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KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag.
Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g.
stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with
SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization
completely.
With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled.
However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for
SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is
there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid
value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator
that the free metadata is missing.
Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into
quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that
have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is
freed right away.
Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb
Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Rename get_alloc_info() and get_free_info() to kasan_get_alloc_meta() and
kasan_get_free_meta() to better reflect what those do and avoid confusion
with kasan_set_free_info().
No functional changes.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/27b7c036b754af15a2839e945f6d8bfce32b4c2f.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ib6e4ba61c8b12112b403d3479a9799ac8fff8de1
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "kasan: boot parameters for hardware tag-based mode", v4.
=== Overview
Hardware tag-based KASAN mode [1] is intended to eventually be used in
production as a security mitigation. Therefore there's a need for finer
control over KASAN features and for an existence of a kill switch.
This patchset adds a few boot parameters for hardware tag-based KASAN that
allow to disable or otherwise control particular KASAN features, as well
as provides some initial optimizations for running KASAN in production.
There's another planned patchset what will further optimize hardware
tag-based KASAN, provide proper benchmarking and tests, and will fully
enable tag-based KASAN for production use.
Hardware tag-based KASAN relies on arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE)
[2] to perform memory and pointer tagging. Please see [3] and [4] for
detailed analysis of how MTE helps to fight memory safety problems.
The features that can be controlled are:
1. Whether KASAN is enabled at all.
2. Whether KASAN collects and saves alloc/free stacks.
3. Whether KASAN panics on a detected bug or not.
The patch titled "kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters" of this
series adds a few new boot parameters.
kasan.mode allows to choose one of three main modes:
- kasan.mode=off - KASAN is disabled, no tag checks are performed
- kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features are enabled
- kasan.mode=full - all KASAN features are enabled
The chosen mode provides default control values for the features mentioned
above. However it's also possible to override the default values by
providing:
- kasan.stacktrace=off/on - enable stacks collection
(default: on for mode=full, otherwise off)
- kasan.fault=report/panic - only report tag fault or also panic
(default: report)
If kasan.mode parameter is not provided, it defaults to full when
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL is enabled, and to prod otherwise.
It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require
rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by
the Android GKI (Generic Kernel Image) initiative.
=== Benchmarks
For now I've only performed a few simple benchmarks such as measuring
kernel boot time and slab memory usage after boot. There's an upcoming
patchset which will optimize KASAN further and include more detailed
benchmarking results.
The benchmarks were performed in QEMU and the results below exclude the
slowdown caused by QEMU memory tagging emulation (as it's different from
the slowdown that will be introduced by hardware and is therefore
irrelevant).
KASAN_HW_TAGS=y + kasan.mode=off introduces no performance or memory
impact compared to KASAN_HW_TAGS=n.
kasan.mode=prod (manually excluding tagging) introduces 3% of performance
and no memory impact (except memory used by hardware to store tags)
compared to kasan.mode=off.
kasan.mode=full has about 40% performance and 30% memory impact over
kasan.mode=prod. Both come from alloc/free stack collection.
=== Notes
This patchset is available here:
https://github.com/xairy/linux/tree/up-boot-mte-v4
This patchset is based on v11 of "kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for
arm64" patchset [1].
For testing in QEMU hardware tag-based KASAN requires:
1. QEMU built from master [6] (use "-machine virt,mte=on -cpu max" arguments
to run).
2. GCC version 10.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/cover.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com/T/#t
[2] https://community.arm.com/developer/ip-products/processors/b/processors-ip-blog/posts/enhancing-memory-safety
[3] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.09517.pdf
[4] https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/blob/master/papers/2020/Security%20analysis%20of%20memory%20tagging.pdf
[5] https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/kernel/generic-kernel-image
[6] https://github.com/qemu/qemu
=== Tags
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
This patch (of 19):
Move get_free_info() call into quarantine_put() to simplify the call site.
