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Commit 091d0d55b286 ("shm: fix null pointer deref when userspace
specifies invalid hugepage size") had replaced MAP_HUGE_MASK with
SHM_HUGE_MASK. Though both of them contain the same numeric value of
0x3f, MAP_HUGE_MASK flag sounds more appropriate than the other one in
the context. Hence change it back.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170404045635.616-1-khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs pile two from Al Viro:
- orangefs fix
- series of fs/namei.c cleanups from me
- VFS stuff coming from overlayfs tree
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
orangefs: Use RCU for destroy_inode
vfs: use helper for calling f_op->fsync()
mm: use helper for calling f_op->mmap()
vfs: use helpers for calling f_op->{read,write}_iter()
vfs: pass type instead of fn to do_{loop,iter}_readv_writev()
vfs: extract common parts of {compat_,}do_readv_writev()
vfs: wrap write f_ops with file_{start,end}_write()
vfs: deny copy_file_range() for non regular files
vfs: deny fallocate() on directory
vfs: create vfs helper vfs_tmpfile()
namei.c: split unlazy_walk()
namei.c: fold the check for DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE into d_revalidate()
lookup_fast(): clean up the logics around the fallback to non-rcu mode
namei: fold unlazy_link() into its sole caller
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Overlayfs-related series from Miklos and Amir
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If madvise(2) advice will result in the underlying vma being split and
the number of areas mapped by the process will exceed
/proc/sys/vm/max_map_count as a result, return ENOMEM instead of EAGAIN.
EAGAIN is returned by madvise(2) when a kernel resource, such as slab,
is temporarily unavailable. It indicates that userspace should retry
the advice in the near future. This is important for advice such as
MADV_DONTNEED which is often used by malloc implementations to free
memory back to the system: we really do want to free memory back when
madvise(2) returns EAGAIN because slab allocations (for vmas, anon_vmas,
or mempolicies) cannot be allocated.
Encountering /proc/sys/vm/max_map_count is not a temporary failure,
however, so return ENOMEM to indicate this is a more serious issue. A
followup patch to the man page will specify this behavior.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1701241431120.42507@chino.kir.corp.google.com
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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When a non-cooperative userfaultfd monitor copies pages in the
background, it may encounter regions that were already unmapped.
Addition of UFFD_EVENT_UNMAP allows the uffd monitor to track precisely
changes in the virtual memory layout.
Since there might be different uffd contexts for the affected VMAs, we
first should create a temporary representation for the unmap event for
each uffd context and then notify them one by one to the appropriate
userfault file descriptors.
The event notification occurs after the mmap_sem has been released.
[arnd@arndb.de: fix nommu build]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170203165141.3665284-1-arnd@arndb.de
[mhocko@suse.com: fix nommu build]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170202091503.GA22823@dhcp22.suse.cz
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485542673-24387-3-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Hillf Danton <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "userfaultfd: non-cooperative: better tracking for mapping
changes", v2.
These patches try to address issues I've encountered during integration
of userfaultfd with CRIU.
Previously added userfaultfd events for fork(), madvise() and mremap()
unfortunately do not cover all possible changes to a process virtual
memory layout required for uffd monitor.
When one or more VMAs is removed from the process mm, the external uffd
monitor has no way to detect those changes and will attempt to fill the
removed regions with userfaultfd_copy.
Another problematic event is the exit() of the process. Here again, the
external uffd monitor will try to use userfaultfd_copy, although mm
owning the memory has already gone.
The first patch in the series is a minor cleanup and it's not strictly
related to the rest of the series.
The patches 2 and 3 below add UFFD_EVENT_UNMAP and UFFD_EVENT_EXIT to
allow the uffd monitor track changes in the memory layout of a process.
The patches 4 and 5 amend error codes returned by userfaultfd_copy to
make the uffd monitor able to cope with races that might occur between
delivery of unmap and exit events and outstanding userfaultfd_copy's.
This patch (of 5):
Commit dc0ef0df7b6a ("mm: make mmap_sem for write waits killable for mm
syscalls") replaced call to vm_munmap in munmap syscall with open coded
version to allow different waits on mmap_sem in munmap syscall and
vm_munmap.
Now both functions use down_write_killable, so we can restore the call
to vm_munmap from the munmap system call.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485542673-24387-2-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hillf Danton <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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mmap_init() is no longer associated with VMA slab. So fix it.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485182601-9294-1-git-send-email-iamyooon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: seokhoon.yoon <iamyooon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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->fault(), ->page_mkwrite(), and ->pfn_mkwrite() calls do not need to
take a vma and vmf parameter when the vma already resides in vmf.
