams, 1452 byte blocks, omitting 0 seconds, 60 second test
[ ID] Interval Transfer Bandwidth
[ 4] 0.00-1.00 sec 240 MBytes 2.02 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 1.00-2.00 sec 239 MBytes 2.01 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 2.00-3.00 sec 240 MBytes 2.01 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 3.00-4.00 sec 239 MBytes 2.00 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 4.00-5.00 sec 245 MBytes 2.05 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 5.00-6.00 sec 240 MBytes 2.01 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 6.00-7.00 sec 240 MBytes 2.02 Gbits/sec
[ 4] 7.00-8.00 sec 239 MBytes 2.01 Gbits/sec
With the reverted patch applied, the SCTP/IPv4 performance is back
to normal on latest upstream for IPv4 and IPv6 and has same throughput
as 3.4.2 test kernel, steady and interval reports are smooth again.
Fixes: ef2820a735f7 ("net: sctp: Fix a_rwnd/rwnd management to reflect real state of the receiver's buffer")
Reported-by: Peter Butler <pbutler@sonusnet.com>
Reported-by: Dongsheng Song <dongsheng.song@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Peter Butler <pbutler@sonusnet.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Matija Glavinic Pecotic <matija.glavinic-pecotic.ext@nsn.com>
Cc: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nsn.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
While working on ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to
verify if we/peer is AUTH capable"), we noticed that there's a skb
memory leakage in the error path.
Running the same reproducer as in ec0223ec48a9 and by unconditionally
jumping to the error label (to simulate an error condition) in
sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() receive path lets kmemleak detector bark about
the unfreed chunk->auth_chunk skb clone:
Unreferenced object 0xffff8800b8f3a000 (size 256):
comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294769856 (age 110.757s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
89 ab 75 5e d4 01 58 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..u^..X.........
backtrace:
[<ffffffff816660be>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff8119f328>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x210
[<ffffffff81566929>] skb_clone+0x49/0xb0
[<ffffffffa0467459>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1d9/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa046fdbc>] sctp_inq_push+0x4c/0x70 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa047e8de>] sctp_rcv+0x82e/0x9a0 [sctp]
[<ffffffff815abd38>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xa8/0x210
[<ffffffff815a64af>] nf_reinject+0xbf/0x180
[<ffffffffa04b4762>] nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x1d2/0x2b0 [nfnetlink_queue]
[<ffffffffa04aa40b>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x250 [nfnetlink]
[<ffffffff815a3269>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xc0
[<ffffffffa04aa7cf>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x23f/0x408 [nfnetlink]
[<ffffffff815a2bd8>] netlink_unicast+0x168/0x250
[<ffffffff815a2fa1>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2e1/0x3f0
[<ffffffff8155cc6b>] sock_sendmsg+0x8b/0xc0
[<ffffffff8155d449>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x369/0x380
What happens is that commit bbd0d59809f9 clones the skb containing
the AUTH chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() when having the edge case
that an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
When we enter sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and before we actually get to
the point where we process (and subsequently free) a non-NULL
chunk->auth_chunk, we could hit the "goto nomem_init" path from
an error condition and thus leave the cloned skb around w/o
freeing it.
The fix is to centrally free such clones in sctp_chunk_destroy()
handler that is invoked from sctp_chunk_free() after all refs have
dropped; and also move both kfree_skb(chunk->auth_chunk) there,
so that chunk->auth_chunk is either NULL (since sctp_chunkify()
allocs new chunks through kmem_cache_zalloc()) or non-NULL with
a valid skb pointer. chunk->skb and chunk->auth_chunk are the
only skbs in the sctp_chunk structure that need to be handeled.
While at it, we should use consume_skb() for both. It is the same
as dev_kfree_skb() but more appropriately named as we are not
a device but a protocol. Also, this effectively replaces the
kfree_skb() from both invocations into consume_skb(). Functions
are the same only that kfree_skb() assumes that the frame was
being dropped after a failure (e.g. for tools like drop monitor),
usage of consume_skb() seems more appropriate in function
sctp_chunk_destroy() though.
Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
RFC4895 introduced AUTH chunks for SCTP; during the SCTP
handshake RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO are negotiated (CHUNKS
being optional though):
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
A special case is when an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO
chunks to be authenticated:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895, section 6.3. Receiving Authenticated Chunks says:
The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in
the HMAC Identifier field. If this algorithm was not
specified by the receiver in the HMAC-ALGO parameter in
the INIT or INIT-ACK chunk during association setup, the
AUTH chunk and all the chunks after it MUST be discarded
and an ERROR chunk SHOULD be sent with the error cause
defined in Section 4.1. [...] If no endpoint pair shared
key has been configured for that Shared Key Identifier,
all authenticated chunks MUST be silently discarded. [...]
