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Follow the pattern used with other *_show_fdinfo functions and only
define and use io_uring_show_fdinfo and its helper functions if
CONFIG_PROC_FS is set.
Fixes: 87ce955b24c9 ("io_uring: add ->show_fdinfo() for the io_uring file descriptor")
Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Dan reports that he triggered a warning on ring exit doing some testing:
percpu ref (io_file_data_ref_zero) <= 0 (0) after switching to atomic
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at lib/percpu-refcount.c:160 percpu_ref_switch_to_atomic_rcu+0xe8/0xf0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3+ #5648
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:percpu_ref_switch_to_atomic_rcu+0xe8/0xf0
Code: e7 ff 55 e8 eb d2 80 3d bd 02 d2 00 00 75 8b 48 8b 55 d8 48 c7 c7 e8 70 e6 81 c6 05 a9 02 d2 00 01 48 8b 75 e8 e8 3a d0 c5 ff <0f> 0b e9 69 ff ff ff 90 55 48 89 fd 53 48 89 f3 48 83 ec 28 48 83
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000110ef8 EFLAGS: 00010292
RAX: 0000000000000045 RBX: 7fffffffffffffff RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000045 RSI: ffffffff825be7a5 RDI: ffffffff825bc32c
RBP: ffff8881b75eac38 R08: 000000042364b941 R09: 0000000000000045
R10: ffffffff825beb40 R11: ffffffff825be78a R12: 0000607e46005aa0
R13: ffff888107dcdd00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000009
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881b9d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f49e6a5ea20 CR3: 00000001b747c004 CR4: 00000000001606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
rcu_core+0x1e4/0x4d0
__do_softirq+0xdb/0x2f1
irq_exit+0xa0/0xb0
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x60/0x140
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
</IRQ>
RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x23/0x170
Code: ff eb ab cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 53 65 8b 2d 10 96 92 7e 0f 1f 44 00 00 e9 07 00 00 00 0f 00 2d 21 d0 51 00 fb f4 <65> 8b 2d f6 95 92 7e 0f 1f 44 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c c3 65 8b 05 e5 95
Turns out that this is due to percpu_ref_switch_to_atomic() only
grabbing a reference to the percpu refcount if it's not already in
atomic mode. io_uring drops a ref and re-gets it when switching back to
percpu mode. We attempt to protect against this with the FFD_F_ATOMIC
bit, but that isn't reliable.
We don't actually need to juggle these refcounts between atomic and
percpu switch, we can just do them when we've switched to atomic mode.
This removes the need for FFD_F_ATOMIC, which wasn't reliable.
Fixes: 05f3fb3c5397 ("io_uring: avoid ring quiesce for fixed file set unregister and update")
Reported-by: Dan Melnic <dmm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Unlike the other core import helpers, import_single_range() returns 0 on
success, not the length imported. This means that links that depend on
the result of non-vec based IORING_OP_{READ,WRITE} that were added for
5.5 get errored when they should not be.
Fixes: 3a6820f2bb8a ("io_uring: add non-vectored read/write commands")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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If work completes inline, then we should pick up a dependent link item
in __io_queue_sqe() as well. If we don't do so, we're forced to go async
with that item, which is suboptimal.
This also fixes an issue with io_put_req_find_next(), which always looks
up the next work item. That should only be done if we're dropping the
last reference to the request, to prevent multiple lookups of the same
work item.
Outside of being a fix, this also enables a good cleanup series for 5.7,
where we never have to pass 'nxt' around or into the work handlers.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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We use ->task_pid for exit cancellation, but we need to ensure it's
cleared to zero for io_req_work_grab_env() to do the right thing. Take
a suggestion from Bart and clear the whole thing, just setting the
function passed in. This makes it more future proof as well.
Fixes: 36282881a795 ("io-wq: add io_wq_cancel_pid() to cancel based on a specific pid")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Andres reports that buffered IO seems to suck up more cycles than we
would like, and he narrowed it down to the fact that the io-wq workers
will briefly spin for more work on completion of a work item. This was
a win on the networking side, but apparently some other cases take a
hit because of it. Remove the optimization to avoid burning more CPU
than we have to for disk IO.
Reported-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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After making ext4 support iopoll method:
let ext4_file_operations's iopoll method be iomap_dio_iopoll(),
we found fio can easily hang in fio_ioring_getevents() with below fio
job:
rm -f testfile; sync;
sudo fio -name=fiotest -filename=testfile -iodepth=128 -thread
-rw=write -ioengine=io_uring -hipri=1 -sqthread_poll=1 -direct=1
-bs=4k -size=10G -numjobs=8 -runtime=2000 -group_reporting
with IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL and IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL enabled.
There are two issues that results in this hang, one reason is that
when IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL and IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL are enabled, fio
does not use io_uring_enter to get completed events, it relies on
kernel io_sq_thread to poll for completed events.
Another reason is that there is a race: when io_submit_sqes() in
io_sq_thread() submits a batch of sqes, variable 'inflight' will
record the number of submitted reqs, then io_sq_thread will poll for
reqs which have been added to poll_list. But note, if some previous
reqs have been punted to io worker, these reqs will won't be in
poll_list timely. io_sq_thread() will only poll for a part of previous
submitted reqs, and then find poll_list is empty, reset variable
'inflight' to be zero. If app just waits these deferred reqs and does
not wake up io_sq_thread again, then hang happens.
For app that entirely relies on io_sq_thread to poll completed requests,
let io_iopoll_req_issued() wake up io_sq_thread properly when adding new
element to poll_list, and when io_sq_thread prepares to sleep, check
whether poll_list is empty again, if not empty, continue to poll.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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We somehow never free the idr, even though we init it for every ctx.
Free it when the rest of the ring data is freed.