No functional changes.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/312d0a3ef92cc6dc4fa5452cbc1714f9393ca239.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Iab0f04e7ebf8d83247024b7190c67c3c34c7940f
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64", v11.
This patchset adds a new hardware tag-based mode to KASAN [1]. The new
mode is similar to the existing software tag-based KASAN, but relies on
arm64 Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) [2] to perform memory and pointer
tagging (instead of shadow memory and compiler instrumentation).
This patchset is co-developed and tested by
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>.
This patchset is available here:
https://github.com/xairy/linux/tree/up-kasan-mte-v11
For testing in QEMU hardware tag-based KASAN requires:
1. QEMU built from master [4] (use "-machine virt,mte=on -cpu max" arguments
to run).
2. GCC version 10.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kasan.html
[2] https://community.arm.com/developer/ip-products/processors/b/processors-ip-blog/posts/enhancing-memory-safety
[3] git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux for-next/mte
[4] https://github.com/qemu/qemu
====== Overview
The underlying ideas of the approach used by hardware tag-based KASAN are:
1. By relying on the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) arm64 CPU feature, pointer tags
are stored in the top byte of each kernel pointer.
2. With the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) arm64 CPU feature, memory tags
for kernel memory allocations are stored in a dedicated memory not
accessible via normal instuctions.
3. On each memory allocation, a random tag is generated, embedded it into
the returned pointer, and the corresponding memory is tagged with the
same tag value.
4. With MTE the CPU performs a check on each memory access to make sure
that the pointer tag matches the memory tag.
5. On a tag mismatch the CPU generates a tag fault, and a KASAN report is
printed.
Same as other KASAN modes, hardware tag-based KASAN is intended as a
debugging feature at this point.
====== Rationale
There are two main reasons for this new hardware tag-based mode:
1. Previously implemented software tag-based KASAN is being successfully
used on dogfood testing devices due to its low memory overhead (as
initially planned). The new hardware mode keeps the same low memory
overhead, and is expected to have significantly lower performance
impact, due to the tag checks being performed by the hardware.
Therefore the new mode can be used as a better alternative in dogfood
testing for hardware that supports MTE.
2. The new mode lays the groundwork for the planned in-kernel MTE-based
memory corruption mitigation to be used in production.
====== Technical details
Considering the implementation perspective, hardware tag-based KASAN is
almost identical to the software mode. The key difference is using MTE
for assigning and checking tags.
Compared to the software mode, the hardware mode uses 4 bits per tag, as
dictated by MTE. Pointer tags are stored in bits [56:60), the top 4 bits
have the normal value 0xF. Having less distict tags increases the
probablity of false negatives (from ~1/256 to ~1/16) in certain cases.
Only synchronous exceptions are set up and used by hardware tag-based KASAN.
====== Benchmarks
Note: all measurements have been performed with software emulation of Memory
Tagging Extension, performance numbers for hardware tag-based KASAN on the
actual hardware are expected to be better.
Boot time [1]:
* 2.8 sec for clean kernel
* 5.7 sec for hardware tag-based KASAN
* 11.8 sec for software tag-based KASAN
* 11.6 sec for generic KASAN
Slab memory usage after boot [2]:
* 7.0 kb for clean kernel
* 9.7 kb for hardware tag-based KASAN
* 9.7 kb for software tag-based KASAN
* 41.3 kb for generic KASAN
Measurements have been performed with:
* defconfig-based configs
* Manually built QEMU master
* QEMU arguments: -machine virt,mte=on -cpu max
* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE disabled
* CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
* clang-10 as the compiler and gcc-10 as the assembler
[1] Time before the ext4 driver is initialized.
[2] Measured as `cat /proc/meminfo | grep Slab`.
