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2015-11-07Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)Linus Torvalds
Merge second patch-bomb from Andrew Morton: - most of the rest of MM - procfs - lib/ updates - printk updates - bitops infrastructure tweaks - checkpatch updates - nilfs2 update - signals - various other misc bits: coredump, seqfile, kexec, pidns, zlib, ipc, dma-debug, dma-mapping, ... * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (102 commits) ipc,msg: drop dst nil validation in copy_msg include/linux/zutil.h: fix usage example of zlib_adler32() panic: release stale console lock to always get the logbuf printed out dma-debug: check nents in dma_sync_sg* dma-mapping: tidy up dma_parms default handling pidns: fix set/getpriority and ioprio_set/get in PRIO_USER mode kexec: use file name as the output message prefix fs, seqfile: always allow oom killer seq_file: reuse string_escape_str() fs/seq_file: use seq_* helpers in seq_hex_dump() coredump: change zap_threads() and zap_process() to use for_each_thread() coredump: ensure all coredumping tasks have SIGNAL_GROUP_COREDUMP signal: remove jffs2_garbage_collect_thread()->allow_signal(SIGCONT) signal: introduce kernel_signal_stop() to fix jffs2_garbage_collect_thread() signal: turn dequeue_signal_lock() into kernel_dequeue_signal() signals: kill block_all_signals() and unblock_all_signals() nilfs2: fix gcc uninitialized-variable warnings in powerpc build nilfs2: fix gcc unused-but-set-variable warnings MAINTAINERS: nilfs2: add header file for tracing nilfs2: add tracepoints for analyzing reading and writing metadata files ...
2015-11-07Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial Pull trivial updates from Jiri Kosina: "Trivial stuff from trivial tree that can be trivially summed up as: - treewide drop of spurious unlikely() before IS_ERR() from Viresh Kumar - cosmetic fixes (that don't really affect basic functionality of the driver) for pktcdvd and bcache, from Julia Lawall and Petr Mladek - various comment / printk fixes and updates all over the place" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial: bcache: Really show state of work pending bit hwmon: applesmc: fix comment typos Kconfig: remove comment about scsi_wait_scan module class_find_device: fix reference to argument "match" debugfs: document that debugfs_remove*() accepts NULL and error values net: Drop unlikely before IS_ERR(_OR_NULL) mm: Drop unlikely before IS_ERR(_OR_NULL) fs: Drop unlikely before IS_ERR(_OR_NULL) drivers: net: Drop unlikely before IS_ERR(_OR_NULL) drivers: misc: Drop unlikely before IS_ERR(_OR_NULL) UBI: Update comments to reflect UBI_METAONLY flag pktcdvd: drop null test before destroy functions
2015-11-06proc: actually make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendlyOleg Nesterov
The commit 96d0df79f264 ("proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly") fixed the access to /proc/self/fd from sub-threads, but introduced another problem: a sub-thread can't access /proc/<tid>/fd/ or /proc/thread-self/fd if generic_permission() fails. Change proc_fd_permission() to check same_thread_group(pid_task(), current). Fixes: 96d0df79f264 ("proc: make proc_fd_permission() thread-friendly") Reported-by: "Jin, Yihua" <yihua.jin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06fs/proc/array.c: set overflow flag in case of errorAndy Shevchenko
For now in task_name() we ignore the return code of string_escape_str() call. This is not good if buffer suddenly becomes not big enough. Do the proper error handling there. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05mm, oom: add comment for why oom_adj existsDavid Rientjes
/proc/pid/oom_adj exists solely to avoid breaking existing userspace binaries that write to the tunable. Add a comment in the only possible location within the kernel tree to describe the situation and motivation for keeping it around. Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05mm: clear_soft_dirty_pmd() requires THPLaurent Dufour
Don't build clear_soft_dirty_pmd() if transparent huge pages are not enabled. Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05mm: clear pte in clear_soft_dirty()Laurent Dufour
As mentioned in the commit 56eecdb912b5 ("mm: Use ptep/pmdp_set_numa() for updating _PAGE_NUMA bit"), architectures like ppc64 don't do tlb flush in set_pte/pmd functions. So when dealing with existing pte in clear_soft_dirty, the pte must be cleared before being modified. Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05mm: hugetlb: proc: add HugetlbPages field to /proc/PID/statusNaoya Horiguchi
Currently there's no easy way to get per-process usage of hugetlb pages, which is inconvenient because userspace applications which use hugetlb typically want to control their processes on the basis of how much memory (including hugetlb) they use. So this patch simply provides easy access to the info via /proc/PID/status. Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Joern Engel <joern@logfs.org> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05mm: hugetlb: proc: add hugetlb-related fields to /proc/PID/smapsNaoya Horiguchi
Currently /proc/PID/smaps provides no usage info for vma(VM_HUGETLB), which is inconvenient when we want to know per-task or per-vma base hugetlb usage. To solve this, this patch adds new fields for hugetlb usage like below: Size: 20480 kB Rss: 0 kB Pss: 0 kB Shared_Clean: 0 kB Shared_Dirty: 0 kB Private_Clean: 0 kB Private_Dirty: 0 kB Referenced: 0 kB Anonymous: 0 kB AnonHugePages: 0 kB Shared_Hugetlb: 18432 kB Private_Hugetlb: 2048 kB Swap: 0 kB KernelPageSize: 2048 kB MMUPageSize: 2048 kB Locked: 0 kB VmFlags: rd wr mr mw me de ht [hughd@google.com: fix Private_Hugetlb alignment ] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Joern Engel <joern@logfs.org> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-04Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux Pull s390 updates from Martin Schwidefsky: "There is only one new feature in this pull for the 4.4 merge window, most of it is small enhancements, cleanup and bug fixes: - Add the s390 backend for the software dirty bit tracking. This adds two new pgtable functions pte_clear_soft_dirty and pmd_clear_soft_dirty which is why there is a hit to arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h in this pull request. - A series of cleanup patches for the AP bus, this includes the removal of the support for two outdated crypto cards (PCICC and PCICA). - The irq