Remove the vma parameter to simplify things.
[arnd@arndb.de: fix ARM build]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170125223558.1451224-1-arnd@arndb.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148521301778.19116.10840599906674778980.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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On 32-bit powerpc the ELF PLT sections of binaries (built with
--bss-plt, or with a toolchain which defaults to it) look like this:
[17] .sbss NOBITS 0002aff8 01aff8 000014 00 WA 0 0 4
[18] .plt NOBITS 0002b00c 01aff8 000084 00 WAX 0 0 4
[19] .bss NOBITS 0002b090 01aff8 0000a4 00 WA 0 0 4
Which results in an ELF load header:
Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align
LOAD 0x019c70 0x00029c70 0x00029c70 0x01388 0x014c4 RWE 0x10000
This is all correct, the load region containing the PLT is marked as
executable. Note that the PLT starts at 0002b00c but the file mapping
ends at 0002aff8, so the PLT falls in the 0 fill section described by
the load header, and after a page boundary.
Unfortunately the generic ELF loader ignores the X bit in the load
headers when it creates the 0 filled non-file backed mappings. It
assumes all of these mappings are RW BSS sections, which is not the case
for PPC.
gcc/ld has an option (--secure-plt) to not do this, this is said to
incur a small performance penalty.
Currently, to support 32-bit binaries with PLT in BSS kernel maps
*entire brk area* with executable rights for all binaries, even
--secure-plt ones.
Stop doing that.
Teach the ELF loader to check the X bit in the relevant load header and
create 0 filled anonymous mappings that are executable if the load
header requests that.
Test program showing the difference in /proc/$PID/maps:
int main() {
char buf[16*1024];
char *p = malloc(123); /* make "[heap]" mapping appear */
int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY);
int len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
write(1, buf, len);
printf("%p\n", p);
return 0;
}
Compiled using: gcc -mbss-plt -m32 -Os test.c -otest
Unpatched ppc64 kernel:
00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so
0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so
0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so
10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test
10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test
10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test
10690000-106c0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
f7f70000-f7fa0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so
f7fa0000-f7fb0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so
f7fb0000-f7fc0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so
ffa90000-ffac0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
0x10690008
Patched ppc64 kernel:
00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so
0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so
0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so
10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test
10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test
10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test
10180000-101b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
^^^^ this has changed
f7c60000-f7c90000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so
f7c90000-f7ca0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so
f7ca0000-f7cb0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so
ff860000-ff890000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
0x10180008
The patch was originally posted in 2012 by Jason Gunthorpe
and apparently ignored:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/30/138
Lightly run-tested.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161215131950.23054-1-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:
PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
$(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)
to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The old code was always doing:
vma->vm_end = next->vm_end
vma_rb_erase(next) // in __vma_unlink
vma->vm_next = next->vm_next // in __vma_unlink
next = vma->vm_next
vma_gap_update(next)
The new code still does the above for remove_next == 1 and 2, but for
remove_next == 3 it has been changed and it does:
next->vm_start = vma->vm_start
vma_rb_erase(vma) // in __vma_unlink
vma_gap_update(next)
In the latter case, while unlinking "vma", validate_mm_rb() is told to
ignore "vma" that is being removed, but next->vm_start was reduced
instead. So for the new case, to avoid the false positive from
validate_mm_rb, it should be "next" that is ignored when "vma" is
being unlinked.
"vma" and "next" in the above comment, considered pre-swap().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474492522-2261-4-git-send-email-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Shaun Tancheff <shaun.tancheff@seagate.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Jan Vorlicek <janvorli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The cases are three not two.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474492522-2261-3-git-send-email-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Jan Vorlicek <janvorli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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If next would be NULL we couldn't reach such code path.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474309513-20313-2-git-send-email-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Jan Vorlicek <janvorli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The rmap_walk can access vm_page_prot (and potentially vm_flags in the
pte/pmd manipulations). So it's not safe to wait the caller to update
the vm_page_prot/vm_flags after vma_merge returned potentially removing
the "next" vma and extending the "current" vma over the
next->vm_start,vm_end range, but still with the "current" vma
vm_page_prot, after releasing the rmap locks.
The vm_page_prot/vm_flags must be transferred from the "next" vma to the
current vma while vma_merge still holds the rmap locks.
