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path: root/fs/namespace.c
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2013-05-04create_mnt_ns: unidiomatic use of list_add()Al Viro
while list_add(A, B) and list_add(B, A) are equivalent when both A and B are guaranteed to be empty, the usual idiom is list_add(what, where), not the other way round... Not a bug per se, but only by accident and it makes RTFS harder for no good reason. Spotted-by: Rajat Sharma <fs.rajat@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-05-04do_mount(): fix a leak introduced in 3.9 ("mount: consolidate permission ↵Al Viro
checks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Bisected-by: Michael Leun <lkml20130126@newton.leun.net> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-05-01Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull VFS updates from Al Viro, Misc cleanups all over the place, mainly wrt /proc interfaces (switch create_proc_entry to proc_create(), get rid of the deprecated create_proc_read_entry() in favor of using proc_create_data() and seq_file etc). 7kloc removed. * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (204 commits) don't bother with deferred freeing of fdtables proc: Move non-public stuff from linux/proc_fs.h to fs/proc/internal.h proc: Make the PROC_I() and PDE() macros internal to procfs proc: Supply a function to remove a proc entry by PDE take cgroup_open() and cpuset_open() to fs/proc/base.c ppc: Clean up scanlog ppc: Clean up rtas_flash driver somewhat hostap: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree() drm: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree() drm: proc: Use minor->index to label things, not PDE->name drm: Constify drm_proc_list[] zoran: Don't print proc_dir_entry data in debug reiserfs: Don't access the proc_dir_entry in r_open(), r_start() r_show() proc: Supply an accessor for getting the data from a PDE's parent airo: Use remove_proc_subtree() rtl8192u: Don't need to save device proc dir PDE rtl8187se: Use a dir under /proc/net/r8180/ proc: Add proc_mkdir_data() proc: Move some bits from linux/proc_fs.h to linux/{of.h,signal.h,tty.h} proc: Move PDE_NET() to fs/proc/proc_net.c ...
2013-05-01proc: Split the namespace stuff out into linux/proc_ns.hDavid Howells
Split the proc namespace stuff out into linux/proc_ns.h. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-04-09Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro: "A nasty bug in fs/namespace.c caught by Andrey + a couple of less serious unpleasantness - ecryptfs misc device playing hopeless games with try_module_get() and palinfo procfs support being... not quite correctly done, to be polite." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: mnt: release locks on error path in do_loopback palinfo fixes procfs: add proc_remove_subtree() ecryptfs: close rmmod race
2013-04-09fold release_mounts() into namespace_unlock()Al Viro
... and provide namespace_lock() as a trivial wrapper; switch to those two consistently. Result is patterned after rtnl_lock/rtnl_unlock pair. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-04-09switch unlock_mount() to namespace_unlock(), convert all umount_tree() callersAl Viro
which allows to kill the last argument of umount_tree() and make release_mounts() static. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-04-09more conversions to namespace_unlock()Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-04-09get rid of the second argument of shrink_submounts()Al Viro
... it's always &unmounted. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-04-09saner umount_tree()/release_mounts(), part 1Al Viro
global list of release_mounts() fodder, protected by namespace_sem; eventually, all umount_tree() callers will use it as kill list. Helper picking the contents of that list, releasing namespace_sem and doing release_mounts() on what it got. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-04-09get rid of full-hash scan on detaching vfsmountsAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-04-09mnt: release locks on error path in do_loopbackAndrey Vagin
do_loopback calls lock_mount(path) and forget to unlock_mount if clone_mnt or copy_mnt fails. [ 77.661566] ================================================ [ 77.662939] [ BUG: lock held when returning to user space! ] [ 77.664104] 3.9.0-rc5+ #17 Not tainted [ 77.664982] ------------------------------------------------ [ 77.666488] mount/514 is leaving the kernel with locks still held! [ 77.668027] 2 locks held by mount/514: [ 77.668817] #0: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#7){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811cca22>] lock_mount+0x32/0xe0 [ 77.671755] #1: (&namespace_sem){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffff811cca3a>] lock_mount+0x4a/0xe0 Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-03-27userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mountedEric W. Biederman
Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already mounted when the user namespace is created. proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that is shared between every instance. Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time the user namespace was created. In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all (some form of mount namespace jail). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-03-27vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespacesEric W. Biederman
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount namespace. Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace that requires fewer privileges. When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set. This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less privileged mount namespace. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-03-27vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mountsEric W. Biederman
When a read-only bind mount is copied from mount namespace in a higher privileged user namespace to a mount namespace in a lesser privileged user namespace, it should not be possible to remove the the read-only restriction. Add a MNT_LOCK_READONLY mount flag to indicate that a mount must remain read-only. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-03-27userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrootedEric W. Biederman
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is established by setting the root directory will not be violated by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace creation. Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current root directory. For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access can not be violated by changing the root directory. Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical limitation for using user namespaces. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-02-22new helper: file_inode(file)Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-02-22mount: consolidate permission checksAl Viro
