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Use the documented kernel-doc format for function Return: descriptions.
Begin constant values in kernel-doc comments with '%'.
Remove kernel-doc "/**" from 2 functions that are not documented with
kernel-doc notation.
Fix typos, punctuation, & grammar.
Also fix a few kernel-doc warnings:
../fs/eventpoll.c:1883: warning: Function parameter or member 'ep' not described in 'ep_loop_check_proc'
../fs/eventpoll.c:1883: warning: Excess function parameter 'priv' description in 'ep_loop_check_proc'
../fs/eventpoll.c:1932: warning: Function parameter or member 'ep' not described in 'ep_loop_check'
../fs/eventpoll.c:1932: warning: Excess function parameter 'from' description in 'ep_loop_check'
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull pstore fixes from Kees Cook:
- Rate-limit ECC warnings (Dmitry Osipenko)
- Fix error path check for NULL (Tetsuo Handa)
* tag 'pstore-v5.12-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
pstore/ram: Rate-limit "uncorrectable error in header" message
pstore: Fix warning in pstore_kill_sb()
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Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
"A bit of a mix between fallout from the worker change, cleanups and
reductions now possible from that change, and fixes in general. In
detail:
- Fully serialize manager and worker creation, fixing races due to
that.
- Clean up some naming that had gone stale.
- SQPOLL fixes.
- Fix race condition around task_work rework that went into this
merge window.
- Implement unshare. Used for when the original task does unshare(2)
or setuid/seteuid and friends, drops the original workers and forks
new ones.
- Drop the only remaining piece of state shuffling we had left, which
was cred. Move it into issue instead, and we can drop all of that
code too.
- Kill f_op->flush() usage. That was such a nasty hack that we had
out of necessity, we no longer need it.
- Following from ->flush() removal, we can also drop various bits of
ctx state related to SQPOLL and cancelations.
- Fix an issue with IOPOLL retry, which originally was fallout from a
filemap change (removing iov_iter_revert()), but uncovered an issue
with iovec re-import too late.
- Fix an issue with system suspend.
- Use xchg() for fallback work, instead of cmpxchg().
- Properly destroy io-wq on exec.
- Add create_io_thread() core helper, and use that in io-wq and
io_uring. This allows us to remove various silly completion events
related to thread setup.
- A few error handling fixes.
This should be the grunt of fixes necessary for the new workers, next
week should be quieter. We've got a pending series from Pavel on
cancelations, and how tasks and rings are indexed. Outside of that,
should just be minor fixes. Even with these fixes, we're still killing
a net ~80 lines"
* tag 'io_uring-5.12-2021-03-05' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: (41 commits)
io_uring: don't restrict issue_flags for io_openat
io_uring: make SQPOLL thread parking saner
io-wq: kill hashed waitqueue before manager exits
io_uring: clear IOCB_WAITQ for non -EIOCBQUEUED return
io_uring: don't keep looping for more events if we can't flush overflow
io_uring: move to using create_io_thread()
kernel: provide create_io_thread() helper
io_uring: reliably cancel linked timeouts
io_uring: cancel-match based on flags
io-wq: ensure all pending work is canceled on exit
io_uring: ensure that threads freeze on suspend
io_uring: remove extra in_idle wake up
io_uring: inline __io_queue_async_work()
io_uring: inline io_req_clean_work()
io_uring: choose right tctx->io_wq for try cancel
io_uring: fix -EAGAIN retry with IOPOLL
io-wq: fix error path leak of buffered write hash map
io_uring: remove sqo_task
io_uring: kill sqo_dead and sqo submission halting
io_uring: ignore double poll add on the same waitqueue head
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
"More regression fixes and stabilization.
