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Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation this program is
distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general
public license along with this program if not see http www gnu org
licenses
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 503 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190602204653.811534538@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms and conditions of the gnu general public license
version 2 as published by the free software foundation this program
is distributed in the hope it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general
public license along with this program if not write to the free
software foundation inc 51 franklin st fifth floor boston ma 02110
1301 usa
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 111 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530000436.567572064@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The "hmac(sha3-224-generic)" algorithm has a descsize of 368 bytes,
which is greater than HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE (360) which is only enough for
sha3-224-generic. The check in shash_prepare_alg() doesn't catch this
because the HMAC template doesn't set descsize on the algorithms, but
rather sets it on each individual HMAC transform.
This causes a stack buffer overflow when SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() is used
with hmac(sha3-224-generic).
Fix it by increasing HASH_MAX_DESCSIZE to the real maximum. Also add a
sanity check to hmac_init().
This was detected by the improved crypto self-tests in v5.2, by loading
the tcrypt module with CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS=y enabled. I
didn't notice this bug when I ran the self-tests by requesting the
algorithms via AF_ALG (i.e., not using tcrypt), probably because the
stack layout differs in the two cases and that made a difference here.
KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:359 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in shash_default_import+0x52/0x80 crypto/shash.c:223
Write of size 360 at addr ffff8880651defc8 by task insmod/3689
CPU: 2 PID: 3689 Comm: insmod Tainted: G E 5.1.0-10741-g35c99ffa20edd #11
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x86/0xc5 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x7f/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:188
__kasan_report+0x144/0x187 mm/kasan/report.c:317
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/generic.c:191
memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:125
memcpy include/linux/string.h:359 [inline]
shash_default_import+0x52/0x80 crypto/shash.c:223
crypto_shash_import include/crypto/hash.h:880 [inline]
hmac_import+0x184/0x240 crypto/hmac.c:102
hmac_init+0x96/0xc0 crypto/hmac.c:107
crypto_shash_init include/crypto/hash.h:902 [inline]
shash_digest_unaligned+0x9f/0xf0 crypto/shash.c:194
crypto_shash_digest+0xe9/0x1b0 crypto/shash.c:211
generate_random_hash_testvec.constprop.11+0x1ec/0x5b0 crypto/testmgr.c:1331
test_hash_vs_generic_impl+0x3f7/0x5c0 crypto/testmgr.c:1420
__alg_test_hash+0x26d/0x340 crypto/testmgr.c:1502
alg_test_hash+0x22e/0x330 crypto/testmgr.c:1552
alg_test.part.7+0x132/0x610 crypto/testmgr.c:4931
alg_test+0x1f/0x40 crypto/testmgr.c:4952
Fixes: b68a7ec1e9a3 ("crypto: hash - Remove VLA usage")
Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The flags field in 'struct shash_desc' never actually does anything.
The only ostensibly supported flag is CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
However, no shash algorithm ever sleeps, making this flag a no-op.
With this being the case, inevitably some users who can't sleep wrongly
pass MAY_SLEEP. These would all need to be fixed if any shash algorithm
actually started sleeping. For example, the shash_ahash_*() functions,
which wrap a shash algorithm with the ahash API, pass through MAY_SLEEP
from the ahash API to the shash API. However, the shash functions are
called under kmap_atomic(), so actually they're assumed to never sleep.
Even if it turns out that some users do need preemption points while
hashing large buffers, we could easily provide a helper function
crypto_shash_update_large() which divides the data into smaller chunks
and calls crypto_shash_update() and cond_resched() for each chunk. It's
not necessary to have a flag in 'struct shash_desc', nor is it necessary
to make individual shash algorithms aware of this at all.
Therefore, remove shash_desc::flags, and document that the
crypto_shash_*() functions can be called from any context.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Remove cryptd_alloc_ablkcipher() and the ability of cryptd to create
algorithms with the deprecated "ablkcipher" type.
This has been unused since commit 0e145b477dea ("crypto: ablk_helper -
remove ablk_helper"). Instead, cryptd_alloc_skcipher() is used.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Some public key algorithms (like EC-DSA) keep in parameters field
important data such as digest and curve OIDs (possibly more for
different EC-DSA variants). Thus, just setting a public key (as
for RSA) is not enough.
Append parameters into the key stream for akcipher_set_{pub,priv}_key.
Appended data is: (u32) algo OID, (u32) parameters length, parameters
data.
This does not affect current akcipher API nor RSA ciphers (they could
ignore it). Idea of appending parameters to the key stream is by Herbert
Xu.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.
Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds a requirement to the generic 3DES implementation
such that 2-key 3DES (K1 == K3) is no longer allowed in FIPS mode.