handling / signaling on buffer full in the runtime instrumentation code is dropped. - Some micro optimizations: remove unnecessary memory barriers for a couple of functions: [smb_]rmb, [smb_]wmb, atomics, bitops, and for spin_unlock. Use the builtin bswap if available and make test_and_set_bit_lock more cache friendly. - Statistics and a tracepoint for the diagnose calls to the hypervisor. - The CPU measurement facility support to sample KVM guests is improved. - The vector instructions are now always enabled for user space processes if the hardware has the vector facility. This simplifies the FPU handling code. The fpu-internal.h header is split into fpu internals, api and types just like x86. - Cleanup and improvements for the common I/O layer. - Rework udelay to solve a problem with kprobe. udelay has busy loop semantics but still uses an idle processor state for the wait" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux: (66 commits) s390: remove runtime instrumentation interrupts s390/cio: de-duplicate subchannel validation s390/css: unneeded initialization in for_each_subchannel s390/Kconfig: use builtin bswap s390/dasd: fix disconnected device with valid path mask s390/dasd: fix invalid PAV assignment after suspend/resume s390/dasd: fix double free in dasd_eckd_read_conf s390/kernel: fix ptrace peek/poke for floating point registers s390/cio: move ccw_device_stlck functions s390/cio: move ccw_device_call_handler s390/topology: reduce per_cpu() invocations s390/nmi: reduce size of percpu variable s390/nmi: fix terminology s390/nmi: remove casts s390/nmi: remove pointless error strings s390: don't store registers on disabled wait anymore s390: get rid of __set_psw_mask() s390/fpu: split fpu-internal.h into fpu internals, api, and type headers s390/dasd: fix list_del corruption after lcu changes s390/spinlock: remove unneeded serializations at unlock ...
2015-11-03Merge branch 'core-debug-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull wchan kernel address hiding from Ingo Molnar: "This fixes a wchan related information leak in /proc/PID/stat. There's a bit of an ABI twist to it: instead of setting the wchan field to 0 (which is our usual technique) we set it conditionally to a 0/1 flag to keep ABI compatibility with older procps versions that only fetches /proc/PID/wchan (symbolic names) if the absolute wchan address is nonzero" * 'core-debug-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: fs/proc, core/debug: Don't expose absolute kernel addresses via wchan
2015-11-01mm: get rid of 'vmalloc_info' from /proc/meminfoLinus Torvalds
It turns out that at least some versions of glibc end up reading /proc/meminfo at every single startup, because glibc wants to know the amount of memory the machine has. And while that's arguably insane, it's just how things are. And it turns out that it's not all that expensive most of the time, but the vmalloc information statistics (amount of virtual memory used in the vmalloc space, and the biggest remaining chunk) can be rather expensive to compute. The 'get_vmalloc_info()' function actually showed up on my profiles as 4% of the CPU usage of "make test" in the git source repository, because the git tests are lots of very short-lived shell-scripts etc. It turns out that apparently this same silly vmalloc info gathering shows up on the facebook servers too, according to Dave Jones. So it's not just "make test" for git. We had two patches to just cache the information (one by me, one by Ingo) to mitigate this issue, but the whole vmalloc information of of rather dubious value to begin with, and people who *actually* want to know what the situation is wrt the vmalloc area should just look at the much more complete /proc/vmallocinfo instead. In fact, according to my testing - and perhaps more importantly, according to that big search engine in the sky: Google - there is nothing out there that actually cares about those two expensive fields: VmallocUsed and VmallocChunk. So let's try to just remove them entirely. Actually, this just removes the computation and reports the numbers as zero for now, just to try to be minimally intrusive. If this breaks anything, we'll obviously have to re-introduce the code to compute this all and add the caching patches on top. But if given the option, I'd really prefer to just remove this bad idea entirely rather than add even more code to work around our historical mistake that likely nobody really cares about. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-10-14mm: add architecture primitives for software dirty bit clearingMartin Schwidefsky
There are primitives to create and query the software dirty bits in a pte or pmd. But the clearing of the software dirty bits is done in common code with x86 specific page table functions. Add the missing architecture primitives to clear the software dirty bits to allow the feature to be used on non-x86 systems, e.g. the s390 architecture. Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2015-10-01fs/proc, core/debug: Don't expose absolute kernel addresses via wchanIngo Molnar
So the /proc/PID/stat 'wchan' field (the 30th field, which contains the absolute kernel address of the kernel function a task is blocked in) leaks absolute kernel addresses to unprivileged user-space: seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', wchan); The absolute address might also leak via /proc/PID/wchan as well, if KALLSYMS is turned off or if the symbol lookup fails for some reason: static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) { unsigned long wchan; char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN]; wchan = get_wchan(task); if (lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname) < 0) { if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) return 0; seq_printf(m, "%lu", wchan); } else { seq_printf(m, "%s", symname); } return 0; } This isn't ideal, because for example it trivially leaks the KASLR offset to any local attacker: fomalhaut:~> printf "%016lx\n" $(cat /proc/$$/stat | cut -d' ' -f35) ffffffff8123b380 Most real-life uses of wchan are symbolic: ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm and procps uses /proc/PID/wchan, not the absolute address in /proc/PID/stat: triton:~/tip> strace -f ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm 2>&1 | grep wchan | tail -1 open("/proc/30833/wchan", O_RDONLY) = 6 There's one compatibility quirk here: procps relies on whether the absolute value is non-zero - and we can provide that functionality by outputing "0" or "1" depending on whether the task is blocked (whether there's a wchan address). These days there appears to be very little legitimate reason user-space would be interested in the absolute address. The absolute address is mostly historic: from the days when we didn't have kallsyms and user-space procps had to do the decoding itself via the System.map. So this patch sets all numeric output to "0" or "1" and keeps only symbolic output, in /proc/PID/wchan. ( The absolute sleep address can generally still be profiled via perf, by tasks with sufficient privileges. ) Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150930135917.GA3285@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-09-29fs: Drop unlikely before IS_ERR(_OR_NULL)Viresh Kumar