When an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be
authenticated, some special procedures have to be followed
because the reception of a COOKIE-ECHO chunk might result
in the creation of an SCTP association. If a packet arrives
containing an AUTH chunk as a first chunk, a COOKIE-ECHO
chunk as the second chunk, and possibly more chunks after
them, and the receiver does not have an STCB for that
packet, then authentication is based on the contents of
the COOKIE-ECHO chunk. In this situation, the receiver MUST
authenticate the chunks in the packet by using the RANDOM
parameters, CHUNKS parameters and HMAC_ALGO parameters
obtained from the COOKIE-ECHO chunk, and possibly a local
shared secret as inputs to the authentication procedure
specified in Section 6.3. If authentication fails, then
the packet is discarded. If the authentication is successful,
the COOKIE-ECHO and all the chunks after the COOKIE-ECHO
MUST be processed. If the receiver has an STCB, it MUST
process the AUTH chunk as described above using the STCB
from the existing association to authenticate the
COOKIE-ECHO chunk and all the chunks after it. [...]
Commit bbd0d59809f9 introduced the possibility to receive
and verification of AUTH chunk, including the edge case for
authenticated COOKIE-ECHO. On reception of COOKIE-ECHO,
the function sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() handles processing,
unpacks and creates a new association if it passed sanity
checks and also tests for authentication chunks being
present. After a new association has been processed, it
invokes sctp_process_init() on the new association and
walks through the parameter list it received from the INIT
chunk. It checks SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM, SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO
and SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS, and copies them into asoc->peer
meta data (peer_random, peer_hmacs, peer_chunks) in case
sysctl -w net.sctp.auth_enable=1 is set. If in INIT's
SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT parameter SCTP_CID_AUTH is set,
peer_random != NULL and peer_hmacs != NULL the peer is to be
assumed asoc->peer.auth_capable=1, in any other case
asoc->peer.auth_capable=0.
Now, if in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() chunk->auth_chunk is
available, we set up a fake auth chunk and pass that on to
sctp_sf_authenticate(), which at latest in
sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() reliably dereferences a NULL pointer
at position 0..0008 when setting up the crypto key in
crypto_hash_setkey() by using asoc->asoc_shared_key that is
NULL as condition key_id == asoc->active_key_id is true if
the AUTH chunk was injected correctly from remote. This
happens no matter what net.sctp.auth_enable sysctl says.
The fix is to check for net->sctp.auth_enable and for
asoc->peer.auth_capable before doing any operations like
sctp_sf_authenticate() as no key is activated in
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() for each case.
Now as RFC4895 section 6.3 states that if the used HMAC-ALGO
passed from the INIT chunk was not used in the AUTH chunk, we
SHOULD send an error; however in this case it would be better
to just silently discard such a maliciously prepared handshake
as we didn't even receive a parameter at all. Also, as our
endpoint has no shared key configured, section 6.3 says that
MUST silently discard, which we are doing from now onwards.
Before calling sctp_sf_pdiscard(), we need not only to free
the association, but also the chunk->auth_chunk skb, as
commit bbd0d59809f9 created a skb clone in that case.
I have tested this locally by using netfilter's nfqueue and
re-injecting packets into the local stack after maliciously
modifying the INIT chunk (removing RANDOM; HMAC-ALGO param)
and the SCTP packet containing the COOKIE_ECHO (injecting
AUTH chunk before COOKIE_ECHO). Fixed with this patch applied.
Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
receiver's buffer
Implementation of (a)rwnd calculation might lead to severe performance issues
and associations completely stalling. These problems are described and solution
is proposed which improves lksctp's robustness in congestion state.
1) Sudden drop of a_rwnd and incomplete window recovery afterwards
Data accounted in sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease takes only payload size (sctp data),
but size of sk_buff, which is blamed against receiver buffer, is not accounted
in rwnd. Theoretically, this should not be the problem as actual size of buffer
is double the amount requested on the socket (SO_RECVBUF). Problem here is
that this will have bad scaling for data which is less then sizeof sk_buff.
E.g. in 4G (LTE) networks, link interfacing radio side will have a large portion
of traffic of this size (less then 100B).
