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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- Fix false-positive build warnings for ARCH=ia64 builds
- Optimize dictionary size for module compression with xz
- Check the compiler and linker versions in Kconfig
- Fix misuse of extra-y
- Support DWARF v5 debug info
- Clamp SUBLEVEL to 255 because stable releases 4.4.x and 4.9.x
exceeded the limit
- Add generic syscall{tbl,hdr}.sh for cleanups across arches
- Minor cleanups of genksyms
- Minor cleanups of Kconfig
* tag 'kbuild-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (38 commits)
initramfs: Remove redundant dependency of RD_ZSTD on BLK_DEV_INITRD
kbuild: remove deprecated 'always' and 'hostprogs-y/m'
kbuild: parse C= and M= before changing the working directory
kbuild: reuse this-makefile to define abs_srctree
kconfig: unify rule of config, menuconfig, nconfig, gconfig, xconfig
kconfig: omit --oldaskconfig option for 'make config'
kconfig: fix 'invalid option' for help option
kconfig: remove dead code in conf_askvalue()
kconfig: clean up nested if-conditionals in check_conf()
kconfig: Remove duplicate call to sym_get_string_value()
Makefile: Remove # characters from compiler string
Makefile: reuse CC_VERSION_TEXT
kbuild: check the minimum linker version in Kconfig
kbuild: remove ld-version macro
scripts: add generic syscallhdr.sh
scripts: add generic syscalltbl.sh
arch: syscalls: remove $(srctree)/ prefix from syscall tables
arch: syscalls: add missing FORCE and fix 'targets' to make if_changed work
gen_compile_commands: prune some directories
kbuild: simplify access to the kernel's version
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
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Instead of storing the version in a single integer and having various
kernel (and userspace) code how it's constructed, export individual
(major, patchlevel, sublevel) components and simplify kernel code that
uses it.
This should also make it easier on userspace.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
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The dcookies stuff was only used by the kernel's old oprofile code. Now
that oprofile's support is removed from the kernel, there is no need for
dcookies as well. Remove it.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>
Acked-by: William Cohen <wcohen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Add two simple helpers to check permissions on a file and path
respectively and convert over some callers. It simplifies quite a few
codepaths and also reduces the churn in later patches quite a bit.
Christoph also correctly points out that this makes codepaths (e.g.
ioctls) way easier to follow that would otherwise have to do more
complex argument passing than necessary.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-4-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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Introduce a mechanism to quickly disable/enable syscall handling for a
specific process and redirect to userspace via SIGSYS. This is useful
for processes with parts that require syscall redirection and parts that
don't, but who need to perform this boundary crossing really fast,
without paying the cost of a system call to reconfigure syscall handling
on each boundary transition. This is particularly important for Windows
games running over Wine.
The proposed interface looks like this:
prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH, <op>, <off>, <length>, [selector])
The range [<offset>,<offset>+<length>) is a part of the process memory
map that is allowed to by-pass the redirection code and dispatch
syscalls directly, such that in fast paths a process doesn't need to
disable the trap nor the kernel has to check the selector. This is
essential to return from SIGSYS to a blocked area without triggering
another SIGSYS from rt_sigreturn.
selector is an optional pointer to a char-sized userspace memory region
that has a key switch for the mechanism. This key switch is set to
either PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON, PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF to enable and disable the
redirection without calling the kernel.
The feature is meant to be set per-thread and it is disabled on
fork/clone/execv.
Internally, this doesn't add overhead to the syscall hot path, and it
requires very little per-architecture support. I avoided using seccomp,
even though it duplicates some functionality, due to previous feedback
that maybe it shouldn't mix with seccomp since it is not a security
mechanism. And obviously, this should never be considered a security
mechanism, since any part of the program can by-pass it by using the
syscall dispatcher.
For the sysinfo benchmark, which measures the overhead added to
executing a native syscall that doesn't require interception, the
overhead using only the direct dispatcher region to issue syscalls is
pretty much irrelevant. The overhead of using the selector goes around
40ns for a native (unredirected) syscall in my system, and it is (as
expected) dominated by the supervisor-mode user-address access. In
fact, with SMAP off, the overhead is consistently less than 5ns on my
test box.
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127193238.821364-4-krisman@collabora.com
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tid_addr is not a "pointer to (pointer to int in userspace)"; it is in
fact a "pointer to (pointer to int in userspace) in userspace". So
sparse rightfully complains about passing a kernel pointer to
put_user().