... and ask for global CAP_SYS_ADMIN only for superblock-level remounts Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-02-22get rid of unprotected dereferencing of mnt->mnt_nsAl Viro
It's safe only under namespace_sem or vfsmount_lock; all places in fs/namespace.c that want mnt->mnt_ns->user_ns actually want to use current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns (note the calls of check_mnt() in there). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-20vfs, freeze: use ACCESS_ONCE() to guard access to ->mnt_flagsMiao Xie
The compiler may optimize the while loop and make the check just be done once, so we should use ACCESS_ONCE() to guard access to ->mnt_flags Signed-off-by: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-12-14userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns.Eric W. Biederman
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> found a nasty little bug in the permissions of setns. With unprivileged user namespaces it became possible to create new namespaces without privilege. However the setns calls were relaxed to only require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the user nameapce of the targed namespace. Which made the following nasty sequence possible. pid = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS); if (pid == 0) { /* child */ system("mount --bind /home/me/passwd /etc/passwd"); } else if (pid != 0) { /* parent */ char path[PATH_MAX]; snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%u/ns/mnt"); fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); setns(fd, 0); system("su -"); } Prevent this possibility by requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current user namespace when joing all but the user namespace. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-11-20proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors.Eric W. Biederman
Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc inode for every namespace in proc. A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test to see if two processes are in the same namespace. This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks impossible. We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors) but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important. I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so their structures can be statically initialized. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-11-19userns: fix return value on mntns_install() failureZhao Hongjiang
Change return value from -EINVAL to -EPERM when the permission check fails. Signed-off-by: Zhao Hongjiang <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-11-19vfs: Allow unprivileged manipulation of the mount namespace.Eric W. Biederman
- Add a filesystem flag to mark filesystems that are safe to mount as an unprivileged user. - Add a filesystem flag to mark filesystems that don't need MNT_NODEV when mounted by an unprivileged user. - Relax the permission checks to allow unprivileged users that have CAP_SYS_ADMIN permissions in the user namespace referred to by the current mount namespace to be allowed to mount, unmount, and move filesystems. Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-11-19vfs: Only support slave subtrees across different user namespacesEric W. Biederman
Sharing mount subtress with mount namespaces created by unprivileged users allows unprivileged mounts created by unprivileged users to propagate to mount namespaces controlled by privileged users. Prevent nasty consequences by changing shared subtrees to slave subtress when an unprivileged users creates a new mount namespace. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-11-19vfs: Add a user namespace reference from struct mnt_namespaceEric W. Biederman
This will allow for support for unprivileged mounts in a new user namespace. Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-11-19vfs: Add setns support for the mount namespaceEric W. Biederman
setns support for the mount namespace is a little tricky as an arbitrary decision must be made about what to set fs->root and fs->pwd to, as there is no expectation of a relationship between the two mount namespaces. Therefore I arbitrarily find the root mount point, and follow every mount on top of it to find the top of the mount stack. Then I set fs->root and fs->pwd to that location. The topmost root of the mount stack seems like a reasonable place to be. Bind mount support for the mount namespace inodes has the possibility of creating circular dependencies between mount namespaces. Circular dependencies can result in loops that prevent mount namespaces from every being freed. I avoid creating those circular dependencies by adding a sequence number to the mount namespace and require all bind mounts be of a younger mount namespace into an older mount namespace. Add a helper function proc_ns_inode so it is possible to detect when we are attempting to bind mound a namespace inode. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-10-12vfs: define struct filename and have getname() return itJeff Layton
getname() is intended to copy pathname strings from userspace into a kernel buffer. The result is just a string in kernel space. It would however be quite helpful to be able to attach some ancillary info to the string. For instance, we could attach some audit-related info to reduce the amount of audit-related processing needed. When auditing is enabled, we could also call getname() on the string more than once and not need to recopy it from userspace. This patchset converts the getname()/putname() interfaces to return a struct instead of a string. For now, the struct just tracks the string in kernel space and the original userland pointer for it. Later, we'll add other information to the struct as it becomes convenient. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-11consitify do_mount() argumentsAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-09-22do_add_mount()/umount -l racesAl Viro
normally we deal with lock_mount()/umount races by checking that mountpoint to be is still in our namespace after lock_mount() has been done. However, do_add_mount() skips that check when called with MNT_SHRINKABLE in flags (i.e. from finish_automount()). The reason is that ->mnt_ns may be a temporary namespace created exactly to contain automounts a-la NFS4 referral handling. It's not the namespace of the caller, though, so check_mnt() would fail here. We still need to check that ->mnt_ns is non-NULL in that case, though. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-31fs: Add freezing handling to mnt_want_write() / mnt_drop_write()Jan Kara
