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2017-11-07x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is activeTom Lendacky
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) does not support string I/O, so unroll the string I/O operation into a loop operating on one element at a time. [ tglx: Gave the static key a real name instead of the obscure __sev ] Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-14-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-11-07x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV activeTom Lendacky
Early in the boot process, add checks to determine if the kernel is running with Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) active. Checking for SEV requires checking that the kernel is running under a hypervisor (CPUID 0x00000001, bit 31), that the SEV feature is available (CPUID 0x8000001f, bit 1) and then checking a non-interceptable SEV MSR (0xc0010131, bit 0). This check is required so that during early compressed kernel booting the pagetables (both the boot pagetables and KASLR pagetables (if enabled) are updated to include the encryption mask so that when the kernel is decompressed into encrypted memory, it can boot properly. After the kernel is decompressed and continues booting the same logic is used to check if SEV is active and set a flag indicating so. This allows to distinguish between SME and SEV, each of which have unique differences in how certain things are handled: e.g. DMA (always bounce buffered with SEV) or EFI tables (always access decrypted with SME). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-11-07x86/mm: Add DMA support for SEV memory encryptionTom Lendacky
DMA access to encrypted memory cannot be performed when SEV is active. In order for DMA to properly work when SEV is active, the SWIOTLB bounce buffers must be used. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>C Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-12-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-11-07x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pagesTom Lendacky
In order for memory pages to be properly mapped when SEV is active, it's necessary to use the PAGE_KERNEL protection attribute as the base protection. This ensures that memory mapping of, e.g. ACPI tables, receives the proper mapping attributes. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-11-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-11-07resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callbackTom Lendacky
In preperation for a new function that will need additional resource information during the resource walk, update the resource walk callback to pass the resource structure. Since the current callback start and end arguments are pulled from the resource structure, the callback functions can obtain them from the resource structure directly. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-10-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-11-07x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is activeTom Lendacky
EFI data is encrypted when the kernel is run under SEV. Update the page table references to be sure the EFI memory areas are accessed encrypted. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-8-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-11-07x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changesTom Lendacky
The current code checks only for sme_active() when determining whether to perform the encryption attribute change. Include sev_active() in this check so that memory attribute changes can occur under SME and SEV. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-7-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-11-07x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEVTom Lendacky
When Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is active, boot data (such as EFI related data, setup data) is encrypted and needs to be accessed as such when mapped. Update the architecture override in early_memremap to keep the encryption attribute when mapping this data. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-6-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-11-07x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEVTom Lendacky
When SEV is active the trampoline area will need to be in encrypted memory so only mark the area decrypted if SME is active. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-5-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-11-07x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEVTom Lendacky
When SEV is active the initrd/initramfs will already have already been placed in memory encrypted so do not try to encrypt it. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-4-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-11-07x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) supportTom Lendacky
Provide support for Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). This initial support defines a flag that is used by the kernel to determine if it is running with SEV active. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-3-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-11-07kprobes, x86/alternatives: Use text_mutex to protect smp_alt_modulesZhou Chengming