Fixes: 071698e13ac6 ("io_uring: allow registering credentials")
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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If we have a chain of requests and they don't all use the same
credentials, then the head of the chain will be issued with the
credentails of the tail of the chain.
Ensure __io_queue_sqe() overrides the credentials, if they are different.
Once we do that, we can clean up the creds handling as well, by only
having io_submit_sqe() do the lookup of a personality. It doesn't need
to assign it, since __io_queue_sqe() now always does the right thing.
Fixes: 75c6a03904e0 ("io_uring: support using a registered personality for commands")
Reported-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
"These are fixes that were found during testing with help of error
injection, plus some other stable material.
There's a fixup to patch added to rc1 causing locking in wrong context
warnings, tests found one more deadlock scenario. The patches are
tagged for stable, two of them now in the queue but we'd like all
three released at the same time.
I'm not happy about fixes to fixes in such a fast succession during
rcs, but I hope we found all the fallouts of commit 28553fa992cb
('Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap')"
* tag 'for-5.6-rc2-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
Btrfs: fix deadlock during fast fsync when logging prealloc extents beyond eof
Btrfs: fix btrfs_wait_ordered_range() so that it waits for all ordered extents
btrfs: fix bytes_may_use underflow in prealloc error condtition
btrfs: handle logged extent failure properly
btrfs: do not check delayed items are empty for single transaction cleanup
btrfs: reset fs_root to NULL on error in open_ctree
btrfs: destroy qgroup extent records on transaction abort
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4
Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"More miscellaneous ext4 bug fixes (all stable fodder)"
* tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
ext4: fix mount failure with quota configured as module
jbd2: fix ocfs2 corrupt when clearing block group bits
ext4: fix race between writepages and enabling EXT4_EXTENTS_FL
ext4: rename s_journal_flag_rwsem to s_writepages_rwsem
ext4: fix potential race between s_flex_groups online resizing and access
ext4: fix potential race between s_group_info online resizing and access
ext4: fix potential race between online resizing and write operations
ext4: add cond_resched() to __ext4_find_entry()
ext4: fix a data race in EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize
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Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
"Here's a small collection of fixes that were queued up:
- Remove unnecessary NULL check (Dan)
- Missing io_req_cancelled() call in fallocate (Pavel)
- Put the cleanup check for aux data in the right spot (Pavel)
- Two fixes for SQPOLL (Stefano, Xiaoguang)"
* tag 'io_uring-5.6-2020-02-22' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: fix __io_iopoll_check deadlock in io_sq_thread
io_uring: prevent sq_thread from spinning when it should stop
io_uring: fix use-after-free by io_cleanup_req()
io_uring: remove unnecessary NULL checks
io_uring: add missing io_req_cancelled()
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Since commit a3a0e43fd770 ("io_uring: don't enter poll loop if we have
CQEs pending"), if we already events pending, we won't enter poll loop.
In case SETUP_IOPOLL and SETUP_SQPOLL are both enabled, if app has
been terminated and don't reap pending events which are already in cq
ring, and there are some reqs in poll_list, io_sq_thread will enter
__io_iopoll_check(), and find pending events, then return, this loop
will never have a chance to exit.
I have seen this issue in fio stress tests, to fix this issue, let
io_sq_thread call io_iopoll_getevents() with argument 'min' being zero,
and remove __io_iopoll_check().
Fixes: a3a0e43fd770 ("io_uring: don't enter poll loop if we have CQEs pending")
Signed-off-by: Xiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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When CONFIG_QFMT_V2 is configured as a module, the test in
ext4_feature_set_ok() fails and so mount of filesystems with quota or
project features fails. Fix the test to use IS_ENABLED macro which
works properly even for modules.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221100835.9332-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: d65d87a07476 ("ext4: improve explanation of a mount failure caused by a misconfigured kernel")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
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I found a NULL pointer dereference in ocfs2_block_group_clear_bits().
The running environment:
kernel version: 4.19
A cluster with two nodes, 5 luns mounted on two nodes, and do some
file operations like dd/fallocate/truncate/rm on every lun with storage
network disconnection.
The fallocate operation on dm-23-45 caused an null pointer dereference.
The information of NULL pointer dereference as follows:
[577992.878282] JBD2: Error -5 detected when updating journal superblock for dm-23-45.
[577992.878290] Aborting journal on device dm-23-45.
...
[577992.890778] JBD2: Error -5 detected when updating journal superblock for dm-24-46.