IS_ERR(_OR_NULL) already contain an 'unlikely' compiler flag and there is no need to do that again from its callers. Drop it. Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2015-09-10proc: convert to kstrto*()/kstrto*_from_user()Alexey Dobriyan
Convert from manual allocation/copy_from_user/... to kstrto*() family which were designed for exactly that. One case can not be converted to kstrto*_from_user() to make code even more simpler because of whitespace stripping, oh well... Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlockWaiman Long
The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10procfs: always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readableCalvin Owens
Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and is only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set. Each mapped file region gets a symlink in /proc/<pid>/map_files/ corresponding to the virtual address range at which it is mapped. The symlinks work like the symlinks in /proc/<pid>/fd/, so you can follow them to the backing file even if that backing file has been unlinked. Currently, files which are mapped, unlinked, and closed are impossible to stat() from userspace. Exposing /proc/<pid>/map_files/ closes this functionality "hole". Not being able to stat() such files makes noticing and explicitly accounting for the space they use on the filesystem impossible. You can work around this by summing up the space used by every file in the filesystem and subtracting that total from what statfs() tells you, but that obviously isn't great, and it becomes unworkable once your filesystem becomes large enough. This patch moves map_files/ out from behind CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and adjusts the permissions enforced on it as follows: * proc_map_files_lookup() * proc_map_files_readdir() * map_files_d_revalidate() Remove the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restriction, leaving only the current restriction requiring PTRACE_MODE_READ. The information made available to userspace by these three functions is already available in /proc/PID/maps with MODE_READ, so I don't see any reason to limit them any further (see below for more detail). * proc_map_files_follow_link() This stub has been added, and requires that the user have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in order to follow the links in map_files/, since there was concern on LKML both about the potential for bypassing permissions on ancestor directories in the path to files pointed to, and about what happens with more exotic memory mappings created by some drivers (ie dma-buf). In older versions of this patch, I changed every permission check in the four functions above to enforce MODE_ATTACH instead of MODE_READ. This was an oversight on my part, and after revisiting the discussion it seems that nobody was concerned about anything outside of what is made possible by ->follow_link(). So in this version, I've left the checks for PTRACE_MODE_READ as-is. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: catch up with concurrent proc_pid_follow_link() changes] Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10proc: add cond_resched to /proc/kpage* read/write loopVladimir Davydov
Reading/writing a /proc/kpage* file may take long on machines with a lot of RAM installed. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Suggested-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10proc: export idle flag via kpageflagsVladimir Davydov
As noted by Minchan, a benefit of reading idle flag from /proc/kpageflags is that one can easily filter dirty and/or unevictable pages while estimating the size of unused memory. Note that idle flag read from /proc/kpageflags may be stale in case the page was accessed via a PTE, because it would be too costly to iterate over all page mappings on each /proc/kpageflags read to provide an up-to-date value. To make sure the flag is up-to-date one has to read /sys/kernel/mm/page_idle/bitmap first. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Reviewed-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10mm: introduce idle page trackingVladimir Davydov
Knowing the portion of memory that is not used by a certain application or memory cgroup (idle memory) can be useful for partitioning the system efficiently, e.g. by setting memory cgroup limits appropriately. Currently, the only means to estimate the amount of idle memory provided by the kernel is /proc/PID/{clear_refs,smaps}: the user can clear the access bit for all pages mapped to a particular process by writing 1 to clear_refs, wait for some time, and then count smaps:Referenced. However, this method has two serious shortcomings: - it does not count unmapped file pages - it affects the reclaimer logic To overcome these drawbacks, this patch introduces two new page flags, Idle and Young, and a new sysfs file, /sys/kernel/mm/page_idle/bitmap. A page's Idle flag can only be set from userspace by setting bit in /sys/kernel/mm/page_idle/bitmap at the offset corresponding to the page, and it is cleared whenever the page is accessed either through page tables (it is cleared in page_referenced() in this case) or using the read(2) system call (mark_page_accessed()). Thus by setting the Idle flag for pages of a particular workload, which can be found e.g. by reading /proc/PID/pagemap, waiting for some time to let the workload access its working set, and then reading the bitmap file, one can estimate the amount of pages that are not used by the workload. The Young page flag is used to avoid interference with the memory reclaimer. A page's Young flag is set whenever the Access bit of a page table entry pointing to the page is cleared by writing to the bitmap file. If page_referenced() is called on a Young page, it will add 1 to its return value, therefore concealing the fact that the Access bit was cleared. Note, since there is no room for extra page flags on 32 bit, this feature uses extended page flags when compiled on 32 bit. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: kpageidle requires an MMU] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: decouple from page-flags rework] Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Reviewed-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10proc: add kpagecgroup fileVladimir Davydov