Regressions:
- zoned mode
- count zone sizes in wider int types
- fix space accounting for read-only block groups
- subpage: fix page tail zeroing
Fixes:
- fix spurious warning when remounting with free space tree
- fix warning when creating a directory with smack enabled
- ioctl checks for qgroup inheritance when creating a snapshot
- qgroup
- fix missing unlock on error path in zero range
- fix amount of released reservation on error
- fix flushing from unsafe context with open transaction,
potentially deadlocking
- minor build warning fixes"
* tag 'for-5.12-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: zoned: do not account freed region of read-only block group as zone_unusable
btrfs: zoned: use sector_t for zone sectors
btrfs: subpage: fix the false data csum mismatch error
btrfs: fix warning when creating a directory with smack enabled
btrfs: don't flush from btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata
btrfs: export and rename qgroup_reserve_meta
btrfs: free correct amount of space in btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata
btrfs: fix spurious free_space_tree remount warning
btrfs: validate qgroup inherit for SNAP_CREATE_V2 ioctl
btrfs: unlock extents in btrfs_zero_range in case of quota reservation errors
btrfs: ref-verify: use 'inline void' keyword ordering
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45d189c606292 ("io_uring: replace force_nonblock with flags") did
something strange for io_openat() slicing all issue_flags but
IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK. Not a bug for now, but better to just forward the
flags.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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We have this weird true/false return from parking, and then some of the
callers decide to look at that. It can lead to unbalanced parks and
sqd locking. Have the callers check the thread status once it's parked.
We know we have the lock at that point, so it's either valid or it's NULL.
Fix race with parking on thread exit. We need to be careful here with
ordering of the sdq->lock and the IO_SQ_THREAD_SHOULD_PARK bit.
Rename sqd->completion to sqd->parked to reflect that this is the only
thing this completion event doesn.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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If we race with shutting down the io-wq context and someone queueing
a hashed entry, then we can exit the manager with it armed. If it then
triggers after the manager has exited, we can have a use-after-free where
io_wqe_hash_wake() attempts to wake a now gone manager process.
Move the killing of the hashed write queue into the manager itself, so
that we know we've killed it before the task exits.
Fixes: e941894eae31 ("io-wq: make buffered file write hashed work map per-ctx")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The callback can only be armed, if we get -EIOCBQUEUED returned. It's
important that we clear the WAITQ bit for other cases, otherwise we can
queue for async retry and filemap will assume that we're armed and
return -EAGAIN instead of just blocking for the IO.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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It doesn't make sense to wait for more events to come in, if we can't
even flush the overflow we already have to the ring. Return -EBUSY for
that condition, just like we do for attempts to submit with overflow
pending.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.11
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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This allows us to do task creation and setup without needing to use
completions to try and synchronize with the starting thread. Get rid of
the old io_wq_fork_thread() wrapper, and the 'wq' and 'worker' startup
completion events - we can now do setup before the task is running.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Linked timeouts are fired asynchronously (i.e. soft-irq), and use
generic cancellation paths to do its stuff, including poking into io-wq.
The problem is that it's racy to access tctx->io_wq, as
io_uring_task_cancel() and others may be happening at this exact moment.
Mark linked timeouts with REQ_F_INLIFGHT for now, making sure there are
no timeouts before io-wq destraction.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Instead of going into request internals, like checking req->file->f_op,
do match them based on REQ_F_INFLIGHT, it's set only when we want it to
be reliably cancelled.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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zone_unusable
We migrate zone unusable bytes to read-only bytes when a block group is
set to read-only, and account all the free region as bytes_readonly.
Thus, we should not increase block_group->zone_unusable when the block
group is read-only.
Fixes: 169e0da91a21 ("btrfs: zoned: track unusable bytes for zones")
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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We need to use sector_t for zone_sectors, or it would set the zone size
to zero when the size >= 4GB (= 2^24 sectors) by shifting the
zone_sectors value by SECTOR_SHIFT. We're assuming zones sizes up to
8GiB.
Fixes: 5b316468983d ("btrfs: get zone information of zoned block devices")
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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If we race on shutting down the io-wq, then we should ensure that any
work that was queued after workers shutdown is canceled. Harden the
add work check a bit too, checking for IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT and cancel if
it's set.
Add a WARN_ON() for having any work before we kill the io-wq context.
Reported-by: syzbot+91b4b56ead187d35c9d3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Alex reports that his system fails to suspend using 5.12-rc1, with the
following dump:
[ 240.650300] PM: suspend entry (deep)
[ 240.650748] Filesystems sync: 0.000 seconds
[ 240.725605] Freezing user space processes ...