[577992.890908] __journal_remove_journal_head: freeing b_committed_data
[577992.890916] (fallocate,88392,52):ocfs2_extend_trans:474 ERROR: status = -30
[577992.890918] __journal_remove_journal_head: freeing b_committed_data
[577992.890920] (fallocate,88392,52):ocfs2_rotate_tree_right:2500 ERROR: status = -30
[577992.890922] __journal_remove_journal_head: freeing b_committed_data
[577992.890924] (fallocate,88392,52):ocfs2_do_insert_extent:4382 ERROR: status = -30
[577992.890928] (fallocate,88392,52):ocfs2_insert_extent:4842 ERROR: status = -30
[577992.890928] __journal_remove_journal_head: freeing b_committed_data
[577992.890930] (fallocate,88392,52):ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree:4947 ERROR: status = -30
[577992.890933] __journal_remove_journal_head: freeing b_committed_data
[577992.890939] __journal_remove_journal_head: freeing b_committed_data
[577992.890949] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020
[577992.890950] Mem abort info:
[577992.890951] ESR = 0x96000004
[577992.890952] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[577992.890952] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[577992.890953] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[577992.890954] Data abort info:
[577992.890955] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[577992.890956] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[577992.890958] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000f8da07a9
[577992.890960] [0000000000000020] pgd=0000000000000000
[577992.890964] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[577992.890965] Process fallocate (pid: 88392, stack limit = 0x00000000013db2fd)
[577992.890968] CPU: 52 PID: 88392 Comm: fallocate Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W OE 4.19.36 #1
[577992.890969] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDD, BIOS 0.98 08/25/2019
[577992.890971] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO)
[577992.891054] pc : _ocfs2_free_suballoc_bits+0x63c/0x968 [ocfs2]
[577992.891082] lr : _ocfs2_free_suballoc_bits+0x618/0x968 [ocfs2]
[577992.891084] sp : ffff0000c8e2b810
[577992.891085] x29: ffff0000c8e2b820 x28: 0000000000000000
[577992.891087] x27: 00000000000006f3 x26: ffffa07957b02e70
[577992.891089] x25: ffff807c59d50000 x24: 00000000000006f2
[577992.891091] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: ffff807bd39abc30
[577992.891093] x21: ffff0000811d9000 x20: ffffa07535d6a000
[577992.891097] x19: ffff000001681638 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[577992.891098] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff000080a03df0
[577992.891100] x15: ffff0000811d9708 x14: 203d207375746174
[577992.891101] x13: 73203a524f525245 x12: 20373439343a6565
[577992.891103] x11: 0000000000000038 x10: 0101010101010101
[577992.891106] x9 : ffffa07c68a85d70 x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f
[577992.891109] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000080
[577992.891110] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000002
[577992.891112] x3 : ffff000001713390 x2 : 2ff90f88b1c22f00
[577992.891114] x1 : ffff807bd39abc30 x0 : 0000000000000000
[577992.891116] Call trace:
[577992.891139] _ocfs2_free_suballoc_bits+0x63c/0x968 [ocfs2]
[577992.891162] _ocfs2_free_clusters+0x100/0x290 [ocfs2]
[577992.891185] ocfs2_free_clusters+0x50/0x68 [ocfs2]
[577992.891206] ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree+0x198/0x5e0 [ocfs2]
[577992.891227] ocfs2_add_inode_data+0x94/0xc8 [ocfs2]
[577992.891248] ocfs2_extend_allocation+0x1bc/0x7a8 [ocfs2]
[577992.891269] ocfs2_allocate_extents+0x14c/0x338 [ocfs2]
[577992.891290] __ocfs2_change_file_space+0x3f8/0x610 [ocfs2]
[577992.891309] ocfs2_fallocate+0xe4/0x128 [ocfs2]
[577992.891316] vfs_fallocate+0x11c/0x250
[577992.891317] ksys_fallocate+0x54/0x88
[577992.891319] __arm64_sys_fallocate+0x28/0x38
[577992.891323] el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130
[577992.891325] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
[577992.891327] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
My analysis process as follows:
ocfs2_fallocate
__ocfs2_change_file_space
ocfs2_allocate_extents
ocfs2_extend_allocation
ocfs2_add_inode_data
ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree
ocfs2_insert_extent
ocfs2_do_insert_extent
ocfs2_rotate_tree_right
ocfs2_extend_rotate_transaction
ocfs2_extend_trans
jbd2_journal_restart
jbd2__journal_restart
/* handle->h_transaction is NULL,
* is_handle_aborted(handle) is true
*/
handle->h_transaction = NULL;
start_this_handle
return -EROFS;
ocfs2_free_clusters
_ocfs2_free_clusters
_ocfs2_free_suballoc_bits
ocfs2_block_group_clear_bits
ocfs2_journal_access_gd
__ocfs2_journal_access
jbd2_journal_get_undo_access
/* I think jbd2_write_access_granted() will
* return true, because do_get_write_access()
* will return -EROFS.
*/
if (jbd2_write_access_granted(...)) return 0;
do_get_write_access
/* handle->h_transaction is NULL, it will
* return -EROFS here, so do_get_write_access()
* was not called.
*/
if (is_handle_aborted(handle)) return -EROFS;
/* bh2jh(group_bh) is NULL, caused NULL
pointer dereference */
undo_bg = (struct ocfs2_group_desc *)
bh2jh(group_bh)->b_committed_data;
If handle->h_transaction == NULL, then jbd2_write_access_granted()
does not really guarantee that journal_head will stay around,
not even speaking of its b_committed_data. The bh2jh(group_bh)
can be removed after ocfs2_journal_access_gd() and before call
"bh2jh(group_bh)->b_committed_data". So, we should move
is_handle_aborted() check from do_get_write_access() into
jbd2_journal_get_undo_access() and jbd2_journal_get_write_access()
before the call to jbd2_write_access_granted().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f72a623f-b3f1-381a-d91d-d22a1c83a336@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yan Wang <wangyan122@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
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If EXT4_EXTENTS_FL is set on an inode while ext4_writepages() is running
on it, the following warning in ext4_add_complete_io() can be hit:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at fs/ext4/page-io.c:234 ext4_put_io_end_defer+0xf0/0x120
Here's a minimal reproducer (not 100% reliable) (root isn't required):
while true; do
sync
done &
while true; do
rm -f file
touch file
chattr -e file
echo X >> file
chattr +e file
done
The problem is that in ext4_writepages(), ext4_should_dioread_nolock()
(which only returns true on extent-based files) is checked once to set
the number of reserved journal credits, and also again later to select
the flags for ext4_map_blocks() and copy the reserved journal handle to
ext4_io_end::handle. But if EXT4_EXTENTS_FL is being concurrently set,
the first check can see dioread_nolock disabled while the later one can
see it enabled, causing the reserved handle to unexpectedly be NULL.
Since changing EXT4_EXTENTS_FL is uncommon, and there may be other races
related to doing so as well, fix this by synchronizing changing
EXT4_EXTENTS_FL with ext4_writepages() via the existing
s_writepages_rwsem (previously called s_journal_flag_rwsem).