We use alternatives_text_reserved() to check if the address is in the fixed pieces of alternative reserved, but the problem is that we don't hold the smp_alt mutex when call this function. So the list traversal may encounter a deleted list_head if another path is doing alternatives_smp_module_del(). One solution is that we can hold smp_alt mutex before call this function, but the difficult point is that the callers of this functions, arch_prepare_kprobe() and arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe(), are called inside the text_mutex. So we must hold smp_alt mutex before we go into these arch dependent code. But we can't now, the smp_alt mutex is the arch dependent part, only x86 has it. Maybe we can export another arch dependent callback to solve this. But there is a simpler way to handle this problem. We can reuse the text_mutex to protect smp_alt_modules instead of using another mutex. And all the arch dependent checks of kprobes are inside the text_mutex, so it's safe now. Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@suse.de Fixes: 2cfa197 "ftrace/alternatives: Introducing *_text_reserved functions" Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509585501-79466-1-git-send-email-zhouchengming1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-07x86/build: Add more generated files to the .gitignore fileChangbin Du
Some of the files generated by the build process were not listed. Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509939179-7556-5-git-send-email-changbin.du@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-07x86/build: Specify -input-charset=utf-8 for mkisofsChangbin Du
It avoids the following warning triggered by newer versions of mkisofs: -input-charset not specified, using utf-8 (detected in locale settings) Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509939179-7556-4-git-send-email-changbin.du@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-07x86/build: Add new paths for isolinux.bin and ldlinux.c32Changbin Du
Recently I failed to build isoimage target, because the path of isolinux.bin changed to /usr/xxx/ISOLINUX/isolinux.bin, as well as ldlinux.c32 which changed to /usr/xxx/syslinux/modules/bios/ldlinux.c32. This patch improves the file search logic: - Show a error message instead of silent fail. - Add above new paths. Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509939179-7556-3-git-send-email-changbin.du@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-07x86/build: Factor out fdimage/isoimage generation commands to standalone scriptChangbin Du
The build messages for fdimage/isoimage generation are pretty unstructured, just the raw shell command blocks are printed. Emit shortened messages similar to existing kbuild messages, and move the Makefile commands into a separate shell script - which is much easier to handle. This patch factors out the commands used for fdimage/isoimage generation from arch/x86/boot/Makefile to a new script arch/x86/boot/genimage.sh. Then it adds the new kbuild command 'genimage' which invokes the new script. All fdimages/isoimage files are now generated by a call to 'genimage' with different parameters. Now 'make isoimage' becomes: ... Kernel: arch/x86/boot/bzImage is ready (#30) GENIMAGE arch/x86/boot/image.iso Size of boot image is 4 sectors -> No emulation 15.37% done, estimate finish Sun Nov 5 23:36:57 2017 30.68% done, estimate finish Sun Nov 5 23:36:57 2017 46.04% done, estimate finish Sun Nov 5 23:36:57 2017 61.35% done, estimate finish Sun Nov 5 23:36:57 2017 76.69% done, estimate finish Sun Nov 5 23:36:57 2017 92.00% done, estimate finish Sun Nov 5 23:36:57 2017 Total translation table size: 2048 Total rockridge attributes bytes: 659 Total directory bytes: 0 Path table size(bytes): 10 Max brk space used 0 32608 extents written (63 MB) Kernel: arch/x86/boot/image.iso is ready Before: Kernel: arch/x86/boot/bzImage is ready (#63) rm -rf arch/x86/boot/isoimage mkdir arch/x86/boot/isoimage for i in lib lib64 share end ; do \ if [ -f /usr/$i/syslinux/isolinux.bin ] ; then \ cp /usr/$i/syslinux/isolinux.bin arch/x86/boot/isoimage ; \ if [ -f /usr/$i/syslinux/ldlinux.c32 ]; then \ cp /usr/$i/syslinux/ldlinux.c32 arch/x86/boot/isoimage ; \ fi ; \ break ; \ fi ; \ if [ $i = end ] ; then exit 1 ; fi ; \ done ... Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509939179-7556-2-git-send-email-changbin.du@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-07x86/cpufeatures: Fix various details in the feature definitionsIngo Molnar
Kept this commit separate from the re-tabulation changes, to make the changes easier to review: - add better explanation for entries with no explanation - fix/enhance the text of some of the entries - fix the vertical alignment of some of the feature number definitions - fix inconsistent capitalization - ... and lots of other small details i.e. make it all more of a coherent unit, instead of a patchwork of years of additions. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171031121723.28524-4-mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-07x86/cpufeatures: Re-tabulate the X86_FEATURE definitionsIngo Molnar
Over the years asm/cpufeatures.h has become somewhat of a mess: the original tabulation style was too narrow, while x86 feature names also kept growing in length, creating frequent field width overflows. Re-tabulate it to make it wider and easier to read/modify. Also harmonize the tabulation of the other defines in this file to match it. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171031121723.28524-3-mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-07Merge branch 'x86/build' into x86/asm, to fix up conflictsIngo Molnar
Conflicts: arch/x86/entry/syscalls/Makefile Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-07Merge branch 'linus' into x86/asm, to pick up fixes and resolve conflictsIngo Molnar