The side effect of this race condition is pte corruption during migrate
as remove_migration_ptes when run on a address of the "next" vma that
got removed, used the vm_page_prot of the current vma.
migrate mprotect
------------ -------------
migrating in "next" vma
vma_merge() # removes "next" vma and
# extends "current" vma
# current vma is not with
# vm_page_prot updated
remove_migration_ptes
read vm_page_prot of current "vma"
establish pte with wrong permissions
vm_set_page_prot(vma) # too late!
change_protection in the old vma range
only, next range is not updated
This caused segmentation faults and potentially memory corruption in
heavy mprotect loads with some light page migration caused by compaction
in the background.
Hugh Dickins pointed out the comment about the Odd case 8 in vma_merge
which confirms the case 8 is only buggy one where the race can trigger,
in all other vma_merge cases the above cannot happen.
This fix removes the oddness factor from case 8 and it converts it from:
AAAA
PPPPNNNNXXXX -> PPPPNNNNNNNN
to:
AAAA
PPPPNNNNXXXX -> PPPPXXXXXXXX
XXXX has the right vma properties for the whole merged vma returned by
vma_adjust, so it solves the problem fully. It has the added benefits
that the callers could stop updating vma properties when vma_merge
succeeds however the callers are not updated by this patch (there are
bits like VM_SOFTDIRTY that still need special care for the whole range,
as the vma merging ignores them, but as long as they're not processed by
rmap walks and instead they're accessed with the mmap_sem at least for
reading, they are fine not to be updated within vma_adjust before
releasing the rmap_locks).
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474309513-20313-1-git-send-email-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Aditya Mandaleeka <adityam@microsoft.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Jan Vorlicek <janvorli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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mm->highest_vm_end doesn't need any update.
After finally removing the oddness from vma_merge case 8 that was
causing:
1) constant risk of trouble whenever anybody would check vma fields
from rmap_walks, like it happened when page migration was
introduced and it read the vma->vm_page_prot from a rmap_walk
2) the callers of vma_merge to re-initialize any value different from
the current vma, instead of vma_merge() more reliably returning a
vma that already matches all fields passed as parameter
.. it is also worth to take the opportunity of cleaning up superfluous
code in vma_adjust(), that if not removed adds up to the hard
readability of the function.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474492522-2261-5-git-send-email-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Jan Vorlicek <janvorli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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vma->vm_page_prot is read lockless from the rmap_walk, it may be updated
concurrently and this prevents the risk of reading intermediate values.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474660305-19222-1-git-send-email-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Jan Vorlicek <janvorli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 vdso updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle centered around adding support for
32-bit compatible C/R of the vDSO on 64-bit kernels, by Dmitry
Safonov"
* 'x86-vdso-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/vdso: Use CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI to enable vdso prctl
x86/vdso: Only define map_vdso_randomized() if CONFIG_X86_64
x86/vdso: Only define prctl_map_vdso() if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
x86/signal: Add SA_{X32,IA32}_ABI sa_flags
x86/ptrace: Down with test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)
x86/coredump: Use pr_reg size, rather that TIF_IA32 flag
x86/arch_prctl/vdso: Add ARCH_MAP_VDSO_*
x86/vdso: Replace calculate_addr in map_vdso() with addr
x86/vdso: Unmap vdso blob on vvar mapping failure
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Add API to change vdso blob type with arch_prctl.
As this is usefull only by needs of CRIU, expose
this interface under CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: 0x7f454c46@gmail.com
Cc: oleg@redhat.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: gorcunov@openvz.org
Cc: xemul@virtuozzo.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160905133308.28234-4-dsafonov@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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The ARMv8 architecture allows execute-only user permissions by clearing
the PTE_UXN and PTE_USER bits. However, the kernel running on a CPU
implementation without User Access Override (ARMv8.2 onwards) can still
access such page, so execute-only page permission does not protect
against read(2)/write(2) etc. accesses. Systems requiring such
protection must enable features like SECCOMP.
This patch changes the arm64 __P100 and __S100 protection_map[] macros
to the new __PAGE_EXECONLY attributes. A side effect is that
pte_user() no longer triggers for __PAGE_EXECONLY since PTE_USER isn't
set. To work around this, the check is done on the PTE_NG bit via the
pte_ng() macro. VM_READ is also checked now for page faults.
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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The vm_brk() alignment calculations should refuse to overflow. The ELF
loader depending on this, but it has been fixed now. No other unsafe
callers have been found.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468014494-25291-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
There's one case when vma_adjust() expands the vma, overlapping with
*two* next vma. See case 6 of mprotect, described in the comment to
vma_merge().