This was originally reported by syzbot without a reproducer at
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2202a584a00fffd19fbf,
but now that dioread_nolock is the default I also started seeing this
when running syzkaller locally.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200219183047.47417-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+2202a584a00fffd19fbf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 6b523df4fb5a ("ext4: use transaction reservation for extent conversion in ext4_end_io")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
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In preparation for making s_journal_flag_rwsem synchronize
ext4_writepages() with changes to both the EXTENTS and JOURNAL_DATA
flags (rather than just JOURNAL_DATA as it does currently), rename it to
s_writepages_rwsem.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200219183047.47417-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
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During an online resize an array of s_flex_groups structures gets replaced
so it can get enlarged. If there is a concurrent access to the array and
this memory has been reused then this can lead to an invalid memory access.
The s_flex_group array has been converted into an array of pointers rather
than an array of structures. This is to ensure that the information
contained in the structures cannot get out of sync during a resize due to
an accessor updating the value in the old structure after it has been
copied but before the array pointer is updated. Since the structures them-
selves are no longer copied but only the pointers to them this case is
mitigated.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206443
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221053458.730016-4-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
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This patch drops 'cur_mm' before calling cond_resched(), to prevent
the sq_thread from spinning even when the user process is finished.
Before this patch, if the user process ended without closing the
io_uring fd, the sq_thread continues to spin until the
'sq_thread_idle' timeout ends.
In the worst case where the 'sq_thread_idle' parameter is bigger than
INT_MAX, the sq_thread will spin forever.
Fixes: 6c271ce2f1d5 ("io_uring: add submission polling")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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While logging the prealloc extents of an inode during a fast fsync we call
btrfs_truncate_inode_items(), through btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(), while
holding a read lock on a leaf of the inode's root (not the log root, the
fs/subvol root), and then that function locks the file range in the inode's
iotree. This can lead to a deadlock when:
* the fsync is ranged
* the file has prealloc extents beyond eof
* writeback for a range different from the fsync range starts
during the fsync
* the size of the file is not sector size aligned
Because when finishing an ordered extent we lock first a file range and
then try to COW the fs/subvol tree to insert an extent item.
The following diagram shows how the deadlock can happen.
CPU 1 CPU 2
btrfs_sync_file()
--> for range [0, 1MiB)
--> inode has a size of
1MiB and has 1 prealloc
extent beyond the
i_size, starting at offset
4MiB
flushes all delalloc for the
range [0MiB, 1MiB) and waits
for the respective ordered
extents to complete
--> before task at CPU 1 locks the
inode, a write into file range
[1MiB, 2MiB + 1KiB) is made
--> i_size is updated to 2MiB + 1KiB
--> writeback is started for that
range, [1MiB, 2MiB + 4KiB)
--> end offset rounded up to
be sector size aligned
btrfs_log_dentry_safe()
btrfs_log_inode_parent()
btrfs_log_inode()
btrfs_log_changed_extents()
btrfs_log_prealloc_extents()
--> does a search on the
inode's root
--> holds a read lock on
leaf X
btrfs_finish_ordered_io()
--> locks range [1MiB, 2MiB + 4KiB)
--> end offset rounded up
to be sector size aligned
--> tries to cow leaf X, through
insert_reserved_file_extent()
--> already locked by the
task at CPU 1
btrfs_truncate_inode_items()
--> gets an i_size of
2MiB + 1KiB, which is
not sector size
aligned
--> tries to lock file
range [2MiB, (u64)-1)
--> the start range
is rounded down
from 2MiB + 1K
to 2MiB to be sector
size aligned
--> but the subrange
[2MiB, 2MiB + 4KiB) is
already locked by
task at CPU 2 which
is waiting to get a
write lock on leaf X
for which we are
holding a read lock
*** deadlock ***
This results in a stack trace like the following, triggered by test case
generic/561 from fstests:
[ 2779.973608] INFO: task kworker/u8:6:247 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[ 2779.979536] Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-btrfs-next-53 #1
[ 2779.984503] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 2779.990136] kworker/u8:6 D 0 247 2 0x80004000
[ 2779.990457] Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
[ 2779.990466] Call Trace:
[ 2779.990491] ? __schedule+0x384/0xa30
[ 2779.990521] schedule+0x33/0xe0
[ 2779.990616] btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x19e/0x2e0 [btrfs]
[ 2779.990632] ? remove_wait_queue+0x60/0x60
[ 2779.990730] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x2f/0x40 [btrfs]
[ 2779.990782] btrfs_search_slot+0x510/0x1000 [btrfs]
[ 2779.990869] btrfs_lookup_file_extent+0x4a/0x70 [btrfs]
[ 2779.990944] __btrfs_drop_extents+0x161/0x1060 [btrfs]
[ 2779.990987] ? mark_held_locks+0x6d/0xc0
[ 2779.990994] ? __slab_alloc.isra.49+0x99/0x100
[ 2779.991060] ? insert_reserved_file_extent.constprop.19+0x64/0x300 [btrfs]
[ 2779.991145] insert_reserved_file_extent.constprop.19+0x97/0x300 [btrfs]
[ 2779.991222] ? start_transaction+0xdd/0x5c0 [btrfs]
[ 2779.991291] btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x4f4/0x840 [btrfs]
[ 2779.991405] btrfs_work_helper+0xaa/0x720 [btrfs]
[ 2779.991432] process_one_work+0x26d/0x6a0
[ 2779.991460] worker_thread+0x4f/0x3e0
[ 2779.991481] ? process_one_work+0x6a0/0x6a0
[ 2779.991489] kthread+0x103/0x140
[ 2779.991499] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
[ 2779.991515] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
(...)