We will also provide helpers that may be used by drivers that
implement 3DES to make the same check.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Don't cast the data buffer directly to streebog_uint512, as this
violates alignment rules.
Fixes: fe18957e8e87 ("crypto: streebog - add Streebog hash function")
Cc: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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cacheline_aligned is a special section. It cannot be const at the same
time because it's not read-only. It doesn't give any MMU protection.
Mark it ____cacheline_aligned to not place it in a special section,
but just align it in .rodata
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au
Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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So that the no-SIMD fallback code can be tested by the crypto
self-tests, add a macro crypto_simd_usable() which wraps may_use_simd(),
but also returns false if the crypto self-tests have set a per-CPU bool
to disable SIMD in crypto code on the current CPU.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Convert the x86 implementations of MORUS-1280 to use the AEAD SIMD
helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This
simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided
aead_request is modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Convert the x86 implementation of MORUS-640 to use the AEAD SIMD
helpers, rather than hand-rolling the same functionality. This
simplifies the code and also fixes the bug where the user-provided
aead_request is modified.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Update the crypto_simd module to support wrapping AEAD algorithms.
Previously it only supported skciphers. The code for each is similar.
I'll be converting the x86 implementations of AES-GCM, AEGIS, and MORUS
to use this. Currently they each independently implement the same
functionality. This will not only simplify the code, but it will also
fix the bug detected by the improved self-tests: the user-provided
aead_request is modified. This is because these algorithms currently
reuse the original request, whereas the crypto_simd helpers build a new
request in the original request's context.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Some arc4 cipher algorithm defines show up in two places:
crypto/arc4.c and drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.h.
Let's export them in a common header and update their users.
Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY confuses newcomers to the crypto API because it
sounds like it is requesting a weak key. Actually, it is requesting
that weak keys be forbidden (for algorithms that have the notion of
"weak keys"; currently only DES and XTS do).
Also it is only one letter away from CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY, with which
it can be easily confused. (This in fact happened in the UX500 driver,
though just in some debugging messages.)
Therefore, make the intent clear by renaming it to
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch add a helper to (un)register a array of templates. The
following patches will use this helper to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <xiongfeng.wang@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Precise and non-ambiguous license information is important. The recently
added morus header files have a SPDX license identifier, which is nice, but
at the same time they have a contradictionary license boiler plate text.
SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
versus
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
* Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
* any later version
Oh well.
As the other morus related files are licensed under the GPL v2 or later,
it's assumed that the boiler plate code is correct, but the SPDX license
identifier is wrong.
Fix the SPDX identifier and remove the boiler plate as it is redundant.
Fixes: 56e8e57fc3a7 ("crypto: morus - Add common SIMD glue code for MORUS")
Fixes: 396be41f16fd ("crypto: morus - Add generic MORUS AEAD implementations")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Some exported functions in af_alg.c aren't used outside of that file.
Therefore, un-export them and make them 'static'.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Move the declaration of crypto_nlsk into internal/cryptouser.h. This
fixes the following sparse warning:
crypto/crypto_user_base.c:41:13: warning: symbol 'crypto_nlsk' was not declared. Should it be static?
Cc: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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streebog_uint512::qword needs to be __le64, not u64. This fixes a large
number of sparse warnings:
crypto/streebog_generic.c:25:9: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different base types)
crypto/streebog_generic.c:25:9: expected unsigned long long
crypto/streebog_generic.c:25:9: got restricted __le64 [usertype]
[omitted many similar warnings]
No actual change in behavior.
Cc: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that all "blkcipher" templates have been converted to "skcipher",
crypto_alloc_instance() is no longer used. And it's not useful any
longer as it creates an old-style weakly typed instance rather than a
new-style strongly typed instance. So remove it, and now that the name
is freed up rename crypto_alloc_instance2() to crypto_alloc_instance().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The majority of skcipher templates (including both the existing ones and
the ones remaining to be converted from the "blkcipher" API) just wrap a
single block cipher algorithm. This includes cbc, cfb, ctr, ecb, kw,
ofb, and pcbc. Add a helper function skcipher_alloc_instance_simple()
that handles allocating an skcipher instance for this common case.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Remove dead code related to internal IV generators, which are no longer
used since they've been replaced with the "seqiv" and "echainiv"
templates. The removed code includes:
- The "givcipher" (GIVCIPHER) algorithm type. No algorithms are
registered with this type anymore, so it's unneeded.
- The "const char *geniv" member of aead_alg, ablkcipher_alg, and
blkcipher_alg. A few algorithms still set this, but it isn't used
anymore except to show via /proc/crypto and CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG.
Just hardcode "<default>" or "<none>" in those cases.