[ 260.739483] Freezing of tasks failed after 20.013 seconds (3 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0):
[ 260.739497] task:iou-mgr-446 state:S stack: 0 pid: 516 ppid: 439 flags:0x00004224
[ 260.739504] Call Trace:
[ 260.739507] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xb/0x81
[ 260.739515] ? pick_next_task_fair+0x197/0x1cde
[ 260.739519] ? sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0x2f/0x6a
[ 260.739522] ? asm_sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0x12/0x20
[ 260.739525] ? __schedule+0x57/0x6d6
[ 260.739529] ? del_timer_sync+0xb9/0x115
[ 260.739533] ? schedule+0x63/0xd5
[ 260.739536] ? schedule_timeout+0x219/0x356
[ 260.739540] ? __next_timer_interrupt+0xf1/0xf1
[ 260.739544] ? io_wq_manager+0x73/0xb1
[ 260.739549] ? io_wq_create+0x262/0x262
[ 260.739553] ? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 260.739557] task:iou-mgr-517 state:S stack: 0 pid: 522 ppid: 439 flags:0x00004224
[ 260.739561] Call Trace:
[ 260.739563] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xb/0x81
[ 260.739566] ? pick_next_task_fair+0x16f/0x1cde
[ 260.739569] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xb/0x81
[ 260.739571] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
[ 260.739574] ? __schedule+0x5b7/0x6d6
[ 260.739578] ? del_timer_sync+0x70/0x115
[ 260.739581] ? schedule_timeout+0x211/0x356
[ 260.739585] ? __next_timer_interrupt+0xf1/0xf1
[ 260.739588] ? io_wq_check_workers+0x15/0x11f
[ 260.739592] ? io_wq_manager+0x69/0xb1
[ 260.739596] ? io_wq_create+0x262/0x262
[ 260.739600] ? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 260.739603] task:iou-wrk-517 state:S stack: 0 pid: 523 ppid: 439 flags:0x00004224
[ 260.739607] Call Trace:
[ 260.739609] ? __schedule+0x5b7/0x6d6
[ 260.739614] ? schedule+0x63/0xd5
[ 260.739617] ? schedule_timeout+0x219/0x356
[ 260.739621] ? __next_timer_interrupt+0xf1/0xf1
[ 260.739624] ? task_thread.isra.0+0x148/0x3af
[ 260.739628] ? task_thread_unbound+0xa/0xa
[ 260.739632] ? task_thread_bound+0x7/0x7
[ 260.739636] ? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 260.739647] OOM killer enabled.
[ 260.739648] Restarting tasks ... done.
[ 260.740077] PM: suspend exit
Play nice and ensure that any thread we create will call try_to_freeze()
at an opportune time so that memory suspend can proceed. For the io-wq
worker threads, mark them as PF_NOFREEZE. They could potentially be
blocked for a long time.
Reported-by: Alex Xu (Hello71) <alex_y_xu@yahoo.ca>
Tested-by: Alex Xu (Hello71) <alex_y_xu@yahoo.ca>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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io_dismantle_req() is always followed by io_put_task(), which already do
proper in_idle wake ups, so we can skip waking the owner task in
io_dismantle_req(). The rules are simpler now, do io_put_task() shortly
after ending a request, and it will be fine.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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__io_queue_async_work() is only called from io_queue_async_work(),
inline it.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Inline io_req_clean_work(), less code and easier to analyse
tctx dependencies and refs usage.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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When we cancel SQPOLL, @task in io_uring_try_cancel_requests() will
differ from current. Use the right tctx from passed in @task, and don't
forget that it can be NULL when the io_uring ctx exits.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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We no longer revert the iovec on -EIOCBQUEUED, see commit ab2125df921d,
and this started causing issues for IOPOLL on devies that run out of
request slots. Turns out what outside of needing a revert for those, we
also had a bug where we didn't properly setup retry inside the submission
path. That could cause re-import of the iovec, if any, and that could lead
to spurious results if the application had those allocated on the stack.
Catch -EAGAIN retry and make the iovec stable for IOPOLL, just like we do
for !IOPOLL retries.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.9+
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Reported-by: Xiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The 'err' path should include the hash put, we already grabbed a reference
once we get that far.