To handle this (and only this) situation we iterate twice over main part
of the function. See "goto again".
Vegard reported[1] that he sees out-of-bounds access complain from
KASAN, if anon_vma_clone() on the *second* iteration fails.
This happens because we free 'next' vma by the end of first iteration
and don't have a way to undo this if anon_vma_clone() fails on the
second iteration.
The solution is to do all required allocations upfront, before we touch
vmas.
The allocation on the second iteration is only required if first two
vmas don't have anon_vma, but third does. So we need, in total, one
anon_vma_clone() call.
It's easy to adjust 'exporter' to the third vma for such case.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1469514843-23778-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1469625255-126641-1-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Provide a shmem_get_unmapped_area method in file_operations, called at
mmap time to decide the mapping address. It could be conditional on
CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE, but save #ifdefs in other places by making
it unconditional.
shmem_get_unmapped_area() first calls the usual mm->get_unmapped_area
(which we treat as a black box, highly dependent on architecture and
config and executable layout). Lots of conditions, and in most cases it
just goes with the address that chose; but when our huge stars are
rightly aligned, yet that did not provide a suitable address, go back to
ask for a larger arena, within which to align the mapping suitably.
There have to be some direct calls to shmem_get_unmapped_area(), not via
the file_operations: because of the way shmem_zero_setup() is called to
create a shmem object late in the mmap sequence, when MAP_SHARED is
requested with MAP_ANONYMOUS or /dev/zero. Though this only matters
when /proc/sys/vm/shmem_huge has been set.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-29-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
As with anon THP, we only mlock file huge pages if we can prove that the
page is not mapped with PTE. This way we can avoid mlock leak into
non-mlocked vma on split.
We rely on PageDoubleMap() under lock_page() to check if the the page
may be PTE mapped. PG_double_map is set by page_add_file_rmap() when
the page mapped with PTEs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-21-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
vma_addjust_trans_huge() splits pmd if it's crossing VMA boundary.
During split we munlock the huge page which requires rmap walk. rmap
wants to take the lock on its own.
Let's move vma_adjust_trans_huge() outside i_mmap_rwsem to fix this.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-19-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Add possibility for 32-bit user-space applications to move
the vDSO mapping.
Previously, when a user-space app called mremap() for the vDSO
address, in the syscall return path it would land on the previous
address of the vDSOpage, resulting in segmentation violation.
Now it lands fine and returns to userspace with a remapped vDSO.
This will also fix the context.vdso pointer for 64-bit, which does
not affect the user of vDSO after mremap() currently, but this
may change in the future.
As suggested by Andy, return -EINVAL for mremap() that would
split the vDSO image: that operation cannot possibly result in
a working system so reject it.
Renamed and moved the text_mapping structure declaration inside
map_vdso(), as it used only there and now it complements the
vvar_mapping variable.
There is still a problem for remapping the vDSO in glibc
applications: the linker relocates addresses for syscalls
on the vDSO page, so you need to relink with the new
addresses.
Without that the next syscall through glibc may fail:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
#0 0xf7fd9b80 in __kernel_vsyscall ()
#1 0xf7ec8238 in _exit () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: 0x7f454c46@gmail.com
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160628113539.13606-2-dsafonov@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
The do_brk() and vm_brk() return value was "unsigned long" and returned
the starting address on success, and an error value on failure. The
reasons are entirely historical, and go back to it basically behaving
like the mmap() interface does.
However, nobody actually wanted that interface, and it causes totally
pointless IS_ERR_VALUE() confusion.
What every single caller actually wants is just the simpler integer
return of zero for success and negative error number on failure.
So just convert to that much clearer and more common calling convention,
and get rid of all the IS_ERR_VALUE() uses wrt vm_brk().
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Now that all the callers handle vm_brk failure we can change it wait for
mmap_sem killable to help oom_reaper to not get blocked just because
vm_brk gets blocked behind mmap_sem readers.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Almost all current users of vm_munmap are ignoring the return value and
so they do not handle potential error. This means that some VMAs might
stay behind. This patch doesn't try to solve those potential problems.
Quite contrary it adds a new failure mode by using down_write_killable
in vm_munmap. This should be safer than other failure modes, though,
because the process is guaranteed to die as soon as it leaves the kernel
and exit_mmap will clean the whole address space.