- The 'skcipher_givcrypt_request' structure, which is never used.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch removes unused dump functions for crypto_user_stats.
There are remains of the copy/paste of crypto_user_base to
crypto_user_stat and I forgot to remove them.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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All crypto_stats functions use the struct xxx_request for feeding stats,
but in some case this structure could already be freed.
For fixing this, the needed parameters (len and alg) will be stored
before the request being executed.
Fixes: cac5818c25d0 ("crypto: user - Implement a generic crypto statistics")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+6939a606a5305e9e9799@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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All the 32-bit fields need to be 64-bit. In some cases, UINT32_MAX crypto
operations can be done in seconds.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Even if CRYPTO_STATS is set to n, some part of CRYPTO_STATS are
compiled.
This patch made all part of crypto_user_stat uncompiled in that case.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add a generic implementation of NHPoly1305, an ε-almost-∆-universal hash
function used in the Adiantum encryption mode.
CONFIG_NHPOLY1305 is not selectable by itself since there won't be any
real reason to enable it without also enabling Adiantum support.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Expose a low-level Poly1305 API which implements the
ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash function underlying the Poly1305 MAC
and supports block-aligned inputs only.
This is needed for Adiantum hashing, which builds an εA∆U hash function
from NH and a polynomial evaluation in GF(2^{130}-5); this polynomial
evaluation is identical to the one the Poly1305 MAC does. However, the
crypto_shash Poly1305 API isn't very appropriate for this because its
calling convention assumes it is used as a MAC, with a 32-byte "one-time
key" provided for every digest.
But by design, in Adiantum hashing the performance of the polynomial
evaluation isn't nearly as critical as NH. So it suffices to just have
some C helper functions. Thus, this patch adds such functions.
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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In preparation for exposing a low-level Poly1305 API which implements
the ε-almost-∆-universal (εA∆U) hash function underlying the Poly1305
MAC and supports block-aligned inputs only, create structures
poly1305_key and poly1305_state which hold the limbs of the Poly1305
"r" key and accumulator, respectively.
These structures could actually have the same type (e.g. poly1305_val),
but different types are preferable, to prevent misuse.
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that the generic implementation of ChaCha20 has been refactored to
allow varying the number of rounds, add support for XChaCha12, which is
the XSalsa construction applied to ChaCha12. ChaCha12 is one of the
three ciphers specified by the original ChaCha paper
(https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf: "ChaCha, a variant of
Salsa20"), alongside ChaCha8 and ChaCha20. ChaCha12 is faster than
ChaCha20 but has a lower, but still large, security margin.
We need XChaCha12 support so that it can be used in the Adiantum
encryption mode, which enables disk/file encryption on low-end mobile
devices where AES-XTS is too slow as the CPUs lack AES instructions.
We'd prefer XChaCha20 (the more popular variant), but it's too slow on
some of our target devices, so at least in some cases we do need the
XChaCha12-based version. In more detail, the problem is that Adiantum
is still much slower than we're happy with, and encryption still has a
quite noticeable effect on the feel of low-end devices. Users and
vendors push back hard against encryption that degrades the user
experience, which always risks encryption being disabled entirely. So
we need to choose the fastest option that gives us a solid margin of
security, and here that's XChaCha12. The best known attack on ChaCha
breaks only 7 rounds and has 2^235 time complexity, so ChaCha12's
security margin is still better than AES-256's. Much has been learned
about cryptanalysis of ARX ciphers since Salsa20 was originally designed
in 2005, and it now seems we can be comfortable with a smaller number of
rounds. The eSTREAM project also suggests the 12-round version of
Salsa20 as providing the best balance among the different variants:
combining very good performance with a "comfortable margin of security".
Note that it would be trivial to add vanilla ChaCha12 in addition to
XChaCha12. However, it's unneeded for now and therefore is omitted.
As discussed in the patch that introduced XChaCha20 support, I
considered splitting the code into separate chacha-common, chacha20,
xchacha20, and xchacha12 modules, so that these algorithms could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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In preparation for adding XChaCha12 support, rename/refactor
chacha20-generic to support different numbers of rounds. The
justification for needing XChaCha12 support is explained in more detail
in the patch "crypto: chacha - add XChaCha12 support".
The only difference between ChaCha{8,12,20} are the number of rounds
itself; all other parts of the algorithm are the same. Therefore,
remove the "20" from all definitions, structures, functions, files, etc.
that will be shared by all ChaCha versions.