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Pull SafeSetID updates from Micah Morton:
"The changes are mostly contained to within the SafeSetID LSM, with the
exception of a few 1-line changes to change some ns_capable() calls to
ns_capable_setid() -- causing a flag (CAP_OPT_INSETID) to be set that
is examined by SafeSetID code and nothing else in the kernel.
The changes to SafeSetID internally allow for setting up GID
transition security policies, as already existed for UIDs"
* tag 'safesetid-5.10' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
LSM: SafeSetID: Fix warnings reported by test bot
LSM: SafeSetID: Add GID security policy handling
LSM: Signal to SafeSetID when setting group IDs
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Replace do_brk with do_brk_flags in comment of prctl_set_mm_map(), since
do_brk was removed in following commit.
Fixes: bb177a732c4369 ("mm: do not bug_on on incorrect length in __mm_populate()")
Signed-off-by: Liao Pingfang <liao.pingfang@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1600650751-43127-1-git-send-email-wang.yi59@zte.com.cn
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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For SafeSetID to properly gate set*gid() calls, it needs to know whether
ns_capable() is being called from within a sys_set*gid() function or is
being called from elsewhere in the kernel. This allows SafeSetID to deny
CAP_SETGID to restricted groups when they are attempting to use the
capability for code paths other than updating GIDs (e.g. setting up
userns GID mappings). This is the identical approach to what is
currently done for CAP_SETUID.
NOTE: We also add signaling to SafeSetID from the setgroups() syscall,
as we have future plans to restrict a process' ability to set
supplementary groups in addition to what is added in this series for
restricting setting of the primary group.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
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Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with
the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary
fall-through markings when it is the case.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
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This brings consistency with the rest of the prctl() syscall where
-EPERM is returned when failing a capability check.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-7-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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Originally, only a local CAP_SYS_ADMIN could change the exe link,
making it difficult for doing checkpoint/restore without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
This commit adds CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE in addition to CAP_SYS_ADMIN
for permitting changing the exe link.
The following describes the history of the /proc/self/exe permission
checks as it may be difficult to understand what decisions lead to this
point.
* [1] May 2012: This commit introduces the ability of changing
/proc/self/exe if the user is CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capable.
In the related discussion [2], no clear thread model is presented for
what could happen if the /proc/self/exe changes multiple times, or why
would the admin be at the mercy of userspace.
* [3] Oct 2014: This commit introduces a new API to change
/proc/self/exe. The permission no longer checks for CAP_SYS_RESOURCE,
but instead checks if the current user is root (uid=0) in its local
namespace. In the related discussion [4] it is said that "Controlling
exe_fd without privileges may turn out to be dangerous. At least
things like tomoyo examine it for making policy decisions (see
tomoyo_manager())."
* [5] Dec 2016: This commit removes the restriction to change
/proc/self/exe at most once. The related discussion [6] informs that
the audit subsystem relies on the exe symlink, presumably
audit_log_d_path_exe() in kernel/audit.c.
* [7] May 2017: This commit changed the check from uid==0 to local
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. No discussion.
* [8] July 2020: A PoC to spoof any program's /proc/self/exe via ptrace
is demonstrated
Overall, the concrete points that were made to retain capability checks
around changing the exe symlink is that tomoyo_manager() and
audit_log_d_path_exe() uses the exe_file path.
Christian Brauner said that relying on /proc/<pid>/exe being immutable (or
guarded by caps) in a sake of security is a bit misleading. It can only
be used as a hint without any guarantees of what code is being executed
once execve() returns to userspace. Christian suggested that in the
future, we could call audit_log() or similar to inform the admin of all
exe link changes, instead of attempting to provide security guarantees
via permission checks. However, this proposed change requires the
understanding of the security implications in the tomoyo/audit subsystems.
[1] b32dfe377102 ("c/r: prctl: add ability to set new mm_struct::exe_file")
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/292515/
[3] f606b77f1a9e ("prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation")
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/479359/
[5] 3fb4afd9a504 ("prctl: remove one-shot limitation for changing exe link")
[6] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/697304/
[7] 4d28df6152aa ("prctl: Allow local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file")
[8] https://github.com/nviennot/run_as_exe
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-6-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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git://github.com/micah-morton/linux
Pull SafeSetID update from Micah Morton:
"Add additional LSM hooks for SafeSetID
SafeSetID is capable of making allow/deny decisions for set*uid calls
on a system, and we want to add similar functionality for set*gid
calls.