This will help in the OOM conditions when the oom victim might be stuck
waiting for the mmap_sem for write which in turn can block oom_reaper
which relies on the mmap_sem for read to make a forward progress and
reclaim the address space of the victim.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
All the callers of vm_mmap seem to check for the failure already and
bail out in one way or another on the error which means that we can
change it to use killable version of vm_mmap_pgoff and return -EINTR if
the current task gets killed while waiting for mmap_sem. This also
means that vm_mmap_pgoff can be killable by default and drop the
additional parameter.
This will help in the OOM conditions when the oom victim might be stuck
waiting for the mmap_sem for write which in turn can block oom_reaper
which relies on the mmap_sem for read to make a forward progress and
reclaim the address space of the victim.
Please note that load_elf_binary is ignoring vm_mmap error for
current->personality & MMAP_PAGE_ZERO case but that shouldn't be a
problem because the address is not used anywhere and we never return to
the userspace if we got killed.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This is a follow up work for oom_reaper [1]. As the async OOM killing
depends on oom_sem for read we would really appreciate if a holder for
write didn't stood in the way. This patchset is changing many of
down_write calls to be killable to help those cases when the writer is
blocked and waiting for readers to release the lock and so help
__oom_reap_task to process the oom victim.
Most of the patches are really trivial because the lock is help from a
shallow syscall paths where we can return EINTR trivially and allow the
current task to die (note that EINTR will never get to the userspace as
the task has fatal signal pending). Others seem to be easy as well as
the callers are already handling fatal errors and bail and return to
userspace which should be sufficient to handle the failure gracefully.
I am not familiar with all those code paths so a deeper review is really
appreciated.
As this work is touching more areas which are not directly connected I
have tried to keep the CC list as small as possible and people who I
believed would be familiar are CCed only to the specific patches (all
should have received the cover though).
This patchset is based on linux-next and it depends on
down_write_killable for rw_semaphores which got merged into tip
locking/rwsem branch and it is merged into this next tree. I guess it
would be easiest to route these patches via mmotm because of the
dependency on the tip tree but if respective maintainers prefer other
way I have no objections.
I haven't covered all the mmap_write(mm->mmap_sem) instances here
$ git grep "down_write(.*\<mmap_sem\>)" next/master | wc -l
98
$ git grep "down_write(.*\<mmap_sem\>)" | wc -l
62
I have tried to cover those which should be relatively easy to review in
this series because this alone should be a nice improvement. Other
places can be changed on top.
[0] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1456752417-9626-1-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1452094975-551-1-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org
[2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1456750705-7141-1-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org
This patch (of 18):
This is the first step in making mmap_sem write waiters killable. It
focuses on the trivial ones which are taking the lock early after
entering the syscall and they are not changing state before.
Therefore it is very easy to change them to use down_write_killable and
immediately return with -EINTR. This will allow the waiter to pass away
without blocking the mmap_sem which might be required to make a forward
progress. E.g. the oom reaper will need the lock for reading to
dismantle the OOM victim address space.
The only tricky function in this patch is vm_mmap_pgoff which has many
call sites via vm_mmap. To reduce the risk keep vm_mmap with the
original non-killable semantic for now.
vm_munmap callers do not bother checking the return value so open code
it into the munmap syscall path for now for simplicity.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Since commit 84638335900f ("mm: rework virtual memory accounting")
RLIMIT_DATA limits both brk() and private mmap() but this's disabled by
default because of incompatibility with older versions of valgrind.
Valgrind always set limit to zero and fails if RLIMIT_DATA is enabled.
Fortunately it changes only rlim_cur and keeps rlim_max for reverting
limit back when needed.
This patch checks current usage also against rlim_max if rlim_cur is
zero. This is safe because task anyway can increase rlim_cur up to
rlim_max. Size of brk is still checked against rlim_cur, so this part
is completely compatible - zero rlim_cur forbids brk() but allows
private mmap().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/56A28613.5070104@de.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Nobody uses it.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 protection key support from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree adds support for a new memory protection hardware feature
that is available in upcoming Intel CPUs: 'protection keys' (pkeys).
There's a background article at LWN.net:
https://lwn.net/Articles/643797/
The gist is that protection keys allow the encoding of
user-controllable permission masks in the pte. So instead of having a
fixed protection mask in the pte (which needs a system call to change
and works on a per page basis), the user can map a (handful of)
protection mask variants and can change the masks runtime relatively
cheaply, without having to change every single page in the affected
virtual memory range.