Most of places where we want freeze protection coincides with the places where we also have remount-ro protection. So make mnt_want_write() and mnt_drop_write() (and their _file alternative) prevent freezing as well. For the few cases that are really interested only in remount-ro protection provide new function variants. BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/897421 Tested-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Tested-by: Peter M. Petrakis <peter.petrakis@canonical.com> Tested-by: Dann Frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com> Tested-by: Massimo Morana <massimo.morana@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14VFS: Comment mount following codeDavid Howells
Add comments describing what the directions "up" and "down" mean and ref count handling to the VFS mount following family of functions. Signed-off-by: Valerie Aurora <vaurora@redhat.com> (Original author) Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14VFS: Make clone_mnt()/copy_tree()/collect_mounts() return errorsDavid Howells
copy_tree() can theoretically fail in a case other than ENOMEM, but always returns NULL which is interpreted by callers as -ENOMEM. Change it to return an explicit error. Also change clone_mnt() for consistency and because union mounts will add new error cases. Thanks to Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> for a bug fix. [AV: folded braino fix by Dan Carpenter] Original-author: Valerie Aurora <vaurora@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Valerie Aurora <valerie.aurora@gmail.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14get rid of magic in proc_namespace.cAl Viro
don't rely on proc_mounts->m being the first field; container_of() is there for purpose. No need to bother with ->private, while we are at it - the same container_of will do nicely. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-14get rid of ->mnt_longtermAl Viro
it's enough to set ->mnt_ns of internal vfsmounts to something distinct from all struct mnt_namespace out there; then we can just use the check for ->mnt_ns != NULL in the fast path of mntput_no_expire() Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-30vfs: umount_tree() might be called on subtree that had never made itAl Viro
__mnt_make_shortterm() in there undoes the effect of __mnt_make_longterm() we'd done back when we set ->mnt_ns non-NULL; it should not be done to vfsmounts that had never gone through commit_tree() and friends. Kudos to lczerner for catching that one... Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-29brlocks/lglocks: API cleanupsAndi Kleen
lglocks and brlocks are currently generated with some complicated macros in lglock.h. But there's no reason to not just use common utility functions and put all the data into a common data structure. In preparation, this patch changes the API to look more like normal function calls with pointers, not magic macros. The patch is rather large because I move over all users in one go to keep it bisectable. This impacts the VFS somewhat in terms of lines changed. But no actual behaviour change. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-08Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial: (53 commits) Kconfig: acpi: Fix typo in comment. misc latin1 to utf8 conversions devres: Fix a typo in devm_kfree comment btrfs: free-space-cache.c: remove extra semicolon. fat: Spelling s/obsolate/obsolete/g SCSI, pmcraid: Fix spelling error in a pmcraid_err() call tools/power turbostat: update fields in manpage mac80211: drop spelling fix types.h: fix comment spelling for 'architectures' typo fixes: aera -> area, exntension -> extension devices.txt: Fix typo of 'VMware'. sis900: Fix enum typo 'sis900_rx_bufer_status' decompress_bunzip2: remove invalid vi modeline treewide: Fix comment and string typo 'bufer' hyper-v: Update MAINTAINERS treewide: Fix typos in various parts of the kernel, and fix some comments. clockevents: drop unknown Kconfig symbol GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_MIGR gpio: Kconfig: drop unknown symbol 'CS5535_GPIO' leds: Kconfig: Fix typo 'D2NET_V2' sound: Kconfig: drop unknown symbol ARCH_CLPS7500 ... Fix up trivial conflicts in arch/powerpc/platforms/40x/Kconfig (some new kconfig additions, close to removed commented-out old ones)
2012-01-06vfs: prevent remount read-only if pending removesMiklos Szeredi
If there are any inodes on the super block that have been unlinked (i_nlink == 0) but have not yet been deleted then prevent the remounting the super block read-only. Reported-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-06vfs: protect remounting superblock read-onlyMiklos Szeredi
Currently remouting superblock read-only is racy in a major way. With the per mount read-only infrastructure it is now possible to prevent most races, which this patch attempts. Before starting the remount read-only, iterate through all mounts belonging to the superblock and if none of them have any pending writes, set sb->s_readonly_remount. This indicates that remount is in progress and no further write requests are allowed. If the remount succeeds set MS_RDONLY and reset s_readonly_remount. If the remounting is unsuccessful just reset s_readonly_remount. This can result in transient EROFS errors, despite the fact the remount failed. Unfortunately hodling off writes is difficult as remount itself may touch the filesystem (e.g. through load_nls()) which would deadlock. A later patch deals with delayed writes due to nlink going to zero. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-06vfs: keep list of mounts for each superblockMiklos Szeredi
Keep track of vfsmounts belonging to a superblock. List is protected by vfsmount_lock. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-06vfs: switch ->show_options() to struct dentry *Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03vfs: trim includes a bitAl Viro
[folded fix for missing magic.h from Tetsuo Handa] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03switch mnt_namespace ->root to struct mountAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03vfs: take /proc/*/mounts and friends to fs/proc_namespace.cAl Viro
rationale: that stuff is far tighter bound to fs/namespace.c than to the guts of procfs proper. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03vfs: opencode mntget() mnt_set_mountpoint()Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03vfs: spread struct mount - remaining argument of next_mnt()Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03vfs: move fsnotify junk to struct mountAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03vfs: move mnt_devnameAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03vfs: move mnt_list to struct mountAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>