| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch replaces a comma between expression statements by a semicolon.
A simplified version of the semantic patch that performs this
transformation is as follows:
// <smpl>
@r@
expression e1,e2,e;
type T;
identifier i;
@@
e1
-,
+;
e2;
// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Himangi Saraogi <himangi774@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Commit f1370cc4 "xfrm: Remove useless secid field from xfrm_audit." changed
"struct xfrm_audit" to have either
{ audit_get_loginuid(current) / audit_get_sessionid(current) } or
{ INVALID_UID / -1 } pair.
This means that we can represent "struct xfrm_audit" as "bool".
This patch replaces "struct xfrm_audit" argument with "bool".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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It seems to me that commit ab5f5e8b "[XFRM]: xfrm audit calls" is doing
something strange at xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo().
If secid != 0 && security_secid_to_secctx(secid) != 0, the caller calls
audit_log_task_context() which basically does
secid != 0 && security_secid_to_secctx(secid) == 0 case
except that secid is obtained from current thread's context.
Oh, what happens if secid passed to xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() was
obtained from other thread's context? It might audit current thread's
context rather than other thread's context if security_secid_to_secctx()
in xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() failed for some reason.
Then, are all the caller of xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() passing either
secid obtained from current thread's context or secid == 0?
It seems to me that they are.
If I didn't miss something, we don't need to pass secid to
xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() because audit_log_task_context() will
obtain secid from current thread's context.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Several spots in the kernel perform a sequence like:
skb_queue_tail(&sk->s_receive_queue, skb);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk, skb->len);
But at the moment we place the SKB onto the socket receive queue it
can be consumed and freed up. So this skb->len access is potentially
to freed up memory.
Furthermore, the skb->len can be modified by the consumer so it is
possible that the value isn't accurate.
And finally, no actual implementation of this callback actually uses
the length argument. And since nobody actually cared about it's
value, lots of call sites pass arbitrary values in such as '0' and
even '1'.
So just remove the length argument from the callback, that way there
is no confusion whatsoever and all of these use-after-free cases get
fixed as a side effect.
Based upon a patch by Eric Dumazet and his suggestion to audit this
issue tree-wide.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Conflicts:
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/micrel-ks8851.txt
net/core/netpoll.c
The net/core/netpoll.c conflict is a bug fix in 'net' happening
to code which is completely removed in 'net-next'.
In micrel-ks8851.txt we simply have overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)
Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.
CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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There's a kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL in a helper
(pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx) used in pfkey_compile_policy which is
called under rcu_read_lock. Adjust pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx to have
a gfp argument and adjust the users.
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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iproute2 already defines a structure with that name, let's use another one to
avoid any conflict.
CC: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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This patch fixes commit d3623099d350 ("ipsec: add support of limited SA dump").
sadb_ext_min_len array should be updated with the new type (SADB_X_EXT_FILTER).
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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The goal of this patch is to allow userland to dump only a part of SA by
specifying a filter during the dump.
The kernel is in charge to filter SA, this avoids to generate useless netlink
traffic (it save also some cpu cycles). This is particularly useful when there
is a big number of SA set on the system.
Note that I removed the union in struct xfrm_state_walk to fix a problem on arm.
struct netlink_callback->args is defined as a array of 6 long and the first long
is used in xfrm code to flag the cb as initialized. Hence, we must have:
sizeof(struct xfrm_state_walk) <= sizeof(long) * 5.
With the union, it was false on arm (sizeof(struct xfrm_state_walk) was
sizeof(long) * 7), due to the padding.
In fact, whatever the arch is, this union seems useless, there will be always
padding after it. Removing it will not increase the size of this struct (and
reduce it on arm).
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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In the case when KMs have no listeners, km_query() will fail and
temporary SAs are garbage collected immediately after their allocation.
This causes strain on memory allocation, leading even to OOM since
temporary SA alloc/free cycle is performed for every packet
and garbage collection does not keep up the pace.
The sane thing to do is to make sure we have audience before
temporary SA allocation.
Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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In order to check against valid IPcomp spi range, export verify_userspi_info
for both pfkey and netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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We now queue packets to the policy if the states are not yet resolved,
this replaces the ancient sleeping code. Also the sleeping can cause
indefinite task hangs if the needed state does not get resolved.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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By semantics, xfrm layer is fully name space aware,
so will the locks, e.g. xfrm_state/pocliy_lock.
Ensure exclusive access into state/policy link list
for different name space with one global lock is not
right in terms of semantics aspect at first place,
as they are indeed mutually independent with each
other, but also more seriously causes scalability
problem.
One practical scenario is on a Open Network Stack,
more than hundreds of lxc tenants acts as routers
within one host, a global xfrm_state/policy_lock
becomes the bottleneck. But onces those locks are
decoupled in a per-namespace fashion, locks contend
is just with in specific name space scope, without
causing additional SPD/SAD access delay for other
name space.