This allows the dynamic switching of the protection bits of large
amounts of virtual memory, via user-space instructions. It also
allows more precise control of MMU permission bits: for example the
executable bit is separate from the read bit (see more about that
below).
This tree adds the MM infrastructure and low level x86 glue needed for
that, plus it adds a high level API to make use of protection keys -
if a user-space application calls:
mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);
or
mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC);
(note PROT_EXEC-only, without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will notice
this special case, and will set a special protection key on this
memory range. It also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection
Keys User Rights (PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable
and unwritable.
So using protection keys the kernel is able to implement 'true'
PROT_EXEC on x86 CPUs: without protection keys PROT_EXEC implies
PROT_READ as well. Unreadable executable mappings have security
advantages: they cannot be read via information leaks to figure out
ASLR details, nor can they be scanned for ROP gadgets - and they
cannot be used by exploits for data purposes either.
We know about no user-space code that relies on pure PROT_EXEC
mappings today, but binary loaders could start making use of this new
feature to map binaries and libraries in a more secure fashion.
There is other pending pkeys work that offers more high level system
call APIs to manage protection keys - but those are not part of this
pull request.
Right now there's a Kconfig that controls this feature
(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) that is default enabled
(like most x86 CPU feature enablement code that has no runtime
overhead), but it's not user-configurable at the moment. If there's
any serious problem with this then we can make it configurable and/or
flip the default"
* 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits)
x86/mm/pkeys: Fix mismerge of protection keys CPUID bits
mm/pkeys: Fix siginfo ABI breakage caused by new u64 field
x86/mm/pkeys: Fix access_error() denial of writes to write-only VMA
mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support
x86/mm/pkeys: Create an x86 arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() for VMA flags
x86/mm/pkeys: Allow kernel to modify user pkey rights register
x86/fpu: Allow setting of XSAVE state
x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init
mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add arch_validate_pkey()
mm/core, arch, powerpc: Pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits()
x86/mm/pkeys: Actually enable Memory Protection Keys in the CPU
x86/mm/pkeys: Add Kconfig prompt to existing config option
x86/mm/pkeys: Dump pkey from VMA in /proc/pid/smaps
x86/mm/pkeys: Dump PKRU with other kernel registers
mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Differentiate instruction fetches
x86/mm/pkeys: Optimize fault handling in access_error()
mm/core: Do not enforce PKEY permissions on remote mm access
um, pkeys: Add UML arch_*_access_permitted() methods
mm/gup, x86/mm/pkeys: Check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys
x86/mm/gup: Simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling
...
|
|
Kernel style prefers a single string over split strings when the string is
'user-visible'.
Miscellanea:
- Add a missing newline
- Realign arguments
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> [percpu]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Currently we have two copies of the same code which implements memory
overcommitment logic. Let's move it into mm/util.c and hence avoid
duplication. No functional changes here.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
max_map_count sysctl unrelated to scheduler. Move its bits from
include/linux/sched/sysctl.h to include/linux/mm.h.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Grazvydas Ignotas has reported a regression in remap_file_pages()
emulation.
Testcase:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define SIZE (4096 * 3)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
unsigned long *p;
long i;
p = mmap(NULL, SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
if (p == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < SIZE / 4096; i++)
p[i * 4096 / sizeof(*p)] = i;
if (remap_file_pages(p, 4096, 0, 1, 0)) {
perror("remap_file_pages");
return -1;
}
if (remap_file_pages(p, 4096 * 2, 0, 1, 0)) {
perror("remap_file_pages");
return -1;
}
assert(p[0] == 1);
munmap(p, SIZE);
return 0;
}
The second remap_file_pages() fails with -EINVAL.
The reason is that remap_file_pages() emulation assumes that the target
vma covers whole area we want to over map. That assumption is broken by
first remap_file_pages() call: it split the area into two vma.
The solution is to check next adjacent vmas, if they map the same file
with the same flags.
Fixes: c8d78c1823f4 ("mm: replace remap_file_pages() syscall with emulation")
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Grazvydas Ignotas <notasas@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Grazvydas Ignotas <notasas@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.0+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Protection keys provide new page-based protection in hardware.
But, they have an interesting attribute: they only affect data
accesses and never affect instruction fetches. That means that
if we set up some memory which is set as "access-disabled" via
protection keys, we can still execute from it.
This patch uses protection keys to set up mappings to do just that.