[ 2780.026211] INFO: task fsstress:17375 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[ 2780.027480] Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-btrfs-next-53 #1
[ 2780.028482] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 2780.030035] fsstress D 0 17375 17373 0x00004000
[ 2780.030038] Call Trace:
[ 2780.030044] ? __schedule+0x384/0xa30
[ 2780.030052] schedule+0x33/0xe0
[ 2780.030075] lock_extent_bits+0x20c/0x320 [btrfs]
[ 2780.030094] ? btrfs_truncate_inode_items+0xf4/0x1150 [btrfs]
[ 2780.030098] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x59/0xa0
[ 2780.030102] ? remove_wait_queue+0x60/0x60
[ 2780.030122] btrfs_truncate_inode_items+0x133/0x1150 [btrfs]
[ 2780.030151] ? btrfs_set_path_blocking+0xb2/0x160 [btrfs]
[ 2780.030165] ? btrfs_search_slot+0x379/0x1000 [btrfs]
[ 2780.030195] btrfs_log_changed_extents.isra.8+0x841/0x93e [btrfs]
[ 2780.030202] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x49/0xc0
[ 2780.030215] ? btrfs_get_num_csums+0x10/0x10 [btrfs]
[ 2780.030239] btrfs_log_inode+0xf83/0x1124 [btrfs]
[ 2780.030251] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x45/0x2a0
[ 2780.030275] btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x2a0/0xe40 [btrfs]
[ 2780.030282] ? dget_parent+0xa1/0x370
[ 2780.030309] btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x4a/0x70 [btrfs]
[ 2780.030329] btrfs_sync_file+0x3f3/0x490 [btrfs]
[ 2780.030339] do_fsync+0x38/0x60
[ 2780.030343] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x13/0x20
[ 2780.030345] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x280
[ 2780.030348] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 2780.030356] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d80f6d5f0
[ 2780.030361] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 2780.030362] RSP: 002b:00007ffdba3c8548 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[ 2780.030364] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f2d80f6d5f0
[ 2780.030365] RDX: 00007ffdba3c84b0 RSI: 00007ffdba3c84b0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 2780.030367] RBP: 000000000000004a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffdba3c855c
[ 2780.030368] R10: 0000000000000078 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000001f4
[ 2780.030369] R13: 0000000051eb851f R14: 00007ffdba3c85f0 R15: 0000557a49220d90
So fix this by making btrfs_truncate_inode_items() not lock the range in
the inode's iotree when the target root is a log root, since it's not
needed to lock the range for log roots as the protection from the inode's
lock and log_mutex are all that's needed.
Fixes: 28553fa992cb28 ("Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
During an online resize an array of pointers to s_group_info gets replaced
so it can get enlarged. If there is a concurrent access to the array in
ext4_get_group_info() and this memory has been reused then this can lead to
an invalid memory access.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206443
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221053458.730016-3-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Balbir Singh <sblbir@amazon.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
|
|
During an online resize an array of pointers to buffer heads gets
replaced so it can get enlarged. If there is a racing block
allocation or deallocation which uses the old array, and the old array
has gotten reused this can lead to a GPF or some other random kernel
memory getting modified.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206443
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221053458.730016-2-tytso@mit.edu
Reported-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
|
|
We tested a soft lockup problem in linux 4.19 which could also
be found in linux 5.x.
When dir inode takes up a large number of blocks, and if the
directory is growing when we are searching, it's possible the
restart branch could be called many times, and the do while loop
could hold cpu a long time.
Here is the call trace in linux 4.19.
[ 473.756186] Call trace:
[ 473.756196] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x198
[ 473.756199] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 473.756205] dump_stack+0xa4/0xcc
[ 473.756210] watchdog_timer_fn+0x300/0x3e8
[ 473.756215] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x114/0x358
[ 473.756217] hrtimer_interrupt+0x104/0x2d8
[ 473.756222] arch_timer_handler_virt+0x38/0x58
[ 473.756226] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x90/0x248
[ 473.756231] generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x50
[ 473.756234] __handle_domain_irq+0x68/0xc0
[ 473.756236] gic_handle_irq+0x6c/0x150
[ 473.756238] el1_irq+0xb8/0x140
[ 473.756286] ext4_es_lookup_extent+0xdc/0x258 [ext4]
[ 473.756310] ext4_map_blocks+0x64/0x5c0 [ext4]
[ 473.756333] ext4_getblk+0x6c/0x1d0 [ext4]
[ 473.756356] ext4_bread_batch+0x7c/0x1f8 [ext4]
[ 473.756379] ext4_find_entry+0x124/0x3f8 [ext4]
[ 473.756402] ext4_lookup+0x8c/0x258 [ext4]
[ 473.756407] __lookup_hash+0x8c/0xe8
[ 473.756411] filename_create+0xa0/0x170
[ 473.756413] do_mkdirat+0x6c/0x140
[ 473.756415] __arm64_sys_mkdirat+0x28/0x38
[ 473.756419] el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130
[ 473.756421] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
[ 473.756423] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 485.755156] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 22s! [tmp:5149]
Add cond_resched() to avoid soft lockup and to provide a better
system responding.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200215080206.13293-1-luoshijie1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Shijie Luo <luoshijie1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
|
|
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize could be accessed concurrently as noticed by
KCSAN,
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ext4_write_end [ext4] / ext4_writepages [ext4]
write to 0xffff91c6713b00f8 of 8 bytes by task 49268 on cpu 127:
ext4_write_end+0x4e3/0x750 [ext4]
ext4_update_i_disksize at fs/ext4/ext4.h:3032
(inlined by) ext4_update_inode_size at fs/ext4/ext4.h:3046
(inlined by) ext4_write_end at fs/ext4/inode.c:1287
generic_perform_write+0x208/0x2a0
ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x11f/0x210 [ext4]
ext4_file_write_iter+0xce/0x9e0 [ext4]
new_sync_write+0x29c/0x3b0
__vfs_write+0x92/0xa0
vfs_write+0x103/0x260
ksys_write+0x9d/0x130
__x64_sys_write+0x4c/0x60
do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
read to 0xffff91c6713b00f8 of 8 bytes by task 24872 on cpu 37:
ext4_writepages+0x10ac/0x1d00 [ext4]
mpage_map_and_submit_extent at fs/ext4/inode.c:2468
(inlined by) ext4_writepages at fs/ext4/inode.c:2772
do_writepages+0x5e/0x130
__writeback_single_inode+0xeb/0xb20
writeback_sb_inodes+0x429/0x900
__writeback_inodes_wb+0xc4/0x150
wb_writeback+0x4bd/0x870
wb_workfn+0x6b4/0x960
process_one_work+0x54c/0xbe0
worker_thread+0x80/0x650
kthread+0x1e0/0x200
ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 37 PID: 24872 Comm: kworker/u261:2 Tainted: G W O L 5.5.0-next-20200204+ #5
Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 07/10/2019
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0)
Since only the read is operating as lockless (outside of the
"i_data_sem"), load tearing could introduce a logic bug. Fix it by
adding READ_ONCE() for the read and WRITE_ONCE() for the write.