An example of sudden drop and incomplete window recovery is given below. Node B
exhibits problematic behavior. Node A initiates association and B is configured
to advertise rwnd of 10000. A sends messages of size 43B (size of typical sctp
message in 4G (LTE) network). On B data is left in buffer by not reading socket
in userspace.
Lets examine when we will hit pressure state and declare rwnd to be 0 for
scenario with above stated parameters (rwnd == 10000, chunk size == 43, each
chunk is sent in separate sctp packet)
Logic is implemented in sctp_assoc_rwnd_decrease:
socket_buffer (see below) is maximum size which can be held in socket buffer
(sk_rcvbuf). current_alloced is amount of data currently allocated (rx_count)
A simple expression is given for which it will be examined after how many
packets for above stated parameters we enter pressure state:
We start by condition which has to be met in order to enter pressure state:
socket_buffer < currently_alloced;
currently_alloced is represented as size of sctp packets received so far and not
yet delivered to userspace. x is the number of chunks/packets (since there is no
bundling, and each chunk is delivered in separate packet, we can observe each
chunk also as sctp packet, and what is important here, having its own sk_buff):
socket_buffer < x*each_sctp_packet;
each_sctp_packet is sctp chunk size + sizeof(struct sk_buff). socket_buffer is
twice the amount of initially requested size of socket buffer, which is in case
of sctp, twice the a_rwnd requested:
2*rwnd < x*(payload+sizeof(struc sk_buff));
sizeof(struct sk_buff) is 190 (3.13.0-rc4+). Above is stated that rwnd is 10000
and each payload size is 43
20000 < x(43+190);
x > 20000/233;
x ~> 84;
After ~84 messages, pressure state is entered and 0 rwnd is advertised while
received 84*43B ~= 3612B sctp data. This is why external observer notices sudden
drop from 6474 to 0, as it will be now shown in example:
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 1875509148] [rwnd: 81920] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 1096057017]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 3198966556] [rwnd: 10000] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 902132839]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057017] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 0] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057017] [a_rwnd 9957] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057018] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 1] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057018] [a_rwnd 9957] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057019] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 2] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057019] [a_rwnd 9914] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
<...>
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057098] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 81] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057098] [a_rwnd 6517] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057099] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 82] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057099] [a_rwnd 6474] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057100] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 83] [PPID 0x18]
--> Sudden drop
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057100] [a_rwnd 0] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
At this point, rwnd_press stores current rwnd value so it can be later restored
in sctp_assoc_rwnd_increase. This however doesn't happen as condition to start
slowly increasing rwnd until rwnd_press is returned to rwnd is never met. This
condition is not met since rwnd, after it hit 0, must first reach rwnd_press by
adding amount which is read from userspace. Let us observe values in above
example. Initial a_rwnd is 10000, pressure was hit when rwnd was ~6500 and the
amount of actual sctp data currently waiting to be delivered to userspace
is ~3500. When userspace starts to read, sctp_assoc_rwnd_increase will be blamed
only for sctp data, which is ~3500. Condition is never met, and when userspace
reads all data, rwnd stays on 3569.
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057100] [a_rwnd 1505] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057100] [a_rwnd 3010] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057101] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 84] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057101] [a_rwnd 3569] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
--> At this point userspace read everything, rwnd recovered only to 3569
IP A.34340 > B.12345: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 1096057102] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 85] [PPID 0x18]
IP B.12345 > A.34340: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 1096057102] [a_rwnd 3569] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
Reproduction is straight forward, it is enough for sender to send packets of
size less then sizeof(struct sk_buff) and receiver keeping them in its buffers.
2) Minute size window for associations sharing the same socket buffer
In case multiple associations share the same socket, and same socket buffer
(sctp.rcvbuf_policy == 0), different scenarios exist in which congestion on one
of the associations can permanently drop rwnd of other association(s).
Situation will be typically observed as one association suddenly having rwnd
dropped to size of last packet received and never recovering beyond that point.
Different scenarios will lead to it, but all have in common that one of the
associations (let it be association from 1)) nearly depleted socket buffer, and
the other association blames socket buffer just for the amount enough to start
the pressure. This association will enter pressure state, set rwnd_press and
announce 0 rwnd.
When data is read by userspace, similar situation as in 1) will occur, rwnd will
increase just for the size read by userspace but rwnd_press will be high enough
so that association doesn't have enough credit to reach rwnd_press and restore
to previous state. This case is special case of 1), being worse as there is, in
the worst case, only one packet in buffer for which size rwnd will be increased.
Consequence is association which has very low maximum rwnd ('minute size', in
our case down to 43B - size of packet which caused pressure) and as such
unusable.