Fixes: e941894eae31 ("io-wq: make buffered file write hashed work map per-ctx")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Now, sqo_task is used only for a warning that is not interesting anymore
since sqo_dead is gone, remove all of that including ctx->sqo_task.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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As SQPOLL task doesn't poke into ->sqo_task anymore, there is no need to
kill the sqo when the master task exits. Before it was necessary to
avoid races accessing sqo_task->files with removing them.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
[axboe: don't forget to enable SQPOLL before exit, if started disabled]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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syzbot reports a deadlock, attempting to lock the same spinlock twice:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
5.11.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
swapper/1/0 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88801b2b1130 (&runtime->sleep){..-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:354 [inline]
ffff88801b2b1130 (&runtime->sleep){..-.}-{2:2}, at: io_poll_double_wake+0x25f/0x6a0 fs/io_uring.c:4960
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88801b2b3130 (&runtime->sleep){..-.}-{2:2}, at: __wake_up_common_lock+0xb4/0x130 kernel/sched/wait.c:137
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&runtime->sleep);
lock(&runtime->sleep);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
2 locks held by swapper/1/0:
#0: ffff888147474908 (&group->lock){..-.}-{2:2}, at: _snd_pcm_stream_lock_irqsave+0x9f/0xd0 sound/core/pcm_native.c:170
#1: ffff88801b2b3130 (&runtime->sleep){..-.}-{2:2}, at: __wake_up_common_lock+0xb4/0x130 kernel/sched/wait.c:137
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.11.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x151 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2829 [inline]
check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2872 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3661 [inline]
__lock_acquire.cold+0x14c/0x3b4 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4900
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5510 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x730 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5475
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2a/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:354 [inline]
io_poll_double_wake+0x25f/0x6a0 fs/io_uring.c:4960
__wake_up_common+0x147/0x650 kernel/sched/wait.c:108
__wake_up_common_lock+0xd0/0x130 kernel/sched/wait.c:138
snd_pcm_update_state+0x46a/0x540 sound/core/pcm_lib.c:203
snd_pcm_update_hw_ptr0+0xa75/0x1a50 sound/core/pcm_lib.c:464
snd_pcm_period_elapsed+0x160/0x250 sound/core/pcm_lib.c:1805
dummy_hrtimer_callback+0x94/0x1b0 sound/drivers/dummy.c:378
__run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1519 [inline]
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x609/0xe40 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1583
hrtimer_run_softirq+0x17b/0x360 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1600
__do_softirq+0x29b/0x9f6 kernel/softirq.c:345
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:221 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:422 [inline]
irq_exit_rcu+0x134/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:434
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x93/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1100
</IRQ>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:632
RIP: 0010:native_save_fl arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:29 [inline]
RIP: 0010:arch_local_save_flags arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:70 [inline]
RIP: 0010:arch_irqs_disabled arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:137 [inline]
RIP: 0010:acpi_safe_halt drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:111 [inline]
RIP: 0010:acpi_idle_do_entry+0x1c9/0x250 drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:516
Code: dd 38 6e f8 84 db 75 ac e8 54 32 6e f8 e8 0f 1c 74 f8 e9 0c 00 00 00 e8 45 32 6e f8 0f 00 2d 4e 4a c5 00 e8 39 32 6e f8 fb f4 <9c> 5b 81 e3 00 02 00 00 fa 31 ff 48 89 de e8 14 3a 6e f8 48 85 db
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000d47d18 EFLAGS: 00000293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8880115c3780 RSI: ffffffff89052537 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff888141127064 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffffffff81794168 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff888141127000 R14: ffff888141127064 R15: ffff888143331804
acpi_idle_enter+0x361/0x500 drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:647
cpuidle_enter_state+0x1b1/0xc80 drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:237
cpuidle_enter+0x4a/0xa0 drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:351
call_cpuidle kernel/sched/idle.c:158 [inline]
cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:239 [inline]
do_idle+0x3e1/0x590 kernel/sched/idle.c:300
cpu_startup_entry+0x14/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:397
start_secondary+0x274/0x350 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:272
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xb0/0xbb
which is due to the driver doing poll_wait() twice on the same
wait_queue_head. That is perfectly valid, but from checking the rest
of the kernel tree, it's the only driver that does this.
We can handle this just fine, we just need to ignore the second addition
as we'll get woken just fine on the first one.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.8+
Fixes: 18bceab101ad ("io_uring: allow POLL_ADD with double poll_wait() users")
Reported-by: syzbot+28abd693db9e92c160d8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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If we create it in a disabled state because IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED is
set on ring creation, we need to ensure that we've kicked the thread if
we're exiting before it's been explicitly disabled. Otherwise we can run
into a deadlock where exit is waiting go park the SQPOLL thread, but the
SQPOLL thread itself is waiting to get a signal to start.