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1581085751-31793-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
|
|
io_cleanup_req() should be called before req->io is freed, and so
shouldn't be after __io_free_req() -> __io_req_aux_free(). Also,
it will be ignored for in io_free_req_many(), which use
__io_req_aux_free().
Place cleanup_req() into __io_req_aux_free().
Fixes: 99bc4c38537d774 ("io_uring: fix iovec leaks")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
In btrfs_wait_ordered_range() once we find an ordered extent that has
finished with an error we exit the loop and don't wait for any other
ordered extents that might be still in progress.
All the users of btrfs_wait_ordered_range() expect that there are no more
ordered extents in progress after that function returns. So past fixes
such like the ones from the two following commits:
ff612ba7849964 ("btrfs: fix panic during relocation after ENOSPC before
writeback happens")
28aeeac1dd3080 ("Btrfs: fix panic when starting bg cache writeout after
IO error")
don't work when there are multiple ordered extents in the range.
Fix that by making btrfs_wait_ordered_range() wait for all ordered extents
even after it finds one that had an error.
Link: https://github.com/kdave/btrfs-progs/issues/228#issuecomment-569777554
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
I hit the following warning while running my error injection stress
testing:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1453 at fs/btrfs/space-info.h:108 btrfs_free_reserved_data_space_noquota+0xfd/0x160 [btrfs]
RIP: 0010:btrfs_free_reserved_data_space_noquota+0xfd/0x160 [btrfs]
Call Trace:
btrfs_free_reserved_data_space+0x4f/0x70 [btrfs]
__btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x378/0x470 [btrfs]
elfcorehdr_read+0x40/0x40
? elfcorehdr_read+0x40/0x40
? btrfs_commit_transaction+0xca/0xa50 [btrfs]
? dput+0xb4/0x2a0
? btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x55/0x70 [btrfs]
? btrfs_sync_file+0x30e/0x420 [btrfs]
? do_fsync+0x38/0x70
? __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x13/0x20
? do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0
? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
This happens if we fail to insert our reserved file extent. At this
point we've already converted our reservation from ->bytes_may_use to
->bytes_reserved. However once we break we will attempt to free
everything from [cur_offset, end] from ->bytes_may_use, but our extent
reservation will overlap part of this.
Fix this problem by adding ins.offset (our extent allocation size) to
cur_offset so we remove the actual remaining part from ->bytes_may_use.
I validated this fix using my inject-error.py script
python inject-error.py -o should_fail_bio -t cache_save_setup -t \
__btrfs_prealloc_file_range \
-t insert_reserved_file_extent.constprop.0 \
-r "-5" ./run-fsstress.sh
where run-fsstress.sh simply mounts and runs fsstress on a disk.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
If we're allocating a logged extent we attempt to insert an extent
record for the file extent directly. We increase
space_info->bytes_reserved, because the extent entry addition will call
btrfs_update_block_group(), which will convert the ->bytes_reserved to
->bytes_used. However if we fail at any point while inserting the
extent entry we will bail and leave space on ->bytes_reserved, which
will trigger a WARN_ON() on umount. Fix this by pinning the space if we
fail to insert, which is what happens in every other failure case that
involves adding the extent entry.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
btrfs_assert_delayed_root_empty() will check if the delayed root is
completely empty, but this is a filesystem-wide check. On cleanup we
may have allowed other transactions to begin, for whatever reason, and
thus the delayed root is not empty.
So remove this check from cleanup_one_transation(). This however can
stay in btrfs_cleanup_transaction(), because it checks only after all of
the transactions have been properly cleaned up, and thus is valid.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
While running my error injection script I hit a panic when we tried to
clean up the fs_root when freeing the fs_root. This is because
fs_info->fs_root == PTR_ERR(-EIO), which isn't great. Fix this by
setting fs_info->fs_root = NULL; if we fail to read the root.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
We clean up the delayed references when we abort a transaction but we
leave the pending qgroup extent records behind, leaking memory.
This patch destroys the extent records when we destroy the delayed refs
and makes sure ensure they're gone before releasing the transaction.
Fixes: 3368d001ba5d ("btrfs: qgroup: Record possible quota-related extent for qgroup.")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
[ Rebased to latest upstream, remove to_qgroup() helper, use
rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe() wrapper ]
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
Andrei Vagin reported that commit 0ddad21d3e99 ("pipe: use exclusive
waits when reading or writing") broke one of the CRIU tests. He even
has a trivial reproducer:
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
int main()
{
int p[2];
pid_t p1, p2;
int status;
if (pipe(p) == -1)
return 1;
p1 = fork();
if (p1 == 0) {
close(p[1]);
read(p[0], &status, sizeof(status));
return 0;
}
p2 = fork();
if (p2 == 0) {
close(p[1]);
read(p[0], &status, sizeof(status));
return 0;
}
sleep(1);
close(p[1]);
wait(&status);
wait(&status);
return 0;
}
and the problem - once he points it out - is obvious. We use these nice
exclusive waits, but when the last writer goes away, it then needs to
wake up _every_ reader (and conversely, the last reader disappearing
needs to wake every writer, of course).