====== Notes
The cover letter for software tag-based KASAN patchset can be found here:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=0116523cfffa62aeb5aa3b85ce7419f3dae0c1b8
===== Tags
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
This patch (of 41):
Don't mention "GNU General Public License version 2" text explicitly, as
it's already covered by the SPDX-License-Identifier.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6ea9f5f4aa9dbbffa0d0c0a780b37699a4531034.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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We hit this issue in our internal test. When enabling generic kasan, a
kfree()'d object is put into per-cpu quarantine first. If the cpu goes
offline, object still remains in the per-cpu quarantine. If we call
kmem_cache_destroy() now, slub will report "Objects remaining" error.
=============================================================================
BUG test_module_slab (Not tainted): Objects remaining in test_module_slab on __kmem_cache_shutdown()
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=34 used=1 fp=0x(____ptrval____) flags=0x2ffff00000010200
CPU: 3 PID: 176 Comm: cat Tainted: G B 5.10.0-rc1-00007-g4525c8781ec0-dirty #10
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2b0
show_stack+0x18/0x68
dump_stack+0xfc/0x168
slab_err+0xac/0xd4
__kmem_cache_shutdown+0x1e4/0x3c8
kmem_cache_destroy+0x68/0x130
test_version_show+0x84/0xf0
module_attr_show+0x40/0x60
sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x128/0x1c0
kernfs_seq_show+0xa0/0xb8
seq_read+0x1f0/0x7e8
kernfs_fop_read+0x70/0x338
vfs_read+0xe4/0x250
ksys_read+0xc8/0x180
__arm64_sys_read+0x44/0x58
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x228
do_el0_svc+0x38/0xa0
el0_sync_handler+0x170/0x178
el0_sync+0x174/0x180
INFO: Object 0x(____ptrval____) @offset=15848
INFO: Allocated in test_version_show+0x98/0xf0 age=8188 cpu=6 pid=172
stack_trace_save+0x9c/0xd0
set_track+0x64/0xf0
alloc_debug_processing+0x104/0x1a0
___slab_alloc+0x628/0x648
__slab_alloc.isra.0+0x2c/0x58
kmem_cache_alloc+0x560/0x588
test_version_show+0x98/0xf0
module_attr_show+0x40/0x60
sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x128/0x1c0
kernfs_seq_show+0xa0/0xb8
seq_read+0x1f0/0x7e8
kernfs_fop_read+0x70/0x338
vfs_read+0xe4/0x250
ksys_read+0xc8/0x180
__arm64_sys_read+0x44/0x58
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x228
kmem_cache_destroy test_module_slab: Slab cache still has objects
Register a cpu hotplug function to remove all objects in the offline
per-cpu quarantine when cpu is going offline. Set a per-cpu variable to
indicate this cpu is offline.
[qiang.zhang@windriver.com: fix slab double free when cpu-hotplug]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201204102206.20237-1-qiang.zhang@windriver.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1606895585-17382-2-git-send-email-Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee <Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Zqiang <qiang.zhang@windriver.com>
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Guangye Yang <guangye.yang@mediatek.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>
Cc: Nicholas Tang <nicholas.tang@mediatek.com>
Cc: Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <qcai@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Move free track from kasan_alloc_meta to kasan_free_meta in order to make
struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta size are both 16 bytes. It is
a good size because it is the minimal redzone size and a good number of
alignment.
For free track, we make some modifications as shown below:
1) Remove the free_track from struct kasan_alloc_meta.
2) Add the free_track into struct kasan_free_meta.
3) Add a macro KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK in order to check whether
it can print free stack in KASAN report.
[1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437
[walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162440.23887-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>
Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601051022.1230-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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totalram_pages and totalhigh_pages are made static inline function.
Main motivation was that managed_page_count_lock handling was complicating
things. It was discussed in length here,
https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/995739/#1181785 So it seemes
better to remove the lock and convert variables to atomic, with preventing
poteintial store-to-read tearing as a bonus.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1542090790-21750-4-git-send-email-arunks@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org>
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This patch adds a "SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0" mark to all source
files under mm/kasan.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bce2d1e618afa5142e81961ab8fa4b4165337380.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The static lock quarantine_lock is used in quarantine.c to protect the
quarantine queue datastructures. It is taken inside quarantine queue
manipulation routines (quarantine_put(), quarantine_reduce() and
quarantine_remove_cache()), with IRQs disabled. This is not a problem on
a stock kernel but is problematic on an RT kernel where spin locks are
sleeping spinlocks, which can sleep and can not be acquired with disabled
interrupts.