Also make ->setkey() store the round count in the chacha_ctx (previously
chacha20_ctx). The generic code then passes the round count through to
chacha_block(). There will be a ->setkey() function for each explicitly
allowed round count; the encrypt/decrypt functions will be the same. I
decided not to do it the opposite way (same ->setkey() function for all
round counts, with different encrypt/decrypt functions) because that
would have required more boilerplate code in architecture-specific
implementations of ChaCha and XChaCha.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add support for the XChaCha20 stream cipher. XChaCha20 is the
application of the XSalsa20 construction
(https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf) to ChaCha20 rather than
to Salsa20. XChaCha20 extends ChaCha20's nonce length from 64 bits (or
96 bits, depending on convention) to 192 bits, while provably retaining
ChaCha20's security. XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 permutation to map the
key and first 128 nonce bits to a 256-bit subkey. Then, it does the
ChaCha20 stream cipher with the subkey and remaining 64 bits of nonce.
We need XChaCha support in order to add support for the Adiantum
encryption mode. Note that to meet our performance requirements, we
actually plan to primarily use the variant XChaCha12. But we believe
it's wise to first add XChaCha20 as a baseline with a higher security
margin, in case there are any situations where it can be used.
Supporting both variants is straightforward.
Since XChaCha20's subkey differs for each request, XChaCha20 can't be a
template that wraps ChaCha20; that would require re-keying the
underlying ChaCha20 for every request, which wouldn't be thread-safe.
Instead, we make XChaCha20 its own top-level algorithm which calls the
ChaCha20 streaming implementation internally.
Similar to the existing ChaCha20 implementation, we define the IV to be
the nonce and stream position concatenated together. This allows users
to seek to any position in the stream.
I considered splitting the code into separate chacha20-common, chacha20,
and xchacha20 modules, so that chacha20 and xchacha20 could be
enabled/disabled independently. However, since nearly all the code is
shared anyway, I ultimately decided there would have been little benefit
to the added complexity of separate modules.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Refactor the unkeyed permutation part of chacha20_block() into its own
function, then add hchacha20_block() which is the ChaCha equivalent of
HSalsa20 and is an intermediate step towards XChaCha20 (see
https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf). HChaCha20 skips the
final addition of the initial state, and outputs only certain words of
the state. It should not be used for streaming directly.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Move CHACHAPOLY_IV_SIZE to header file, so it can be reused.
Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Register Streebog hash function in Hash Info arrays to let IMA use
it for its purposes.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add GOST/IETF Streebog hash function (GOST R 34.11-2012, RFC 6986)
generic hash transformation.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The parsed BER/DER blob obtained from user space contains a TPM_Key
structure. This structure has some information about the key as well as
the public key portion.
This patch extracts this information for future use.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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This patch adds the basic skeleton for the asym_tpm asymmetric key
subtype.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Put a flag in the public_key struct to indicate if the structure is holding
a private key. The private key must be held ASN.1 encoded in the format
specified in RFC 3447 A.1.2. This is the form required by crypto/rsa.c.
The software encryption subtype's verification and query functions then
need to select the appropriate crypto function to set the key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Provide the missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops. This
include query, encrypt, decrypt and create signature. Verify signature
already exists. Also provided are accessor functions for this:
int query_asymmetric_key(const struct key *key,
struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
int encrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *data, void *enc);
int decrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *enc, void *data);
int create_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *data, void *enc);
The public_key_signature struct gains an encoding field to carry the
encoding for verify_signature().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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sparse complains thusly:
CHECK arch/x86/crypto/morus640-sse2-glue.c
arch/x86/crypto/morus640-sse2-glue.c:38:1: warning: symbol 'crypto_morus640_sse2_algs' was not declared. Should it be static?
CHECK arch/x86/crypto/morus1280-sse2-glue.c
arch/x86/crypto/morus1280-sse2-glue.c:38:1: warning: symbol 'crypto_morus1280_sse2_algs' was not declared. Should it be static?
CHECK arch/x86/crypto/morus1280-avx2-glue.c
arch/x86/crypto/morus1280-avx2-glue.c:38:1: warning: symbol 'crypto_morus1280_avx2_algs' was not declared. Should it be static?
and sparse is correct - these don't need to be global and polluting the namespace.
Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch implement a generic way to get statistics about all crypto
usages.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that all the users of the VLA-generating SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK()
macro have been moved to SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(), we can remove
the former.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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In preparation for removal of VLAs due to skcipher requests on the stack
via SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage, this introduces the infrastructure
for the "sync skcipher" tfm, which is for handling the on-stack cases of
skcipher, which are always non-ASYNC and have a known limited request
size.
The crypto API additions:
struct crypto_sync_skcipher (wrapper for struct crypto_skcipher)
crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher()
crypto_free_sync_skcipher()
crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey()
crypto_sync_skcipher_get_flags()
crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags()
crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags()
crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize()
crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize()
crypto_sync_skcipher_reqtfm()
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm()
SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() (with tfm type check)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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