The work to do that is not yet complete, so probably won't make it in
for v5.8, but we are looking to get this simple patch in for v5.8
since we have it ready.
We are planning on the rest of the work for extending the SafeSetID
LSM being merged during the v5.9 merge window"
* tag 'LSM-add-setgid-hook-5.8-author-fix' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
security: Add LSM hooks to set*gid syscalls
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The SafeSetID LSM uses the security_task_fix_setuid hook to filter
set*uid() syscalls according to its configured security policy. In
preparation for adding analagous support in the LSM for set*gid()
syscalls, we add the requisite hook here. Tested by putting print
statements in the security_task_fix_setgid hook and seeing them get hit
during kernel boot.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
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Convert comments that reference mmap_sem to reference mmap_lock instead.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up linux-next leftovers]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/lockaphore/lock/, per Vlastimil]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: more linux-next fixups, per Michel]
Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-13-walken@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This change converts the existing mmap_sem rwsem calls to use the new mmap
locking API instead.
The change is generated using coccinelle with the following rule:
// spatch --sp-file mmap_lock_api.cocci --in-place --include-headers --dir .
@@
expression mm;
@@
(
-init_rwsem
+mmap_init_lock
|
-down_write
+mmap_write_lock
|
-down_write_killable
+mmap_write_lock_killable
|
-down_write_trylock
+mmap_write_trylock
|
-up_write
+mmap_write_unlock
|
-downgrade_write
+mmap_write_downgrade
|
-down_read
+mmap_read_lock
|
-down_read_killable
+mmap_read_lock_killable
|
-down_read_trylock
+mmap_read_trylock
|
-up_read
+mmap_read_unlock
)
-(&mm->mmap_sem)
+(mm)
Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-5-walken@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Merge updates from Andrew Morton:
"A few little subsystems and a start of a lot of MM patches.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: squashfs, ocfs2, parisc,
vfs. With mm subsystems: slab-generic, slub, debug, pagecache, gup,
swap, memcg, pagemap, memory-failure, vmalloc, kasan"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (128 commits)
kasan: move kasan_report() into report.c
mm/mm_init.c: report kasan-tag information stored in page->flags
ubsan: entirely disable alignment checks under UBSAN_TRAP
kasan: fix clang compilation warning due to stack protector
x86/mm: remove vmalloc faulting
mm: remove vmalloc_sync_(un)mappings()
x86/mm/32: implement arch_sync_kernel_mappings()
x86/mm/64: implement arch_sync_kernel_mappings()
mm/ioremap: track which page-table levels were modified
mm/vmalloc: track which page-table levels were modified
mm: add functions to track page directory modifications
s390: use __vmalloc_node in stack_alloc
powerpc: use __vmalloc_node in alloc_vm_stack
arm64: use __vmalloc_node in arch_alloc_vmap_stack
mm: remove vmalloc_user_node_flags
mm: switch the test_vmalloc module to use __vmalloc_node
mm: remove __vmalloc_node_flags_caller
mm: remove both instances of __vmalloc_node_flags
mm: remove the prot argument to __vmalloc_node
mm: remove the pgprot argument to __vmalloc
...
|
|
PF_LESS_THROTTLE exists for loop-back nfsd (and a similar need in the
loop block driver and callers of prctl(PR_SET_IO_FLUSHER)), where a
daemon needs to write to one bdi (the final bdi) in order to free up
writes queued to another bdi (the client bdi).
The daemon sets PF_LESS_THROTTLE and gets a larger allowance of dirty
pages, so that it can still dirty pages after other processses have been
throttled. The purpose of this is to avoid deadlock that happen when
the PF_LESS_THROTTLE process must write for any dirty pages to be freed,
but it is being thottled and cannot write.
This approach was designed when all threads were blocked equally,
independently on which device they were writing to, or how fast it was.
Since that time the writeback algorithm has changed substantially with
different threads getting different allowances based on non-trivial
heuristics. This means the simple "add 25%" heuristic is no longer
reliable.
The important issue is not that the daemon needs a *larger* dirty page
allowance, but that it needs a *private* dirty page allowance, so that
dirty pages for the "client" bdi that it is helping to clear (the bdi
for an NFS filesystem or loop block device etc) do not affect the
throttling of the daemon writing to the "final" bdi.