That results in the below trace of both tasks hung, waiting on each other:
INFO: task syz-executor458:8401 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted 5.11.0-next-20210226-syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz-executor458 state:D stack:27536 pid: 8401 ppid: 8400 flags:0x00004004
Call Trace:
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:4324 [inline]
__schedule+0x90c/0x21a0 kernel/sched/core.c:5075
schedule+0xcf/0x270 kernel/sched/core.c:5154
schedule_timeout+0x1db/0x250 kernel/time/timer.c:1868
do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:85 [inline]
__wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:106 [inline]
wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:117 [inline]
wait_for_completion+0x168/0x270 kernel/sched/completion.c:138
io_sq_thread_park fs/io_uring.c:7115 [inline]
io_sq_thread_park+0xd5/0x130 fs/io_uring.c:7103
io_uring_cancel_task_requests+0x24c/0xd90 fs/io_uring.c:8745
__io_uring_files_cancel+0x110/0x230 fs/io_uring.c:8840
io_uring_files_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:47 [inline]
do_exit+0x299/0x2a60 kernel/exit.c:780
do_group_exit+0x125/0x310 kernel/exit.c:922
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:933 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:931 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 kernel/exit.c:931
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x43e899
RSP: 002b:00007ffe89376d48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004af2f0 RCX: 000000000043e899
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffffffffffc0 R09: 0000000010000000
R10: 0000000000008011 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004af2f0
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
INFO: task iou-sqp-8401:8402 can't die for more than 143 seconds.
task:iou-sqp-8401 state:D stack:30272 pid: 8402 ppid: 8400 flags:0x00004004
Call Trace:
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:4324 [inline]
__schedule+0x90c/0x21a0 kernel/sched/core.c:5075
schedule+0xcf/0x270 kernel/sched/core.c:5154
schedule_timeout+0x1db/0x250 kernel/time/timer.c:1868
do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:85 [inline]
__wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:106 [inline]
wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:117 [inline]
wait_for_completion+0x168/0x270 kernel/sched/completion.c:138
io_sq_thread+0x27d/0x1ae0 fs/io_uring.c:6717
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294
INFO: task iou-sqp-8401:8402 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Reported-by: syzbot+fb5458330b4442f2090d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
io_run_ctx_fallback() can use xchg() instead of cmpxchg(). It's simpler
and faster.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
There is an unlikely but possible race using a freed context. That's
because req->task_work.func() can free a request, but we won't
necessarily find a completion in submit_state.comp and so all ctx refs
may be put by the time we do mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_ctx);
There are several reasons why it can miss going through
submit_state.comp: 1) req->task_work.func() didn't complete it itself,
but punted to iowq (e.g. reissue) and it got freed later, or a similar
situation with it overflowing and getting flushed by someone else, or
being submitted to IRQ completion, 2) As we don't hold the uring_lock,
someone else can do io_submit_flush_completions() and put our ref.
3) Bugs and code obscurities, e.g. failing to propagate issue_flags
properly.
One example is as follows
CPU1 | CPU2
=======================================================================
@req->task_work.func() |
-> @req overflwed, |
so submit_state.comp,nr==0 |
| flush overflows, and free @req
| ctx refs == 0, free it
ctx is dead, but we do |
lock + flush + unlock |
So take a ctx reference for each new ctx we see in __tctx_task_work(),
and do release it until we do all our flushing.
Fixes: 65453d1efbd2 ("io_uring: enable req cache for task_work items")
Reported-by: syzbot+a157ac7c03a56397f553@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
[axboe: fold in my one-liner and fix ref mismatch]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
This was always a weird work-around or file referencing, and we don't
need it anymore. Get rid of it.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
We already run the fallback task_work in io_uring_try_cancel_requests(),
no need to duplicate at ring exit explicitly.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
If we move it in there, then we no longer have to care about it in io-wq.
This means we can drop the cred handling in io-wq, and we can drop the
REQ_F_WORK_INITIALIZED flag and async init functions as that was the last
user of it since we moved to the new workers. Then we can also drop
io_wq_work->creds, and just hold the personality u16 in there instead.
Suggested-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
We're no longer checking anything that requires the work item to be
initialized, as we're not carrying any file related state there.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
We prune the full cache regardless, get rid of the dead argument.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Destroy current's io-wq backend and tctx on __io_uring_task_cancel(),
aka exec(). Looks it's not strictly necessary, because it will be done
at some point when the task dies and changes of creds/files/etc. are
handled, but better to do that earlier to free io-wq and not potentially
lock previous mm and other resources for the time being.