Convert the quarantine_lock to a raw spinlock_t. The usage of
quarantine_lock is confined to quarantine.c and the work performed while
the lock is held is used for debug purpose.
[bigeasy@linutronix.de: slightly altered the commit message]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181010214945.5owshc3mlrh74z4b@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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quarantine_remove_cache() frees all pending objects that belong to the
cache, before we destroy the cache itself. However there are currently
two possibilities how it can fail to do so.
First, another thread can hold some of the objects from the cache in
temp list in quarantine_put(). quarantine_put() has a windows of
enabled interrupts, and on_each_cpu() in quarantine_remove_cache() can
finish right in that window. These objects will be later freed into the
destroyed cache.
Then, quarantine_reduce() has the same problem. It grabs a batch of
objects from the global quarantine, then unlocks quarantine_lock and
then frees the batch. quarantine_remove_cache() can finish while some
objects from the cache are still in the local to_free list in
quarantine_reduce().
Fix the race with quarantine_put() by disabling interrupts for the whole
duration of quarantine_put(). In combination with on_each_cpu() in
quarantine_remove_cache() it ensures that quarantine_remove_cache()
either sees the objects in the per-cpu list or in the global list.
Fix the race with quarantine_reduce() by protecting quarantine_reduce()
with srcu critical section and then doing synchronize_srcu() at the end
of quarantine_remove_cache().
I've done some assessment of how good synchronize_srcu() works in this
case. And on a 4 CPU VM I see that it blocks waiting for pending read
critical sections in about 2-3% of cases. Which looks good to me.
I suspect that these races are the root cause of some GPFs that I
episodically hit. Previously I did not have any explanation for them.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c8
IP: qlist_free_all+0x2e/0xc0 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:155
PGD 6aeea067
PUD 60ed7067
PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 13667 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #60
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88005f948040 task.stack: ffff880069818000
RIP: 0010:qlist_free_all+0x2e/0xc0 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:155
RSP: 0018:ffff88006981f298 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffffea0000ffff00 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffea0000ffff1f
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88003fffc3e0 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88006981f2c0 R08: ffff88002fed7bd8 R09: 00000001001f000d
R10: 00000000001f000d R11: ffff88006981f000 R12: ffff88003fffc3e0
R13: ffff88006981f2d0 R14: ffffffff81877fae R15: 0000000080000000
FS: 00007fb911a2d700(0000) GS:ffff88003ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000c8 CR3: 0000000060ed6000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
quarantine_reduce+0x10e/0x120 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:239
kasan_kmalloc+0xca/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:590
kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:544
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:456 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2718 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1d3/0x280 mm/slub.c:2754
__alloc_skb+0x10f/0x770 net/core/skbuff.c:219
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:932 [inline]
_sctp_make_chunk+0x3b/0x260 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:1388
sctp_make_data net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:1420 [inline]
sctp_make_datafrag_empty+0x208/0x360 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:746
sctp_datamsg_from_user+0x7e8/0x11d0 net/sctp/chunk.c:266
sctp_sendmsg+0x2611/0x3970 net/sctp/socket.c:1962
inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:761
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643
SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1685
SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1653
I am not sure about backporting. The bug is quite hard to trigger, I've
seen it few times during our massive continuous testing (however, it
could be cause of some other episodic stray crashes as it leads to
memory corruption...). If it is triggered, the consequences are very
bad -- almost definite bad memory corruption. The fix is non trivial
and has chances of introducing new bugs. I am also not sure how
actively people use KASAN on older releases.