Also this patch improve scalability while as without
changing original xfrm behavior.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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because the home agent could surely be run on a different
net namespace other than init_net. The original behavior
could lead into inconsistent of key info.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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For legacy IPsec anti replay mechanism:
bitmap in struct xfrm_replay_state could only provide a 32 bits
window size limit in current design, thus user level parameter
sadb_sa_replay should honor this limit, otherwise misleading
outputs("replay=244") by setkey -D will be:
192.168.25.2 192.168.22.2
esp mode=transport spi=147561170(0x08cb9ad2) reqid=0(0x00000000)
E: aes-cbc 9a8d7468 7655cf0b 719d27be b0ddaac2
A: hmac-sha1 2d2115c2 ebf7c126 1c54f186 3b139b58 264a7331
seq=0x00000000 replay=244 flags=0x00000000 state=mature
created: Sep 17 14:00:00 2013 current: Sep 17 14:00:22 2013
diff: 22(s) hard: 30(s) soft: 26(s)
last: Sep 17 14:00:00 2013 hard: 0(s) soft: 0(s)
current: 1408(bytes) hard: 0(bytes) soft: 0(bytes)
allocated: 22 hard: 0 soft: 0
sadb_seq=1 pid=4854 refcnt=0
192.168.22.2 192.168.25.2
esp mode=transport spi=255302123(0x0f3799eb) reqid=0(0x00000000)
E: aes-cbc 6485d990 f61a6bd5 e5660252 608ad282
A: hmac-sha1 0cca811a eb4fa893 c47ae56c 98f6e413 87379a88
seq=0x00000000 replay=244 flags=0x00000000 state=mature
created: Sep 17 14:00:00 2013 current: Sep 17 14:00:22 2013
diff: 22(s) hard: 30(s) soft: 26(s)
last: Sep 17 14:00:00 2013 hard: 0(s) soft: 0(s)
current: 1408(bytes) hard: 0(bytes) soft: 0(bytes)
allocated: 22 hard: 0 soft: 0
sadb_seq=0 pid=4854 refcnt=0
And also, optimizing xfrm_replay_check window checking by setting the
desirable x->props.replay_window with only doing the comparison once
for all when xfrm_state is first born.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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present_and_same_family has checked addresses family validness for both
SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST in the beginning.
Thereafter pfkey_sadb_addr2xfrm_addr doesn't need to do the checking again.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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The lookup tables for minimum sizes of extensions and for the pfkey
handler functions are read only, therefore can be const.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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The mark argument is read only, so constify it. Also make dummy_mark in
af_key const -- only used as dummy argument for this very function.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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This is inspired by a5cc68f3d6 "af_key: fix info leaks in notify
messages". There are some struct members which don't get initialized
and could disclose small amounts of private information.
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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key_notify_sa_flush() and key_notify_policy_flush() miss to initialize
the sadb_msg_reserved member of the broadcasted message and thereby
leak 2 bytes of heap memory to listeners. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In some cases after deleting a policy from the SPD the policy would
remain in the dst/flow/route cache for an extended period of time
which caused problems for SELinux as its dynamic network access
controls key off of the number of XFRM policy and state entries.
This patch corrects this problem by forcing a XFRM garbage collection
whenever a policy is sucessfully removed.
Reported-by: Ondrej Moris <omoris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
1) Initialize the satype field in key_notify_policy_flush(),
this was left uninitialized. From Nicolas Dichtel.
2) The sequence number difference for replay notifications
was misscalculated on ESN sequence number wrap. We need
a separate replay notify function for esn.
3) Fix an off by one in the esn replay notify function.
From Mathias Krause.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: Martin Zhang <martinbj2008@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived
list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member)
The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter:
hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member)
Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only
they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking
exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate.
Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required:
- Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h
- Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones.
- A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this
was modified to use 'obj->member' instead.
- Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator
properly, so those had to be fixed up manually.
The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here:
@@
iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host;
type T;
expression a,c,d,e;
identifier b;
statement S;
@@
-T b;
<+... when != b
(
hlist_for_each_entry(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_from(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a,
- b,
c) S
|
for_each_busy_worker(a, c,
- b,
d) S
|
ax25_uid_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
ax25_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sctp_for_each_hentry(a,
- b,
c) S
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sk_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
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sk_for_each_rcu(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sk_for_each_from
-(a, b)
+(a)
S
+ sk_for_each_from(a) S
|
sk_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
sk_for_each_bound(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a,
- b,
c, d, e) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_neigh_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
nr_node_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_node_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
- for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S
+ for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S
|
- for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S
+ for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S
|
for_each_host(a,
- b,
c) S
|
for_each_host_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
for_each_mesh_entry(a,
- b,
c, d) S
)
...+>
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings]
[akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes]
Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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proc_net_remove is only used to remove proc entries
that under /proc/net,it's not a general function for
removing proc entries of netns. if we want to remove
some proc entries which under /proc/net/stat/, we still
need to call remove_proc_entry.
this patch use remove_proc_entry to replace proc_net_remove.
we can remove proc_net_remove after this patch.
Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Right now, some modules such as bonding use proc_create
to create proc entries under /proc/net/, and other modules
such as ipv4 use proc_net_fops_create.
It looks a little chaos.this patch changes all of
proc_net_fops_create to proc_create. we can remove
proc_net_fops_create after this patch.
Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
1) Remove a duplicated call to skb_orphan() in pf_key, from Cong Wang.
2) Prepare xfrm and pf_key for algorithms without pf_key support,
from Jussi Kivilinna.
3) Fix an unbalanced lock in xfrm_output_one(), from Li RongQing.
4) Add an IPsec state resolution packet queue to handle
packets that are send before the states are resolved.
5) xfrm4_policy_fini() is unused since 2.6.11, time to remove it.
From Michal Kubecek.
6) The xfrm gc threshold was configurable just in the initial
namespace, make it configurable in all namespaces. From
Michal Kubecek.
7) We currently can not insert policies with mark and mask
such that some flows would be matched from both policies.
Allow this if the priorities of these policies are different,
the one with the higher priority is used in this case.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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pfkey support
Mark existing algorithms as pfkey supported and make pfkey only use algorithms
that have pfkey_supported set.
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@mbnet.fi>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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All users of xfrm_addr_cmp() use its result as boolean.
Introduce xfrm_addr_equal() (which is equal to !xfrm_addr_cmp())
and convert all users.
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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skb_set_owner_r() will call skb_orphan(), I don't
see any reason to call it twice.
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Allow an unpriviled user who has created a user namespace, and then
created a network namespace to effectively use the new network
namespace, by reducing capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) and
capable(CAP_NET_RAW) calls to be ns_capable(net->user_ns,
CAP_NET_ADMIN), or capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) calls.
Allow creation of af_key sockets.
Allow creation of llc sockets.
Allow creation of af_packet sockets.
Allow sending xfrm netlink control messages.
Allow binding to netlink multicast groups.
Allow sending to netlink multicast groups.
Allow adding and dropping netlink multicast groups.
Allow sending to all netlink multicast groups and port ids.
Allow reading the netfilter SO_IP_SET socket option.
Allow sending netfilter netlink messages.
Allow setting and getting ip_vs netfilter socket options.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Because sizeof() is size_t then if "len" is negative, it counts as a
large positive value.
The call tree looks like:
pfkey_sendmsg()
-> pfkey_process()
-> pfkey_spdadd()
-> parse_ipsecrequests()
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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It is a frequent mistake to confuse the netlink port identifier with a
process identifier. Try to reduce this confusion by renaming fields
that hold port identifiers portid instead of pid.
I have carefully avoided changing the structures exported to
userspace to avoid changing the userspace API.
I have successfully built an allyesconfig kernel with this change.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
This is an initial merge in of Eric Biederman's work to start adding
user namespace support to the networking.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Sematically speaking, xfrm_mgr.acquire is called when kernel intends to ask
user space IKE daemon to negotiate SAs with peers. IOW the direction will
*always* be XFRM_POLICY_OUT, so remove int dir for clarity.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Cc: Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Use of "unsigned int" is preferred to bare "unsigned" in net tree.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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At the point of this error-handling code, alloc_skb has succeded, so free
the resulting skb by jumping to the err label.
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Instead of testing defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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C assignment can handle struct in6_addr copying.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Unnecessary casts of void * clutter the code.
These are the remainder casts after several specific
patches to remove netdev_priv and dev_priv.
Done via coccinelle script:
$ cat cast_void_pointer.cocci
@@
type T;
T *pt;
void *pv;
@@
- pt = (T *)pv;
+ pt = pv;
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@conan.davemloft.net>
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The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers,
specifically via /proc interfaces. Exposing these pointers provides an
easy target for kernel write vulnerabilities, since they reveal the
locations of writable structures containing easily triggerable function
pointers. The behavior of %pK depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl.
If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior
occurs. If kptr_restrict is set to 1, the default, if the current user
(intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG
(currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's.
If kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers using %pK are printed as
0's regardless of privileges. Replacing with 0's was chosen over the
default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects
"(nil)".
The supporting code for kptr_restrict and %pK are currently in the -mm
tree. This patch converts users of %p in net/ to %pK. Cases of printing
pointers to the syslog are not covered, since this would eliminate useful
information for postmortem debugging and the reading of the syslog is
already optionally protected by the dmesg_restrict sysctl.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Add const qualifiers to structs iphdr, ipv6hdr and in6_addr pointers
where possible, to make code intention more obvious.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If CONFIG_NET_KEY_MIGRATE is not defined the arguments of
pfkey_migrate stub do not match causing warning.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This actually pointed out a (seemingly known) bug where we mangle the
pfkey header in a potentially shared SKB, which is fixed here.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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