It's safe to do because we wait for all requests of the current task to
complete, so no request will use tctx afterwards. Note, that
io_uring_files_cancel() may leave some requests for later reaping, so it
leaves tctx intact, that's ok as the task is dying anyway.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Make sure that we killed an io-wq by the time a task is dead.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
We clear the bit marking the ctx task_work as active after having run
the queued work, but we really should be clearing it before. Otherwise
we can hit a tiny race ala:
CPU0 CPU1
io_task_work_add() tctx_task_work()
run_work
add_to_list
test_and_set_bit
clear_bit
already set
and CPU0 will return thinking the task_work is queued, while in reality
it's already being run. If we hit the condition after __tctx_task_work()
found no more work, but before we've cleared the bit, then we'll end up
thinking it's queued and will be run. In reality it is queued, but we
didn't queue the ctx task_work to ensure that it gets run.
Fixes: 7cbf1722d5fc ("io_uring: provide FIFO ordering for task_work")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
If we put the io-wq from io_uring, we really want it to exit. Provide
a helper that does that for us. Couple that with not having the manager
hold a reference to the 'wq' and the normal SQPOLL exit will tear down
the io-wq context appropriate.
On the io-wq side, our wq context is per task, so only the task itself
is manipulating ->manager and hence it's safe to check and clear without
any extra locking. We just need to ensure that the manager task stays
around, in case it exits.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
We want to reuse this completion, and a single complete should do just
fine. Ensure that we park ourselves first if requested, as that is what
lead to the initial deadlock in this area. If we've got someone attempting
to park us, then we can't proceed without having them finish first.
Fixes: 37d1e2e3642e ("io_uring: move SQPOLL thread io-wq forked worker")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
io_uring_try_cancel_requests() matches not only current's requests, but
also of other exiting tasks, so we need to actively cancel them and not
just wait, especially since the function can be called on flush during
do_exit() -> exit_files().
Even if it's not a problem for now, it's much nicer to know that the
function tries to cancel everything it can.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
If we fail to fork an SQPOLL worker, we can hit cancel, and hence
attempted thread stop, with the thread already being stopped. Ensure
we check for that.
Also guard thread stop fully by the sqd mutex, just like we do for
park.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
We are already freeing the wq struct in both spots, so don't put it and
get it freed twice.
Reported-by: syzbot+7bf785eedca35ca05501@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 4fb6ac326204 ("io-wq: improve manager/worker handling over exec")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
The manager waits for the workers, hence the manager is always valid if
workers are running. Now also have wq destroy wait for the manager on
exit, so we now everything is gone.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
This is a leftover from a different use cases, it's used to wait for
the manager to startup. Rename it as such.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
If we're in the process of shutting down the async context, then don't
create new workers if we already have at least the fixed one.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Instead of having to wait separately on workers and manager, just have
the manager wait on the workers. We use an atomic_t for the reference
here, as we need to start at 0 and allow increment from that. Since the
number of workers is naturally capped by the allowed nr of processes,
and that uses an int, there is no risk of overflow.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
There is a quite huge "uncorrectable error in header" flood in KMSG
on a clean system boot since there is no pstore buffer saved in RAM.
Let's silence the redundant noisy messages by rate-limiting the printk
message. Now there are maximum 10 messages printed repeatedly instead
of 35+.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302095850.30894-1-digetx@gmail.com
|
|
[BUG]
When running fstresss, we can hit strange data csum mismatch where the
on-disk data is in fact correct (passes scrub).
With some extra debug info added, we have the following traces:
0482us: btrfs_do_readpage: root=5 ino=284 offset=393216, submit force=0 pgoff=0 iosize=8192
0494us: btrfs_do_readpage: root=5 ino=284 offset=401408, submit force=0 pgoff=8192 iosize=4096
0498us: btrfs_submit_data_bio: root=5 ino=284 bio first bvec=393216 len=8192
0591us: btrfs_do_readpage: root=5 ino=284 offset=405504, submit force=0 pgoff=12288 iosize=36864
0594us: btrfs_submit_data_bio: root=5 ino=284 bio first bvec=401408 len=4096
0863us: btrfs_submit_data_bio: root=5 ino=284 bio first bvec=405504 len=36864
0933us: btrfs_verify_data_csum: root=5 ino=284 offset=393216 len=8192
0967us: btrfs_do_readpage: root=5 ino=284 offset=442368, skip beyond isize pgoff=49152 iosize=16384
1047us: btrfs_verify_data_csum: root=5 ino=284 offset=401408 len=4096
1163us: btrfs_verify_data_csum: root=5 ino=284 offset=405504 len=36864
1290us: check_data_csum: !!! root=5 ino=284 offset=438272 pg_off=45056 !!!