Scenario happened in the field and labs frequently after congestion state (link
breaks, different probabilities of packet drop, packet reordering) and with
scenario 1) preceding. Here is given a deterministic scenario for reproduction:
>From node A establish two associations on the same socket, with rcvbuf_policy
being set to share one common buffer (sctp.rcvbuf_policy == 0). On association 1
repeat scenario from 1), that is, bring it down to 0 and restore up. Observe
scenario 1). Use small payload size (here we use 43). Once rwnd is 'recovered',
bring it down close to 0, as in just one more packet would close it. This has as
a consequence that association number 2 is able to receive (at least) one more
packet which will bring it in pressure state. E.g. if association 2 had rwnd of
10000, packet received was 43, and we enter at this point into pressure,
rwnd_press will have 9957. Once payload is delivered to userspace, rwnd will
increase for 43, but conditions to restore rwnd to original state, just as in
1), will never be satisfied.
--> Association 1, between A.y and B.12345
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 836880897] [rwnd: 10000] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 4032536569]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 2873310749] [rwnd: 81920] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 3799315613]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK]
--> Association 2, between A.z and B.12346
IP A.55915 > B.12346: sctp (1) [INIT] [init tag: 534798321] [rwnd: 10000] [OS: 10] [MIS: 65535] [init TSN: 2099285173]
IP B.12346 > A.55915: sctp (1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 516668823] [rwnd: 81920] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] [init TSN: 3676403240]
IP A.55915 > B.12346: sctp (1) [COOKIE ECHO]
IP B.12346 > A.55915: sctp (1) [COOKIE ACK]
--> Deplete socket buffer by sending messages of size 43B over association 1
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315613] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 0] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315613] [a_rwnd 9957] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
<...>
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315696] [a_rwnd 6388] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315697] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 84] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315697] [a_rwnd 6345] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
--> Sudden drop on 1
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315698] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 85] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315698] [a_rwnd 0] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
--> Here userspace read, rwnd 'recovered' to 3698, now deplete again using
association 1 so there is place in buffer for only one more packet
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315799] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 186] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315799] [a_rwnd 86] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315800] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 187] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315800] [a_rwnd 43] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
--> Socket buffer is almost depleted, but there is space for one more packet,
send them over association 2, size 43B
IP B.12346 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3676403240] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 0] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12346: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3676403240] [a_rwnd 0] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
--> Immediate drop
IP A.60995 > B.12346: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 387491510] [a_rwnd 0] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
--> Read everything from the socket, both association recover up to maximum rwnd
they are capable of reaching, note that association 1 recovered up to 3698,
and association 2 recovered only to 43
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315800] [a_rwnd 1548] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315800] [a_rwnd 3053] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12345 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3799315801] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 188] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12345: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3799315801] [a_rwnd 3698] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
IP B.12346 > A.55915: sctp (1) [DATA] (B)(E) [TSN: 3676403241] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 1] [PPID 0x18]
IP A.55915 > B.12346: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3676403241] [a_rwnd 43] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
A careful reader might wonder why it is necessary to reproduce 1) prior
reproduction of 2). It is simply easier to observe when to send packet over
association 2 which will push association into the pressure state.
Proposed solution:
Both problems share the same root cause, and that is improper scaling of socket
buffer with rwnd. Solution in which sizeof(sk_buff) is taken into concern while
calculating rwnd is not possible due to fact that there is no linear
relationship between amount of data blamed in increase/decrease with IP packet
in which payload arrived. Even in case such solution would be followed,
complexity of the code would increase. Due to nature of current rwnd handling,
slow increase (in sctp_assoc_rwnd_increase) of rwnd after pressure state is
entered is rationale, but it gives false representation to the sender of current
buffer space. Furthermore, it implements additional congestion control mechanism
which is defined on implementation, and not on standard basis.
Proposed solution simplifies whole algorithm having on mind definition from rfc:
o Receiver Window (rwnd): This gives the sender an indication of the space
available in the receiver's inbound buffer.
Core of the proposed solution is given with these lines:
sctp_assoc_rwnd_update:
if ((asoc->base.sk->sk_rcvbuf - rx_count) > 0)
asoc->rwnd = (asoc->base.sk->sk_rcvbuf - rx_count) >> 1;
else
asoc->rwnd = 0;
We advertise to sender (half of) actual space we have. Half is in the braces
depending whether you would like to observe size of socket buffer as SO_RECVBUF
or twice the amount, i.e. size is the one visible from userspace, that is,
from kernelspace.