In fact, when going through this, we had several small oddities around
how to wake things. We did in fact wake every reader when we changed
the size of the pipe buffers. But that's entirely pointless, since that
just acts as a possible source of new space - no new data to read.
And when we change the size of the buffer, we don't need to wake all
writers even when we add space - that case acts just as if somebody made
space by reading, and any writer that finds itself not filling it up
entirely will wake the next one.
On the other hand, on the exit path, we tried to limit the wakeups with
the proper poll keys etc, which is entirely pointless, because at that
point we obviously need to wake up everybody. So don't do that: just
wake up everybody - but only do that if the counts changed to zero.
So fix those non-IO wakeups to be more proper: space change doesn't add
any new data, but it might make room for writers, so it wakes up a
writer. And the actual changes to reader/writer counts should wake up
everybody, since everybody is affected (ie readers will all see EOF if
the writers have gone away, and writers will all get EPIPE if all
readers have gone away).
Fixes: 0ddad21d3e99 ("pipe: use exclusive waits when reading or writing")
Reported-and-tested-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The "kmsg" pointer can't be NULL and we have already dereferenced it so
a check here would be useless.
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs
Pull eCryptfs fixes from Tyler Hicks:
- downgrade the eCryptfs maintenance status to "Odd Fixes"
- change my email address
- fix a couple memory leaks in error paths
- stability improvement to avoid a needless BUG_ON()
* tag 'ecryptfs-5.6-rc3-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tyhicks/ecryptfs:
ecryptfs: replace BUG_ON with error handling code
eCryptfs: Replace deactivated email address
MAINTAINERS: eCryptfs: Update maintainer address and downgrade status
ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in ecryptfs_init_messaging()
ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in parse_tag_1_packet()
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fix from David Sterba:
"This is the fix for sleeping in a locked section bug reported by Dave
Jones, caused by a patch dependence in development and pulled
branches.
I picked the existing patch over the fixup that Filipe sent, as it's a
bit more generic fix. I've verified it with a specific test case, some
rsync stress and one round of fstests"
* tag 'for-5.6-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: don't set path->leave_spinning for truncate
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The only time we actually leave the path spinning is if we're truncating
a small amount and don't actually free an extent, which is not a common
occurrence. We have to set the path blocking in order to add the
delayed ref anyway, so the first extent we find we set the path to
blocking and stay blocking for the duration of the operation. With the
upcoming file extent map stuff there will be another case that we have
to have the path blocking, so just swap to blocking always.
Note: this patch also fixes a warning after 28553fa992cb ("Btrfs: fix
race between shrinking truncate and fiemap") got merged that inserts
extent locks around truncation so the path must not leave spinning locks
after btrfs_search_slot.
[70.794783] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slab.h:565
[70.794834] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1141, name: rsync
[70.794863] 5 locks held by rsync/1141:
[70.794876] #0: ffff888417b9c408 (sb_writers#17){.+.+}, at: mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50
[70.795030] #1: ffff888428de28e8 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#13/1){+.+.}, at: lock_rename+0xf1/0x100
[70.795051] #2: ffff888417b9c608 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x394/0x560
[70.795124] #3: ffff888403081768 (btrfs-fs-01){++++}, at: btrfs_try_tree_write_lock+0x2f/0x160
[70.795203] #4: ffff888403086568 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}, at: btrfs_try_tree_write_lock+0x2f/0x160
[70.795222] CPU: 5 PID: 1141 Comm: rsync Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-backup+ #2
[70.795362] Call Trace:
[70.795374] dump_stack+0x71/0xa0
[70.795445] ___might_sleep.part.96.cold.106+0xa6/0xb6
[70.795459] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1d3/0x290
[70.795471] alloc_extent_state+0x22/0x1c0
[70.795544] __clear_extent_bit+0x3ba/0x580
[70.795557] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30
[70.795569] btrfs_truncate_inode_items+0x339/0xe50
[70.795647] btrfs_evict_inode+0x269/0x540
[70.795659] ? dput.part.38+0x29/0x460
[70.795671] evict+0xcd/0x190
[70.795682] __dentry_kill+0xd6/0x180
[70.795754] dput.part.38+0x2ad/0x460
[70.795765] do_renameat2+0x3cb/0x540
[70.795777] __x64_sys_rename+0x1c/0x20
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Fixes: 28553fa992cb ("Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add note ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
"Two races fixed, memory leak fix, sysfs directory fixup and two new
log messages:
- two fixed race conditions: extent map merging and truncate vs
fiemap
- create the right sysfs directory with device information and move
the individual device dirs under it
- print messages when the tree-log is replayed at mount time or
cannot be replayed on remount"
* tag 'for-5.6-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: sysfs, move device id directories to UUID/devinfo
btrfs: sysfs, add UUID/devinfo kobject
Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap
btrfs: log message when rw remount is attempted with unclean tree-log
btrfs: print message when tree-log replay starts
Btrfs: fix race between using extent maps and merging them
btrfs: ref-verify: fix memory leaks
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Pull cifs fixes from Steve French:
"Four small CIFS/SMB3 fixes. One (the EA overflow fix) for stable"
* tag '5.6-rc1-smb3-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
cifs: make sure we do not overflow the max EA buffer size
cifs: enable change notification for SMB2.1 dialect
cifs: Fix mode output in debugging statements
cifs: fix mount option display for sec=krb5i
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4
Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"Miscellaneous ext4 bug fixes (all stable fodder)"
* tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
ext4: improve explanation of a mount failure caused by a misconfigured kernel
jbd2: do not clear the BH_Mapped flag when forgetting a metadata buffer
jbd2: move the clearing of b_modified flag to the journal_unmap_buffer()
ext4: add cond_resched() to ext4_protect_reserved_inode
ext4: fix checksum errors with indexed dirs
ext4: fix support for inode sizes > 1024 bytes
ext4: simplify checking quota limits in ext4_statfs()
ext4: don't assume that mmp_nodename/bdevname have NUL
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fallocate_finish() is missing cancellation check. Add it.