7387us: end_bio_extent_readpage: root=5 ino=284 before pending_read_bios=0
[CAUSE]
Normally we expect all submitted bio reads to only touch the range we
specified, and under subpage context, it means we should only touch the
range specified in each bvec.
But in data read path, inside end_bio_extent_readpage(), we have page
zeroing which only takes regular page size into consideration.
This means for subpage if we have an inode whose content looks like below:
0 16K 32K 48K 64K
|///////| |///////| |
|//| = data needs to be read from disk
| | = hole
And i_size is 64K initially.
Then the following race can happen:
T1 | T2
--------------------------------+--------------------------------
btrfs_do_readpage() |
|- isize = 64K; |
| At this time, the isize is |
| 64K |
| |
|- submit_extent_page() |
| submit previous assembled bio|
| assemble bio for [0, 16K) |
| |
|- submit_extent_page() |
submit read bio for [0, 16K) |
assemble read bio for |
[32K, 48K) |
|
| btrfs_setsize()
| |- i_size_write(, 16K);
| Now i_size is only 16K
end_io() for [0K, 16K) |
|- end_bio_extent_readpage() |
|- btrfs_verify_data_csum() |
| No csum error |
|- i_size = 16K; |
|- zero_user_segment(16K, |
PAGE_SIZE); |
!!! We zeroed range |
!!! [32K, 48K) |
| end_io for [32K, 48K)
| |- end_bio_extent_readpage()
| |- btrfs_verify_data_csum()
| ! CSUM MISMATCH !
| ! As the range is zeroed now !
[FIX]
To fix the problem, make end_bio_extent_readpage() to only zero the
range of bvec.
The bug only affects subpage read-write support, as for full read-only
mount we can't change i_size thus won't hit the race condition.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
When we have smack enabled, during the creation of a directory smack may
attempt to add a "smack transmute" xattr on the inode, which results in
the following warning and trace:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2548 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:537 start_transaction+0x489/0x4f0
Modules linked in: nft_objref nf_conntrack_netbios_ns (...)
CPU: 3 PID: 2548 Comm: mkdir Not tainted 5.9.0-rc2smack+ #81
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:start_transaction+0x489/0x4f0
Code: e9 be fc ff ff (...)
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001887d10 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffff88816f1e0000 RBX: 0000000000000201 RCX: 0000000000000003
RDX: 0000000000000201 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff888177849000
RBP: ffff888177849000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000004
R10: ffffffff825e8f7a R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffffffffffffffe2
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88803d884270 R15: ffff8881680d8000
FS: 00007f67317b8440(0000) GS:ffff88817bcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f67247a22a8 CR3: 000000004bfbc002 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? slab_free_freelist_hook+0xea/0x1b0
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0xe0
btrfs_setxattr_trans+0x3c/0xf0
__vfs_setxattr+0x63/0x80
smack_d_instantiate+0x2d3/0x360
security_d_instantiate+0x29/0x40
d_instantiate_new+0x38/0x90
btrfs_mkdir+0x1cf/0x1e0
vfs_mkdir+0x14f/0x200
do_mkdirat+0x6d/0x110
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7f673196ae6b
Code: 8b 05 11 (...)
RSP: 002b:00007ffc3c679b18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000053
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000001ff RCX: 00007f673196ae6b
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000001ff RDI: 00007ffc3c67a30d
RBP: 00007ffc3c67a30d R08: 00000000000001ff R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 000055d3e39fe930 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffc3c679cd8 R14: 00007ffc3c67a30d R15: 00007ffc3c679ce0
irq event stamp: 11029
hardirqs last enabled at (11037): [<ffffffff81153fe6>] console_unlock+0x486/0x670
hardirqs last disabled at (11044): [<ffffffff81153c01>] console_unlock+0xa1/0x670
softirqs last enabled at (8864): [<ffffffff81e0102f>] asm_call_on_stack+0xf/0x20
softirqs last disabled at (8851): [<ffffffff81e0102f>] asm_call_on_stack+0xf/0x20
This happens because at btrfs_mkdir() we call d_instantiate_new() while
holding a transaction handle, which results in the following call chain:
btrfs_mkdir()
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 5);
d_instantiate_new()
smack_d_instantiate()
__vfs_setxattr()
btrfs_setxattr_trans()
btrfs_start_transaction()
start_transaction()
WARN_ON()
--> a tansaction start has TRANS_EXTWRITERS
set in its type
h->orig_rsv = h->block_rsv
h->block_rsv = NULL
btrfs_end_transaction(trans)
Besides the warning triggered at start_transaction, we set the handle's
block_rsv to NULL which may cause some surprises later on.