/proc/kpagecgroup contains a 64-bit inode number of the memory cgroup each page is charged to, indexed by PFN. Having this information is useful for estimating a cgroup working set size. The file is present if CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR && CONFIG_MEMCG. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Reviewed-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-08mm: /proc/pid/smaps:: show proportional swap share of the mappingMinchan Kim
We want to know per-process workingset size for smart memory management on userland and we use swap(ex, zram) heavily to maximize memory efficiency so workingset includes swap as well as RSS. On such system, if there are lots of shared anonymous pages, it's really hard to figure out exactly how many each process consumes memory(ie, rss + wap) if the system has lots of shared anonymous memory(e.g, android). This patch introduces SwapPss field on /proc/<pid>/smaps so we can get more exact workingset size per process. Bongkyu tested it. Result is below. 1. 50M used swap SwapTotal: 461976 kB SwapFree: 411192 kB $ adb shell cat /proc/*/smaps | grep "SwapPss:" | awk '{sum += $2} END {print sum}'; 48236 $ adb shell cat /proc/*/smaps | grep "Swap:" | awk '{sum += $2} END {print sum}'; 141184 2. 240M used swap SwapTotal: 461976 kB SwapFree: 216808 kB $ adb shell cat /proc/*/smaps | grep "SwapPss:" | awk '{sum += $2} END {print sum}'; 230315 $ adb shell cat /proc/*/smaps | grep "Swap:" | awk '{sum += $2} END {print sum}'; 1387744 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: simplify kunmap_atomic() call] Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Reported-by: Bongkyu Kim <bongkyu.kim@lge.com> Tested-by: Bongkyu Kim <bongkyu.kim@lge.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-08pagemap: add mmap-exclusive bit for marking pages mapped only hereKonstantin Khlebnikov
This patch sets bit 56 in pagemap if this page is mapped only once. It allows to detect exclusively used pages without exposing PFN: present file exclusive state 0 0 0 non-present 1 1 0 file page mapped somewhere else 1 1 1 file page mapped only here 1 0 0 anon non-CoWed page (shared with parent/child) 1 0 1 anon CoWed page (or never forked) CoWed pages in (MAP_FILE | MAP_PRIVATE) areas are anon in this context. MMap-exclusive bit doesn't reflect potential page-sharing via swapcache: page could be mapped once but has several swap-ptes which point to it. Application could detect that by swap bit in pagemap entry and touch that pte via /proc/pid/mem to get real information. See http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAEVpBa+_RyACkhODZrRvQLs80iy0sqpdrd0AaP_-tgnX3Y9yNQ@mail.gmail.com Requested by Mark Williamson. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix spello] Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Reviewed-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com> Tested-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-08pagemap: hide physical addresses from non-privileged usersKonstantin Khlebnikov
This patch makes pagemap readable for normal users and hides physical addresses from them. For some use-cases PFN isn't required at all. See http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1425935472-17949-1-git-send-email-kirill@shutemov.name Fixes: ab676b7d6fbf ("pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com> Tested-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-08pagemap: rework hugetlb and thp reportKonstantin Khlebnikov
This patch moves pmd dissection out of reporting loop: huge pages are reported as bunch of normal pages with contiguous PFNs. Add missing "FILE" bit in hugetlb vmas. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com> Tested-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-08pagemap: switch to the new format and do some cleanupKonstantin Khlebnikov
This patch removes page-shift bits (scheduled to remove since 3.11) and completes migration to the new bit layout. Also it cleans messy macro. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com> Tested-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-08pagemap: check permissions and capabilities at open timeKonstantin Khlebnikov
This patchset makes pagemap useable again in the safe way (after row hammer bug it was made CAP_SYS_ADMIN-only). This patchset restores access for non-privileged users but hides PFNs from them. Also it adds bit 'map-exclusive' which is set if page is mapped only here: it helps in estimation of working set without exposing pfns and allows to distinguish CoWed and non-CoWed private anonymous pages. Second patch removes page-shift bits and completes migration to the new pagemap format: flags soft-dirty and mmap-exclusive are available only in the new format. This patch (of 5): This patch moves permission checks from pagemap_read() into pagemap_open(). Pointer to mm is saved in file->private_data. This reference pins only mm_struct itself. /proc/*/mem, maps, smaps already work in the same way. See http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFyKpWrt_Ajzh1rzp_GcwZ4=6Y=kOv8hBz172CFJp6L8Tg@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com> Tested-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-04userfaultfd: add VM_UFFD_MISSING and VM_UFFD_WPAndrea Arcangeli
These two flags gets set in vma->vm_flags to tell the VM common code if the userfaultfd is armed and in which mode (only tracking missing faults, only tracking wrprotect faults or both). If neither flags is set it means the userfaultfd is not armed on the vma. Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com> Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com> Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" <peter.huangpeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-04capabilities: ambient capabilitiesAndy Lutomirski
Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn. This patch is heavily based on Christoph's patch. ===== The status quo ===== On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel. To perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that they hold. Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP), inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X). When the kernel checks for a capability, it checks pE. The other capability masks serve to modify what capabilities can be in pE. Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time. If a task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI. If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it can remove capabilities from X. Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also have capabilities. A file can have no capabilty information at all [1]. If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP) and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2]. File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them. A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e. the binary itself if that binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old value and pZ' represents the new value. The rules are: pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) pI' = pI pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0) X is unchanged For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior. Similarly, if euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently (primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set). For nonroot users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP are empty and fE is false. As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set, LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc. This is rather messy. We've learned that making any changes is dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged program to change its security state in a way that persists cross execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped programs to be exploited for privilege escalation. ===== The problem ===== Capability inheritance is basically useless. If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'. This means that you can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated capabilities if you aren't root. On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files. This causes pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works. No one does this because it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems. If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with secure exec rules, breaking many things. This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use capabilities for anything useful. ===== The proposed change ===== This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA). pA does what most people expect pI to do. pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not set in both pP and pI. Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from pA. This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities still do so, with a complication. Because capability inheritance is so broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and then calling execve effectively drops capabilities. Therefore, setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set. Processes that don't like this can re-add bits to pA afterwards. The capability evolution rules are changed: pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA) pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA' pI' = pI pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA') X is unchanged If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA. If you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE. For example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can automatically bind low-numbered ports. Hallelujah! Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace) and unprivileged process trees. This is currently more or less impossible. Hallelujah! You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch. Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that capability. If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping privileges will still work. It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could possibly be reduced without causing serious problems. Specifically, if we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker *already* has those capabilities. This would make me nervous, though -- setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so, and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have unexpected side effects. (Whether these unexpected side effects would be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more paranoid route. We can revisit this later. An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting ambient capabilities. I think that this would be annoying and would make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities (CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than it is with this patch. ===== Footnotes ===== [1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false. The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason. [2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong. fE is *not* a mask; it's a single bit. This has probably confused every single person who has tried to use file capabilities. [3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results from thinking about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly discarded. Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2 Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality (from Christoph): /* * Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell * that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities. * * (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> * Released under: GPL v3 or later. * * * Compile using: * * gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng * * This program must have the following capabilities to run properly: * Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE * * A command to equip the binary with the right caps is: * * setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test * * * To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes: * * ./ambient_test /bin/bash * * * Verifying that it works: * * From the bash spawed by ambient_test run * * cat /proc/$$/status * * and have a look at the capabilities. */ #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <cap-ng.h> #include <sys/prctl.h> #include <linux/capability.h> /* * Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed * when the /usr/include files have these defined. */ #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3 #define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4 static void set_ambient_cap(int cap) { int rc; capng_get_caps_process(); rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap); if (rc) { printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n"); exit(2); } capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS); /* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */ if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) { perror("Cannot set cap"); exit(1); } } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int rc; set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW); set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN); set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE); printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n"); if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1)) perror("Cannot exec"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com> Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com> Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-01Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "This finishes up the changes to ensure proc and sysfs do not start implementing executable files, as the there are application today that are only secure because such files do not exist. It akso fixes a long standing misfeature of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo that did not show the proper source for files bind mounted from /proc/<pid>/ns/*. It also straightens out the handling of clone flags related to user namespaces, fixing an unnecessary failure of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) when files such as /proc/<pid>/environ are read while <pid> is calling unshare. This winds up fixing a minor bug in unshare flag handling that dates back to the first version of unshare in the kernel. Finally, this fixes a minor regression caused by the introduction of sysfs_create_mount_point, which broke someone's in house application, by restoring the size of /sys/fs/cgroup to 0 bytes. Apparently that application uses the directory size to determine if a tmpfs is mounted on /sys/fs/cgroup. The bind mount escape fixes are present in Al Viros for-next branch. and I expect them to come from there. The bind mount escape is the last of the user namespace related security bugs that I am aware of" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0. userns,pidns: Force thread group sharing, not signal handler sharing. unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm nsfs: Add a show_path method to fix mountinfo mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid if !SB_I_NOEXEC vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
2015-07-18Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Two families of fixes: - Fix an FPU context related boot crash on newer x86 hardware with larger context sizes than what most people test. To fix this without ugly kludges or extensive reverts we had to touch core task allocator, to allow x86 to determine the task size dynamically, at boot time. I've tested it on a number of x86 platforms, and I cross-built it to a handful of architectures: (warns) (warns) testing x86-64: -git: pass ( 0), -tip: pass ( 0) testing x86-32: -git: pass ( 0), -tip: pass ( 0) testing arm: -git: pass ( 1359), -tip: pass ( 1359) testing cris: -git: pass ( 1031), -tip: pass ( 1031) testing m32r: -git: pass ( 1135), -tip: pass ( 1135) testing m68k: -git: pass ( 1471), -tip: pass ( 1471) testing mips: -git: pass ( 1162), -tip: pass ( 1162) testing mn10300: -git: pass ( 1058), -tip: pass ( 1058) testing parisc: -git: pass ( 1846), -tip: pass ( 1846) testing sparc: -git: pass ( 1185), -tip: pass ( 1185) ... so I hope the cross-arch impact 'none', as intended. (by Dave Hansen) - Fix various NMI handling related bugs unearthed by the big asm code rewrite and generally make the NMI code more robust and more maintainable while at it. These changes are a bit late in the cycle, I hope they are still acceptable. (by Andy Lutomirski)" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/fpu, sched: Introduce CONFIG_ARCH_WANTS_DYNAMIC_TASK_STRUCT and use it on x86 x86/fpu, sched: Dynamically allocate 'struct fpu' x86/entry/64, x86/nmi/64: Add CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY NMI testing code x86/nmi/64: Make the "NMI executing" variable more consistent x86/nmi/64: Minor asm simplification x86/nmi/64: Use DF to avoid userspace RSP confusing nested NMI detection x86/nmi/64: Reorder nested NMI checks x86/nmi/64: Improve nested NMI comments x86/nmi/64: Switch stacks on userspace NMI entry x86/nmi/64: Remove asm code that saves CR2 x86/nmi: Enable nested do_nmi() handling for 64-bit kernels
2015-07-18x86/fpu, sched: Introduce CONFIG_ARCH_WANTS_DYNAMIC_TASK_STRUCT and use it ↵Ingo Molnar
on x86 Don't burden architectures without dynamic task_struct sizing with the overhead of dynamic sizing. Also optimize the x86 code a bit by caching task_struct_size. Acked-and-Tested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1437128892-9831-3-git-send-email-mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-07-18x86/fpu, sched: Dynamically allocate 'struct fpu'Dave Hansen
The FPU rewrite removed the dynamic allocations of 'struct fpu'. But, this potentially wastes massive amounts of memory (2k per task on systems that do not have AVX-512 for instance). Instead of having a separate slab, this patch just appends the space that we need to the 'task_struct' which we dynamically allocate already. This saves from doing an extra slab allocation at fork(). The only real downside here is that we have to stick everything and the end of the task_struct. But, I think the BUILD_BUG_ON()s I stuck in there should keep that from being too fragile. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1437128892-9831-2-git-send-email-mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-07-17/proc/$PID/cmdline: fixup empty ARGV caseAlexey Dobriyan
/proc/*/cmdline code checks if it should look at ENVP area by checking last byte of ARGV area: rv = access_remote_vm(mm, arg_end - 1, &c, 1, 0); if (rv <= 0) goto out_free_page; If ARGV is somehow made empty (by doing execve(..., NULL, ...) or manually setting ->arg_start and ->arg_end to equal values), the decision will be based on byte which doesn't even belong to ARGV/ENVP. So, quickly check if ARGV area is empty and report 0 to match previous behaviour. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-07-17fs, proc: add help for CONFIG_PROC_CHILDRENIago López Galeiras