Conflicts: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-06Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu: "This fixes an unaligned panic in x86/sha-mb and a bug in ccm that triggers with certain underlying implementations" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: ccm - preserve the IV buffer crypto: x86/sha1-mb - fix panic due to unaligned access crypto: x86/sha256-mb - fix panic due to unaligned access
2017-11-06x86/mm: Define _PAGE_TABLE using _KERNPG_TABLEBorislav Petkov
... so that the difference is obvious. No functionality change. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171103102028.20284-1-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-06Merge branch 'x86/mm' into x86/asm, to pick up pending changesIngo Molnar
Concentrate x86 MM and asm related changes into a single super-topic, in preparation for larger changes. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-06Merge branch 'x86/fpu' into x86/asm, to pick up fixIngo Molnar
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-05Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Two fixes: - A PCID related revert that fixes power management and performance regressions. - The module loader robustization and sanity check commit is rather fresh, but it looked like a good idea to apply because of the hidden data corruption problem such invalid modules could cause" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/module: Detect and skip invalid relocations Revert "x86/mm: Stop calling leave_mm() in idle code"
2017-11-05Merge branch 'ras-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull RAS fix from Ingo Molnar: "Fix an RCU warning that triggers when /dev/mcelog is used" * 'ras-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mcelog: Get rid of RCU remnants
2017-11-05x86/module: Detect and skip invalid relocationsJosh Poimboeuf
There have been some cases where external tooling (e.g., kpatch-build) creates a corrupt relocation which targets the wrong address. This is a silent failure which can corrupt memory in unexpected places. On x86, the bytes of data being overwritten by relocations are always initialized to zero beforehand. Use that knowledge to add sanity checks to detect such cases before they corrupt memory. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: jeyu@kernel.org Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/37450d6c6225e54db107fba447ce9e56e5f758e9.1509713553.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com [ Restructured the messages, as it's unclear whether the relocation or the target is corrupted. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-04Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds
Pull KVM fixes from Paolo Bonzini: "Fixes for interrupt controller emulation in ARM/ARM64 and x86, plus a one-liner x86 KVM guest fix" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: KVM: x86: Update APICv on APIC reset KVM: VMX: Do not fully reset PI descriptor on vCPU reset kvm: Return -ENODEV from update_persistent_clock KVM: arm/arm64: vgic-its: Check GITS_BASER Valid bit before saving tables KVM: arm/arm64: vgic-its: Check CBASER/BASER validity before enabling the ITS KVM: arm/arm64: vgic-its: Fix vgic_its_restore_collection_table returned value KVM: arm/arm64: vgic-its: Fix return value for device table restore arm/arm64: kvm: Disable branch profiling in HYP code arm/arm64: kvm: Move initialization completion message arm/arm64: KVM: set right LR register value for 32 bit guest when inject abort KVM: arm64: its: Fix missing dynamic allocation check in scan_its_table
2017-11-04Revert "x86/mm: Stop calling leave_mm() in idle code"Andy Lutomirski
This reverts commit 43858b4f25cf0adc5c2ca9cf5ce5fdf2532941e5. The reason I removed the leave_mm() calls in question is because the heuristic wasn't needed after that patch. With the original version of my PCID series, we never flushed a "lazy cpu" (i.e. a CPU running kernel thread) due a flush on the loaded mm. Unfortunately, that caused architectural issues, so now I've reinstated these flushes on non-PCID systems in: commit b956575bed91 ("x86/mm: Flush more aggressively in lazy TLB mode"). That, in turn, gives us a power management and occasionally performance regression as compared to old kernels: a process that goes into a deep idle state on a given CPU and gets its mm flushed due to activity on a different CPU will wake the idle CPU. Reinstate the old ugly heuristic: if a CPU goes into ACPI C3 or an intel_idle state that is likely to cause a TLB flush gets its mm switched to init_mm before going idle. FWIW, this heuristic is lousy. Whether we should change CR3 before idle isn't a good hint except insofar as the performance hit is a bit lower if the TLB is getting flushed by the idle code anyway. What we really want to know is whether we anticipate being idle long enough that the mm is likely to be flushed before we wake up. This is more a matter of the expected latency than the idle state that gets chosen. This heuristic also completely fails on systems that don't know whether the TLB will be flushed (e.g. AMD systems?). OTOH it may be a bit obsolete anyway -- PCID systems don't presently benefit from this heuristic at all. We also shouldn't do this callback from innermost bit of the idle code due to the RCU nastiness it causes. All the information need is available before rcu_idle_enter() needs to happen. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: 43858b4f25cf "x86/mm: Stop calling leave_mm() in idle code" Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c513bbd4e653747213e05bc7062de000bf0202a5.1509793738.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-03x86: CPU: Fix up "cpu MHz" in /proc/cpuinfoRafael J. Wysocki