So fix this by making btrfs_setxattr_trans() not start a transaction when
we already have a handle on one, stored in current->journal_info, and use
that handle. We are good to use the handle because at btrfs_mkdir() we did
reserve space for the xattr and the inode item.
Reported-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/434d856f-bd7b-4889-a6ec-e81aaebfa735@schaufler-ca.com/
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
Calling btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta_prealloc from
btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata can result in flushing delalloc
while holding a transaction and delayed node locks. This is deadlock
prone. In the past multiple commits:
* ae5e070eaca9 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't try to wait flushing if we're
already holding a transaction")
* 6f23277a49e6 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't commit transaction when we already
hold the handle")
Tried to solve various aspects of this but this was always a
whack-a-mole game. Unfortunately those 2 fixes don't solve a deadlock
scenario involving btrfs_delayed_node::mutex. Namely, one thread
can call btrfs_dirty_inode as a result of reading a file and modifying
its atime:
PID: 6963 TASK: ffff8c7f3f94c000 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "test"
#0 __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d
#1 schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff
#2 schedule_timeout at ffffffffa52a1bdd
#3 wait_for_completion at ffffffffa529eeea <-- sleeps with delayed node mutex held
#4 start_delalloc_inodes at ffffffffc0380db5
#5 btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot at ffffffffc0393836
#6 try_flush_qgroup at ffffffffc03f04b2
#7 __btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta at ffffffffc03f5bb6 <-- tries to reserve space and starts delalloc inodes.
#8 btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e31aa <-- acquires delayed node mutex
#9 btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8
#10 btrfs_dirty_inode at ffffffffc038627b <-- TRANSACTIION OPENED
#11 touch_atime at ffffffffa4cf0000
#12 generic_file_read_iter at ffffffffa4c1f123
#13 new_sync_read at ffffffffa4ccdc8a
#14 vfs_read at ffffffffa4cd0849
#15 ksys_read at ffffffffa4cd0bd1
#16 do_syscall_64 at ffffffffa4a052eb
#17 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffa540008c
This will cause an asynchronous work to flush the delalloc inodes to
happen which can try to acquire the same delayed_node mutex:
PID: 455 TASK: ffff8c8085fa4000 CPU: 5 COMMAND: "kworker/u16:30"
#0 __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d
#1 schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff
#2 schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa529e80a
#3 __mutex_lock at ffffffffa529fdcb <-- goes to sleep, never wakes up.
#4 btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e3143 <-- tries to acquire the mutex
#5 btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8 <-- this is the same inode that pid 6963 is holding
#6 cow_file_range_inline.constprop.78 at ffffffffc0386be7
#7 cow_file_range at ffffffffc03879c1
#8 btrfs_run_delalloc_range at ffffffffc038894c
#9 writepage_delalloc at ffffffffc03a3c8f
#10 __extent_writepage at ffffffffc03a4c01
#11 extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffffc03a500b
#12 extent_writepages at ffffffffc03a6de2
#13 do_writepages at ffffffffa4c277eb
#14 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffffa4c1e5bb
#15 btrfs_run_delalloc_work at ffffffffc0380987 <-- starts running delayed nodes
#16 normal_work_helper at ffffffffc03b706c
#17 process_one_work at ffffffffa4aba4e4
#18 worker_thread at ffffffffa4aba6fd
#19 kthread at ffffffffa4ac0a3d
#20 ret_from_fork at ffffffffa54001ff
To fully address those cases the complete fix is to never issue any
flushing while holding the transaction or the delayed node lock. This
patch achieves it by calling qgroup_reserve_meta directly which will
either succeed without flushing or will fail and return -EDQUOT. In the
latter case that return value is going to be propagated to
btrfs_dirty_inode which will fallback to start a new transaction. That's
fine as the majority of time we expect the inode will have
BTRFS_DELAYED_NODE_INODE_DIRTY flag set which will result in directly
copying the in-memory state.
Fixes: c53e9653605d ("btrfs: qgroup: try to flush qgroup space when we get -EDQUOT")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