The purpose of the option was documented in Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt but the help text was missing. Add small help text that also points to the documentation. Signed-off-by: Iago López Galeiras <iago@endocode.com> Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-07-10vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.Eric W. Biederman
Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs. Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems. Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and enforce that flag. Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the execute bit is cleared. The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects. This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs. Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions). Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-04Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro: "Assorted VFS fixes and related cleanups (IMO the most interesting in that part are f_path-related things and Eric's descriptor-related stuff). UFS regression fixes (it got broken last cycle). 9P fixes. fs-cache series, DAX patches, Jan's file_remove_suid() work" [ I'd say this is much more than "fixes and related cleanups". The file_table locking rule change by Eric Dumazet is a rather big and fundamental update even if the patch isn't huge. - Linus ] * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (49 commits) 9p: cope with bogus responses from server in p9_client_{read,write} p9_client_write(): avoid double p9_free_req() 9p: forgetting to cancel request on interrupted zero-copy RPC dax: bdev_direct_access() may sleep block: Add support for DAX reads/writes to block devices dax: Use copy_from_iter_nocache dax: Add block size note to documentation fs/file.c: __fget() and dup2() atomicity rules fs/file.c: don't acquire files->file_lock in fd_install() fs:super:get_anon_bdev: fix race condition could cause dev exceed its upper limitation vfs: avoid creation of inode number 0 in get_next_ino namei: make set_root_rcu() return void make simple_positive() public ufs: use dir_pages instead of ufs_dir_pages() pagemap.h: move dir_pages() over there remove the pointless include of lglock.h fs: cleanup slight list_entry abuse xfs: Correctly lock inode when removing suid and file capabilities fs: Call security_ops->inode_killpriv on truncate fs: Provide function telling whether file_remove_privs() will do anything ...
2015-07-04Merge branch 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull scheduler fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Debug info and other statistics fixes and related enhancements" * 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: sched/numa: Fix numa balancing stats in /proc/pid/sched sched/numa: Show numa_group ID in /proc/sched_debug task listings sched/debug: Move print_cfs_rq() declaration to kernel/sched/sched.h sched/stat: Expose /proc/pid/schedstat if CONFIG_SCHED_INFO=y sched/stat: Simplify the sched_info accounting dependency
2015-07-04sched/stat: Expose /proc/pid/schedstat if CONFIG_SCHED_INFO=yNaveen N. Rao
Expand /proc/pid/schedstat output: - enable it on CONFIG_TASK_DELAY_ACCT=y && !CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS kernels. - dump all zeroes on kernels that are booted with the 'nodelayacct' option, which boot option disables delay accounting on CONFIG_TASK_DELAY_ACCT=y kernels. Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl Cc: ricklind@us.ibm.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5ccbef17d4bc841084ea6e6421d4e4a23b7b806f.1435654789.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-07-03Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all. Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and sysfs. Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced. There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement. Only filesystems mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but the test for empty directories was insufficient. So in my tree directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are created specially. Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and shows that the directory is empty. Special creation of directories for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about it's purpose. I asked container developers from the various container projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount points on proc and sysfs that are created specially. This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of proc and sysfs. I expected this to be the boring part of the work but unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags on the previous mount of proc and sysfs. So for now only the atime, read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep consistent are enforced. Dealing with the noexec and nosuid attributes remains for another time. This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed. Recently readlink of /proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was converted) and is not now actively wrong. There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that I will mention briefly. It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount. At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem. With user namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename to outside of the bind mount. This is challenging to fix and doubly so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the performance part of pathname resolution. As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once they are recognized" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points. kernfs: Add support for always empty directories. proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints. fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories. vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
2015-07-01proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount pointsEric W. Biederman