In this way sender is given with good approximation of our buffer space,
regardless of the buffer policy - we always advertise what we have. Proposed
solution fixes described problems and removes necessity for rwnd restoration
algorithm. Finally, as proposed solution is simplification, some lines of code,
along with some bytes in struct sctp_association are saved.
Version 2 of the patch addressed comments from Vlad. Name of the function is set
to be more descriptive, and two parts of code are changed, in one removing the
superfluous call to sctp_assoc_rwnd_update since call would not result in update
of rwnd, and the other being reordering of the code in a way that call to
sctp_assoc_rwnd_update updates rwnd. Version 3 corrected change introduced in v2
in a way that existing function is not reordered/copied in line, but it is
correctly called. Thanks Vlad for suggesting.
Signed-off-by: Matija Glavinic Pecotic <matija.glavinic-pecotic.ext@nsn.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nsn.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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fix checkpatch errors below:
ERROR: switch and case should be at the same inden
ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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fix checkpatch errors below:
ERROR: "(foo*)" should be "(foo *)"
ERROR: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar"
ERROR: "foo* bar" should be "foo *bar"
Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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fix checkpatch errors while the space is required or prohibited
to the "=,()++..."
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c
drivers/net/macvtap.c
Both minor merge hassles, simple overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Currently, sctp associations latch a sockets autoclose value to an association
at association init time, subject to capping constraints from the max_autoclose
sysctl value. This leads to an odd situation where an application may set a
socket level autoclose timeout, but sliently sctp will limit the autoclose
timeout to something less than that.
Fix this by modifying the autoclose setsockopt function to check the limit, cap
it and warn the user via syslog that the timeout is capped. This will allow
getsockopt to return valid autoclose timeout values that reflect what subsequent
associations actually use.
While were at it, also elimintate the assoc->autoclose variable, it duplicates
whats in the timeout array, which leads to multiple sources for the same
information, that may differ (as the former isn't subject to any capping). This
gives us the timeout information in a canonical place and saves some space in
the association structure as well.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: Wang Weidong <wangweidong1@huawei.com>
CC: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Several files refer to an old address for the Free Software Foundation
in the file header comment. Resolve by replacing the address with
the URL <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/> so that we do not have to keep
updating the header comments anytime the address changes.
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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With the restructuring of the lksctp.org site, we only allow bug
reports through the SCTP mailing list linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org,
not via SF, as SF is only used for web hosting and nothing more.
While at it, also remove the obvious statement that bugs will be
fixed and incooperated into the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The SCTP mailing list address to send patches or questions
to is linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org and not
lksctp-developers@lists.sourceforge.net anymore. Therefore,
update all occurences.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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We should get rid of all own SCTP debug printk macros and use the ones
that the kernel offers anyway instead. This makes the code more readable
and conform to the kernel code, and offers all the features of dynamic
debbuging that pr_debug() et al has, such as only turning on/off portions
of debug messages at runtime through debugfs. The runtime cost of having
CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG enabled, but none of the debug statements printing,
is negligible [1]. If kernel debugging is completly turned off, then these
statements will also compile into "empty" functions.
While we're at it, we also need to change the Kconfig option as it /now/
only refers to the ifdef'ed code portions in outqueue.c that enable further
debugging/tracing of SCTP transaction fields. Also, since SCTP_ASSERT code
was enabled with this Kconfig option and has now been removed, we
transform those code parts into WARNs resp. where appropriate BUG_ONs so
that those bugs can be more easily detected as probably not many people
have SCTP debugging permanently turned on.
To turn on all SCTP debugging, the following steps are needed:
# mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug
# echo -n 'module sctp +p' > /sys/kernel/debug/dynamic_debug/control
This can be done more fine-grained on a per file, per line basis and others
as described in [2].
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/ols/2009/ols2009-pages-39-46.pdf
[2] Documentation/dynamic-debug-howto.txt
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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While this currently cannot trigger any NULL pointer dereference in
sctp_seq_dump_local_addrs(), better change the order of commands to
prevent a future bug to happen. Although we first add SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC
and then set the SCTP_CMD_INIT_CHOOSE_TRANSPORT, it is okay for now,
since this primitive is only called by sctp_connect() or sctp_sendmsg()
with sctp_assoc_add_peer() set first. However, lets do this precaution
and first set the transport and then add it to the association hashlist
to prevent in future something to possibly triggering this.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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While sctp handling a duplicate COOKIE-ECHO and the action is
'Association restart', sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a() will processing
the unexpected COOKIE-ECHO for peer restart, but it does not set
the association state to SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED, so the association
could stuck in SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING state forever.