If a user calls:
mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);
or
mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC);
(note PROT_EXEC-only without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will
notice this, and set a special protection key on the memory. It
also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection Keys User Rights
(PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable and
unwritable.
I haven't found any userspace that does this today. With this
facility in place, we expect userspace to move to use it
eventually. Userspace _could_ start doing this today. Any
PROT_EXEC calls get converted to PROT_READ inside the kernel, and
would transparently be upgraded to "true" PROT_EXEC with this
code. IOW, userspace never has to do any PROT_EXEC runtime
detection.
This feature provides enhanced protection against leaking
executable memory contents. This helps thwart attacks which are
attempting to find ROP gadgets on the fly.
But, the security provided by this approach is not comprehensive.
The PKRU register which controls access permissions is a normal
user register writable from unprivileged userspace. An attacker
who can execute the 'wrpkru' instruction can easily disable the
protection provided by this feature.
The protection key that is used for execute-only support is
permanently dedicated at compile time. This is fine for now
because there is currently no API to set a protection key other
than this one.
Despite there being a constant PKRU value across the entire
system, we do not set it unless this feature is in use in a
process. That is to preserve the PKRU XSAVE 'init state',
which can lead to faster context switches.
PKRU *is* a user register and the kernel is modifying it. That
means that code doing:
pkru = rdpkru()
pkru |= 0x100;
mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);
wrpkru(pkru);
could lose the bits in PKRU that enforce execute-only
permissions. To avoid this, we suggest avoiding ever calling
mmap() or mprotect() when the PKRU value is expected to be
unstable.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Piotr Kwapulinski <kwapulinski.piotr@gmail.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210240.CB4BB5CA@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This plumbs a protection key through calc_vm_flag_bits(). We
could have done this in calc_vm_prot_bits(), but I did not feel
super strongly which way to go. It was pretty arbitrary which
one to use.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@leon.nu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Maxime Coquelin <mcoquelin.stm32@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Riley Andrews <riandrews@android.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: devel@driverdev.osuosl.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210231.E6F1F0D6@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Provide a stable basis for the pkeys patches, which touches various
x86 details.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Sequence vma_lock_anon_vma() - vma_unlock_anon_vma() isn't safe if
anon_vma appeared between lock and unlock. We have to check anon_vma
first or call anon_vma_prepare() to be sure that it's here. There are
only few users of these legacy helpers. Let's get rid of them.
This patch fixes anon_vma lock imbalance in validate_mm(). Write lock
isn't required here, read lock is enough.
And reorders expand_downwards/expand_upwards: security_mmap_addr() and
wrapping-around check don't have to be under anon vma lock.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Y908EjM2z=706dv4rV6dWtxTLK9nFg9_7DhRMLppBo2g@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The mmap_sem for reading in validate_mm called from expand_stack is not
enough to prevent the argumented rbtree rb_subtree_gap information to
change from under us because expand_stack may be running from other
threads concurrently which will hold the mmap_sem for reading too.
The argumented rbtree is updated with vma_gap_update under the
page_table_lock so use it in browse_rb() too to avoid false positives.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This patch provides a way of working around a slight regression
introduced by commit 84638335900f ("mm: rework virtual memory
accounting").
Before that commit RLIMIT_DATA have control only over size of the brk
region. But that change have caused problems with all existing versions
of valgrind, because it set RLIMIT_DATA to zero.
This patch fixes rlimit check (limit actually in bytes, not pages) and
by default turns it into warning which prints at first VmData misuse:
"mmap: top (795): VmData 516096 exceed data ulimit 512000. Will be forbidden soon."
Behavior is controlled by boot param ignore_rlimit_data=y/n and by sysfs
/sys/module/kernel/parameters/ignore_rlimit_data. For now it set to "y".
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak kernel-parameters.txt text[
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151228211015.GL2194@uranus
Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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changes
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Dmitry Vyukov has reported[1] possible deadlock (triggered by his
syzkaller fuzzer):
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&hugetlbfs_i_mmap_rwsem_key);
lock(&mapping->i_mmap_rwsem);
lock(&hugetlbfs_i_mmap_rwsem_key);
lock(&mapping->i_mmap_rwsem);
Both traces points to mm_take_all_locks() as a source of the problem.
It doesn't take care about ordering or hugetlbfs_i_mmap_rwsem_key (aka
mapping->i_mmap_rwsem for hugetlb mapping) vs. i_mmap_rwsem.
huge_pmd_share() does memory allocation under hugetlbfs_i_mmap_rwsem_key
and allocator can take i_mmap_rwsem if it hit reclaim. So we need to
take i_mmap_rwsem from all hugetlb VMAs before taking i_mmap_rwsem from
rest of VMAs.