This patch changes the heuristic so that the task is not throttled when
the bdi it is writing to has a dirty page count below below (or equal
to) the free-run threshold for that bdi. This ensures it will always be
able to have some pages in flight, and so will not deadlock.
In a steady-state, it is expected that PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE tasks might
still be throttled by global threshold, but that is acceptable as it is
only the deadlock state that is interesting for this flag.
This approach of "only throttle when target bdi is busy" is consistent
with the other use of PF_LESS_THROTTLE in current_may_throttle(), were
it causes attention to be focussed only on the target bdi.
So this patch
- renames PF_LESS_THROTTLE to PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE,
- removes the 25% bonus that that flag gives, and
- If PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE is set, don't delay at all unless the
global and the local free-run thresholds are exceeded.
Note that previously realtime threads were treated the same as
PF_LESS_THROTTLE threads. This patch does *not* change the behvaiour
for real-time threads, so it is now different from the behaviour of nfsd
and loop tasks. I don't know what is wanted for realtime.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> [nfsd]
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ftbf7gs3.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.name
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
The sysinfo() syscall includes uptime in seconds but has no correction for
time namespaces which makes it inconsistent with the /proc/uptime inside of
a time namespace.
Add the missing time namespace adjustment call.
Signed-off-by: Cyril Hrubis <chrubis@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303150638.7329-1-chrubis@suse.cz
|
|
There are several storage drivers like dm-multipath, iscsi, tcmu-runner,
amd nbd that have userspace components that can run in the IO path. For
example, iscsi and nbd's userspace deamons may need to recreate a socket
and/or send IO on it, and dm-multipath's daemon multipathd may need to
send SG IO or read/write IO to figure out the state of paths and re-set
them up.
In the kernel these drivers have access to GFP_NOIO/GFP_NOFS and the
memalloc_*_save/restore functions to control the allocation behavior,
but for userspace we would end up hitting an allocation that ended up
writing data back to the same device we are trying to allocate for.
The device is then in a state of deadlock, because to execute IO the
device needs to allocate memory, but to allocate memory the memory
layers want execute IO to the device.
Here is an example with nbd using a local userspace daemon that performs
network IO to a remote server. We are using XFS on top of the nbd device,
but it can happen with any FS or other modules layered on top of the nbd
device that can write out data to free memory. Here a nbd daemon helper
thread, msgr-worker-1, is performing a write/sendmsg on a socket to execute
a request. This kicks off a reclaim operation which results in a WRITE to
the nbd device and the nbd thread calling back into the mm layer.
[ 1626.609191] msgr-worker-1 D 0 1026 1 0x00004000
[ 1626.609193] Call Trace:
[ 1626.609195] ? __schedule+0x29b/0x630
[ 1626.609197] ? wait_for_completion+0xe0/0x170
[ 1626.609198] schedule+0x30/0xb0
[ 1626.609200] schedule_timeout+0x1f6/0x2f0
[ 1626.609202] ? blk_finish_plug+0x21/0x2e
[ 1626.609204] ? _xfs_buf_ioapply+0x2e6/0x410
[ 1626.609206] ? wait_for_completion+0xe0/0x170
[ 1626.609208] wait_for_completion+0x108/0x170
[ 1626.609210] ? wake_up_q+0x70/0x70
[ 1626.609212] ? __xfs_buf_submit+0x12e/0x250
[ 1626.609214] ? xfs_bwrite+0x25/0x60
[ 1626.609215] xfs_buf_iowait+0x22/0xf0
[ 1626.609218] __xfs_buf_submit+0x12e/0x250
[ 1626.609220] xfs_bwrite+0x25/0x60
[ 1626.609222] xfs_reclaim_inode+0x2e8/0x310
[ 1626.609224] xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag+0x1b6/0x300
[ 1626.609227] xfs_reclaim_inodes_nr+0x31/0x40
[ 1626.609228] super_cache_scan+0x152/0x1a0
[ 1626.609231] do_shrink_slab+0x12c/0x2d0
[ 1626.609233] shrink_slab+0x9c/0x2a0
[ 1626.609235] shrink_node+0xd7/0x470
[ 1626.609237] do_try_to_free_pages+0xbf/0x380
[ 1626.609240] try_to_free_pages+0xd9/0x1f0
[ 1626.609245] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x3a4/0xd30
[ 1626.609251] ? ___slab_alloc+0x238/0x560