It's safe to do that, as only flags setup and sqe fields copy are done
before it gets into __io_fallocate().
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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If CONFIG_QFMT_V2 is not enabled, but CONFIG_QUOTA is enabled, when a
user tries to mount a file system with the quota or project quota
enabled, the kernel will emit a very confusing messsage:
EXT4-fs warning (device vdc): ext4_enable_quotas:5914: Failed to enable quota tracking (type=0, err=-3). Please run e2fsck to fix.
EXT4-fs (vdc): mount failed
We will now report an explanatory message indicating which kernel
configuration options have to be enabled, to avoid customer/sysadmin
confusion.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200215012738.565735-1-tytso@mit.edu
Google-Bug-Id: 149093531
Fixes: 7c319d328505b778 ("ext4: make quota as first class supported feature")
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
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Pull NFS client bugfixes from Anna Schumaker:
"The only stable fix this time is the DMA scatter-gather list bug fixed
by Chuck.
The rest fix up races and refcounting issues that have been found
during testing.
Stable fix:
- fix DMA scatter-gather list mapping imbalance
The rest:
- fix directory verifier races
- fix races between open and dentry revalidation
- fix revalidation of dentries with delegations
- fix "cachethis" setting for writes
- fix delegation and delegation cred pinning"
* tag 'nfs-for-5.6-2' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/anna/linux-nfs:
NFSv4: Ensure the delegation cred is pinned when we call delegreturn
NFSv4: Ensure the delegation is pinned in nfs_do_return_delegation()
NFSv4.1 make cachethis=no for writes
xprtrdma: Fix DMA scatter-gather list mapping imbalance
NFSv4: Fix revalidation of dentries with delegations
NFSv4: Fix races between open and dentry revalidation
NFS: Fix up directory verifier races
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Pull ceph fixes from Ilya Dryomov:
- make O_DIRECT | O_APPEND combination work better
- redo the server path canonicalization patch that went into -rc1
- fix the 'noacl' mount option that got broken by the conversion to the
new mount API in 5.5
* tag 'ceph-for-5.6-rc2' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
ceph: noacl mount option is effectively ignored
ceph: canonicalize server path in place
ceph: do not execute direct write in parallel if O_APPEND is specified
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Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
"Here's a set of fixes for io_uring:
- Various fixes with cleanups from Pavel, fixing corner cases where
we're not correctly dealing with iovec cleanup.
- Clarify that statx/openat/openat2 don't accept fixed files
- Buffered raw device write EOPTNOTSUPP fix
- Ensure async workers grab current->fs
- A few task exit fixes with pending requests that grab the file
table
- send/recvmsg async load fix
- io-wq offline node setup fix
- CQ overflow flush in poll"
* tag 'io_uring-5.6-2020-02-14' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: (21 commits)
io_uring: prune request from overflow list on flush
io-wq: don't call kXalloc_node() with non-online node
io_uring: retain sockaddr_storage across send/recvmsg async punt
io_uring: cancel pending async work if task exits
io-wq: add io_wq_cancel_pid() to cancel based on a specific pid
io-wq: make io_wqe_cancel_work() take a match handler
io_uring: fix openat/statx's filename leak
io_uring: fix double prep iovec leak
io_uring: fix async close() with f_op->flush()
io_uring: allow AT_FDCWD for non-file openat/openat2/statx
io_uring: grab ->fs as part of async preparation
io-wq: add support for inheriting ->fs
io_uring: retry raw bdev writes if we hit -EOPNOTSUPP
io_uring: add cleanup for openat()/statx()
io_uring: fix iovec leaks
io_uring: remove unused struct io_async_open
io_uring: flush overflowed CQ events in the io_uring_poll()
io_uring: statx/openat/openat2 don't support fixed files
io_uring: fix deferred req iovec leak
io_uring: fix 1-bit bitfields to be unsigned
...
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In crypt_scatterlist, if the crypt_stat argument is not set up
correctly, the kernel crashes. Instead, by returning an error code
upstream, the error is handled safely.
The issue is detected via a static analysis tool written by us.
Fixes: 237fead619984 (ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig)
Signed-off-by: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
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Replace a recently deactived email address with one that I'll be able to
personally control and keep alive.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
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RHBZ: 1752437
Before we add a new EA we should check that this will not overflow
the maximum buffer we have available to read the EAs back.
Otherwise we can get into a situation where the EAs are so big that
we can not read them back to the client and thus we can not list EAs
anymore or delete them.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
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It was originally enabled only for SMB3 or later dialects, but
had requests to add it to SMB2.1 mounts as well given the
large number of systems at that dialect level.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reported-by: L Walsh <cifs@tlinx.org>
Acked-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
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Carter reported an issue where he could produce a stall on ring exit,
when we're cleaning up requests that match the given file table. For
this particular test case, a combination of a few things caused the
issue:
- The cq ring was overflown
- The request being canceled was in the overflow list
The combination of the above means that the cq overflow list holds a
reference to the request. The request is canceled correctly, but since
the overflow list holds a reference to it, the final put won't happen.
Since the final put doesn't happen, the request remains in the inflight.
Hence we never finish the cancelation flush.
Fix this by removing requests from the overflow list if we're canceling
them.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5
Reported-by: Carter Li 李通洲 <carter.li@eoitek.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Ensure we don't release the delegation cred during the call to
nfs4_proc_delegreturn().
Fixes: ee05f456772d ("NFSv4: Fix races between open and delegreturn")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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