[dvyukov@google.com: - sorted includes[
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170309094028.51088-1-dvyukov@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170308151532.5070-1-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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We see reported stalls/lockups in quarantine_remove_cache() on machines
with large amounts of RAM. quarantine_remove_cache() needs to scan
whole quarantine in order to take out all objects belonging to the
cache. Quarantine is currently 1/32-th of RAM, e.g. on a machine with
256GB of memory that will be 8GB. Moreover quarantine scanning is a
walk over uncached linked list, which is slow.
Add cond_resched() after scanning of each non-empty batch of objects.
Batches are specifically kept of reasonable size for quarantine_put().
On a machine with 256GB of RAM we should have ~512 non-empty batches,
each with 16MB of objects.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170308154239.25440-1-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Per memcg slab accounting and kasan have a problem with kmem_cache
destruction.
- kmem_cache_create() allocates a kmem_cache, which is used for
allocations from processes running in root (top) memcg.
- Processes running in non root memcg and allocating with either
__GFP_ACCOUNT or from a SLAB_ACCOUNT cache use a per memcg
kmem_cache.
- Kasan catches use-after-free by having kfree() and kmem_cache_free()
defer freeing of objects. Objects are placed in a quarantine.
- kmem_cache_destroy() destroys root and non root kmem_caches. It takes
care to drain the quarantine of objects from the root memcg's
kmem_cache, but ignores objects associated with non root memcg. This
causes leaks because quarantined per memcg objects refer to per memcg
kmem cache being destroyed.
To see the problem:
1) create a slab cache with kmem_cache_create(,,,SLAB_ACCOUNT,)
2) from non root memcg, allocate and free a few objects from cache
3) dispose of the cache with kmem_cache_destroy() kmem_cache_destroy()
will trigger a "Slab cache still has objects" warning indicating
that the per memcg kmem_cache structure was leaked.
Fix the leak by draining kasan quarantined objects allocated from non
root memcg.
Racing memcg deletion is tricky, but handled. kmem_cache_destroy() =>
shutdown_memcg_caches() => __shutdown_memcg_cache() => shutdown_cache()
flushes per memcg quarantined objects, even if that memcg has been
rmdir'd and gone through memcg_deactivate_kmem_caches().
This leak only affects destroyed SLAB_ACCOUNT kmem caches when kasan is
enabled. So I don't think it's worth patching stable kernels.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1482257462-36948-1-git-send-email-gthelen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently we dedicate 1/32 of RAM for quarantine and then reduce it by
1/4 of total quarantine size. This can be a significant amount of
memory. For example, with 4GB of RAM total quarantine size is 128MB and
it is reduced by 32MB at a time. With 128GB of RAM total quarantine
size is 4GB and it is reduced by 1GB. This leads to several problems:
- freeing 1GB can take tens of seconds, causes rcu stall warnings and
just introduces unexpected long delays at random places
- if kmalloc() is called under a mutex, other threads stall on that
mutex while a thread reduces quarantine
- threads wait on quarantine_lock while one thread grabs a large batch
of objects to evict
- we walk the uncached list of object to free twice which makes all of
the above worse
- when a thread frees objects, they are already not accounted against
global_quarantine.bytes; as the result we can have quarantine_size
bytes in quarantine + unbounded amount of memory in large batches in
threads that are in process of freeing
Reduce size of quarantine in smaller batches to reduce the delays. The
only reason to reduce it in batches is amortization of overheads, the
new batch size of 1MB should be well enough to amortize spinlock
lock/unlock and few function calls.
Plus organize quarantine as a FIFO array of batches. This allows to not
walk the list in quarantine_reduce() under quarantine_lock, which in
turn reduces contention and is just faster.
This improves performance of heavy load (syzkaller fuzzing) by ~20% with
4 CPUs and 32GB of RAM. Also this eliminates frequent (every 5 sec)
drops of CPU consumption from ~400% to ~100% (one thread reduces
quarantine while others are waiting on a mutex).