The patch also documents locking order for hugetlbfs_i_mmap_rwsem_key.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Zu95tBs-0EvdiAKzUOsb4tczRRfCRTpLr4bg_OP9HuVg@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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When inspecting a vague code inside prctl(PR_SET_MM_MEM) call (which
testing the RLIMIT_DATA value to figure out if we're allowed to assign
new @start_brk, @brk, @start_data, @end_data from mm_struct) it's been
commited that RLIMIT_DATA in a form it's implemented now doesn't do
anything useful because most of user-space libraries use mmap() syscall
for dynamic memory allocations.
Linus suggested to convert RLIMIT_DATA rlimit into something suitable
for anonymous memory accounting. But in this patch we go further, and
the changes are bundled together as:
* keep vma counting if CONFIG_PROC_FS=n, will be used for limits
* replace mm->shared_vm with better defined mm->data_vm
* account anonymous executable areas as executable
* account file-backed growsdown/up areas as stack
* drop struct file* argument from vm_stat_account
* enforce RLIMIT_DATA for size of data areas
This way code looks cleaner: now code/stack/data classification depends
only on vm_flags state:
VM_EXEC & ~VM_WRITE -> code (VmExe + VmLib in proc)
VM_GROWSUP | VM_GROWSDOWN -> stack (VmStk)
VM_WRITE & ~VM_SHARED & !stack -> data (VmData)
The rest (VmSize - VmData - VmStk - VmExe - VmLib) could be called
"shared", but that might be strange beast like readonly-private or VM_IO
area.
- RLIMIT_AS limits whole address space "VmSize"
- RLIMIT_STACK limits stack "VmStk" (but each vma individually)
- RLIMIT_DATA now limits "VmData"
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to
exploitation of user-space processes in the presence of security
vulnerabilities by making it more difficult to find desired code/data
which could help an attack. This is done by adding a random offset to
the location of regions in the process address space, with a greater
range of potential offset values corresponding to better protection/a
larger search-space for brute force, but also to greater potential for
fragmentation.
The offset added to the mmap_base address, which provides the basis for
the majority of the mappings for a process, is set once on process exec
in arch_pick_mmap_layout() and is done via hard-coded per-arch values,
which reflect, hopefully, the best compromise for all systems. The
trade-off between increased entropy in the offset value generation and
the corresponding increased variability in address space fragmentation
is not absolute, however, and some platforms may tolerate higher amounts
of entropy. This patch introduces both new Kconfig values and a sysctl
interface which may be used to change the amount of entropy used for
offset generation on a system.
The direct motivation for this change was in response to the
libstagefright vulnerabilities that affected Android, specifically to
information provided by Google's project zero at:
http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/09/stagefrightened.html
The attack presented therein, by Google's project zero, specifically
targeted the limited randomness used to generate the offset added to the
mmap_base address in order to craft a brute-force-based attack.
Concretely, the attack was against the mediaserver process, which was
limited to respawning every 5 seconds, on an arm device. The hard-coded
8 bits used resulted in an average expected success rate of defeating
the mmap ASLR after just over 10 minutes (128 tries at 5 seconds a
piece). With this patch, and an accompanying increase in the entropy
value to 16 bits, the same attack would take an average expected time of
over 45 hours (32768 tries), which makes it both less feasible and more
likely to be noticed.
The introduced Kconfig and sysctl options are limited by per-arch
minimum and maximum values, the minimum of which was chosen to match the
current hard-coded value and the maximum of which was chosen so as to
give the greatest flexibility without generating an invalid mmap_base
address, generally a 3-4 bits less than the number of bits in the
user-space accessible virtual address space.
When decided whether or not to change the default value, a system
developer should consider that mmap_base address could be placed
anywhere up to 2^(value) bits away from the non-randomized location,
which would introduce variable-sized areas above and below the mmap_base
address such that the maximum vm_area_struct size may be reduced,
preventing very large allocations.
This patch (of 4):
ASLR only uses as few as 8 bits to generate the random offset for the
mmap base address on 32 bit architectures. This value was chosen to
prevent a poorly chosen value from dividing the address space in such a
way as to prevent large allocations. This may not be an issue on all
platforms. Allow the specification of a minimum number of bits so that
platforms desiring greater ASLR protection may determine where to place
the trade-off.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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