Add a new function proc_create_mount_point that when used to creates a directory that can not be added to. Add a new function is_empty_pde to test if a function is a mount point. Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when reporting a permanently empty directory to the vfs. Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories. Update /proc/openprom and /proc/fs/nfsd to be permanently empty directories. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-01sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.Eric W. Biederman
Add a magic sysctl table sysctl_mount_point that when used to create a directory forces that directory to be permanently empty. Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when accessing permanently empty directories. Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories. Update /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc to be a permanently empty directory. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-06-25fs, proc: introduce CONFIG_PROC_CHILDRENIago López Galeiras
Commit 818411616baf ("fs, proc: introduce /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children entry") introduced the children entry for checkpoint restore and the file is only available on kernels configured with CONFIG_EXPERT and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. This is available in most distributions (Fedora, Debian, Ubuntu, CoreOS) because they usually enable CONFIG_EXPERT and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. But Arch does not enable CONFIG_EXPERT or CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. However, the children proc file is useful outside of checkpoint restore. I would like to use it in rkt. The rkt process exec() another program it does not control, and that other program will fork()+exec() a child process. I would like to find the pid of the child process from an external tool without iterating in /proc over all processes to find which one has a parent pid equal to rkt. This commit introduces CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN and makes CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE select it. This allows enabling /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children without needing to enable CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE and CONFIG_EXPERT. Alban tested that /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children is present when the kernel is configured with CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN=y but without CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE Signed-off-by: Iago López Galeiras <iago@endocode.com> Tested-by: Alban Crequy <alban@endocode.com> Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Djalal Harouni <djalal@endocode.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25proc: fix PAGE_SIZE limit of /proc/$PID/cmdlineAlexey Dobriyan
/proc/$PID/cmdline truncates output at PAGE_SIZE. It is easy to see with $ cat /proc/self/cmdline $(seq 1037) 2>/dev/null However, command line size was never limited to PAGE_SIZE but to 128 KB and relatively recently limitation was removed altogether. People noticed and ask questions: http://stackoverflow.com/questions/199130/how-do-i-increase-the-proc-pid-cmdline-4096-byte-limit seq file interface is not OK, because it kmalloc's for whole output and open + read(, 1) + sleep will pin arbitrary amounts of kernel memory. To not do that, limit must be imposed which is incompatible with arbitrary sized command lines. I apologize for hairy code, but this it direct consequence of command line layout in memory and hacks to support things like "init [3]". The loops are "unrolled" otherwise it is either macros which hide control flow or functions with 7-8 arguments with equal line count. There should be real setproctitle(2) or something. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix a billion min() warnings] Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Tested-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-24procfs: treat parked tasks as sleeping for task stateChris Metcalf
Allowing watchdog threads to be parked means that we now have the opportunity of actually seeing persistent parked threads in the output of /proc/<pid>/stat and /proc/<pid>/status. The existing code reported such threads as "Running", which is kind-of true if you think of the case where we park them as part of taking cpus offline. But if we allow parking them indefinitely, "Running" is pretty misleading, so we report them as "Sleeping" instead. We could simply report them with a new string, "Parked", but it feels like it's a bit risky for userspace to see unexpected new values; the output is already documented in Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt, and it seems like a mistake to change that lightly. The scheduler does report parked tasks with a "P" in debugging output from sched_show_task() or dump_cpu_task(), but that's a different API. Similarly, the trace_ctxwake_* routines report a "P" for parked tasks, but again, different API. This change seemed slightly cleaner than updating the task_state_array to have additional rows. TASK_DEAD should be subsumed by the exit_state bits; TASK_WAKEKILL is just a modifier; and TASK_WAKING can very reasonably be reported as "Running" (as it is now). Only TASK_PARKED shows up with unreasonable output here. Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-23vfs: add seq_file_path() helperMiklos Szeredi
Turn seq_path(..., &file->f_path, ...); into seq_file_path(..., file, ...); Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-05-13mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespaceEric W. Biederman
Fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are a very special case that works very much like a bind mount. Unfortunately the current structure can not preserve the MNT_LOCK... mount flags. Therefore refactor the logic into a form that can be modified to preserve those lock bits. Add a new filesystem flag FS_USERNS_VISIBLE that requires some mount of the filesystem be fully visible in the current mount namespace, before the filesystem may be mounted. Move the logic for calling fs_fully_visible from proc and sysfs into fs/namespace.c where it has greater access to mount namespace state. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-05-11switch ->put_link() from dentry to inodeAl Viro
only one instance looks at that argument at all; that sole exception wants inode rather than dentry. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-05-10don't pass nameidata to ->follow_link()Al Viro
its only use is getting passed to nd_jump_link(), which can obtain it from current->nameidata Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>