[ 1626.609254] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x30c/0x350
[ 1626.609259] skb_page_frag_refill+0x97/0xd0
[ 1626.609274] sk_page_frag_refill+0x1d/0x80
[ 1626.609279] tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2bb/0xdd0
[ 1626.609304] tcp_sendmsg+0x27/0x40
[ 1626.609307] sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x60
[ 1626.609308] ___sys_sendmsg+0x29f/0x320
[ 1626.609313] ? sock_poll+0x66/0xb0
[ 1626.609318] ? ep_item_poll.isra.15+0x40/0xc0
[ 1626.609320] ? ep_send_events_proc+0xe6/0x230
[ 1626.609322] ? hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x54/0xf0
[ 1626.609324] ? ep_read_events_proc+0xc0/0xc0
[ 1626.609326] ? _raw_write_unlock_irq+0xa/0x20
[ 1626.609327] ? ep_scan_ready_list.constprop.19+0x218/0x230
[ 1626.609329] ? __hrtimer_init+0xb0/0xb0
[ 1626.609331] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xa/0x20
[ 1626.609334] ? ep_poll+0x26c/0x4a0
[ 1626.609337] ? tcp_tsq_write.part.54+0xa0/0xa0
[ 1626.609339] ? release_sock+0x43/0x90
[ 1626.609341] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0xa/0x20
[ 1626.609342] __sys_sendmsg+0x47/0x80
[ 1626.609347] do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x1c0
[ 1626.609349] ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x75/0xa0
[ 1626.609351] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
This patch adds a new prctl command that daemons can use after they have
done their initial setup, and before they start to do allocations that
are in the IO path. It sets the PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO and PF_LESS_THROTTLE
flags so both userspace block and FS threads can use it to avoid the
allocation recursion and try to prevent from being throttled while
writing out data to free up memory.
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Masato Suzuki <masato.suzuki@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112001900.9206-1-mchristi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
Initialization is not guaranteed to zero padding bytes so use an
explicit memset instead to avoid leaking any kernel content in any
possible padding bytes.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/dfa331c00881d61c8ee51577a082d8bebd61805c.camel@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
There are two 'struct timeval' fields in 'struct rusage'.
Unfortunately the definition of timeval is now ambiguous when used in
user space with a libc that has a 64-bit time_t, and this also changes
the 'rusage' definition in user space in a way that is incompatible with
the system call interface.
While there is no good solution to avoid all ambiguity here, change
the definition in the kernel headers to be compatible with the kernel
ABI, using __kernel_old_timeval as an unambiguous base type.
In previous discussions, there was also a plan to add a replacement
for rusage based on 64-bit timestamps and nanosecond resolution,
i.e. 'struct __kernel_timespec'. I have patches for that as well,
if anyone thinks we should do that.
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull core timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Timers and timekeeping updates:
- A large overhaul of the posix CPU timer code which is a preparation
for moving the CPU timer expiry out into task work so it can be
properly accounted on the task/process.
An update to the bogus permission checks will come later during the
merge window as feedback was not complete before heading of for
travel.
- Switch the timerqueue code to use cached rbtrees and get rid of the
homebrewn caching of the leftmost node.
- Consolidate hrtimer_init() + hrtimer_init_sleeper() calls into a
single function
- Implement the separation of hrtimers to be forced to expire in hard
interrupt context even when PREEMPT_RT is enabled and mark the
affected timers accordingly.
- Implement a mechanism for hrtimers and the timer wheel to protect
RT against priority inversion and live lock issues when a (hr)timer
which should be canceled is currently executing the callback.
Instead of infinitely spinning, the task which tries to cancel the
timer blocks on a per cpu base expiry lock which is held and
released by the (hr)timer expiry code.
- Enable the Hyper-V TSC page based sched_clock for Hyper-V guests
resulting in faster access to timekeeping functions.
- Updates to various clocksource/clockevent drivers and their device
tree bindings.