Commit 890da9cf0983 (Revert "x86: do not use cpufreq_quick_get() for /proc/cpuinfo "cpu MHz"") is not sufficient to restore the previous behavior of "cpu MHz" in /proc/cpuinfo on x86 due to some changes made after the commit it has reverted. To address this, make the code in question use arch_freq_get_on_cpu() which also is used by cpufreq for reporting the current frequency of CPUs and since that function doesn't really depend on cpufreq in any way, drop the CONFIG_CPU_FREQ dependency for the object file containing it. Also refactor arch_freq_get_on_cpu() somewhat to avoid IPIs and return cached values right away if it is called very often over a short time (to prevent user space from triggering IPI storms through it). Fixes: 890da9cf0983 (Revert "x86: do not use cpufreq_quick_get() for /proc/cpuinfo "cpu MHz"") Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.13 - together with 890da9cf0983 Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-03crypto: x86/sha1-mb - fix panic due to unaligned accessAndrey Ryabinin
struct sha1_ctx_mgr allocated in sha1_mb_mod_init() via kzalloc() and later passed in sha1_mb_flusher_mgr_flush_avx2() function where instructions vmovdqa used to access the struct. vmovdqa requires 16-bytes aligned argument, but nothing guarantees that struct sha1_ctx_mgr will have that alignment. Unaligned vmovdqa will generate GP fault. Fix this by replacing vmovdqa with vmovdqu which doesn't have alignment requirements. Fixes: 2249cbb53ead ("crypto: sha-mb - SHA1 multibuffer submit and flush routines for AVX2") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03crypto: x86/sha256-mb - fix panic due to unaligned accessAndrey Ryabinin
struct sha256_ctx_mgr allocated in sha256_mb_mod_init() via kzalloc() and later passed in sha256_mb_flusher_mgr_flush_avx2() function where instructions vmovdqa used to access the struct. vmovdqa requires 16-bytes aligned argument, but nothing guarantees that struct sha256_ctx_mgr will have that alignment. Unaligned vmovdqa will generate GP fault. Fix this by replacing vmovdqa with vmovdqu which doesn't have alignment requirements. Fixes: a377c6b1876e ("crypto: sha256-mb - submit/flush routines for AVX2") Reported-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Acked-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-02Revert "x86: do not use cpufreq_quick_get() for /proc/cpuinfo "cpu MHz""Linus Torvalds
This reverts commit 51204e0639c49ada02fd823782ad673b6326d748. There wasn't really any good reason for it, and people are complaining (rightly) that it broke existing practice. Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-02KVM: x86: Update APICv on APIC resetJan H. Schönherr
In kvm_apic_set_state() we update the hardware virtualized APIC after the full APIC state has been overwritten. Do the same, when the full APIC state has been reset in kvm_lapic_reset(). This updates some hardware state that was previously forgotten, as far as I can tell. Also, this allows removing some APIC-related reset code from vmx_vcpu_reset(). Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-11-02KVM: VMX: Do not fully reset PI descriptor on vCPU resetJan H. Schönherr
Parts of the posted interrupt descriptor configure host behavior, such as the notification vector and destination. Overwriting them with zero as done during vCPU reset breaks posted interrupts. KVM (re-)writes these fields on certain occasions and belatedly fixes the situation in many cases. However, if you have a guest configured with "idle=poll", for example, the fields might stay zero forever. Do not reset the full descriptor in vmx_vcpu_reset(). Instead, reset only the outstanding notifications and leave everything else untouched. Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-11-02kvm: Return -ENODEV from update_persistent_clockJason Gunthorpe
kvm does not support setting the RTC, so the correct result is -ENODEV. Returning -1 will cause sync_cmos_clock to keep trying to set the RTC every second. Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-11-02Merge tag 'spdx_identifiers-4.14-rc8' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core Pull initial SPDX identifiers from Greg KH: "License cleanup: add SPDX license identifiers to some files Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>" * tag 'spdx_identifiers-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with a license License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with no license License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
2017-11-02x86/cpuid: Replace set/clear_bit32()Thomas Gleixner
Peter pointed out that the set/clear_bit32() variants are broken in various aspects. Replace them with open coded set/clear_bit() and type cast cpu_info::x86_capability as it's done in all other places throughout x86. Fixes: 0b00de857a64 ("x86/cpuid: Add generic table for CPUID dependencies") Reported-by: Peter Ziljstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
2017-11-02x86/entry/64: Shorten TEST instructionsBorislav Petkov
Convert TESTL to TESTB and save 3 bytes per callsite. No functionality change. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171102120926.4srwerqrr7g72e2k@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with a licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman
Many user space API headers have licensing information, which is either incomplete, badly formatted or just a shorthand for referring to the license under which the file is supposed to be. This makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license. Update these files with an SPDX license identifier. The identifier was chosen based on the license information in the file. GPL/LGPL licensed headers get the matching GPL/LGPL SPDX license identifier with the added 'WITH Linux-syscall-note' exception, which is the officially assigned exception identifier for the kernel syscall exception: NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work". This exception makes it possible to include GPL headers into non GPL code, without confusing license compliance tools. Headers which have either explicit dual licensing or are just licensed under a non GPL license are updated with the corresponding SPDX identifier and the GPLv2 with syscall exception identifier. The format is: ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR SPDX-ID-OF-OTHER-LICENSE) SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. The update does not remove existing license information as this has to be done on a case by case basis and the copyright holders might have to be consulted. This will happen in a separate step. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. See the previous patch in this series for the methodology of how this patch was researched. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with no ↵Greg Kroah-Hartman
license Many user space API headers are missing licensing information, which makes it hard for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default are files without license information under the default license of the kernel, which is GPLV2. Marking them GPLV2 would exclude them from being included in non GPLV2 code, which is obviously not intended. The user space API headers fall under the syscall exception which is in the kernels COPYING file: NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work". otherwise syscall usage would not be possible. Update the files which contain no license information with an SPDX license identifier. The chosen identifier is 'GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note' which is the officially assigned identifier for the Linux syscall exception. SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. See the previous patch in this series for the methodology of how this patch was researched. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02x86/traps: Use a new on_thread_stack() helper to clean up an assertionAndy Lutomirski
Let's keep the stack-related logic together rather than open-coding a comparison in an assertion in the traps code. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/856b15bee1f55017b8f79d3758b0d51c48a08cf8.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-02x86/entry/64: Remove thread_struct::sp0Andy Lutomirski
On x86_64, we can easily calculate sp0 when needed instead of storing it in thread_struct. On x86_32, a similar cleanup would be possible, but it would require cleaning up the vm86 code first, and that can wait for a later cleanup series. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/719cd9c66c548c4350d98a90f050aee8b17f8919.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-02x86/entry/32: Fix cpu_current_top_of_stack initialization at bootAndy Lutomirski
cpu_current_top_of_stack's initialization forgot about TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING. This bug didn't matter because the idle threads never enter user mode. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e5e370a7e6e4fddd1c4e4cf619765d96bb874b21.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-02x86/entry/64: Remove all remaining direct thread_struct::sp0 readsAndy Lutomirski
The only remaining readers in context switch code or vm86(), and they all just want to update TSS.sp0 to match the current task. Replace them all with a new helper update_sp0(). Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2d231687f4ff288c9d9e98d7861b7df374246ac3.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-02x86/entry/64: Stop initializing TSS.sp0 at bootAndy Lutomirski
In my quest to get rid of thread_struct::sp0, I want to clean up or remove all of its readers. Two of them are in cpu_init() (32-bit and 64-bit), and they aren't needed. This is because we never enter userspace at all on the threads that CPUs are initialized in. Poison the initial TSS.sp0 and stop initializing it on CPU init. The comment text mostly comes from Dave Hansen. Thanks! Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ee4a00540ad28c6cff475fbcc7769a4460acc861.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-02x86/xen/64, x86/entry/64: Clean up SP code in cpu_initialize_context()Andy Lutomirski
I'm removing thread_struct::sp0, and Xen's usage of it is slightly dubious and unnecessary. Use appropriate helpers instead. While we're at at, reorder the code slightly to make it more obvious what's going on. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d5b9a3da2b47c68325bd2bbe8f82d9554dee0d0f.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-02x86/entry: Add task_top_of_stack() to find the top of a task's stackAndy Lutomirski
This will let us get rid of a few places that hardcode accesses to thread.sp0. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b49b3f95a8ff858c40c9b0f5b32be0355324327d.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-02x86/entry/64: Pass SP0 directly to load_sp0()Andy Lutomirski
load_sp0() had an odd signature: void load_sp0(struct tss_struct *tss, struct thread_struct *thread); Simplify it to: void load_sp0(unsigned long sp0); Also simplify a few get_cpu()/put_cpu() sequences to preempt_disable()/preempt_enable(). Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2655d8b42ed940aa384fe18ee1129bbbcf730a08.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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