Some reference numbers:
1. Machine with 4 CPUs and 4GB of memory. Quarantine size 128MB.
Currently we free 32MB at at time.
With new code we free 1MB at a time (1024 batches, ~128 are used).
2. Machine with 32 CPUs and 128GB of memory. Quarantine size 4GB.
Currently we free 1GB at at time.
With new code we free 8MB at a time (1024 batches, ~512 are used).
3. Machine with 4096 CPUs and 1TB of memory. Quarantine size 32GB.
Currently we free 8GB at at time.
With new code we free 4MB at a time (16K batches, ~8K are used).
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478756952-18695-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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It's quite unlikely that the user will so little memory that the per-CPU
quarantines won't fit into the given fraction of the available memory.
Even in that case he won't be able to do anything with the information
given in the warning.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470929182-101413-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kuthonuzo Luruo <kuthonuzo.luruo@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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If the total amount of memory assigned to quarantine is less than the
amount of memory assigned to per-cpu quarantines, |new_quarantine_size|
may overflow. Instead, set it to zero.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup: use WARN_ONCE return value]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470063563-96266-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Fixes: 55834c59098d ("mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The state of object currently tracked in two places - shadow memory, and
the ->state field in struct kasan_alloc_meta. We can get rid of the
latter. The will save us a little bit of memory. Also, this allow us
to move free stack into struct kasan_alloc_meta, without increasing
memory consumption. So now we should always know when the last time the
object was freed. This may be useful for long delayed use-after-free
bugs.
As a side effect this fixes following UBSAN warning:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in mm/kasan/quarantine.c:102:13
member access within misaligned address ffff88000d1efebc for type 'struct qlist_node'
which requires 8 byte alignment
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-5-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Reported-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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SLUB doesn't require disabled interrupts to call ___cache_free().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-3-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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There are two bugs on qlist_move_cache(). One is that qlist's tail
isn't set properly. curr->next can be NULL since it is singly linked
list and NULL value on tail is invalid if there is one item on qlist.
Another one is that if cache is matched, qlist_put() is called and it
will set curr->next to NULL. It would cause to stop the loop
prematurely.
These problems come from complicated implementation so I'd like to
re-implement it completely. Implementation in this patch is really
simple. Iterate all qlist_nodes and put them to appropriate list.
Unfortunately, I got this bug sometime ago and lose oops message. But,
the bug looks trivial and no need to attach oops.
Fixes: 55834c59098d ("mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1467766348-22419-1-git-send-email-iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kuthonuzo Luruo <poll.stdin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.
When the object is freed, its state changes from KASAN_STATE_ALLOC to
KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE. The object is poisoned and put into quarantine
instead of being returned to the allocator, therefore every subsequent
access to that object triggers a KASAN error, and the error handler is
able to say where the object has been allocated and deallocated.
When it's time for the object to leave quarantine, its state becomes
KASAN_STATE_FREE and it's returned to the allocator. From now on the
allocator may reuse it for another allocation. Before that happens,
it's still possible to detect a use-after free on that object (it
retains the allocation/deallocation stacks).
When the allocator reuses this object, the shadow is unpoisoned and old
allocation/deallocation stacks are wiped. Therefore a use of this
object, even an incorrect one, won't trigger ASan warning.
Without the quarantine, it's not guaranteed that the objects aren't
reused immediately, that's why the probability of catching a
use-after-free is lower than with quarantine in place.
Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.
Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues. When a
cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects are
moved into the global quarantine queue. Whenever a kmalloc call allows
memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the global queue
until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than 3/4 of the
maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed physical
memory).
As long as an object remains in the quarantine, KASAN is able to report
accesses to it, so the chance of reporting a use-after-free is
increased. Once the object leaves quarantine, the allocator may reuse
it, in which case the object is unpoisoned and KASAN can't detect
incorrect accesses to it.
Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator.
Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later.
This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally
prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. A number of improvements have been
suggested by Andrey Ryabinin.
[glider@google.com: v9]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462987130-144092-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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