- The usual small improvements all over the place"
* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (101 commits)
posix-cpu-timers: Fix permission check regression
posix-cpu-timers: Always clear head pointer on dequeue
hrtimer: Add a missing bracket and hide `migration_base' on !SMP
posix-cpu-timers: Make expiry_active check actually work correctly
posix-timers: Unbreak CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS=n build
tick: Mark sched_timer to expire in hard interrupt context
hrtimer: Add kernel doc annotation for HRTIMER_MODE_HARD
x86/hyperv: Hide pv_ops access for CONFIG_PARAVIRT=n
posix-cpu-timers: Utilize timerqueue for storage
posix-cpu-timers: Move state tracking to struct posix_cputimers
posix-cpu-timers: Deduplicate rlimit handling
posix-cpu-timers: Remove pointless comparisons
posix-cpu-timers: Get rid of 64bit divisions
posix-cpu-timers: Consolidate timer expiry further
posix-cpu-timers: Get rid of zero checks
rlimit: Rewrite non-sensical RLIMIT_CPU comment
posix-cpu-timers: Respect INFINITY for hard RTTIME limit
posix-cpu-timers: Switch thread group sampling to array
posix-cpu-timers: Restructure expiry array
posix-cpu-timers: Remove cputime_expires
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cpu-feature updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Rework the Intel model names symbols/macros, which were decades of
ad-hoc extensions and added random noise. It's now a coherent, easy
to follow nomenclature.
- Add new Intel CPU model IDs:
- "Tiger Lake" desktop and mobile models
- "Elkhart Lake" model ID
- and the "Lightning Mountain" variant of Airmont, plus support code
- Add the new AVX512_VP2INTERSECT instruction to cpufeatures
- Remove Intel MPX user-visible APIs and the self-tests, because the
toolchain (gcc) is not supporting it going forward. This is the
first, lowest-risk phase of MPX removal.
- Remove X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC
- Various smaller cleanups and fixes
* 'x86-cpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (25 commits)
x86/cpu: Update init data for new Airmont CPU model
x86/cpu: Add new Airmont variant to Intel family
x86/cpu: Add Elkhart Lake to Intel family
x86/cpu: Add Tiger Lake to Intel family
x86: Correct misc typos
x86/intel: Add common OPTDIFFs
x86/intel: Aggregate microserver naming
x86/intel: Aggregate big core graphics naming
x86/intel: Aggregate big core mobile naming
x86/intel: Aggregate big core client naming
x86/cpufeature: Explain the macro duplication
x86/ftrace: Remove mcount() declaration
x86/PCI: Remove superfluous returns from void functions
x86/msr-index: Move AMD MSRs where they belong
x86/cpu: Use constant definitions for CPU models
lib: Remove redundant ftrace flag removal
x86/crash: Remove unnecessary comparison
x86/bitops: Use __builtin_constant_p() directly instead of IS_IMMEDIATE()
x86: Remove X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC
x86/mpx: Remove MPX APIs
...
|
|
Deactivation of the expiry cache is done by setting all clock caches to
0. That requires to have a check for zero in all places which update the
expiry cache:
if (cache == 0 || new < cache)
cache = new;
Use U64_MAX as the deactivated value, which allows to remove the zero
checks when updating the cache and reduces it to the obvious check:
if (new < cache)
cache = new;
This also removes the weird workaround in do_prlimit() which was required
to convert a RLIMIT_CPU value of 0 (immediate expiry) to 1 because handing
in 0 to the posix CPU timer code would have effectively disarmed it.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190821192922.275086128@linutronix.de
|
|
The comment above the function which arms RLIMIT_CPU in the posix CPU timer
code makes no sense at all. It claims that the kernel does not return an
error code when it rejected the attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. That's clearly
bogus as the code does an error check and the rlimit is only set and
activated when the permission checks are ok. In case of a rejection an
appropriate error code is returned.
This is a historical and outdated comment which got dragged along even when
the rlimit handling code was rewritten.
Replace it with an explanation why the setup function is not called when
the rlimit value is RLIM_INFINITY and how the 'disarming' is handled.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190821192922.185511287@linutronix.de
|
|
Require that arg{3,4,5} of the PR_{SET,GET}_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL prctl and
arg2 of the PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL prctl() are zero rather than ignored
for future extensions.
Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
|
|
It is not desirable to relax the ABI to allow tagged user addresses into
the kernel indiscriminately. This patch introduces a prctl() interface
for enabling or disabling the tagged ABI with a global sysctl control
for preventing applications from enabling the relaxed ABI (meant for
testing user-space prctl() return error checking without reconfiguring
the kernel). The ABI properties are inherited by threads of the same
application and fork()'ed children but cleared on execve(). A Kconfig
option allows the overall disabling of the relaxed ABI.
The PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL will be expanded in the future to handle
MTE-specific settings like imprecise vs precise exceptions.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
|
|
MPX is being removed from the kernel due to a lack of support in the
toolchain going forward (gcc).
The first step is to remove the userspace-visible ABIs so that applications
will stop using it. The most visible one are the enable/disable prctl()s.
Remove them first.
This is the most minimal and least invasive change needed to ensure that
apps stop using MPX with new kernels.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190705175321.DB42F0AD@viggo.jf.intel.com
|
|
The commit a3b609ef9f8b ("proc read mm's {arg,env}_{start,end} with mmap
semaphore taken.") added synchronization of reading argument/environment
boundaries under mmap_sem. Later commit 88aa7cc688d4 ("mm: introduce
arg_lock to protect arg_start|end and env_start|end in mm_struct") avoided
the coarse use of mmap_sem in similar situations. But there still
remained two places that (mis)use mmap_sem.
get_cmdline should also use arg_lock instead of mmap_sem when it reads the
boundaries.
The second place that should use arg_lock is in prctl_set_mm. By
protecting the boundaries fields with the arg_lock, we can downgrade
mmap_sem to reader lock (analogous to what we already do in
prctl_set_mm_map).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190502125203.24014-3-mkoutny@suse.com
Fixes: 88aa7cc688d4 ("mm: introduce arg_lock to protect arg_start|end and env_start|end in mm_struct")
Signed-off-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Co-developed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Despite comment of validate_prctl_map claims there are no capability
checks, it is not completely true since commit 4d28df6152aa ("prctl: Allow
local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file"). Extract the check out of the
function and make the function perform purely arithmetic checks.
This patch should not change any behavior, it is mere refactoring for
following patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190502125203.24014-2-mkoutny@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
While validating new map we require the @start_data to be strictly less
than @end_data, which is fine for regular applications (this is why this
nit didn't trigger for that long). These members are set from executable
loaders such as elf handers, still it is pretty valid to have a loadable
data section with zero size in file, in such case the start_data is equal
to end_data once kernel loader finishes.
As a result when we're trying to restore such programs the procedure fails
and the kernel returns -EINVAL. From the image dump of a program:
| "mm_start_code": "0x400000",
| "mm_end_code": "0x8f5fb4",
| "mm_start_data": "0xf1bfb0",
| "mm_end_data": "0xf1bfb0",
Thus we need to change validate_prctl_map from strictly less to less or
equal operator use.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190408143554.GY1421@uranus.lan
Fixes: f606b77f1a9e3 ("prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation")
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
- some of the rest of MM
- various misc things
- dynamic-debug updates
- checkpatch
- some epoll speedups
- autofs
- rapidio
- lib/, lib/lzo/ updates
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (83 commits)
samples/mic/mpssd/mpssd.h: remove duplicate header
kernel/fork.c: remove duplicated include
include/linux/relay.h: fix percpu annotation in struct rchan
arch/nios2/mm/fault.c: remove duplicate include
unicore32: stop printing the virtual memory layout
MAINTAINERS: fix GTA02 entry and mark as orphan
mm: create the new vm_fault_t type
arm, s390, unicore32: remove oneliner wrappers for memblock_alloc()
arch: simplify several early memory allocations
openrisc: simplify pte_alloc_one_kernel()
sh: prefer memblock APIs returning virtual address
microblaze: prefer memblock API returning virtual address
powerpc: prefer memblock APIs returning virtual address
lib/lzo: separate lzo-rle from lzo
lib/lzo: implement run-length encoding
lib/lzo: fast 8-byte copy on arm64
lib/lzo: 64-bit CTZ on arm64
lib/lzo: tidy-up ifdefs
ipc/sem.c: replace kvmalloc/memset with kvzalloc and use struct_size
ipc: annotate implicit fall through
...
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There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and this
place in the code produced a warning (W=1).
This commit remove the following warning:
kernel/sys.c:1748:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190114203347.17530-1-malat@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This change ensures that the set*uid family of syscalls in kernel/sys.c
(setreuid, setuid, setresuid, setfsuid) all call ns_capable_common with
the CAP_OPT_INSETID flag, so capability checks in the security_capable
hook can know whether they are being called from within a set*uid
syscall. This change is a no-op by itself, but is needed for the
proposed SafeSetID LSM.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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UNAME26 is a mechanism to report Linux's version as 2.6.x, for
compatibility with old/broken software. Due to the way it is
implemented, it would have to be updated after 5.0, to keep the
resulting versions unique. Linus Torvalds argued:
"Do we actually need this?