This violates the sctp specification:
RFC 4960 5.2.4. Handle a COOKIE ECHO when a TCB Exists
Action
A) In this case, the peer may have restarted. .....
After this, the endpoint shall enter the ESTABLISHED state.
To resolve this problem, adding a SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE cmd to the
command list before SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd, this will set the restart
association to SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED state properly and also avoid
I-bit being set in the DATA chunk header when COOKIE_ACK is bundled
with DATA chunks.
Signed-off-by: Xufeng Zhang <xufeng.zhang@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial
Pull trivial branch from Jiri Kosina:
"Usual stuff -- comment/printk typo fixes, documentation updates, dead
code elimination."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial: (39 commits)
HOWTO: fix double words typo
x86 mtrr: fix comment typo in mtrr_bp_init
propagate name change to comments in kernel source
doc: Update the name of profiling based on sysfs
treewide: Fix typos in various drivers
treewide: Fix typos in various Kconfig
wireless: mwifiex: Fix typo in wireless/mwifiex driver
messages: i2o: Fix typo in messages/i2o
scripts/kernel-doc: check that non-void fcts describe their return value
Kernel-doc: Convention: Use a "Return" section to describe return values
radeon: Fix typo and copy/paste error in comments
doc: Remove unnecessary declarations from Documentation/accounting/getdelays.c
various: Fix spelling of "asynchronous" in comments.
Fix misspellings of "whether" in comments.
eisa: Fix spelling of "asynchronous".
various: Fix spelling of "registered" in comments.
doc: fix quite a few typos within Documentation
target: iscsi: fix comment typos in target/iscsi drivers
treewide: fix typo of "suport" in various comments and Kconfig
treewide: fix typo of "suppport" in various comments
...
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SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS call
The current SCTP stack is lacking a mechanism to have per association
statistics. This is an implementation modeled after OpenSolaris'
SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS.
Userspace part will follow on lksctp if/when there is a general ACK on
this.
V4:
- Move ipackets++ before q->immediate.func() for consistency reasons
- Move sctp_max_rto() at the end of sctp_transport_update_rto() to avoid
returning bogus RTO values
- return asoc->rto_min when max_obs_rto value has not changed
V3:
- Increase ictrlchunks in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() as well
- Move ipackets++ to sctp_inq_push()
- return 0 when no rto updates took place since the last call
V2:
- Implement partial retrieval of stat struct to cope for future expansion
- Kill the rtxpackets counter as it cannot be precise anyway
- Rename outseqtsns to outofseqtsns to make it clearer that these are out
of sequence unexpected TSNs
- Move asoc->ipackets++ under a lock to avoid potential miscounts
- Fold asoc->opackets++ into the already existing asoc check
- Kill unneeded (q->asoc) test when increasing rtxchunks
- Do not count octrlchunks if sending failed (SCTP_XMIT_OK != 0)
- Don't count SHUTDOWNs as SACKs
- Move SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS to the private space API
- Adjust the len check in sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats() to allow for
future struct growth
- Move association statistics in their own struct
- Update idupchunks when we send a SACK with dup TSNs
- return min_rto in max_rto when RTO has not changed. Also return the
transport when max_rto last changed.
Signed-off: Michele Baldessari <michele@acksyn.org>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If the variable parameter length provided in the mandatory
heartbeat information parameter exceeds the calculated payload
length the packet has been corrupted. Reply with a parameter
length protocol violation message.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Masanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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Suppose we have an SCTP connection with two paths. After connection is
established, path1 is not available, thus this path is marked as inactive. Then
traffic goes through path2, but for some reasons packets are delayed (after
rto.max). Because packets are delayed, the retransmit mechanism will switch
again to path1. At this time, we receive a delayed SACK from path2. When we
update the state of the path in sctp_check_transmitted(), we do not take into
account the source address of the SACK, hence we update the wrong path.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add struct net as a parameter to sctp_verify_param so it can be passed
to sctp_verify_ext_param where struct net will be needed when the sctp
tunables become per net tunables.
Add struct net as a parameter to sctp_verify_init so struct net can be
passed to sctp_verify_param.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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There are a handle of state machine functions primarily those dealing
with processing INIT packets where there is neither a valid endpoint nor
a valid assoication from which to derive a struct net. Therefore add
struct net * to the parameter list of sctp_state_fn_t and update all of
the state machine functions.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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