I'd rather let it bitrot, and just let it return random versions. It
will just start again at 2.4.60, won't it?
Anybody who uses UNAME26 for a 5.x kernel might as well think it's
still 4.x. The user space is so old that it can't possibly care about
differences between 4.x and 5.x, can it?
The only thing that matters is that it shows "2.4.<largeenough>",
which it will do regardless"
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Add an arm64-specific prctl to allow a thread to reinitialize its
pointer authentication keys to random values. This can be useful when
exec() is not used for starting new processes, to ensure that different
processes still have different keys.
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180821133424.18716-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace fixes from Eric Biederman:
"This is a set of four fairly obvious bug fixes:
- a switch from d_find_alias to d_find_any_alias because the xattr
code perversely takes a dentry
- two mutex vs copy_to_user fixes from Jann Horn
- a fix to use a sanitized size not the size userspace passed in from
Christian Brauner"
* 'userns-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
getxattr: use correct xattr length
sys: don't hold uts_sem while accessing userspace memory
userns: move user access out of the mutex
cap_inode_getsecurity: use d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias()
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Holding uts_sem as a writer while accessing userspace memory allows a
namespace admin to stall all processes that attempt to take uts_sem.
Instead, move data through stack buffers and don't access userspace memory
while uts_sem is held.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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get_monotonic_boottime() is deprecated because it uses the old 'timespec'
structure. This replaces one of the last callers with a call to
ktime_get_boottime.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: y2038@lists.linaro.org
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180618150114.849216-1-arnd@arndb.de
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mmap_sem is on the hot path of kernel, and it very contended, but it is
abused too. It is used to protect arg_start|end and evn_start|end when
reading /proc/$PID/cmdline and /proc/$PID/environ, but it doesn't make
sense since those proc files just expect to read 4 values atomically and
not related to VM, they could be set to arbitrary values by C/R.
And, the mmap_sem contention may cause unexpected issue like below:
INFO: task ps:14018 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Tainted: G E 4.9.79-009.ali3000.alios7.x86_64 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this
message.
ps D 0 14018 1 0x00000004
Call Trace:
schedule+0x36/0x80
rwsem_down_read_failed+0xf0/0x150
call_rwsem_down_read_failed+0x18/0x30
down_read+0x20/0x40
proc_pid_cmdline_read+0xd9/0x4e0
__vfs_read+0x37/0x150
vfs_read+0x96/0x130
SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xc5
Both Alexey Dobriyan and Michal Hocko suggested to use dedicated lock
for them to mitigate the abuse of mmap_sem.
So, introduce a new spinlock in mm_struct to protect the concurrent
access to arg_start|end, env_start|end and others, as well as replace
write map_sem to read to protect the race condition between prctl and
sys_brk which might break check_data_rlimit(), and makes prctl more
friendly to other VM operations.
This patch just eliminates the abuse of mmap_sem, but it can't resolve
the above hung task warning completely since the later
access_remote_vm() call needs acquire mmap_sem. The mmap_sem
scalability issue will be solved in the future.
[yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com: add comment about mmap_sem and arg_lock]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524077799-80690-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1523730291-109696-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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`resource' can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
kernel/sys.c:1474 __do_compat_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)
kernel/sys.c:1455 __do_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing *resource* before using it to index
current->signal->rlim
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to
kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180515030038.GA11822@embeddedor.com
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Adjust arch_prctl_get/set_spec_ctrl() to operate on tasks other than
current.
This is needed both for /proc/$pid/status queries and for seccomp (since
thread-syncing can trigger seccomp in non-current threads).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites
and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance
impacting mitigations.
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with
the following meaning:
Bit Define Description
0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
disabled
2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
enabled
If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is
available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
misfeature will fail.
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the
control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.
The common return values are:
EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl()
arguments are not 0
ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values:
ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE
ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled
The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is
PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between
architectures.
Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
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Using this helper allows us to avoid the in-kernel call to the
sys_setsid() syscall. The ksys_ prefix denotes that this function
is meant as a drop-in replacement for the syscall. In particular, it
uses the same calling convention as sys_setsid().
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
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Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
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